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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In post-traditional societies, identity has been pervasively understood as a 
‘thing’ one needs to and can endeavour to achieve or create. Many studies 
about identity in the humanities and social sciences have increasingly been 
approached in both reified and impersonal ways. These trends in 
understanding identity have made a significant impact on research into 
education and identity. 
 
This thesis aims to demonstrate the complexity of personal identity on a 
theoretical level and endeavours to rethink the theoretical understanding of 
personal identity in relation to the notion of learning. Based on Paul Ricoeur 
and Charles Taylor’s theories of personal identity, this thesis argues that 
personal identity needs to be understood both as sameness and as selfhood at a 
conceptual level. Ontologically, the former belongs to the category of ‘thing’, 
‘substance’ in terms of permanence in time. The latter belongs the category of 
‘being’ in terms of permanence in time. This thesis will argue that this 
conceptual understanding of personal identity suggests that identity is largely 
‘shaped’ by social, cultural, traditional, moral and ethical dimensions in the 
human world over time, rather than merely being a result of personal 
endeavour as an individual creation or/and an adaptation to constant social 
changes.  
 
The moral and ethical dimensions of personal identity also suggest that the 
need for and ‘meaning’ of personal identity to a person in his/her life cannot be 
simply approached in an objective manner through impersonal terms. Rather, 
personal identity constitutively depends on self-interpretation, which 
highlights the role of narrative in understanding personal identity. 
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This thesis further argues that a new understanding about reflexive learning 
relevant to personal identity can be drawn from this theoretical understanding 
of personal identity and narrative. This new understanding is based on a 
person’s reflexivity not only in the dialectical frameworks between sameness, 
self and others, but also in different moral frameworks. What this presents us 
with is a different view of lifelong learning as an alternative to lifelong learning 
implied in the notion of a ‘reflexive project of the self’.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Identity and education 
Over the past few decades, the topic of identity has been widely discussed in 
the field of education. Questions of teaching and learning in relation to identity 
have been studied through various approaches. In the last two decades, terms 
like ‘teacher identity’ and ‘learner identity’ appear in the practical field of 
teaching and learning in high frequency. The number of educational research 
projects related to the notion of identity is becoming increasingly large and the 
scope of such projects is extensive.  As the Google search engine shows, 
during the period of 2000-2007, over 2,565 books and 433,000 articles in English 
on the topic of identity in the subject of education have been published. By the 
middle of 2008, the websites/webpages containing such key words as ‘identity, 
education and learning’ have reached nearly 17,300,000. Educational topics 
concerning identity cover school education, further education, higher 
education, special education and lifelong education/learning. The issues 
involved in the relationship between identity and education include personal 
development, social justice, culture, knowledge, power, class, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, (dis)ability and so forth. A journal titled Journal of Language, Identity 
and Education was even issued from 2002. 
 
The rising interest in the topics of identity in educational field at least suggests 
that the studies of identity are becoming more fashionable in the field of theory 
and practice of education. Broadly speaking, it seems that education does have 
something to do with identity. For example, education takes a central role in 
personal development. The latter includes the formation, maintenance, 
management and construction of the sense of self, the personal identity, in a 
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person’s living world. Education as socialization takes a crucial part in the 
production and reproduction of particular identities and social roles. 
Education as the cultivation of being the human person is also fundamentally 
important in order for an individual to have personal meaning of life and 
self-definition. Teaching and learning increasingly play important roles in 
facing questions such as ‘Who am I?’, ‘Where do I come from?’, ‘Where will I 
go?’ and ‘How do I fit in?’, which are frequently posed in the increasingly 
changeable, transitory and pluralistic societies of the early 21st century.  
 
It could be argued that the questions of education in respect of identity first of 
all have everything to do with the understanding of the notion of identity.  
This is because different approaches to identity from different disciplines that 
are applied to educational research might lead to very different outcomes. The 
diversified understanding of this notion can explain why the landscape of 
educational research in relation to identity seems to develop into a fragmented 
view with an extensive body of diversified literature. But, how to understand 
identity is a complex question. Linking this notion to the broad field of 
education adds further complexities. To demonstrate this notion’s complexity, 
I wish to present some different approaches to the study of identity by firstly 
discussing the fundamental question of the need of the notion of identity in 
practical world. Then, I will move on to a description of how this notion is 
approached theoretically in a historical context. 
 
1.2 Identity in the practical world/society   
Do we need identity? Most people would answer ‘yes’, since everyone needs a 
name in order that he/she can be identified by others. We assume that identity 
is something that we use to show others ‘who I am’ in our daily life and in the 
highly complicated societies today. It is not difficult to see how questions of 
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identity in our age pervasively concern practical issues. A government 
recognizes a person’s citizenship by his/her ID Card; a foreign Immigration 
Officer knows a person’s national identity by checking his/her visa; a bank 
identifies a person as a customer by checking his/her Credit Card; universities 
requires a student to offer his/her student card number to register in every 
new academic year, access to computer network and borrow books in 
university libraries. Also, a diversity of organizations and clubs create many 
identities of membership in order to offer privilege to their members. So, 
identity seems to be an important ‘thing’ everyone needs to have. Lack of 
identity seems to lead to difficulties in our daily life. However, if we examine 
the notion of identity from its history, we will find it is fundamentally a 
theoretical construct. 
 
1.3 Identity on the theoretical level 
The topic of identity on the theoretical level embraces many domains. 
Although the study of this notion is originally confined to the field of 
philosophy, the rising interest in this notion has been expanded to a myriad of 
disciplines like sociology, psychology, linguistics, arts, anthropology, politics 
and so forth. The rising interest in this topic among authors in different fields 
reflects the fact that there might be certain current issues about identity both 
on the theoretical level and the empirical level. Those issues seem to deserve 
attentions from a multitude of disciplines in social sciences and humanities. 
This has lead to the multi-dimensions and complexity of the notion of identity 
which result in an extensively growing body of literature on this topic. To 
demonstrate the complexities of this domain, I wish to present a brief 
overview of theories of identity in the three main disciplines in the studies of 
identity: philosophy, psychology and sociology. 
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1.3.1 Philosophical approaches to identity1 
The word ‘identity’ can be traced back to its origin in the 16th century. 
Originally, by definition, the term is not applied to a person as it is pervasively 
used today. Rather, it is initially a theoretical construct that was introduced to 
‘do’ something in the field of philosophy. According to The Oxford English 
Dictionary, ‘identity’ appeared as ‘idemptitie’ in 1570, meaning ‘the quality or 
condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in 
particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; 
oneness’ (see OED [Online version] 2008). The British Philosopher John Locke 
introduced the term ‘identity’ in 1694 in an essay titled ‘Identity and Diversity’ 
in his work ‘An Essay concerning Human Understanding’ (Locke 1964[1694]). He 
defines identity as sameness of a thing with itself, through comparing this thing 
with itself over time (in different places), in contrast with the notion of diversity. 
As he argues, ‘When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or 
no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, 
which it was certain at that instant, was the same with itself’ (ibid., p.207 cited 
in Ricoeur 1992, p.125). One can therefore infer from this that sameness is 
actually a theoretical construct/concept of relation, and is also a relation among 
relations. This relation is expressed in mathematics and logic by the ‘equals’ 
sign, ‘=’. But identity is distinguished among relations by being the only logical 
relation, which means that ‘rules governing the use of “=” are counted among 
                                                 
1 The key literature that this section is based on includes Ricoeur, P. (1992 [1990]) 
Oneself as another. Trans. Blamey, K. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Flew, A. & 
Priest, S. (2002). A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan Books; Hume, D. (2000 [1739]). 
On personal identity. In A Treatise of human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
pp. 164-171; Wagner, S.J. (1999). Identity. In R. Audi (ed.) The Cambridge Dictionary of 
philosophy (2nd ed.) (pp.415-416). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Biesta, 
G. J.J. (2006). Beyond learning: Democratic education for a human future. Boulder: 
Paradigm Publishers; Benwell, B. & Stokoe, E. (2006). Discourse and identity. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
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the rules of inference’. (Flew & Priest 1984, p.186). So, although the relation of 
identity is an equivalence relation, it is ‘distinguished from other equivalence by 
having the further property of licensing substitutions’ (ibid.). That is to say, if a 
is identical with b, then any property of a is property of b, or whatever is true 
of a is true of b. This principle is known as Leibniz’s Law (see ibid.). Conversely, 
if a and b are identical in all respects, that is, if a has every property that b has, 
and b has every property that a has, then a and b are identical objects. This is 
called the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the term first coined by 
Leibniz in 1716 (see ibid.). 
  
The nature of these principles is not without difficulties and issues, and they 
are still debatable in philosophy today. However, the originality of this notion 
suggests that, fundamentally, identity should be understood as a theoretical 
construct and has been introduced to see whether or not something is either 
identical to itself or something else. For example, Wagner defines identity as 
‘the relation each thing bears just to itself’, i.e., a = a.  Furthermore the identity 
of two objects or ideas is constituted by their sharing of all properties (see 
Wagner 1999, p.415), that is, a = b. We can also see, this theoretical construct is 
not created for its own sake, rather, it is introduced to ‘do’ very particular 
things; for example to represent certain relation in logic and mathematics, to 
address the philosophical problem of permanence over time of substance and 
so on.  
 
However, identity in this tradition seems to address identity as 
‘things-being-identical’ and has less to do with identity of the person. Given 
that the latter is the central focus of this thesis, we need to have a closer look at 
the notion of identity of person or personal identity in philosophy. When Locke 
firstly applied the notion of identity to ‘person’, he still used his original 
  CHAPTER 1 
 18
definition of ‘identity’, that is, sameness (of a person) with oneself. But instead 
of focusing on same body, his definition of personal identity seems to focus on 
same continued consciousness, or one’s same instantaneous reflection extended 
through time as the same memory (see Ricoeur 1992, p.125-126). Despite of his 
disregard of body as the criteria of personal identity, the sameness of oneself in 
Locke’s idea can still be understood as a ‘thing’ with which one can be 
identified and re-identified by oneself over time. This historical investigation 
at least also shows that the ‘sameness with oneself’ can be seen as the original 
meaning of the concept of personal identity in philosophy.  
 
However, David Hume questions the existence of personal identity and 
contends it is an illusion. As an empiricist, he requires that for every idea there 
must be a corresponding impression. He argues, 
 
‘For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, or heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any 
thing but the perception’ (Hume 2000 [1739], p.165 emph. in original).  
 
Hence Hume casts doubts on the notion of personal identity. He argues that 
each of us is ‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which 
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux 
and movement’ (ibid.).  
 
Following this tradition, personal identity becomes the concept posing 
philosophical problems in dealing with what it means to say that this person at 
this time is the same person as that person at that time. Many problems 
relating to personal identity in this tradition have been debated, for example, 
controversies relating to the criteria of personal identity, the question of 
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persistence of a person from one time to another, what matters in personal 
identity and so on. In the Western history of philosophy, many thinkers have 
grappled with these questions until the modern age. For example, Derek Parfit, 
who approached the notion of personal identity from his ‘Reductionist view’, 
argues that ‘personal identity consists in an additional fact in relation to 
physical and/or mental continuity’ (Parfit 1986 cited in Ricoeur 1992, p 131).  
In his view, persons are nothing more than our brains and our bodies. But he 
argues that personal identity cannot be reduced to either, which leads to his 
conclusion that the puzzling cases of personal identity (i.e., what should be the 
criteria to decide a person’s identity: consciousness or body?) cannot be 
decided. Thus, Parfit claims that personal identity is not what matters. His 
claim will not surprise us if we realize that his idea of personal identity is still 
based on the classical sense in terms of ‘sameness’. To Parfit, identity can be 
fully described impersonally: there need not be a determinate answer to the 
question ‘Will the person that continues to exist remain to be me?’ 
 
Later on, many schools of Western philosophical thoughts influenced the 
notion of personal identity in history. In the pre-modern age of the Western 
world, identity on the social and the cultural levels are generally understood 
as something that is passively given to a person from one’s birth to death; for 
example, ancestral title, family business, local tradition, social role, social class 
and so on. Under the influence of the Enlightenment and with the advocacy of 
human reason, the new idea that personal identity can be fashioned through 
one’s self emerges. The notion of identity turned towards the evolvement of 
cognition and the use of reason and agency can be ascribed to several 
important philosophers. Decartes’s separation of mind and body, gives an 
independent position to subjectivity; Locke’s stress on reflexive capacity of the 
mind helps the formation of a ‘sovereign subject’, or ‘human agent who is able 
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to remake himself [sic] by methodical and disciplined action’ (Taylor 1989, 
p.159). This approach towards thinking about subjectivity was elaborated by 
Emmanuel Kant through his notion of Enlightenment. He describes the 
Enlightenment as ‘man’s [sic] release from his self-incurred tutelage’ and 
defines tutelage as ‘man’s [sic] inability to make use of his understanding 
without direction form another’ (Kant 1992 [1784], p.90 cited in Biesta 2006b, 
p.3). This enabled him articulate the ‘motto’ of Enlightenment as ‘Sapere aude!’ 
(‘Have courage to exercise your own understanding!’) (ibid.). Hence, Kant 
actually calls for an autonomous subjectivity underpinned by rationality. As 
Biesta explains, Kant’s idea of using one’s own understanding/free 
thinking/independent judgement concerns rational autonomy, i.e. autonomy 
based on one’s own reason, and this human capacity for Kant ‘was an inherent 
part of human nature’ (see Biesta 2006b, p.3). For Kant, ‘the propensity for free 
thinking could only be brought about through education’ (ibid.). Biesta argues 
that the modern education can be seen as a task of bringing out or releasing 
such inherent human nature (see ibid., p.4). This situation comes about 
through the intertwining of the Enlightenment and the tradition of Bildung (i.e. 
the tradition concerning the question of what constitutes an educated or 
cultivated human being) that has laid the foundation for modern education 
(see ibid. p.3). The tradition of the Enlightenment has made a profound impact 
on modern educational theory and practice. As Biesta argues, 
 
‘Education became understood as the process that helps people to 
develop their rational potential so that they can become 
autonomous, self-directing individualist, while rationality became 
the modern marker of what it means to be human’ (ibid. p.4).  
 
Modern education has been seen as the creation and/or production of 
subjectivities as rational autonomous persons. For example, as seen in 
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cognitive and moral development, in liberal education, in critical thinking as 
an educational ideal and in democratic education (see ibid., p.127-128).  
Following this tradition, being a ‘human’ person or ‘educated person’ becomes 
normatively understood as developing or having a ‘rational autonomous 
subjectivity’. Hence, if education is seen as an insertion of a pre-existing 
system, or as a creation or production of identities and social roles for societies, 
or even as a self-cultivation of being a human person, then a ‘normal’ person 
or ‘educated person’ should be a person who can be identified by him/herself 
and/or by others as a subjectivity with the character of rational autonomy. 
Alternatively perhaps we can say, someone with a personal identity should be 
the one who is characteristic of rational autonomy. And ever since the rise of 
Enlightenment, cultivating a kind of subjectivity characterized by rational 
identity comes to be one of the central tasks of modern education. 
 
In the first half of 19th century, the Romantic Movement approached the notion 
of identity by advocating the notion of individuality. Advocating expressing 
some innate part of the self through sensibility and feeling and being in 
harmony with ‘Nature’, Romanticism is a movement that is anti-empiricism 
which promotes expressive individualism and natural-fulfilment of the self. 
Also, Romantic expressivism requires the individual to take responsibility for 
one’s destiny. This movement had a deep influence on the Western world and 
some theorists consider that we can even find its essence in the modern view 
of identity as the ‘project of the self’ (see Benwell & Stokoe 2006, p.20).  
 
During the dawn of the 20th century studies relating to the identity of the 
person gradually emerged in social sciences, particularly in psychology and 
sociology, coming to develop into a main research trend in social sciences in 
the second half of the last century. 
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1.3.2 Psychological approaches to identity2 
Many studies concerning identity in psychology can at least be traced back to 
the psychoanalytic tradition. Working on the internal functions of the 
subjectivity, the psyche, the core of the self, the founder of psychoanalysis, 
Freud developed three components of personality structure: ‘id’, ‘ego’ and 
‘superego’ (Goldenson1984). The id (from Latin, meaning ‘it’)  
 
‘is a reservoir of energy derived from instincts, governed by the 
pleasure principle, and its contents are unconscious, some being 
innate and others derived from experience but submerged by 
repression, and it is in constant conflict with the ego and the 
superego, both of which originate from it during the course of 
development’ (Colman 2001, p.365).  
 
The ego (from Latin, meaning ‘I’) ‘is largely conscious part of the mind, 
governed mainly (though not exclusively) by the reality principle, mediating 
between external reality, the id, and the superego’ (ibid., p.233).  In his book 
‘The Ego and the Id’ (1923), Freud described its role as follows,  
                                                 
2 The key literature that this section is based on includes Goldenson, R. (1984). 
Longman dictionary of psychology and psychiatry. New York: Longman Inc.; Colman, A. 
(2001). A dictionary of psychology. Oxford: Oxford University; Erikson, E. H.(1980[1959]) 
Identity and the life cycle. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.; Côté, 
J.& Levine, C. (2002). Identity formation, agency and culture: A social psychological synthesis. 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers; Shrauger, J.S. & 
Schoeneman, T.J. (1999) Symbolic interactionsit view of self-concept: through the 
looking glass darkly. In R. Baumeister (ed.) (1999) The self in social psychology: essential 
readings. Philadelphia: Psychology Press; Biesta, G.J.J. (1998). Mead, Intersubjectivity, 
and Education: The Early Writings. Studies in Philosophy and Education 17, 73-99; Biesta, 
G.J.J. (1999). Redefining the subject, redefining the social, reconsidering education: 
George Herbert Mead's course on Philosophy of Education at the University of Chi-
cago. Educational Theory 49 (4), 475-492; Brewer, M. B. & Hewstone, M. (2004). (eds.) Self 
and social identity; Oxford: Blackwell publishing Ltd.; Benwell, B. & Stokoe, E. (2006). 
Discourse and identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
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‘It owes service to three masters and is consequently menaced by 
three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id and 
from the severity of the superego’ (Standard Edition, XIX, pp.12-66, 
at p.56 cited in Colman 2001, p.233).  
 
The superego ‘originates from a conflict between the id and the ego in the 
course of development’ and ‘monitors and controls the ego like a judge or a 
censor’ (Colman 2001, p.724). Freud has even used the term ‘inner identity’ 
and Erikson interpreted it as ‘identity of something in the individual’s core 
with an essential aspect of a group’s inner coherence’ (Eriskon 1980, p.109).  
 
Freud’s psychoanalytical theories pave the way to the studies of identity in 
developmental psychology. Based on Freud’s notion of ‘ego’, Erikson coins the 
term ‘ego identity’ in one of his papers published in 1946 ( ibid., p.22). In this 
paper, he writes, 
 
‘ego identity concerns more than the mere fact of existence, as 
conveyed by personal identity; it is the ego quality of this 
existence…Ego identity, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of 
the fact that there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s 
synthesizing methods and that methods are effective in 
safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for 
others’ (ibid.).  
 
As Côté and Levine suggest, ego identity ‘refers to the “identity of the ego”, 
and that the ego is the personality agency responsible for behavioural, 
cognitive, and emotional control’ (Côté and Levine 2002, p.94). Realising 
trauma suffered by American victims after the Second World War, Erikson 
argues that people sometimes experience ‘identity crisis’ (Erikson 1968) when 
they lose a sense of personal sameness and historical continuity (see Côté and 
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Levine 2002, p.95). Later, Erikson’s view of ‘identity crisis’ becomes the 
experiences of 
 
‘severely conflicted young people whose sense of confusion is due 
to a war within themselves, and in confused rebels and destructive 
delinquents who war on their society’ (Erikson 1968, p.17 cited in 
Côté and Levine 2002, p.95),  
 
In other words, it is a period of intensive analysis and exploration of different 
ways of looking at oneself. Meanwhile, Erikson links his writings to identity 
problems of adulthood. Although Erikson’s notion of ego identity focuses on 
psychosocial development, it also stresses the ‘subjective’ sense of ego and is 
labelled as ‘felt’ identity (see Goffman 1990[1963], p.129).  Erikson also 
acknowledges social, cultural, normative and historical dimensions in his 
argument on identity formation and maintenance (see Côté & Levine 2002, 
p.14-19, 94). 
 
Côté and Levine have also argued that, in the field of psychology, the tradition 
of the study of the ‘formation of identity’ during the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood originates from and is influenced by Eriskon’s 
psychoanalytical approach (Côté & Levine 2002, p.14). This approach is mainly 
applied in the realm of developmental psychology. For example, James Marcia 
(1964, 1966) developed his ‘identity status paradigm’ based on Erikson’s early 
writings on ‘the American identity’.  This paradigm is an elaboration on the 
notion of ‘ego identity’, and assumed that ‘the formation of identity’ might 
experience four identity statuses. Thus this paradigm categorized identity into 
a four-categories typology based on individual choice making in youth and 
adolescence.  The work included an intensive study on variations in the 
presence or absence of choice-making and commitments. Later, these four 
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categories were further developed to produce many sub-categories. 
 
‘Identity status is theorized to vary hierarchically regarding levels 
of maturity of self-regulation and complexity of social functioning. 
Each status has been empirically associated with personality 
characteristics and social behaviours, and these characteristics tend 
to reflect this hierarchy’ (Marcia 1993 summarized in Côté & 
Levine 2002, p.19).  
 
A large number of empirical research programmes focusing on the 
measurement of identity status have been conducted and numerous 
approaches to ‘identity formation’ in this psychological field have been 
developed from this paradigm (see Côté & Levine 2002, p.18-20). 
 
Another important approach to identity in psychology is the tradition of 
self-psychology (see Côté and Levine 2002, p. 14). This field chiefly focuses on 
the ideas of how notions of self and self-concept can be understood as 
cognitive organization and process that enable persons to maintain their 
identities in interactive contexts. But self is a complex concept. This field has 
developed a large number of related concepts, such as self-image, self-esteem, 
self-enhancement, self-analysis, etc., which makes the ‘self’ largely 
multifaceted. The early writing on self in psychology is rooted in the 
pioneering psycho-philosophical writings of early American pragmatists (e.g. 
James 1948 [1892]; Cooley 1902; Mead 1900-1925, 1934). These works 
conceptualised self as a product of social interaction. Cooley is generally 
credited as the first interactionist and developed his social theory of self 
through the metaphor of the image of a looking-glass self (see Shrauger & 
Schoeneman 1999, p.26). He assumes that there is a shared awareness between 
individuals, which implies that we ‘live in the mind of others’ (see Cooley 
1902). Cooley argues that we develop our concepts of self from seeing how 
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others respond to us—we see our ‘self’ through the mind of others. As he 
wrote,  
 
‘In the presence of one whom we feel to be of importance, there is a 
tendency to enter into and adopt, by sympathy, his judgment of 
ourself’ (Cooley 1902, p.175).  
 
According to Cooley, the individual is not independent of the social aspect; 
both are aspects of the same process of interaction. 
 
Mead is one of the early social psychologists in the American pragmatic 
tradition and his thoughts are regarded as the main source of inspiration for 
symbolic interactionism though this claim is still contested (see Biesta 1998, p.75; 
1999, p.478; see also Joas, 1989 p.235, n.38). But according to Biesta, at least his 
early writings (1900-1925) show that ‘reflective consciousness – which 
encompasses both conscious reflection and self-consciousness – implies a 
social situation as its precondition’ (Biesta 1998). This suggests that ‘for Mead 
intersubjectivity, i.e., that which “happens” between human beings, precedes 
subjectivity and is constitutive of it’ (Biesta 1998, p.91, see also Biesta 1999). 
Following Mead’s thoughts, self can be seen as process and object in social 
interaction. According to Mead, there is no sense of self at birth.  The 
individual is not conscious of himself or herself as an object from the inside out, 
rather, he/she sees himself/herself through the ‘eyes’ of others. Mead 
describes self as the process of conduct formation between ‘I’ and ‘Me’. The 
first phase of self is ‘I’, which is impulsive to a situation. When an individual’s 
adjustment to a situation is disturbed in the first phase, the second phase of the 
self, the ‘Me’, which is conscious, comes into play. Before responding to a 
situation, the ‘Me’ will consider and plan to regulate his/her action and choose 
the best way to respond to the situation. The ‘Me’, then, to some extent, is the 
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‘I’ that is conscious and is the ‘self’ that is ‘socialized’ by ‘others’. Thus the 
individual experiences himself and becomes an object to him/herself ‘only by 
taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social 
environment or context of experience and behaviour in which both he and 
they are involved’ (Mead 1934, p.138).  
 
The concept of self nowadays seems to be much more elaborated and 
diversified. It has been defined as an important cognitive concept and memory 
structure (e.g. Andersen, Glassman & Gold 1998; Catrambone, Beike & 
Neidenthal 1996). The self-concept also appears to be a cognitive construction 
developed in the course of social interaction and experiences as a group 
member (e.g. Brewer & Hewstone 2004, p.xi). Some theorists also study 
self-concept from a broad cross-cultural perspective rather than only in 
Western cultural tradition (e.g. Bond 1988; Markus & Kitayama 1991; 
Oyserman 2004). Contrastingly, Bruner’s discussion emanates from a history 
of the notion of self.  He argues that there is a shift from ontological questions 
about the ‘conceptual self’ to the ‘epistemological’ concern of it, that is, from 
‘essentialist’ and ‘realist’ self to its ‘transactional’ construction (see Bruner 1990, 
p.100). But Kenneth Gergen claims that in a postmodern age, self has become a 
‘saturated self’. As he argues, 
 
‘Emerging technologies saturate us with the voices of humankind – 
both harmonious and alien. As we absorb their varied rhymes and 
reasons, they become part of us and we of them. Social saturation 
furnished us with a multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated 
languages of the self’ (Gergen 1991, p.6-7 cited in Côté & Levine 2002, 
p. 26) 
 
However, self is different from identity, more precisely, different from the 
identity of the person, though both are related. It could be argued that identity 
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can be understood partly as a constructed dimension of the self and partly as 
an individual’s identification of the self as an ‘object’. But, identity in this field 
seems to be generally described as ‘the sense of self’. Baumeister (1998) 
categorizes a self-psychology field as three traditions: reflexive consciousness, 
the interpersonal self, and the executive functions of the self. This 
categorization of the landscape of self-psychology today suggests the study of 
identity in this field seems to focus on intrapsychic domain (see Côté & Levine 
2002). These approaches to the self can be reflected in many definitions of 
identity. For example, Brewer & Hewstone think identity refers to ‘the content 
of self-knowledge as it is represented to and by others’ (see Brewer & 
Hewstone 2004, p.xi). Rainwater (1989) maintains that self-identity is a 
reflexive project that one can control and achieve. 
 
In the second half of the 20th Century, there was a rising interest in ‘collective 
identities’ in psychological and socio-psychological fields. One of widely 
discussed theories is Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT). Tajfel 
(1981) asserts that, ‘identity represents the conceptual link between individual 
and the society as a whole’. This approach is characterized as referring to a 
group label and categorization in understanding identity. SIT theory contends 
that a person does not just have a ‘personal self’, but rather several selves that 
correspond to widening circles of group membership. The process of social 
categorisation is a social-cognitive process of membership. The difference 
between ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ is defined in a relative or flexible way that is 
subject to the activities one is engaged in. Different social contexts may cause 
an individual to think, feel and act on the basis of his personal, family or 
national ‘level of self’ (see Tajfel &Turner, 1986). Social Identity Theory posits 
that group membership is an important component of one’s identity and that 
individuals are motivated to view their groups as positive and distinct from 
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other groups. In recent years, some theories have challenged the view of 
identity as essential, permanent and unified quality of group categories. As 
Benwell & Stokoe (2006) argue, some theories that challenged ‘group’ identity 
can be found in poststructuralist and sociolinguistic theories.  Such theories 
approach the notion of identity by linking it with the notions like diaspora (see 
Hall 1995, p.48) and hybridity (see Bhabba 1994).3 
 
1.3.3 Sociological approaches to identity4 
Côté and Levine (2002) have suggested that the foundation of sociological 
approaches to identity is chiefly governed by five sociological traditions (see 
also Weigert et al 1986). In this section, while following Côté & Levine in 
describing these traditions, I will insert some of my own understandings of 
related works of and approaches to identity. According to Côté & Levine 
(2002), the first two traditions are rooted in theoretical perspective of Symbolic 
Interactionism, a term first used by Herbert Blumer (1969), based on Mead’s 
thoughts. The first tradition was developed by the Chicago School of Symbolic 
Interactionism. This tradition is noted for its qualitative investigations and 
assumes that social reality is to be understood from a nominalist perspective. 
Therefore such thinking requires continual negotiation to maintain adequate 
definitions of situations. Its fundamental ontological assumption is that social 
reality is continually created by humans through the names and meanings 
                                                 
3 See also Chen, L.L. (2006). Writing Chinese: Reshaping Chinese cultural identity. New 
York: Plagrave Macmillan. 
4 The key literature that this section is based on includes Côté, J. & Levine, C. (2002). 
Identity formation, agency and culture: A social psychological synthesis. New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers; Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and 
self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: Polity Press; Edwards, 
R.(1997). Changing places: flexibility, lifelong learning, and learning society. London: 
Routledge; Bauman, Z, (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
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they attach to things (i.e., symbols) when communicating with each other (i.e. 
during interactions). Identities are constructed and modified through these 
ongoing processes. Erving Goffman, following Mead’s thoughts, famously 
discussed ego identity, personal identity and social identity in Stigma 
(Gofffman 1990[1963]). His work was based on his notion of the self, i.e., self in 
the process of day-to-day social interaction. But he is best known for his 
detailed analyses of management of identity in day-to-day social encounters 
(Goffman 1959). Hewitt (2000) also argues because of the emergent nature of 
social reality, identities are considered to be precarious and in need of 
continual management (see Côté and Levine 2002, p.33).  
 
The second tradition is categorized as The Iowa School of Symbolic 
Interactionism which was developed by Manfrred Kuhn during 1950s. 
 
‘Its ontological and epistemological assumptions are polar opposites 
to those of Chicago School, favouring quantitative methodologies 
and realist assumptions about the self (i.e. that it can be considered 
fixed, relatively stable, and therefore reliably measured as opposed 
to being precarious, in need of continual reconstruction, and open 
only to introspection)’ (Côté & Levine 2002, p.34). 
 
The third tradition is the Sociology of Knowledge and Interpretive Sociology. 
This tradition is demonstrated in the work titled The Social Construction of 
Reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966). This often-cited work among contemporary 
social constructionists is actually the statement of ‘pragmatic social 
constructionism’ and social epistemology (Weigert et al., 1986). The key to 
understanding pragmatic constructionism is to note that social constructions 
create higher order realities that are nonreducible to individual constructions 
because they take on an ‘existence’ of their own through the process of 
‘objectivation’. Consequently, identities are both subjective and objective:  
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they are nominalist in the sense that they are derived from and negotiated 
within social constructions, but can have very real consequences for human 
welfare and survival (see Côté & Levine 2000, p.37). 
 
Côté and Levine (2000) further suggest that the fourth tradition is The 
Structural-functionalist Tradition. Identity in this tradition is defined in terms 
of the interplay between self and social structure. This tradition rooted in 
Emile Durkheim’s classical formulations (e.g. Durkheim 1964[1893]) and its 
main proponent was Talcott Parsons (e.g. Parsons 1968). 
Structural-functionalists assert that societies comprise interdependent 
subsystems whose functions contribute to the maintenance of social order and 
continuity. This perspective begins with macro-sociological propositions and 
contends that identity is shaped by the institutional structures of society, 
which means each individual is given a social role. The strength of the 
functionalist perspective lies in its recognition of a level of structural analysis 
irreducible to the level of individuals or psychic process. The structure-agency 
debate can be seen as a big issue emerged from this tradition and 
psychological tradition. 
 
The fifth tradition is Critical Theory approach to identity. Côté & Levine (2002) 
argue that this approach, which proposes there is a sociological stock of 
knowledge in respect of identity, was largely developed through Jügen 
Habermas’s endeavour. As Weigert et al write,  
 
‘Habermas (1974) strove to formulate a theoretical version of social 
evolution and personal development based on underlying 
homologies between the two process. He sees social identity evolving 
from primitive mythic and kinship foundations to contemporary 
rational and communicative relationships. Within this overall scheme, 
he tries to integrate contemporary psychoanalytic, sociological, and 
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developmental psychology perspectives on individual identity into a 
synthetic and normative argument for a sense of identity based on 
communicative competence, rationality and tolerance—a universal 
pragmatics (1979). Habermas offers a historically grounded 
perspective with an emancipatory interest and normative thrust for 
analyzing identity’ (Weigert et al.1986, p.25 cited in Côté & Levine 
2002, p.38) 
 
Following Côté and Levine (2002), I think we can add one further approach to 
the sociological studies of identity.  This is a late/post modernist perspective 
in sociology, appropriate given the popularity of this approach to identity in 
current time. However I will reconstruct the argument in an alternative 
manner. The question of identity today has become a significant issue that has 
been the subject of much controversy. One pervasive view in analysing why 
identity has become an issue is that, in comparison with pre-modern ages, 
rapid changes within current society and the decline of fixed frameworks 
caused by modernity create radical changing conditions. This view further 
advocates that the rapid changes of society and the decline of fixed 
frameworks not only change one’s personal life and the self, but also tend to 
change the way a person feels the sense of selfhood.  Many sociologists 
particularly hold this view and they examine the questions of identity by 
linking it with the transformations in social structure (e.g. Giddens 1990, 1991, 
Beck 1992, Bauman 2000). Following The Structural-Functionalist Tradition in 
sociology ( e.g., Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons) and holding a position 
between macro structure and micro self, sociologist Anthony Giddens 
approaches identity by analysing the interplay between modern institutions 
and the self in current age (see Giddens 1991). Giddens analyses that in 
post-traditional society, identity is no longer ‘given’ from the outside.  Rather, 
in what he calls ‘late modern’ society, the reference points for the construction 
of the self seem to have to be set from the inside of the self. Hence, identity 
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tends to be understood as an individual’s ‘endeavour’ (see Giddens 1991, p.5), a 
‘reflexive project of the self’ (ibid, p.244), and a personal ‘achievement’ (ibid., p.215) 
achieved through the personal narrative(s) of one’s life.  
 
For postmodernists, ’the notion of “lifestyle” and “image”, and the 
proliferation and circulation of the latter through the media, are the means by 
which an identity, a self-image, is constructed’ (Edwards 1997, p.43). This 
tradition holds that in a society filled with rapid changes and uncertainties, the 
‘emphasis on images and illusions is reflected in great attention to 
self-presentation and to style over substance’ (Gecas & Burke 1995, p.57 cited 
in Côté & Levine 2002, p.41). Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that identity 
has become an ‘unfulfilled project’ in a society characterized as ‘liquid modernity’, 
given one’s constant desires to have new identity, accompanied by countless 
choices and possibilities of one’s lifestyles (Bauman 2000, p.28-29). Although 
both Giddens and Bauman agree that rapid social changes induced by 
modernity cause great ‘anxieties’ of the self and produce identity problems, 
they do not agree on the degree of the social changes happened in our age. 
 
1.4 The need of further exploration   
It would seem apparent from this brief overview, at least in my understanding, 
that there is a need to conduct a further exploration into personal identity on a 
conceptual level and into the need of personal identity for a subject. First of all, 
one can at least realize that the notion of identity has developed into a complex 
and multi-dimensional notion over time. Different approaches have been 
applied to this notion for further study and various approaches have led to 
different understandings of identity. However, there appears to be a growing 
trend towards treating this notion in a radically specialized and reified manner, 
particularly within the social science. Many traditions have largely ignored the 
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theoretical weight of the notion of identity. For example, the Identity Status 
Paradigm operationalizes identity in terms of degrees of conscious 
choice-making (exploration) about commitments to various domains of values 
and functioning.  Furthermore it is used to precisely represent the resolution 
of identity stages, something which Erikson considers as a normative 
phenomenon. Also, the Self-psychological tradition seems to conceptualize self 
mainly by focusing on the intrapsychic domain and has produced an extensive 
number of fragmented literature and terms on self. Recent sociological 
approaches (e.g. Giddens 1991, Bauman 2000) to identity seem to suggest 
identity is a specific ‘thing’ one can ‘have’, can ‘choose to have’ and can 
‘achieve’, ‘purchase’ and even ‘discard’. All these indicate that there is a need 
to clarify the question of ‘what’ identity really is on the theoretical level. It can 
be argued that this question needs to be investigated from a philosophical field 
of identity, since identity is originally a philosophical notion. 
 
My second observation is that quite a few approaches to the studies of 
personal identity seem to be rather objective and impersonal. In the 
philosophical field, Parfit, for example, still seems to treat personal identity 
merely as identity in the sense of ‘things-being-identical’, and simply describes 
personal identity in impersonal language. In the field of psychology, 
particularly in developmental psychology, the study of identity increasingly 
seem to be treated like an object in physical science, which can be measured 
and observed in a detached manner with less reference to a subject’s social, 
cultural, and normative surroundings and their shaping on such a subject. In 
sociology, identity is mainly viewed from outside the subject by focusing on 
how structure and institutions shape one’s social roles and status within social 
stratification, and research in this tradition is mainly approached through large 
scale quantitative surveys. However, descriptions and interpretations about 
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identity offered by subjects are seldom held to be important. Personal identity 
as defined through Symbolic Interactionism is generally focused on the 
importance of ‘self-image’ in day-to-day life based on certain general social 
standards. This approach is concerned more with the general fact of social 
interaction of human beings than with human personhood. In these traditions, 
personal identity seems to be simply objectively described as sameness, 
continuity or traits of a physical thing or an objective phenomenon, which 
seems to suggest that the ‘person’ is basically just an objective ‘thing’ or 
‘phenomenon’. Personal identity appears to have nothing to do with a person 
as social, political cultural, historical and ethical being. If personal identity is 
simply construed in an objective or impersonal sense, what is the point of 
linking the notion of personal identity to a person that cannot be reduced to a 
biological ‘thing’ or ‘phenomenon’? 
 
What appears to be emerging is a fundamental philosophical question 
concerning personal identity. Does personal identity matter? But to ask ‘does 
personal identity matter’ is to ask ‘to whom does personal identity matter’. Of 
course, ‘personal identity’ matters to researchers like me, but it is simply in the 
sense of research interest. This is not what I mean. What I mean is that if 
personal identity as a notion has something to do with being a person 
himself/herself in the human world, working on the notion of personal identity 
cannot be simply confined to impersonal language. This question about 
personal identity particularly concerns the basic relationship between identity 
and education (and learning), if education (and learning) is concerned with the 
cultivation of the being as a human person. It is therefore important to explore 
the need for personal identity within the person, because this directly concerns 
the question of to what extent the understanding of personal identity is 
relevant to education and learning in terms of being a human person. 
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1.5 Theme of the research and how it was conducted 
The bulk of this thesis is an endeavour to show how the notion of personal 
identity can be understood differently in relation to current mainstream views 
of identity in philosophy and social sciences. The thesis is based on my 
understanding and thinking of the works of several sociologists and 
philosophers. While this research will conduct a critical analysis of some 
sociologists’ view on identity, the main theme of this thesis will be a critical 
reconstruction of French philosopher Ricoeur’s work and Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor’s work on identity and narrative as well as an 
investigation of the role of learning in their identity theories. I will particularly 
have a look at the aspects of lifelong learning in my discussion of the role of 
learning by linking my discussion to both philosophers’ identity theories.  
 
I start to investigate the question of why identity has become problematic in 
Western world in our age by reading the British sociologist Anthony Giddens’s 
work Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (1991). It 
is a work that links sociological analysis with psychological analysis in 
understanding the interplay between self and society in the constitution of 
identity in post-traditional societies. I take this work as one important part of 
my discussion of identity, because I realized the fact that the notion of personal 
identity today is largely approached by both psychological and sociological 
analyses. Giddens’s analyses in this work provide me with certain sociological 
and psychological understandings about identity in today’s societies, or what 
he calls the ‘late modern’ societies. This work has been widely discussed and 
massively cited. It has also been frequently applied to many fields.  
Particularly it has influenced policies, theories and practices in the field of 
lifelong learning. In sum, one major part of my discussion concerns personal 
identity shaped by the interplay between the self and the society. 
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I also read sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s work Liquid Modernity (2000) and 
Identity (2004), because I want to have a look at how the interplay between 
identity and society is examined by sociologists in a postmodernist perspective, 
since Giddens’s work only reflects a late modernist view. I also refer to the 
American sociologist Richard Sennett’s work The Corrosion of Character: the 
Personal Consequence of Work in the New Capitalism (1997) in order to understand 
how modern institutions exert negative impacts on personal character in a 
specific context, i.e., workplace. This work inspires me to reflect on the 
personal consequences of working flexibly in a modern capitalist society.   
 
Rather than taking a sociological or psychological approach to the notion of 
personal identity, I wish to develop a different understanding of this notion 
from philosophical views. I will establish the theoretical rationale of my 
research, based on reconstruction and critical analysis of the works of Ricoeur 
and Taylor. Firstly this is because problems about personal identity are not 
simply psychological and/or sociological problems, but originally 
philosophical problems. Secondly, personal identity as a philosophical concept 
should not simply be understood in its original sense, since this is a 
philosophical concept that has changed and developed over time. Identity as a 
philosophical concept then needs to be investigated in the context of current 
theories as developed by modern philosophers in our age. Ricoeur and Taylor 
are two philosophers in our time who developed the theories of personal 
identity in a deep and systematic way against the historical background to this 
notion in philosophy. Thirdly, one common feature between two philosophers 
is that both of them put the notion of narrative into their discussion about the 
notion of identity. As I mentioned in my overview of different theories of 
identity, Giddens asserts that self-identity in late modern societies can only be 
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found in one’s ‘capacity to keep a particular narrative going’ (Giddens 1991, p.54, 
emph. in original), so I wish to examine how the relation between narrative 
and identity in Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s theories are relevant to and different 
from Giddens’s argument. 
 
I studied Ricoeur’s work Oneself as Another (1992), because in this work he 
conducted a conceptual analysis of the notion of personal identity as a 
necessary step for him to argue for an ethical dimension to personal identity. I 
also studied part of his three-volume work titled Time and Narrative (1984, 
1992). In addition, I study Taylor’s work Sources of the Self: the Making of the 
Modern Identity (1989). I choose this work because in it Taylor provides a 
thorough argument for the need or importance of identity to the person by 
articulating the inescapable relationship between identity and the good in its 
broad moral sense.   
 
1.6 A theoretical rationale 
By following Ricoeur and Taylor’s works, I approach the notion of personal 
identity by analysing the constitution and nature of the concept of personal 
identity and by arguing for the need of this notion for a person on a conceptual 
level. 
 
Personal identity as a concept, I would argue, is a theoretical construct, that is, 
an idea constructed by human minds. In this sense, it is not an objective 
phenomenon/thing like tree, mountain, or sheep and so on which exists there 
outside of human minds. However, ontologically, personal identity can be 
understood as a ‘thing’ in the sense of identity as ‘sameness of the person’. 
Such a view implies an objective phenomenon of ‘permanence in time’ of a 
substance (both on the material level and the immaterial level) — a ‘thing’, 
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‘entity’ with which one can be identified and re-identified by oneself and by 
others over time. This idea is drawn from Ricoeur’s conceptual analysis of 
personal identity. His analysis of personal identity distinguishes between 
identity as sameness (idem-identity) and identity as selfhood (ipse-identity).  This 
is a response to the problematic nature of personal identity in terms of criteria 
for personal identity. This analysis suggests that personal identity can be seen 
as selfsameness, i.e. both as sameness, an ‘entity’, a ‘thing’ ontologically, and as 
selfhood, a ‘being’, the ‘existence of a person in the world’. I will take this 
analysis as a point of departure for my studies on personal identity and its 
relation to learning and narrative. I will further define identity as being in two 
senses: being in ‘moral space’ by following Taylor and being in ethical 
relationships with others by following Ricoeur.  
 
The significance of the notion of personal identity therefore can be understood 
in two senses in terms of a ‘thing’ and a ‘being’. First, as Taylor suggests, 
identity is that we concern and we need to find and/or discover in a ‘moral 
space’, and in this sense, identity can be seen as a ‘thing’ and such a thing is a 
‘meaning’ of one’s life. Having and maintaining such a meaning defines what 
is important and what is not in our life. It is this meaning of life that defines 
the mode of our life and the kind of person we want to be in a human world, 
hence our identity. Without such meaning, we would feel disoriented in our 
life and suffer ‘identity-crisis’. By articulating such meaning, we would be 
empowered to live up to the goods we strongly value.  Second, personal 
identity is significant also because it is about the presence of our unique being 
on the moral level and the ethical level in the human world. Personal identity 
is about a mode of ‘moral being’ that one cares about, which exists in the 
‘moral space’ of human world. Identification of such ‘moral being’ can be 
understood as a history of such being vis-à-vis one’s strongly valued good in 
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the ‘moral space’.  Also, personal identity is about a mode of ‘ethical being’, 
because such a kind of being presents itself in the way he/she responds to 
others in the intersubjective world. For example from the act of keeping one’s 
words to others, one can recognize an individual identity as permanence 
through time that others can count on. These two senses of personal identity are 
important in that they concern the notion of ‘personhood’, that is, the quality 
or condition of being a person, rather than simply being a person in the 
biological sense. I will regard these understandings of the notion of personal 
identity as the theoretical rationale of this thesis. 
 
The second focus for this thesis is the notion of learning. In Ricoeur and 
Taylor’s theories of identity, I find informative discussions on narrative in 
relation to personal identity. I therefore conduct a detailed analysis of the role 
of narrative plays in understanding identity. Then, I draw together my 
thoughts about learning from my reconstruction of the notion of personal 
identity and my analysis of the importance of narrative in their theories. In 
doing this, I refer to some works on learning and lifelong learning. I 
particularly cite the book Theory and Practice of Learning (Jarvis al et. 2003) and 
Gert Biesta’s work Beyond Learning (2006). These works not only help me grasp 
an understanding about the landscape of learning and lifelong learning, but 
also enable me to form my way of defining my notion of learning in this thesis. 
John Field’s work Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order (2000) and 
Richard Edwards’s work Changing places? Flexibility, lifelong learning and a 
learning society (1997) also provide me with an overview of the policies and 
practice of lifelong learning in the past few decades in the Western societies. 
These works help me conduct an ongoing discussion on personal identity and 
learning, with particular attention to lifelong learning. 
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1.7 Aims and contribution 
My research aim is then to try to formulate different views on the notion of 
personal identity, examine the role of narrative in understanding personal 
identity and analyse whether narrative and learning is related in this domain. I 
will clarify the complexity of personal identity on a theoretical level and 
develop a different theoretical understanding of this notion in the field of 
education and learning. I also endeavour to articulate the need and ‘meaning’ 
of personal identity for a person in his/her life.  I hope that through using my 
theoretical rationale, I can contribute a new theory of learning that is relevant 
to personal identity and demonstrate how learning can be drawn from 
narrative identity, with particular attentions to the aspects of lifelong learning. 
 
1.8 Overview of the structure of the thesis  
In Chapter 2, I attempt to find the answers to the question why identity has 
become a problem in Western modern societies in the second half of the last 
century. I do this by focusing on theories of two British leading sociologists: 
Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. I first seek to understand the notion 
of ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’, and then shift to the question of how 
modernity and modernization related to the self. Giddens analyses that the 
dynamism of institutions of modernity causes new anxieties, dangers and 
opportunities to the self. New risks and dangers are created. These risks 
emerge in terms of the existential questions of an individual’s being in the 
world, through his/her trust of the disembedding mechanism of modernity, 
though securities (certainties) and new possibilities are also created in this 
process. Media as a product of modernity are both expressions and 
instruments of the disembedding mechanism and globalising tendencies of 
modernity from which no one can escape. With the decline of traditions and 
fixed structures, under the conditions of reflexivity of modernity and rapid 
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social changes, the self also becomes ‘the reflexive project of the self’. By the 
same token, ‘self-identity is the self as reflexively understood by the person in 
terms of his or her biography’ (Giddens 1991, p.244). Giddens therefore asserts 
that the choices of lifestyles and life-planning are increasingly significant to the 
constitution of self-identity in late modern settings.  
 
I then move my discussion to Bauman’s arguments about issues of identity. 
For him, problems of identity are caused by radical individualization. Identity 
has shifted from ‘given’ to an ‘unfulfilled project’ that one has to perform and 
an individual has to take responsibility for this task with no public place to 
address personal problems. All these situations bring agony to the modern 
person in Bauman’s view. After presenting some criticisms on Giddens’s 
radical individualism implied in some literature about lifelong learning and 
identity, I point out that the importance of reflexivity in relation to personal 
identity and in relation to learning, need to be critically examined in Giddens’s 
analysis and need to be understood from different approaches.  
 
In Chapter 3, I explore Paul Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity, narrative 
identity and how the notion of reflexivity can be viewed differently from this 
theory. This chapter starts with a general discussion of a conceptual paradox of 
personal identity and how Ricoeur responds to the issue. Then the chapter is 
developed by following three modes of dialectics contained in Ricoeur’s theory 
of personal identity. First, I clarify and interpret in detail Ricoeur’s conceptual 
analysis of personal identity by focusing on the difference between identity as 
sameness (idem-identity) and identity as selfhood (ipse-identity) and the dialectic 
between them. This distinction suggests two different concepts of identity on 
the ontological level.  Idem-identity can be seen as identity as a ‘thing’, an 
‘entity’; ipse-identity can be seen as identity as a ‘being’, a ‘Dasein’. Then, I 
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move to the section on Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity, where I 
distinguish the notion of ‘narrative identity’ on a conceptual level and in a 
practical category. The notion of narrative identity on a conceptual level is a 
notion that Ricoeur suggests in order to resolve the paradox of personal 
identity, which can function as a mediator between idem-identity and 
ipse-identity. The notion of narrative identity in a practical category is about 
one’s personal identity identified through one’s self-interpretation of one’s 
personal and community story. It is exactly in the notion of narrative identity 
on the conceptual level that I find different views of reflexivity in relation to 
identity. This is not only because narrative is by nature reflexive in terms of 
prefiguration, configuration and refiguration. More importantly, narrative identity 
has an internal dialectic as a kind of discordant concordance that can be 
inscribed in the dialectic between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood. 
Narrative submits imaginative variations to narrative identity to mediate 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity. The implication is that such kind of 
variations can be deliberately made by an individual in his/her reflexivity to 
examine the different proportions of the constitution of one’s personal identity.  
 
The second dialectic exists between selfhood and others. A mode of reflexivity 
mediated between selfhood and others therefore can be found in this dialectic 
relationship. The third dialectic, the dialectic between sameness and others, is 
finally revealed, which crowns the first two dialectics. From here, the 
reflexivity mediated between sameness and others emerged. In the end, I 
present my thoughts on the role of learning and aspects of lifelong learning 
implied in different modes of reflexivity emerged from three kinds of dialectics 
presented in Ricoeur’s theories of personal identity. 
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In Chapter 4, I investigate Charles Taylor’s theory of identity and the role of 
learning in his theory. I start with a discussion on the issue of whether or not 
personal identity matters by reconstructing the discussions on this issue 
among Parfit, Ricoeur and Taylor. Then I focus on Taylor’s theory of identity 
by clarifying his concept of the self and his definition of identity. For Taylor, 
self as a being exists not only in the ‘moral space’ or a ‘space of questions’ 
related to strong evaluations but also in the ‘web of interlocution’. Identity is 
defined by one’s essential strong evaluations and is what allows us to define 
what is important for us and what is not. The space in question is a space 
where the self as an agent or strong evaluator exists to determine issues related 
to self-concerns in terms of quality of life and kinds of being. The notion of 
strong evaluation is also interpreted in detail. I then discuss Taylor’s main 
thesis that identity is connected with ‘good’. Losing or not having found one’s 
orientation towards strongly valued good(s) in the ‘moral space’ of questions, 
one might suffer disorientation or a sense of homelessness, or what Taylor calls 
‘identity crisis’. Thus, the different fundamental strong evaluations can be seen 
as moral frameworks that define one’s identity. For Taylor, in order to find or 
deepen the understanding of our identity, there is a need to articulate the 
underpinned strong evaluations. It is in this mode of articulation, I find a 
mode of reflexivity, which is used not only to examine one’s life and identity, 
but also empower oneself towards the good. Then, I discuss how Taylor’s 
notion of moral identity is related to narrative. I end up with a discussing on 
the roles of leaning in Taylor’s theory of identity by linking the notions of 
articulation, reflexivity, narrative and power of expression. 
 
In Chapter 5, I make an attempt to deal with the question of how we should 
understand the role(s) of narrative in understanding the notion of identity, or 
the question of what contribution(s) narrative can make in understanding 
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identity. By referring to Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories of identity, I clarify and 
define how I understand the notion of identity. I approach personal identity 
from a dimension of conceptual constitution of this notion and the need of 
personal identity as a concept. Then, I conduct a detailed analysis of roles of 
narrative in understanding identity in Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories. I argue 
that what emerge from my analyses are two categories of roles of narrative in 
understanding identity, i.e. category of structural roles and category of 
interpretative roles. My conclusion is that narrative takes a multifunctional 
role in both categories in helping us understand identity. I also argue that 
simply holding either structural analysis of narrative or interpretative analysis 
of narrative, rather than both, will be likely to cause issues in understanding 
narrative identity. After that, I deal with the problem of the ‘truthfulness’ of 
narrative identity in relation to ‘identity’ ‘as it is’ in reality, which is a central 
issue that might be raised in using the notion of narrative identity. In order to 
do this, I first clarify the relation between life as narrative and life ‘as it is’ in 
reality as the background for my argument about the former issue. I conclude 
that if personal identity is partly constituted by self-interpretation and such 
self-interpretation as narrative keeps developing, it is hard to say there is 
something like ‘identity as it is’ in reality. Narrative identity as a concept 
provides us with a strong approach to understanding ourselves. 
 
In Chapter 6, I discuss how what I have investigated can contribute to the 
notion of learning in respect of identity, with particular attention to lifelong 
learning. I start with a discussion about the emergence of the notion of lifelong 
learning. Then I link the view of personal identity developed from Ricoeur and 
Taylor’s theories with lifelong learning. Subsequently I point out the issue of 
normative reading of Giddens’s analysis of identity, which pervasively exists 
in current policies, practices and theories of lifelong learning. After that, I 
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revisit Giddens’ theory of self-identity and present my critical analyses of his 
description around three assumptions of his notion of ‘reflexivity’. I conclude 
that lifelong learning implied in Giddens’s theory of identity is problematic. I 
suggest its problematic nature lies in the fact that it is the learning merely for 
the sake of the external changes, a mode of learning for flexibility, which might 
lead to moral deficit. It is also a mode of learning based on radical 
individualism that might lead to ethical problems.  
 
Next, I present the alternative views of identity by referring to Ricoeur and 
Taylor’s theories of identity. I also analyse the roles of reflexivity and of 
learning indicated in their theories. I then offer a critical synthesis of four 
modes of reflexive learning that is relevant to personal identity together with 
my discussion of different theories of lifelong learning. Continuing on I take a 
critical look at the necessity of narrative in relation to learning and lifelong 
learning concerning identity implied in Giddens’s theory. Finally, I present 
different views derived from Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories on the necessity of 
narrative in the role of learning in relation to identity. 
 
In concluding section, I reiterate the main points of what I have investigated 
and main thoughts I have argued. I also offer some reflections on the 
concluding remarks, the weakness and the limitations of the whole thesis in 
this ending chapter. Then, I present some proposals that the different modes of 
reflexive learning that I drew from my argument will not only open some new 
discussions among educational researchers, but also provide new insights for 
policy makers in rethinking about personal development for the individual 
members in current societies. I also hope that this study is not only 
illuminative for lifelong learners in their reflection on their identities, but also 
helpful for lifelong educators to guide learners who explore the question of 
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‘who am I’ for various reasons.  
 
I do not wish to make any claims that the outcome of the research will provide 
an encompassing understanding of the notion of personal identity and can 
produce a comprehensive theory of learning in relation to personal identity. 
Rather, this research tries to present itself as a case to show that the 
understanding of personal identity is a complex issue intertwined with 
multiple dimensions. Learning theories and practice in respect of personal 
identity therefore need to be developed with awareness of the complexities of 
this notion. I hope this research will open a new discussion on the complexities 
of identity in relation to education and what implications for learning and 
lifelong learning can be drawn from our understanding of personal identity.
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Chapter 2 Why has identity become a problem in modern societies? 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
The study of identity in sociology is not a new field. Questions of identity have 
been explored as early as from the middle of last century among different 
schools of thought in sociology (e.g., Strauss 1959; Goffman 1963; Turner 1975; 
Stryker 1968; Parsons 1968; Habermas 1974; Weigert et al. 1986; Gecas and 
Burke 1995, etc.). However it is at the end of the 20th century that the 
sociological study of identity appears to have become more intensive than ever 
before. A great number of social research projects link themselves to the notion 
of identity, although this notion is highly complicated and variously defined. 
This has made numerous modern researchers continually focus on the 
questions of what identity is so as to associate a proper concept of identity with 
their research projects. However, the question of why identity has become a 
problem seems to have been seldom explored. In order to narrow down this 
question in the following discussion, I want to explore why, according to social 
researchers and sociologists, identity has increasingly become a current 
concern. Doubtless to say, the possible answer to this fundamental question 
might provide a wide and clear backdrop against which questions concerning 
identity are studied, and thus help us gain a real and significant understanding 
of what problems concerning research projects into identity are to try to solve. 
 
In this chapter, I endeavour to provide an analysis of why has identity become 
a problem in modern Western societies by exploring what different 
sociologists think about this question. I will start with discussing some key 
concepts related to the notion of identity. Next I will explore how Western 
modern society is linked with individual’s identity. Then, I will particularly 
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focus on an analysis of two leading British sociologists, Anthony Giddens and 
Zygmunt Bauman. Whilst they present the theoretical views of late modernity 
and liquid modernity respectively in sociology today, American sociologist 
Richard Sennett provides us with a different discussion on identity based on 
his empirical studies.  
  
2.2 Why identity and modernity? 
Identity is basically defined as ‘sense of self’. This over-generalized 
understanding of identity might be problematic since this understanding is 
subject to the understanding of a more complex notion, the ‘self’.  Self is 
multi-faced, and so is identity. Self is biological, psychological, sociological 
and even cultural, and they all intertwine together. Lewis writes, 
 
 ‘Sense of self initially involves simply sensing that one’s body is 
separate from others, so that identity begins with a physical sense of 
the boundaries of one’s body and where it is in space’ (Lewis 1990, 
pp.277-300).  
 
However, it is not that simple. Freud equated the ego with our sense of self in 
his early writing (e.g. Freud 1923). He then began to portray ego more as a set 
of psychic functions such as reality-testing, defence, synthesis of information, 
intellectual functioning, memory, and the like.  But identity cannot be simply 
equated with ego-identity, a term devised by Erikson (see Erikson 1959). There 
are also sociological views. Oyserman conceptualises identity as answering the 
questions of ‘who am I?’, ‘Where do I belong?’, and ‘how do I fit?’ (2004). 
Based on this understanding, Brew and Miles (2004) suggest, 
   
‘Although the focus of these questions is on the ‘I’—the individual 
self-concept—the self is meaningful only in the context of one’s 
relationship to others and one’s position in social groups’ (p.3).  
CHAPTER 2 
 50
 
The fact that self-concept is conceptualized as a social product that develops 
through one’s relationships with others and what they see in one’s self has 
long been seen in Symoblic Interactionism School (e.g. James 1890, Cooley 1902, 
Mead 1921-1925/1964, Goffman 1959, 1963). In this theoretical line of ‘self’, 
Goffman has contributed his notion of identity. Here the notion of identity 
stresses the identification of an individual from others both in daily encounters 
between individuals (personal identity) and according to social categories 
(social identity). It could be argued that although ego-identity in principle 
might be described as how an individual him/herself, not others, feels about or 
senses him/her ‘self’, it is not a notion without social elements since he/she 
‘internalizes’ the external socio-cultural influences that are exerted on one’s 
‘core of self’, the ego, and puts others’ views into considerations in 
constructing his/her ‘sense of self’. As Tajfel’s claims, ‘the study of “identity” 
refers to the content of self-knowledge as it is represented to and by others. 
Identity represents the conceptual link between the individual and the society 
as a whole’ (Tajfel 1981 cited in Brewer and Miles 2004).  
 
However, is self a passive entity or dynamic entity to the external social 
influences? In the sociological field, the inter-influences between social 
reality/structure and the formation/development of ‘self’ have been 
recognized as early as in the middle of last century (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 
1966; Parsons 1968).  Moreover a similar line of thought continued in modern 
sociology, for example through the theory of structuration (see Giddens 
1979,1984). Those theories at least suggest that self as a whole and society to 
some extent shape each other. But is self passive or autonomous in responding 
to the impact of modern society?  How does self respond to social changes in 
modern societies? There have been some sociological concerns about these 
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questions and different explanations like narcissism, hedonism, survivalism 
and human agency have emerged in the past few decades. Thus, questions of 
identity became more contentious. Since the contour of self develops in its 
interaction with social reality, any analysis of questions of identity should 
therefore go hand in hand with societal analysis.  Thus it is firstly essential for 
us to examine the conditions of modern social reality, in order then to find out 
how the self responds to social influences.  
 
2.3 What are modernity and modernization? 
Modernity is a term used to describe the condition of being ‘modern’ and the 
consequences of being modernized. There are different views about defining 
modernity. ‘Modern’ can mean all of post-medieval European history, in the 
context of dividing history into three large epochs: Antiquity or Ancient 
history, the Middle Ages, and Modern times. Rather than holding this artificial 
division of history, some theorists consider that being modern has many 
different meanings.  For example, Habermas even maintains that from the 
12th century until the Enlightenment, people saw themselves as ‘modern’ 
whenever they looked back to antiquity as a period to be emulated, as an ideal 
to which one should return. This condition changed with the advent of the 
Enlightenment, and with the beginning of what is generally termed 
modernism.  This is the term that Habermas sees as that which ‘simply makes 
an abstract opposition between tradition and the present’ (Habermas 1981, 
p.147).  
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Modern as Post-Medieval1 is to describe the condition of Western History 
since the mid-1400’s, or roughly marked by the European discovery of 
moveable type and the printing press. Some remarkable movements and 
thoughts characterize this period:  
 
Rise of the nation state 
Industrialization 
Rise of capitalism  
Emergence of Socialist countries 
Rise of representative democracy 
Increasing role of science and technology 
Rise of social movements 
Urbanization 
Mass literacy 
Proliferation of mass media 
 
Thus, modernity can be seen as a series of consequences, a social development 
over several periods with many influential events which denote breaks in the 
continuity of human social life. These events might include, for example, 
 
The Age of Discovery 
The Renaissance  
The Reformation and Counter Reformation 
The Age of Reason 
The Enlightenment 
The Romantic 
The Victorian / The Industrial Revolution 
The Modern 
The Postmodern 
The Arrival of the Printing Press 
The English Civil War 
The American Revolution 
                                                 
1 Part of the discussion of this term and the list of periods and events have referred to 
the entry of ‘modernity’ in Wikipedia. Available: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernity 
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The French Revolution 
The Revolutions of 1848 
The Russian Revolution 
The First World War and the Second World War 
 
Since the term ‘modern’ can describe a wide range of periods, modernity 
therefore must be taken in context. The term ‘modernity’ can specifically refer to 
the conditions of human life that originated in the Western world in the period 
starting somewhere between 1870s and 1910s, to the present (or even more 
specifically to the 1910s-1960s period) and which increasingly influences the 
rest of the world. By the middle of the 20th century, with the advance of 
modernization, a notion I will discuss below, has gone beyond the Western 
world and became widely regarded as a global tendency in which all states 
strove to become ‘modern’ like Western countries. As Giddens asserts,  
 
‘modernity refers to modes of social life or organization which 
emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards 
and which subsequently become more or less worldwide in their 
influence’ (Giddens 1990, p.1).  
 
However, globalization, the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts, and the 
proliferation of information technologies are taken by some theorists as 
reasons to adopt a new vision to see the advent of ‘late-modernity’ or 
‘post-modernity’. 
 
Modernization is a process that creates a modern society. The concept of 
modernization might have originated from ‘Social Evolutionary Theory’.  
That is, social change is a unidirectional and predetermined process, from a 
primitive to an advanced state. Referring to Charles Darwins’s approach to 
biological development, this theory assumes that social change is slow, 
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gradual and piecemeal and therefore is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 
This theory also imposes a value judgement on the evolutionary process: the 
movement toward the final phase is good because it represents progress, 
humanity, and civilization, which is in line with Western European cultural 
parameters. In this sense, modernization is a progressive process. While 
advocating this theory, Talcott Parsons presents the Structural Functionalist 
Theory, maintaining that human society is like a biological organism, with 
different parts corresponding to the different institutions that make up a 
society (see Parsons 1968). Each institution performs a specific function for the 
good of the whole, so functionalist theory states that societies tend to be in 
harmony, stability, equilibrium and the status quo. ‘Modernization’ understood in 
this line can be seen as a social organizing process being differentiated and 
pluralized with increasing labour-division. Moore has given a relative 
comprehensive definition of modernization, which is based on Evolutionary 
and Functionalist assumptions: 
 
‘modernization refers to a total transformation of a traditional or 
pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated 
social organization that characterized the advanced, economically 
prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western 
world’ (Moore1963, p.89).  
 
Smelser and Rostow contribute different views on modernization from 
sociological and economic perspectives. Smelser (1969) distinguished four 
processes of modernization from a traditional society to a modern one: a move 
from a simple to a complex technology, a change from subsistence farming to 
cash crops, a move from animal and human power to machine power, a move 
from rural settlements to urban settlements. This offers us a clear picture that 
differentiates traditional societies and modern ones. Rostow (1960) 
concentrates on the economic system of modernization from a capitalistic point 
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of view.  He shows factors needed for a country to reach the path to 
modernization in his Rostovian take-off model with five categories or stages of 
economic growth. From this line, modernization is characterized as 
Industrialism and Capitalism.  
 
Modernization can also be seen from political and psychological perspectives. 
David Apter (1996) concentrated on the political system and history of 
democracy, researching into the connection between democracy, good 
governance, efficiency and modernization. In his work ‘The Achieving Society’ 
(1967) David McClelland approached this notion from the psychological 
perspective, with his achievement motivations theory.  McClelland argued that 
modernization cannot happen until a given society values innovation, success 
and free enterprise. In his book entitled ‘Becoming Modern’, (1974), Alex Inkeles 
creates a model of modern personality.  Here the modern personality needs to be 
independent, active, interested in public policies and cultural matters, open to 
new experiences, rational and able to create long-term plans for the future. 
Ulrick Beck develops his notion of ‘reflexive modernization’ (see Beck 1992). 
When this notion is applied to an individual, it can be seen as a process of 
modernization of an individual through personal reflexivity as the result of 
organizational reflexivity produced in risk modern society. 
 
Nowadays, the different aspects of modernization have been extended to the 
states around the globe as I mentioned above. To give a new definition of 
modernization, I will follow Best and Kellner’s theory:  
 
‘The dynamics by which modernity produced a new industrial and 
colonial world can be described as ‘modernization’—a term denoting 
those processes of individualization, secularisation, industrialization, 
cultural differentiation, commodification, urbanization, 
bureaucratisation, and rationalization which together have constituted 
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the modern world’ (Best and Kellner 1991, p.3). 
 
However, some modernization theories have asserted that modernization 
nowadays is a process of Europeanization and/or Northamericanization of the 
rest of the world. This becomes one aspect of modernization theory that critics 
attack. 
 
Over the landscape of modernization theory, what is widely accepted among 
social scientists is that modernization is a paradoxical gift or double-edged 
weapon. On the one hand, modernization brought more remarkable benefits to 
human social life than any pre-modern ages.  For example, lower infant 
mortality rate, decreased death from starvation, eradication of some fatal 
diseases, an easier life that is aided by technology, greater equality to people 
from different social and economic backgrounds and so on. On the other hand, 
many more sinister sides of modernization emerged.  These include for 
example, the development of technology that escalates the scale and the 
damage of war as well as the arms race and development of nuclear weaponry, 
the appearance of totalitarianism and ecological catastrophes. The impacts of 
modernization on human individuals have also been bombarded from 
different directions.  For example, there appear to be more and more 
psychological and moral hazards in modern life.  These include: alienation, 
feelings of rootlessness, loss of strong bonds and common values, hedonism, 
narcissism and so on. Any individual’s identity thus becomes increasingly 
problematic with the advancement of modernization. This might be one reason 
why the problem of identity draws the attention of modern sociologists. As 
Wiegert et al. (1986) noted, for functionalists like Parsons, increasing social  
 
‘complexity presents a wide range of possible choices and 
subsequent cross-pressures once the individual makes a 
commitment to one or another set of positions and acquires the 
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attendant identities…The modern person is much more aware of 
the problem of identity than persons living in simpler, stabler 
societies’ (Wiegert et al.1986, p.19 cited in Côté and Levine 2002, 
p.38 ).  
 
This view indicates that any analysis of the problem of identity should be 
linked with adequate and analytical understanding of modernity and/or 
modernization in present day.   
 
2.4 Giddens’s view: self-identity with anxieties caused by external changes  
Among sociologists, Anthony Giddens is the one who develops a systematic 
theory and a sophisticated analysis of the problems of identity in relation to 
modern society, particularly in the Western world at the end of the 20th 
century. Putting his analysis in the connection between micro level (structure) 
and macro level (individual) of today’s modern society, Giddens identifies the 
fact that we are neither in the conditions of modernity nor ‘post-modernity’ 
now, but in the settings of what he calls as ‘late’ or ‘high’ modernity.  Here 
the ‘self’ has undergone massive changes caused by social transformations and 
he particularly focuses on negative impacts of social changes on the self. In the 
following section, I will present what late/high modernity is in Giddens’ view 
and why identity has become a problem under those conditions. 
 
2.4.1 Modernity: Giddens’s view 
According to Giddens, to understand and rethink the nature of modernity, one 
needs to analyse it from the constitution and forms of social order, that is, the 
‘modern institutions’. In Giddens’s own words, ‘Modernity must be 
understood on an institutional level’ (Gidden 1991, p. 1). Here, he uses the 
term ‘modernity’ to generally refer to ‘the institutions and modes of behaviour 
established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in the twentieth 
century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact’ (ibid., p.15). 
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For him, what separates modern institutions from pre-modern cultures and 
ways of life is a certain discontinuity or a set of discontinuities. The modern 
world is a ‘runaway world’ with its extreme dynamism characterized by the 
pace of social change (e.g. technology), scope of change (e.g. tendency of 
globalization) and nature of modern institutions (e.g. nation-state, 
commercialization, capitalism) (Giddens1990, p.6). According to Giddens, the 
modes of life being transformed by modernity are very different from 
traditional types of social order. The transformations brought by modernity 
can be characterised as extensionality and intentionality. Modernity’s extensional 
transformation (e.g. globalising influences) undercuts traditional habit and 
customs and establishes forms of social interconnection that span the globe. In 
terms of intentionality, modernity ‘comes to alter some of the most intimate 
and personal features of our day-to-day existence’ (1990, p.4).  
 
According to Giddens, three main elements can explain the peculiarly dynamic 
character of modern social life:  
 
(1) The separation of time and space: the condition for the articulation of social 
relations across wide spans of time-space, up to and including global systems 
(1991, p.19-20).  Traditional society is based on direct interaction between 
people living close to each other in one certain fixed space. Modern societies 
expand further and further across space and time using mass media and 
interactive media. 
 
(2) Disembedding mechanisms: consist of symbolic tokens and expert systems 
(these together are called abstract system).  The term used to describe ‘the 
lifting out of social relationships from local contexts and their 
recombination across indefinite time/space distances’ (ibid. p.233). 
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Abstract system brackets time and space. Symbolic tokens, e.g. money, 
brackets both time, because it is a means of credit, and space, since 
standardised values allow transactions between a multiplicity of 
individuals who never physically meet one another. Expert systems bracket 
time and space through deploying modes of technical knowledge of 
scientists, technicians or engineers, which have validity independent of the 
practitioners and clients who make use of them, e.g. food, medicines, the 
buildings, transport, etc. Expert systems also extend to social relations 
themselves and to the intimacies of the self, e.g. doctor, counsellor and 
therapist. Both types of expert system depend on the trust of the 
individuals. Giddens explains, ‘Trust presumes a leap to commitment, a 
quality of “faith”, which is irreducible. It is specifically related to absence 
in time and space, as well as to ignorance’ (ibid., p.19). 
 
(3) Institutional reflexivity: Modernity’s reflexivity refers to the 
susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with 
nature, to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge 
(ibid., p.20). It involves the routine incorporation of new knowledge or 
information into any environment of action that are thereby reconstituted 
or reorganised (ibid., p.243). Contrary to Enlightenment expectations for 
certitude of rational knowledge, under the conditions of modernity, 
increased knowledge and information related to social life are always open 
to revision, and might even be abandoned. As Giddens writes, ‘The 
transformation of time and space, coupled with the disembedding 
mechanisms, propel social life away from the hold of pre-established 
precepts and practices’ (ibid., p.20).   
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2.4.2 What is the late/high modernity? 
The question of modernity, however, according to Giddens, has reappeared as 
a fundamental sociological problem at the turn of the twenty-first century.  A 
problem that relates to its past development and current institutional forms. 
Among today’s theorists, there is a general agreement that significant social, 
economic, technological and cultural changes took place in the Western world 
in the latter part of the 20th century.  These changes include globalization, the 
end of the Cold War, the proliferation of information technologies and 
bio-technology, and ethnic conflicts. But there is also a debate over how much 
change has happened and why the changes have arisen.  Many labels such as 
‘post-modern society’ (Lyotard, Bauman), ‘risk society’ (Beck) and ‘information 
society’ (Castells), or ‘knowledge-based society’ appear. While Giddens 
acknowledges that the contours of the new and different order are remarkable 
in today’s world, he does not agree that people nowadays enter a totally new 
era called a post-modern era. Instead, he claims that ‘we are moving into one 
in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalised and 
universalised than before’ (Giddens 1990, p.3). This is called by him ‘high 
modernity’ or ‘late modernity’ which is defined as ‘the current phase of 
development of modern institutions, marked by the radicalising and 
globalising of basic traits of modernity’ (Giddens 1991, p.243).  
 
Since knowledge about circumstances of social life has to be regularised so as 
to use it as a constitutive element in the organization and transformation of 
modes of life,  ‘institutional reflexivity’ continues to be dynamic feature of late 
modernity. As Giddens writes, 
 
‘The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social 
practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming transformation about those very practices, thus 
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constitutively altering their character’ (ibid., p.38).  
 
In this sense, late modernity to some extent can be seen as ‘reflexive modernity’. 
This suggests that late modern society becomes much more reflexive and 
self-aware than earlier modern settings. As we will discuss below, this 
parameter of modernity has made a great impact on the individual and it 
seems that a modern person’s sense of self has to be reflexively made too. The 
intensification of institutional and individual reflexivity in the absence of sure 
foundations of knowledge has a chronic propensity to manufacture 
uncertainty and has resulted in ‘radicalised modernity’ becoming one feature of 
‘late modernity’. 
 
Agreeing with Ulrich Beck, Giddens contends a ‘climate of risk’ is a 
characteristic of late/high modernity. As Giddens writes, 
 
‘in a post-traditional social universe, an indefinite range of potential 
courses of action (with their attendant risks) is at any given moment 
open to individuals and collectivities’ (Giddens 1991, p.28-29). 
 
Giddens further explains, 
 
‘it is not that day-to-day is inherently more risky than was the case 
in prior eras. It is rather that, in conditions of modernity, for lay 
actors as well as for experts in specific fields, thinking in terms of 
risk and risk assessment is a more or less ever-present exercise, of a 
partly imponderable character’ (ibid.,p124).  
 
How? First, late modernity is apocalyptical due to ‘high-consequence risks’ 
which ‘are pervasively consequential in terms of their implications for very 
large numbers of people’ (ibid., p.243).  And ‘…not because it is inevitably 
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heading towards calamity, but because it introduces risks which previous 
generations have not had to face’ (ibid., p.4).  For example  nuclear weapons 
and  novel weaponry is more likely to lead to massive warfare, ecological 
catastrophe and economic crisis etc.. Second, institutionally organized risk is full 
of uncertainties for individuals. In Giddens’ words, 
 
‘to live in the “world” produced by high modernity has the feeling 
of riding a juggernaut. It is not just that more or less continuous and 
profound processes of change occur; rather, change does not 
consistently conform either to human expectation or to human 
control’ (ibid.p.28).    
 
This has become ‘a fundamental cultural aspect of modernity, in which 
awareness of risk forms a medium of colonising the future’ (ibid., p.244). 
According to Giddens, the elements of risk to be encountered in late modernity 
are far more radicalised than was the case in ‘modernity’, with the 
proliferation of specialisms (expert systems) combining with the advance of 
modern institutions and thus no one can escape. As he writes, 
 
‘For the most part, however, institutionally structured risk 
environments are much more prominent in modern than premodern 
societies. Such institutionalised systems of risk affect virtually 
everyone, regardless of whether or not they are ‘players’ within 
them—competitive markets in products, labour power, investments 
or money provide the most significant example (ibid, p 117-118)’. 
 
2.4.3 Self and self-identity in relation to the late modernity 
For Giddens, ‘late/high modernity’ is the continuing development of ‘modernity’, 
and is still forged by the extension of the same social forces that shaped the 
previous age. In late modern settings, modernity’s extensional and intentional 
transformations are more radical than ever. With respect to intentionality, 
Giddens stresses, ‘the transmutations introduced by modern institutions 
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interlace in a direct way with individual life and therefore with the self’ (ibid., 
p.3). Late modernity’s extensionality also is characterized as globalisation. 
Moreover, intentionality and extensionality are interconnected. As Giddens 
writes, ‘Transformations in self-identity and globalisations are the two poles of 
the dialectic of the local and global in condition of high modernity’ (ibid, p.32).  
He also asserts, ‘Changes in intimate aspects of personal life, in other words, 
are directly tied to the establishment of social connections of very wide scope’ 
(ibid.).  This dialectic suggests that questions of identity need to be analysed 
by linking self with late modernity. More precisely, in Giddens’s view, in the 
context of late modern settings, ‘new mechanisms of self-identity…are shaped 
by – yet also shape – the institutions of modernity’ (ibid., p.2). Three questions 
emerge here. 
 
The first question which emerges relates to how late modernity has its impacts 
on individual’s life, and his/her identity. Giddens suggests that in social 
transformations from traditional institutions to post-traditional institutions, an 
individual’s self undergoes deep psychic changes. With the impacts of a 
radicalised dynamism of modernity, including institutional reflexivity and risk 
environment on the individual life: 
 
‘[t]ransitions in individual’s lives have always demand psychic 
reorganisation, something which was often ritualised in traditional 
cultures in the shape of rites de passage (i.e. the changed identity was 
clearly staked out from adolescence to adulthood)’ (ibid.,p.33).  
 
However, ‘in the settings of modernity, by contrast, the altered self has to be 
explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting personal 
and social change ‘ (ibid.).  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 64
These psychic changes are expressed as a new kind of anxiety. Giddens writes, 
  
‘What happens is a flooding in of anxiety which the ordinary 
connections of day-to-day life usually keep successfully at bay. The 
natural attitude brackets out questions about ourselves, others and 
the object world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep 
on with everyday activity’ (ibid., p.37). 
 
Thus, these new anxieties threaten an individual’s ontological security. For 
Giddens, such anxiety of the ‘self’ is also related to the existential issues, to the 
very roots of coherent sense of ‘being in the world’. One key element of 
ontological security and existential issues concerns the continuity of self-identity, 
that is, ‘the persistence of feelings of personhood in a continuous self and 
body’ (ibid., p.55). His profound analysis of this form of anxiety is precisely 
defined thus:  
 
‘As a general phenomenon, anxiety derives from the capacity—and, 
indeed, necessity—for the individual to think ahead, to anticipate 
future possibilities counterfactually in relation to present action. But 
in a deep way, anxiety (or its likelihood) comes from very ‘faith’ in 
the dependent existence of persons and objects that ontological 
security implies’ (ibid., p.48).  
 
In late modernity, Giddens suggests that such kind of anxiety is more 
commonplace than ever because  social changes, uncertainties and diversity 
of possibilities created by high modernity and their negative influences on the 
self are more and more radicalized than ever. In the meanwhile, in high 
modern settings, the mass media’s impact on the intimacies of the self, 
becomes more and more commonplace and creates new forms of 
fragmentation and dispersal. As Giddens writes,  
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‘With the development of mass communication, particularly 
electronic communication, the interpenetration of self-development 
and social systems, up to and including global systems, becomes 
ever more pronounced’ (ibid.,p.4). 
  
This situation also makes a modern individual feel deeper anxiety in terms of 
the question of self-identity. So for Giddens, self-identity becomes problematic  
because external changes break the integrity and continuity of individual’s 
sense of the self in terms of ontological security. 
 
Then, the second question is: how does the self respond to those impacts? As I 
have shown at the beginning of this section, according to Giddens, self-identity 
and the institution of modernity shape each other. Then it is not difficult to 
understand although new anxieties are mainly caused by external changes 
from, for example, the abstract system.  Individuals, however, driven by these 
new anxieties, seem to still resort to the abstract system. More precisely, they 
invest their trust or faith in an abstract system in order to protect their 
ontological security, including their continuity of self-identity.  
 
For Giddens, the abstract system, e.g., expert knowledge, has, ‘become 
centrally involved not only in the institutional order of modernity but also in 
the formation and continuity of the self’ (ibid., p.33). He gives as an example 
the rise of modes of modern therapy and counselling of all kinds to illustrate 
the connection between abstract systems and the self (see ibid.). This seems to 
stress that the self is not passive, but active in its response to the external 
changes that impinge on it. He believes in the late modern settings, the self, 
like the reflexive institutions of modernity, becomes a reflexive project. The 
reflexivity of self according to Giddens, under the impacts of external changes, 
is ‘a phenomenon which, on the level of the individual, like the broader 
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institutions of modernity, balances opportunity and potential catastrophe in 
equal measure’ (ibid., p.34). 
 
Finally, the third question is: how exactly is an individual’s project in terms of            
calculative measure between the self and risky social situations to be 
understood? Giddens’s notion of the self seems to be based on an active 
individualism, since he assumes that the self has become the self of 
self-actualization and self-realization in the late modern settings. Meanwhile, 
the reflexivity of modernity, according to Giddens, ‘extends into the core of the 
self’ (ibid., p.33). In ‘reflexive modernity’, individuals as actors and agents are 
much less concerned with the precedents set by previous generations, and 
options are at least as open as the law and public opinion will allow. Therefore 
individual actions now require much more analysis and consideration before 
they are taken.  To quote Giddens, 
 
‘The social conventions produced and reproduced in our day-to-day 
activities are reflexively monitored by the agent as part of ‘going on’ 
in the variegated settings of our lives. Reflexive awareness in this 
sense is characteristic of all human action, and is the specific 
condition of that massively developed institutional reflexivity 
spoken of in the preceding chapter as an intrinsic component of 
modernity. All human beings continuously monitor the 
circumstances of their activities as a feature of doing what they do, 
and such monitoring always has discursive features. In other words, 
agents are normally able, if asked, to provide discursive 
interpretations of the nature of, and the reasons for, the behaviour in 
which they engage’ (ibid.,p.35).  
 
Accordingly, the individual’s self in ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernity, for Giddens, has 
to be reflexively made. He argues that,  
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‘systems of accumulated expertise – which form important 
disembedding influences – represent multiple sources of authority, 
frequently internally contested and divergent in their implications. In 
the settings of what I call ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernity – our present-day 
world – the self, like the broader institutional contexts in which it 
exists, has to be reflexively made’ (ibid., p.3).  
 
In this sense, Giddens suggests that in the conditions of late modernity, the 
individual’s reflexivity is much needed and more significant than ever.  
 
However, after claiming that the self has to be reflexively made in late modern 
settings, Giddens immediately points out, ‘Yet this task has to be accomplished 
amid a puzzling diversity of options and possibilities’ (ibid.,p.3). Why? Firstly, 
this is because for the most part in the modern world, while modernity 
protects people from dangers like wild beasts, inclement weather and crops 
failure, it also brings new ‘risks’ and ‘uncertainties’. As Giddens asserts, 
late/high modernity  
 
‘is characterised by widespread scepticism about providential 
reason, coupled with the recognition that science and technology are 
double-edged, creating new parameters of risk and danger as well 
as offering beneficent possibilities for humankind….The chronic 
entry of knowledge into the circumstances of action it analyses or 
describes creates a set of uncertainties to add to the circular and 
fallible character of post-traditional claims to knowledge’ (ibid., 
pp.27-28). 
 
 Secondly, although the traditional notion of ‘fate’ still exists, a course of 
events is no longer considered totally preordained in circumstances of 
modernity. Thus Giddens maintains, 
 
‘To accept risk as risk, an orientation which is more or less forced 
on us by the abstract systems of modernity, is to acknowledge that 
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no aspects of our activities follow a predestined course, and all are 
open to contingent happenings (ibid.). 
 
 In this sense, modern people have to act by choosing ‘an indefinite range of 
potential courses of action (with their attendant risks)’ and this is always an ‘as 
if’ matter, a question of selecting between possible worlds’ (ibid., p.29). 
Consequently  Giddens concludes, ‘Living in “risk society” means living with 
a calculative attitude to the open possibilities of action, positive and negative, 
with which, as individuals and globally, we are confronted in a continuous 
way in our contemporary social existence’ (ibid., p.28).  
 
Therefore, under such conditions, Giddens concludes that the task of 
self-formation has to be reflexively made and remade continually. By the same 
token, self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour (see ibid., p.5). 
Thus, self-identity has to be understood by a person in terms of his/her 
biography and autobiography as a narrative.  This is in order to keep a 
coherent identity, under the impact of continual external changes on the self. 
As he writes, ‘The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining 
of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in 
the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems’ (ibid.).  
 
2.4.4 Giddens’s analysis: lifestyles and self-identity formation 
From Giddens’ notion of self-identity, that is, the self reflexively understood 
by the person in terms of her/his biography/autobiography, we can perceive 
an agentic self in one’s continual interaction with the vicissitudes of one’s social 
life. This autonomous capability of the self, or what Giddens calls as ‘human 
agent’ (ibid., p.175), makes individuals actively respond to the basic questions 
of who am I and how to act and respond to the ever-changing modern 
situations in which the tasks of self-actualization and self-realization have to 
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be performed. Giddens shows us that the self is never a passive entity. The self 
never stops shaping and reshaping itself in its intertwining with external social 
forces even under the overwhelming influence of the dynamic global and local 
transformations nowadays. With this agentic capability and through ‘life 
politics’, i.e. the politics of choices of lifestyle, individuals therefore are able to 
shape, alter and reflexively sustain the narrative of self-identity by connecting 
future projects with past experiences in a reasonably coherent fashion in relation 
to rapidly changing circumstances of social life. 
 
In any setting of high modernity, a rich array of lifestyles is also part of a 
diversity of dazzling choices. Giddens considers that self-identity has 
increasingly depended on lifestyle choice. He stresses that lifestyle choice is 
increasingly important in the constitution of self-identity and daily activity. He 
holds that the choice of lifestyle, the confrontation of and the decision on a 
diversity of possibilities of ways of life concerns the core of self-identity. As he 
writes,  
 
‘In conditions of high modernity, we all not only follow lifestyles, 
but in an important sense are forced to do so—we have no choice 
but to choose. A lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated 
set of practices which an individual embraces, not only because such 
practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but because they give material form 
to a particular narrative of self-identity’ (ibid., p.81). 
 
Hence, Giddens seems to suggest that choices in lifestyle are decisions not only 
about how to act but who to be. He writes, ‘The more post-traditional the 
settings in which an individual moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very 
core of self-identity, its making and remaking’ (ibid.). The ‘openness’ of social 
life today, the pluralisation of contexts of action and the diversity of 
‘authorities’ all make lifestyle choices more possible than ever. Life-planning for 
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the individual’s future therefore becomes essential to the formation of 
self-identity.  As Giddens writes, 
 
‘Reflexively organised life-planning, which normally presumes 
consideration of risks as filtered through contact with expert 
knowledge, becomes a central feature of the structuring of 
self-identity’ (ibid., p.5).  
 
Based on these thoughts, Giddens puts forward the idea of life politics. Life 
politics as a ‘politics of life decisions’ concerns debates and contestations 
emerging from the issues of the self and self-identity influenced by globalising 
tendency in post-traditional contexts (see Giddens 1991). For Giddens, the 
importance of the agenda of life politics lies in his good wishes that ‘they 
(agenda) call for a remoralising of social life and they demand a renewed 
sensitivity to questions that the institutions of modernity systematically 
dissolve’ (ibid., p.244). 
 
To sum up, the question of why self-identity becomes a problem for Giddens is 
that under the dynamic impact of late modernity and with the interplay of the 
dialectic of the local and global, ‘the self undergoes massive change’ (ibid., 
p.80). This change causes many anxieties concerning an individual’s trust in 
her/his dependent existence on persons and objects in terms of his/her 
ontological security. Under the conditions of reflexivity of modernity, the self 
thus becomes the ‘reflexive project of the self’, and by the same token, 
self-identity is thus no longer seen as something that is given but appears as 
something ‘that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive 
activities of the individual’ (ibid., p.52).  Furthermore, ‘self-identity is the self 
as reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her 
biography/autobiography (ibid., p.53).  Giddens therefore points out that the 
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choices of lifestyles and life-planning are increasingly significant to the 
constitution of self-identity of the people nowadays. 
 
2.5 Bauman’s view: identity as an unfulfilled project due to radical 
individualism  
2.5.1 What is liquid modernity? 
Bauman argues that we have moved away from a ‘heavy’, ‘solid’ and 
hardware-focused modernity to a ‘light’, ‘liquid’, ‘fluid’ and software-based 
modernity. Bauman points out that the ‘spirit’ of modernity is ‘melting the 
solids’, that is, ‘dissolving whatever persists over time and is negligent of its 
passage or immune to its flow’ (Bauman 2000, p.3).  In early modernity, 
‘melting the solids’ is the process of one solid replacing another solid. As 
Bauman writes,  
 
‘The first solid to be melted and the first sacreds to be profaned were 
traditional loyalties, customary rights and obligations which bound 
hands and feet, hindered moves and cramped the enterprise. To set 
earnestly about the task of building a new (truly solid!) order, it was 
necessary to get rid of the ballast with which the older burdened the 
builders’ (ibid., p.3-4).  
 
This is a ‘solid modernity’, which was dominated by an instrumental 
rationality claimed by Max Weber or determining role of economy articulated 
by Karl Marx. It is more ‘solid’ than ‘the orders it replaced, because—unlike 
them—it was immune to the challenge from non-economic action’ (ibid., p.4). 
For Bauman, solid modernity acted as a ‘basis’ of social life and treated other 
realms of life as ‘superstructure’, which is actually an ‘artefact of the “basis” 
whose sole function was to service its smooth and continuing operation’ (ibid.). 
It is called a solid modernity also because it is considered as ‘lasting’ or 
permanent, something which ‘one could trust and rely upon and which would 
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make the world predictable and therefore manageable’ (ibid., p.3). Such 
modernity is a frame which ‘encapsulated the totality of life conditions and life 
prospects and determined the range of realistic life projects and life strategies’ 
(ibid., p.7).  
 
However, Bauman criticises the fact that ‘solid modernity’ turned out to be 
‘rigid, fatal and sealed off from any freedom of choice’ (ibid., p.3), and the 
‘rigidity of order’ is ‘the artefact and sediment of the human agents’ freedom’ 
(ibid., p.5). Bauman argues that there is a decline in the illusions of ‘solid 
modernity’ as mentioned above. Rather, the condition in which we live 
nowadays is ‘liquid modernity’. He writes, 
 
‘Configuration, constellations, patterns of dependency and 
interaction were all thrown into the melting pot, to be subsequently 
recast and refashioned; this was the ‘breaking the mould’ phase in 
the history of the ‘inherently transgressive, boundary-breaking, 
all-eroding modernity’ (ibid., p.6). 
 
The freedom in liquid modernity is ‘the radical melting of the fetters and 
manacles rightly or wrongly suspected of limiting the individual freedom to 
choose and to act’ (ibid., p.5). Meanwhile, more and more new patterns and 
configurations appeared under numerous and profound social changes. There 
are so many different kinds of patterns and configurations—they clash with 
one another and there is no authoritative single pattern that can be seen in 
solid modernity.  As Bauman writes,  
 
‘the world full of possibilities is like a buffet table set with 
mouth-watering dishes, too numerous for the keenest of eaters to 
hope to taste them all. The diners are consumers, and the most 
taxing and irritating of the challenges consumers confront is the 
need to establish priorities: the necessity to forsake some unexplored 
CHAPTER 2 
 73
options and to leave them unexplored. The consumers’ misery 
derives from the surfeit, not the dearth of choices (Have I used my 
means to the best advantage?’ is the consumer’s most haunting, 
insomnia-causing question’ (ibid., p.63).  
 
Bauman thus called this as ‘moving from the era of pre-allocated “reference 
groups” into the epoch of “universal comparison”’ (ibid. p.7). 
 
As a result, those possibilities have changed their nature and have been 
reclassified as ‘items in the inventory of individual task’ (ibid.). Consequently 
Bauman perceives that the ‘liquidizing powers’ have moved from the “system” 
to “society”, from “politics” to “life-policies” – or have “descended from the 
“macro” to the “micro” level of social cohabitation (ibid.). This is why Bauman 
thinks that the present conditions of Western societies are the ‘individualized, 
privatized version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the 
responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual’s shoulders’ (ibid.). 
Based on the notion of radical individualization, he sharply points out the loss 
of public sphere in fluid modernity: 
 
‘The solids whose turn has come to be thrown into melting pot and 
which are in the process of being melted at the present time, the 
time of fluid modernity, are the bonds which interlock individual 
choices in collective projects and actions – the patterns of 
communication and co-ordination between individually conducted 
life policies on the one hand and political actions of human 
collectivities on the other (ibid., p. 6) 
 
2.5.2 Problem of identity and individual de jure  
For an individual, ‘being modern’, in Bauman’s view, ‘means being 
perpetually ahead of oneself, in a state of constant transgression. It also means 
having an identity which can exist only as an unfulfilled project’ (ibid., p.28-29).  
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For Bauman, this is one key reason why identity becomes more and more 
problematic in nowadays.  According to Bauman, there are at least three 
explanations for the cause of this problem. 
 
First of all, as can be seen above, for Bauman, one main characteristics of liquid 
modernity is its radicalized ‘individualization’. Driven by radical 
individualism, individual’s desire of ‘being somebody’ never ends in front of 
endless choices, which is the liquid condition of ‘the impossibility of ever 
being gratified’. To quote his own words,  
 
‘Being modern came to mean, as it means today, being unable to 
stop and even less able to stand still. We move and are bound to 
keep moving not so much because of the ‘delay of gratification’, as 
Max Weber suggested, as because of the impossibility of ever being 
gratified: the horizon of satisfaction, the finishing line of effort and 
the moment of restful self-congratulation move faster than the 
fastest of the runners’ (ibid., p.28). 
 
In this condition, an individual is no longer free when the end has been 
reached; he/she is not him/herself when he/she becomes somebody. Thus 
Bauman claims, ‘The state of unfinishedness, incompleteness and 
undertermination is full of risk and anxiety; but its opposite brings no 
unadultered pleasure either, since it forecloses what freedom needs to stay 
open’ (ibid.).  
 
Secondly, individualization not only causes the disappearance of the ‘public 
sphere’, it also imposes heavy burdens and responsibility on individuals. 
According to Bauman, 
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‘Being an individual de jure means having no one to blame for one’s 
own misery, seeking the causes of one’s own defeats nowhere 
except in one’s own indolence and sloth, and looking for no 
remedies other than trying harder and harder still’ (ibid. p., 38).  
 
But individual de facto can ‘gain control over their fate and make the choices 
they truly desire’ (ibid., p.39). In Bauman’s eyes, individuals today only have 
freedom de jure and what they lack is the freedom de facto. This process also 
exerts a great influence on an individual’s identity. As he writes,  
 
‘individualization’ consists of transforming human ‘identity’ from a 
‘given’ into a ‘task’ and charging the actors with the responsibility 
for performing that task and for the consequences (also the 
side-effects) of their performance. In other words, it consists in the 
establishment of a de jure autonomy (whether or not the de facto 
autonomy has been established as well )’ (ibid., p.37). 
 
Thirdly, as has been shown, in liquid settings, there is a surfeit of possibilities, 
and people increasingly have the ‘freedom to become anybody’. For Bauman, 
the identities in the conditions of liquid modernity are like ‘commodities’ — 
the ‘things’ to choose and buy: 
 
‘Given the intrinsic volatility and unfixity of all or most identities, it 
is the ability to ‘shop around’ in the supermarket of identities, the 
degree of genuine of putative consumer freedom to select one’s 
identity and to hold to it as long as desired, that becomes the royal 
road to the fulfilment of identity fantasies. Having that ability, one is 
free to make and unmake identities at will. Or so it seems’ (ibid., 
p.83). 
 
In this sense, modern people enjoy more ‘freedom’ to choose anyone they want 
to become.  As Bauman writes, 
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‘whether genuine or putative to the eye of the analyst, the loose, 
“associative” status of identity, the opportunity to “shop around”, 
to pick and shed one’s “true self”, to “be on the move”, has come in 
present-day consumer society to signify freedom’ (ibid., p.87).  
 
However, did individuals really enjoy such kinds of freedom? Bauman 
suggests that individuals actually suffer from it rather then gaining more 
freedom. He considers that this is the freedom de jure, i.e. freedom based on 
individual’s decisions among countless possibilities. Individuals not only 
suffer difficult decision-making among a dazzling diversity of choices, but also 
have to undertake the responsibility for choosing them. As Bauman writes, 
 
‘”Being thrown on one’s own resources” augurs mental torments 
and the agony of indecision, while “responsibility resting on one’s 
own shoulders” portends a paralysing fear of risk and failure 
without the right to appeal and seek redress. This cannot be what 
“freedom” really means; and if “really existing” freedom, the 
freedom on offer, does mean all that, it can be neither the warrant of 
happiness nor an objective worth fighting for’ (Bauman 2000, p.19).  
 
From Bauman’s argument, one can see that because of radical 
individualization, an individual’s identity has become ‘an unfulfilled project’ 
and to have an ‘identity’ could cause more agonies and anxieties than ever. 
 
2.5.3 Bauman’s analysis: citizenship and Individual de facto  
As can be seen from above, in Bauman’s eyes, individuals today only have 
freedom de jure and what they lack is freedom de facto. The choice of identity in 
a liquid setting is a kind of ‘passive’ choice rather than the choice made of their 
own will. Thus, Bauman thinks that there is a wide and growing gap between 
the conditions of individual de jure and chances to become individuals de facto. 
To be more precise,  
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‘The yawning gap between the right of self assertion and the 
capacity to control the social settings which render such 
self-assertion feasible or unrealistic seems to be the main 
contradiction of fluid modernity—one that, through trial and error, 
critical reflection and bold experimentation, we would need 
collectively to learn to tackle collectively’ (ibid., p.38). 
 
This is why Bauman calls for the citizenship to bridge this gap.  He writes,  
 
‘The individual de jure cannot turn into the individual de facto 
without first becoming the citizen. There are no autonomous 
individuals without an autonomous society, and the autonomy of 
society requires deliberate and perpetually deliberated 
self-constitution, something that may be only a shared 
accomplishment of its members’ (ibid., p.40).  
 
In this sense, individuals need to relearn forgotten citizenship skills and 
reappropriate lost citizenship tools for cooperation and solidarity in order to 
handle collectively those private agonies encountered in liquid situations. 
 
2.6 Individualization, modernity and identity 
From Bauman’s theory, one can realize that radical individualism is a key 
phenomenon that causes problems with identity today. To further understand 
how individualism and individualization put the identity in a troubled 
position, we need to go through the development of notions ‘individualism’ 
and ‘individualization’ and their relations to identity in modern time. 
According to Flew & Priest (2002),  
 
‘In political ontology, individualism is the thesis that social wholes, 
such as states, classes, nations, or forces of history, may only exist or 
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act if individual human beings exist and act. In the philosophy of 
mind, individualism is the thesis that a person’s mental state is 
essentially determined by facts about that individual’s mind, rather 
than their environment or other individuals’ (p.196-197).  
 
The term ‘individual’ is most often used to refer to ‘a person/human being’; 
however, the emphasis here is to separate and distinct from others of the same 
kind. It has been said that from the seventeenth century onwards this term 
indicated separateness, as in individualism (Abbs 1986, cited in Klein 2005, 
p.26-27). So, individualism emphasizes individual liberty, the primary 
importance of the individual, and the ‘virtues of self-reliance’ and ‘personal 
independence’. It opposes authority, and all manner of controls over the 
individual, especially when exercised by the political state or ‘society’. Hence, 
individualism is contrary to collectivism, which advocates subordination of the 
individual to the will of the society or community. Philosophically, 
individualism has its origin in the Renaissances and the Enlightenment in 
Europe. From historical and political points of views, individualism can be 
traced back to the French Revolution and American Revolution. The notion of 
individualism is connected to the identity as personality.  The popularity of 
the modern term ‘personality’ has something to do with individualism. 
According to Sennett (Sennett 1977) ‘personality’ replaces the earlier 
Enlightenment belief in natural ‘character’. ‘Personality’ suggests that 
behaviour is the clue to inner self and that personal feelings are more 
important than rational control in the formation of self-identity. However, 
‘Horace writes that the character of a man depends on his connections to the 
world. In this sense, ‘character’ is a more encompassing term than its more 
moderns offspring “personality”, which concerns desires and sentiments 
which may fester within, witnessed by no one else’ (see Sennett 1998, p.10). 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 79
The concepts of individuality/individualization in sociology have their origin 
in Western individualism. Individualism has only emerged as a focus for 
sociological research in last century. According to Giddens, Baumeister (1986) 
has claimed that in pre-modern times our current emphasis on individuality 
was absent. Durkheim (1893) holds that with the differentiation of the labour 
division during the emergence of modern societies, the separate individual 
becomes a focus of attention. Individualization has been seen as one significant 
process of modernization. The notion of individualization can be seen as one 
form of modernization related to the notion of ‘emancipation’. However, one 
must note that ‘individualization’ in modern social theorists’ mind has 
changed its meaning from early modernity. Bauman points this out well,  
 
‘“individualization” now means something very different form 
what it meant a hundred years ago and what it conveyed at the 
early times of the modern era – the times of the extolled 
“emancipation” of man from the tightly knit tissue of communal 
dependency, surveillance and enforcement’ (Bauman 2000, p.31).  
 
When discussing the problem of identity in modern Western societies 
nowadays, both Giddens and Bauman suggest that ‘individualization’ is 
closely bound up with the issues of identity. Also, both Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens view individualization as an unavoidable and necessary 
intermediate phase on the way to new forms of social life. For Bauman, in late 
or liquid modern settings, the task of human emancipation has done and  
traditional authority has declined.  Instead, many authorities (possibilities 
and patterns) have emerged that affect an individual’s daily life.  Modern 
individuals are thus free to choose from many possibilities but consequently 
are more and more in a state of confusion and uncertainty. They have to seek 
in personal life from personal resources what is denied to them in public 
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arenas. No doubt, this greatly radicalises the process of individualization. As 
Bauman contends, in liquid modernity, individualization has been immensely 
radicalized towards the unexpected conditions which causes many problems 
of the ‘privatized’. Sennett also argues that the fact that public space has 
become ‘dead’ is one reason for the pervasiveness of narcissism, one form of 
radical individualization (see Sennett 1977). 
 
More importantly, individualization is accelerated by today’s consumerism in 
Capitalist societies. According to Giddens, at the early stage of capitalism in 
modernization, individualism only related to labour division and individual 
rights. He writes, ‘From the beginning, markets promote individualism in the 
sense that they stress individual rights and responsibilities, but at first this 
phenomenon mainly concerns the freedom of contract and mobility intrinsic to 
capitalistic employment’ (Giddens 1990, p.197). In the age of late modernity 
and liquid modernity, individualization is immensely radicalized by a 
consumption culture. Capitalism commodifies modern society, and 
commodification directly affects consumption processes.  Individualism thus 
is cultivated by the sphere of consumption, e.g. through advertisers’ 
cultivation of specific consumption ‘packages’. Commodification then 
influences the ‘project of the self’ and the establishment of lifestyles, because, 
‘to a great or lesser degree, the project of the self becomes translated into one 
of the possession of desired goods and pursuit of artificially framed styles of 
life’ (ibid., p.198). Bauman even goes further to see identities directly as 
different kinds of ‘commodities’ in liquid modern settings and subsequently 
the individual has to keep choosing and quitting identities as if they are 
commodities. No matter whether this view is true or not nowadays, 
individualization makes identity incoherent, fragmented and unstable. As 
Beck asserts, in the changing conditions of modern society with radically 
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individualized and privatized trends, individuals must first disembed and 
then, re-embed into industrial society’s ways of life by adopting new ways in 
which individuals must produce, stage, and cobble together their biographies 
themselves. People nowadays have diversely different stories of their life when 
compared with those held by their ancestors in their life course. No wonder 
Peter Alheit has written of Bastelbiografie—the do-it-yourself biography (Alheit 
1994). It is then not difficult to understand why Giddens claims that an 
individual’s self-identity has to be reflexively understood in terms of his/her 
biography/autobiography. But as Bauman sharply asserted, individualization 
in liquid settings, ‘consists of transforming human “identity” from a “given” 
into a “task” and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing 
that task and for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance’ 
(Bauman 2000, p.32).   
  
However, Giddens and Bauman differ in their analyses of the problem. 
Giddens analyses that ‘life politics’ have emerged from an individual’s 
dealings with personal problems in current society. While it is significant to 
call for ‘agency’ to control individual’s life, including troubled self-identity, it 
seems that this simply makes the individualization more radicalized since this 
analysis suggests that all the decisions about choices have to be made by an 
individual her/himself and troubles brought by such decisions are that 
individual’s problems. However, Bauman sharply criticizes the side effects 
brought about by increasingly intensified individualization. There are only 
individuals de jure in present societies and they suffer the agony of 
decision-making in front of diversity of choices which are not their own but 
imposed by modern society. These are individual plights caused by radical 
individualization; ‘life politics’ can only deepen such individual plights.  
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Therefore, according to Bauman what we urgently need is citizenship to 
handle the privatized problem collectively. 
 
2.7 Other questions related to the problem of identity 
2.7.1 Where does the problem of identity exist? 
The first question we should have a look is where does the problem of identity 
exist? Given that the problem of identity is closely bound up with the 
advancement of modernization, one can perceive from above that the problem 
of identity is more salient in the Western societies than in the rest of the human 
world. Other economically developing countries nowadays, with the trend of 
globalization, are striving for the entry into the group of the developed 
countries through their effort of modernization.  However, they are generally 
still in the transition from local traditional settings to modern circumstances. 
Consequently they are not experiencing radicalised modernization as the 
Western world has experienced. Also, because of the different social, cultural 
and political systems, problems of identity emerge differently in forms and in 
degree. Take China as an example. China takes ‘the realization of 
modernization of the whole country’ as its fundamental national goal and the 
centrality of policy.  This country has undergone rapid modernization, 
particularly in its economy with its rapid development of free market and 
‘open-door’ policy for foreign investors. Chinese people to some extent are also 
individualized by a consumption culture.  However on the whole, the 
phenomenon of individualization in China is not as radicalized and 
universalized as in the Western world. Also because of the Chinese 
socio-cultural background and political ideology, possibilities and choices in 
terms of individual’s life are not as indefinite as in western countries, at least 
not to date.  
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2.7.2 To whom the identity has becomes a problem? 
The second key question about identity is to whom the identity has become a 
problem.  Bauman offers an insightful answer to this question: 
 
‘Let me note that identification is also a powerful factor in 
stratification; one of its most divisive and sharply differentiating 
dimensions. At one pole of the emergent global hierarchy are those 
who can compose and decompose their identities more or less at 
will, drawing from the uncommonly large, planet-wide pool of 
offers. At the other pole are crowded those whose access to identity 
choice has been barred, people who are given no say in deciding 
their preferences and who in the end are burdened with identities 
enforced and imposed by others; identities which they themselves 
resent but are not allowed to shed and cannot manage to get rid of. 
Stereotyping, humiliating, dehumanizing, stigmatizing 
identities…’(Bauman2004, p.38) 
 
Then, Bauman claims that ‘most of us are suspended uneasily between those 
two poles’ (ibid.). Most people, according Bauman, are uncertain about how 
long their freedom to choose and renounce an identity will last and are 
worrying about their ability to hold their desirable identity in their hands. 
Likewise, Giddens thinks that in the circumstances of high modernity, the 
influences of ‘lifestyle choices and life planning’ are ‘more or less universal, no 
matter how objectively limiting the social situations of particular individuals 
or groups may be’ (Giddens 1990, p.85). 
 
Furthermore, both Bauman and Giddens seem to suggest that the problem of 
identity appears to be universal is because both the rich and the poor live in 
the same society, same world and within the same culture. As Bauman says, 
‘the poor cannot avert their eyes; there is nowhere they could avert their eyes 
to’ because they exist in the same society as the rich (Bauman 2000, p.88). Also 
according to Giddens, for poor and under-privileged people, ‘the reflexive 
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constitution of self-identity may be every bit as important as among more 
affluent strata, and as strongly affected by globalising influences’ (Giddens 
1990. p.86). 
 
Furthermore, both theorists suggest that the affluent and the privileged enjoy 
more choices in their life than the poor, as the rich and the privileged have 
more life chances and a higher volume of resources at their disposal. But 
different agonies may be caused. For Giddens, life chances condition lifestyle 
choices. In this sense, one may say that the rich face more possibilities and 
uncertainties in their lives. This suggests that they might suffer more anxiety in 
order to forge a coherent and consistent self-identity. However, for Bauman, 
more resources enable the rich to choose among more options and to keep 
selecting among the ‘fast-moving’ and new-fashioned targets. They cannot 
stop. If they stop, it means they have no freedom to choose any longer. Hence, 
Bauman writes, ‘The more choices the rich seem to have, the less bearable to all 
is a life without choosing’ (Bauman 2000, p.88). In another words, while the 
rich suffer the agony of decision-making among indefinite possibilities, they 
also have to keep quenching their thirst for freedom of choosing.  
 
Richard Sennett, seeing from the notion of character, offers different views. He 
suggests that people who feel at home in the new capitalism are those who 
develop ‘the capacity to let go of one’s past, the confidence to accept 
fragmentation’ (Sennett 1999, p.62).  The realities that drive any individual to 
pursue many possibilities at the same time require a particular strength of 
character  – ‘that of someone who has the confidence to dwell in disorder, 
someone who flourishes in the midst of dislocation’ (ibid.). People, who have 
problems with anxiety concerning ‘selfhood’ in terms of certain aspects of 
character, working identity or self-actualisation, are passive people.  Sennett 
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claims, ‘in a dynamic society, passive people wither’ (ibid., p.88). This view 
thus reveals a phenomenon that modern persons who cannot learn to adapt to 
the flexible society are likely to suffer identity problem. 
 
2.7.3 How does identity become a problem?  
The answers to this third question from both Giddens and Bauman are quite 
similar. First of all, both consider that it is the decline of traditions caused by 
modernization in today’s settings that makes the problem of identity present 
itself  in a more salient manner than ever. But both however,  have different 
emphases. For Giddens, the decline of the tradition is just one explanation of 
the problem of identity, but not a central reason. He writes, 
 
‘Modernity, it might be said, breaks down the protective framework 
of the small community and of tradition, replacing these with much 
larger, impersonal organisation. The individual feels bereft and 
alone in a world in which she or he lacks the psychological supports 
and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings’ 
(Giddens 1990, p.33-34).  
 
Nevertheless he stresses that the ‘anxieties’ caused by uncertainties in the 
future brought by changes from institutional reflexivity are the real key reason 
why identity has become a problem. However, Bauman stresses that 
modernization as individualization is the major reason for the problem of 
identity. He writes, 
 
‘The shifting of responsibilities for choice onto individual shoulders, 
the dismantling of signposts and the removing of milestones, 
topped up by a growing indifference of the powers-on-high to the 
nature of the choices made and to their feasibility, were two trends 
present in the ‘challenge of self-identification” from the start. In the 
course of time the two trends, closely intertwined and mutually 
invigorating, gathered force – even if they were frowned on, 
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bewailed and censured as worrying, even pathological, 
developments’( Bauman 2004, p.50-51). 
 
For Bauman, this process goes hand in hand with ‘liquefaction’ of social 
frameworks and institutions. 
 
Secondly, as a key aspect of identity formation, intimate relationships between 
people have changed nowadays. Both theorists consider there is no ‘long-term 
commitment’ for amorous relationships both in late and liquid modern 
settings. For Giddens the partnership of ‘till death us to part’ has been replaced 
by ‘confluent love’.  That is, in Bauman’s words, ‘a relationship that lasts only 
as long as and not a moment longer than, the satisfaction it brings to both 
partners’ (Bauman 2004, p.65). Pure relationships are very easy to break without 
commitment, and this greatly threatens an individual’s ontological security.  
Also, Bauman claims that the modern person is a ‘man without Bonds’. This is 
because, 
 
 ‘in a world where disengagement is practised as a common 
strategy of the power struggle and self-assertion, there are few of 
any points in life that can be safely predicted to last. The “present” 
does not therefore bind the “future”, and there is nothing in the 
present that allows us to guess, let alone to visualize, the shape of 
things to come. Long-term thinking and, even more, long-term 
commitment and obligations indeed appear “meaningless”’ (ibid., 
p.68).  
 
This modern feature profoundly affects a person’s identity in its original shape 
and form: 
 
‘The blows strike right into the heart of human mode of 
being-in-the-world. After all, the hard core of identity—the answer 
to the question “who am I?” and even more importantly the 
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continuing credibility of whatever answer might have been given to 
the question—cannot be formed unless in reference to the bonds 
connecting the self to other people and the assumption that such 
bonds are reliable and stable over time’ (ibid., p.68).  
 
Long-term commitment in any intimate relationship would give rise to the 
ambivalence. We need long-term commitment both for others and ourselves. 
‘We need them nonetheless, we need them badly, and not only because of 
moral concern for the well-being of others, but also for our own sake, for the 
sake of the cohesion and logic of our own being’ (ibid.). Bauman further 
writes,  
 
‘When it comes to entering and staying in a relationship, fear and 
desire fight to get the better of each other. We earnestly struggle for 
the security that only a committed relationship (and yes, committed 
for a long term!) may bring and yet we fear a victory no less than 
defeat. Our attitudes to human bonds tend to be painfully 
ambivalent, and the chances of resolving that ambivalence are 
nowadays slim (ibid., p.69).  
 
This is how self-identification and self-identity becomes a problem for most 
people nowadays. 
 
Thirdly, not only are the intimate relationships and thus self-identity 
influenced by no ‘long-term commitment’ due to changing social settings.  
Modern people’s character and thus their personal lives are corroded by it. 
Sennett focuses on the challenges posed by modern work patterns that affect 
modern people’s work ethic. Sennett analyses the new economy feeds on 
experience that drifts in time, from place to place, from job to job. Short-term 
capitalism threatens to corrode an individual’s character, ‘particularly those 
qualities of character which bind human beings to one another and furnishes 
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each with a sense of sustainable self’ (Sennett 1989, pp.26-27). Character like 
commitment, loyalty and trust which need a long time to develop are 
corroded by ‘no long term’.  This is a new way of organizing time, especially 
working time, in order to keep up with rapid changes of ‘consumer-driven’ 
market. As he writes, ‘”no long term” disorients action over the longer term, 
loosens bonds of trust and commitment, and divorces will from behaviour’ 
(ibid., p.31). This not only weakens the traditional work ethic but also directly 
affects individuals’ emotional lives outside the workplace.  
 
However, as we have seen in previous sections, there are different 
observations on how the problem of identity can be solved. For Giddens, 
people nowadays could make decision by themselves to adopt different life 
styles, which suggests they can choose who to be and how to act. But this 
process could only be realized through the ‘project of reflexivity of the self’ 
and by ensuring that self-identity is organized and reorganized through the 
calculative weighing up of opportunities and risks. For Bauman, in a liquid 
modern world, people are floating on the wave of changeable and short-lived 
opportunities (see Bauman 2000, 2004).   Since any long-term commitment to 
a particular identity is ‘meaningless’, one is inclined to swap one identity 
chosen once and for all, for a ‘network of connections’ (Bauman 2004, p.31). So, 
one tends to seek ‘redemption in quantity’ for the unhappiness of quality. 
Bauman writes,  
 
‘Once you have done it, however, entering a commitment and 
making it secure appear even more difficult (and so more 
off-putting, even frightening) than before. You now miss the skills 
that would or at least could make it work. Being on the move, once a 
privilege and an achievement, is then not longer a matter of choice: 
it now becomes “a must”. Keep up the speed, once an exhilarating 
adventure, turns into an exhausting chore’ (ibid).  
CHAPTER 2 
 89
Thus Bauman thinks people can only adopt Don Juan’s strategy: ‘finishing 
quickly and starting from a new beginning’ (ibid., p.53). From the above, 
although identity is no longer a ‘given’ and ‘solid’ thing nowadays, one can see 
both theorists have different analyses of identity in the present.  To put it in a 
nutshell, while Giddens still thinks people can make and remake their identity 
by themselves in an attempt to keep its continuity and cohesion, Bauman 
asserts in our age identity is for wearing and showing, not for keeping and 
storing (see Bauman 2004).  
 
Fourthly, both think that to have and realize an identity is largely subject to an 
individuals’ resources in today’s settings. Giddens contends that although 
both the poor and the rich face the universal phenomenon of decision making 
in terms of lifestyles, the lack of resources ‘might make these tasks become an 
almost insupportable burden, a source of despair rather than self-enrichment’ 
(ibid., p.86). For Bauman, ‘Selecting the means required to achieve an 
alternative identity of your choice is no longer a problem (if you have enough 
money, that is, to purchase its obligatory paraphernalia) (see Bauman 2004). 
Consequently, Bauman suggests that having an identity under liquid settings 
is largely related to person's resources. For the rich and /or privileged, identity 
might be treated as commodity to buy and throw away. Meanwhile for the 
poor, identity might be a thing of 'luxury'. The rich feel the agony of countless 
decision-making and are not able to stop to choose, but the poor might have to 
survive the hopelessness of not having a desired identity in the same world as 
the affluent because of the lack of resources. Thus, although in different ways, 
modern persons might not only suffer the burden of decision-making before 
indefinite and confused choices, they also need ‘lifelong attention, continuous 
vigilance, a huge and growing volume of resources and incessant effort with 
no hope of respite’ (Bauman 2004, p.82).  
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Fifthly, globalization can also be seen as a key factor in order to explain how 
identity has become a problem. For Giddens, globalization deskills the 
day-to-day life, yet new/modern knowledge of everyday life is also 
re-appropriated by lay actors.  However, according to Giddens, ‘few 
individuals sustain an unswerving trust in the systems of technical knowledge 
that impinge on them, and everyone, whether consciously or not selects among 
the competing possibilities of action that such system (or disengagement from 
them) provide’ (Giddens 1990, p.23). This is how ‘the reflexivity of the self’ 
expresses itself, that is, ‘a phenomenon which, on the level of the individual, 
like the broader institutions of modernity, balances opportunity and potential 
catastrophe in equal measure’ (ibid., p.34). For Bauman, however, 
globalization in liquid modernity not only means that at an individual level, ‘a 
cohesive, firmly riveted and solidly constructed identity would be a burden, a 
constraint and a limitation on the freedom to choose before indefinite 
possibilities’ (Bauman 2004, p.53).  It also means that at group level, people 
attempt to find protection from the ‘globalizing winds’, as the nation-state is 
unable to provide it. According to Bauman, this is one reason why the different 
kinds of movements seeking community recognition are common these days. 
Modernization facilitates migration, and migration accelerates pluralisation, 
and pluralisation in one area complicates communication and interaction. 
Then, the awareness of differences and recognition between groups looms 
large. This could also be one explanation for how identity, particularly 
community identity, has become a heated issue in nowadays. 
 
2.8 Critical Observations 
2.8.1 Different ‘anxieties’, different identity problems 
As has been shown above, the nature of self and identity have undergone 
massive changes under the dynamic socio-economic transformation that 
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emerged from modernization in the latter part of the 20th century in modern 
societies. This is the social backdrop against which the problem of identity 
becomes a concern among different disciplines nowadays. Giddens highlights 
anxieties about the ‘existential issues’ of being a person arisen from the lack of 
sense of security caused by external changes in the late modern settings and 
regards it as a main factor why identity has become problem. Bauman’s 
argument relating to the problem of identity seems to emerge from his critical 
examination of radical individualism and agonizing conditions of individual’s 
freedom brought by the transformation in fluid modernity. 
 
However, one must note that the two theorists talk about different kinds of 
‘anxiety’ within the individual. As has been shown, Giddens and Bauman set 
their argument about identity against post-traditional settings.  They agree 
that there has been a profound socio-economic change to various aspects of the 
human condition in Western society in the latter part of last century.  
However, they hold different views about the degree and range of that change. 
This might be the point where they part company in terms of the ‘anxiety’ they 
focus on. For Giddens, anxieties are caused by rapid external changes, and 
they are about existential issues in terms of the ontological security of a person. 
Specifically, it is about the continuity of self-identity, i.e. ‘the persistence of 
feelings of personhood in a continuous self and body’ (Giddens 1991, p.55). For 
Bauman, the anxieties are about the agony of individuals’ never-ending desire 
to choose in front of a surfeit of possibilities for choice. That is, to have an 
identity becomes an unfulfilled ‘task’ to perform for any individual.  By using 
his own resources and he/she has to be responsible for the consequence of 
performing him/herself. If the speed and depth of changes brought out by 
modernity are as radical and violent as Bauman analyses, we may find that his 
analyses on the problem of identity goes further than that offered by Giddens. 
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2.8.2 Criticisms towards Giddens’s analyses: radical individualism and 
hidden power 
First, Giddens’s notion of self as a reflexive project suggests an active agency. 
When one examines this ‘human agency’ about the individual’s self at a deeper 
level, he or she would find that Giddens’s over-emphasis on individualistic 
endeavour to confront, mitigate and eliminate the personal anxiety brought by 
late modernity actually leaves heavy burden on the self of the individual. It 
could make the individual suffer more. It is exactly here we can see the 
importance of Bauman’s criticism on radical individualism. Since the anxiety 
concerning the problem of identity nowadays is the consequence of 
modernization as individualization, it is not fair to simply put the 
responsibility to solve this problem on the shoulders of  individuals. There 
should be an urgent need to make the public undertake or at least share the 
responsibility to ease the pain of the miserable ‘modern’ self. What Giddens 
makes invisible by his analysis on ‘reflexivity of the self’ has been sharply 
made visible by Bauman’s insightful comments on ‘life politics’:  
 
‘When public politics sheds its functions and life-politics takes over, 
problems encountered by individuals de jure in their efforts to 
become individuals de facto turn out to be notoriously non-additive 
and non-cumulative, thereby denuding the public sphere of all 
substance except of the site where private worries are confessed and 
put on public display’ (Bauman 2000, p.51-52). 
 
Secondly, one also needs to realize that the ‘human agent’ suggested by 
Giddens is ‘de jure’ by nature. It is an ability to reflexively adapt, alter and 
sustain the ‘self’ of an individual according to the endless changes happened 
in the external world. In other words, this ‘human agent’ is triggered by 
coercion of external forces rather than emerges from his/her real own will. It is 
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not an autonomy de facto, i.e. the exercise of free will, to ‘gain control over their 
fate and make the choices they truly desire’ (ibid., p.39). Instead, the individual 
under today’s late modern circumstances in Giddens’s mind seems to be an 
individual de jure. 
 
Bauman’s view on liquid modernity and its negative impacts on the individual 
mirrors modern Western social conditions to a great extent. He sharply 
suggests capitalism as an invisible control produced by liquid modernity over 
the conditions of individual’s life and the side effects resulting from this 
control. The surfeit of choices existed in present settings is a freedom de jure 
and is actually the source of agony for any individual to suffer. Although the 
countless choices derived from rapid and ephemeral changes seem to be the 
enjoyments of freedom, they lead to confusion, anxiety and risks. People 
change from one identity to another through the purchase of   ‘supermarket 
of identities’ as Bauman’s metaphor suggests.  In Bauman’s line of argument, 
one finally could see that the identity under a liquid setting has lost identity’s 
original meaning. Identity is no longer about the true aspect of selfhood or a 
coherent ‘sense of self’ or a sameness of self-identification, but is about ‘things’ 
offered and displayed by an invisible power for choice. Bauman perceptibly 
suggests that modern people’ s identity is increasingly shaped and determined 
by external force, rather than by true human ‘agency’, which is the autonomy 
de facto to form their own identity and control their lives at their own will.  
 
Bauman’s calling for the urgent need for learning about citizenship to bridge 
that gap between the conditions of individual de jure and their chances to 
become individual de facto provides us with a tool to change the situation.  
This can be done by turning an individual’s privatized worries, fragmented 
anxieties and weak self-assertion to the united human condition for 
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cooperation and solidity in order to tackle our problem collectively. Given that 
the need to relearn forgotten citizen skills and reappropriate lost citizen tools 
is the only way to fill that gap (see Bauman 2000), it meanwhile reminds the 
public of the necessity to rethink the meaning of the democracy education in 
Western societies nowadays.   
 
Thirdly, Giddens’s idea of ‘reflexive project of the self’ implies individuals’ 
adaptation and flexibility to the external changes. Sennett demonstrates the 
side effects of being a flexible person in his work The Corrosion of Character 
(Sennett 1999). He argues that today people live in conditions of ‘flexible 
capitalism’, where ‘rigid forms of bureaucracy are under attack, as are the evils 
of blind routine’ (Sennett 1998, p.9). This flexibility arouses anxiety. As he 
writes, ‘people do not know what risks will pay off, what paths to pursue’ 
(ibid.).  Sennett also points out the consequences of the loss of authority for 
the individual, especially in the workplace, where the ‘the ironic man’ will 
appear.  Sennett thinks Richard Rorty writes well when describing this kind 
of irony as a state of mind in which people are ‘never quite able to take 
themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they 
describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency 
and fragility of their final “vocabularies, and thus of their selves”’(Richard 
Rorty quoted by Sennett 1998, p.116). Sennett also holds that the rules and 
authority of the past are actually substituted by the new order and new control, 
which are hard to understand. As he writes, ‘the new capitalism is an illegible 
regime of power’ (ibid., p.9). Therefore, ‘Flexibility begets disorder, but not 
freedom from restraint’ (ibid., p.59). 
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2.8.3 Criticism towards Bauman 
Nevertheless, one might criticize Bauman on the grounds that his view is too  
pessimistic.  What he described as the problem of identity seems to suggest 
that there is no longer the true existence of person’s identity in a present-day 
setting.  I partly agree with this criticism because I think Bauman might 
overestimate the rapidity and range of changes brought by liquid modernity 
and their impacts on personal identity. He seems to suggest that changes of 
identity are so rapid and choices of identity are so many that the modern 
person has no time to pause to think, to reflect and or to maintain a continuity 
of identity in liquid settings. It might be still early to deny the continuity of 
identity at present. I am sceptical towards the idea that identity is like a 
‘commodity’, which could be quickly possessed and quickly thrown away in 
today’s Western societies. Instead, I would argue that the identity one holds 
today in a large sense can be understood as a certain sense of oneself with 
his/her self-interpretations and the interpretations from others to him/herself 
at present, together with traces of his/her past and signs of his/her future. I 
agree with what Charles Taylor has said, ‘In order to have a sense of who we 
are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are 
going’ (Taylor 1989, p.47). 
 
2.9. Implications for lifelong learning and some criticisms 
Both theorists’ thoughts on the problems of identity imply that learning has 
become a lifelong project for any individual of today. Given that Giddens’s 
theory of self-identity is the self reflexively understood by person in terms of 
his/her biography/autobiography, one can link the ‘reflexivity’ to lifelong 
learning by saying that individuals are autonomous to learn over their lifespan.  
This might be achieved by continually thinking and rethinking about 
individual issues relevant to who I am and how do I act in relation to social life 
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in one’s life course. Giddens’s idea about a ‘Human agent’ can be specifically 
considered as a certain learning autonomy to adapt oneself to the everlasting 
changing settings.  
 
The late modernist view of routine ‘reflexivity’ can be seen as a kind of 
‘permanent learning’ and has been considered to have a direct relation to a 
new mode of lifelong learning (e.g., Hake 1998).  Although this view has even 
been regarded as a central factor in ‘grasping the underlying function and 
place of lifelong learning in contemporary societies’ (Field 2000, p.62), the 
lifelong learning underpinned by this view has aroused some criticisms. For 
example, to what extent the claim that the self has becomes a reflexive project 
is true and universal still requires further empirical evidence.  
 
Two further key criticisms have also emerged in recent years. Firstly, it has 
been pointed out by some that the act of reflexivity of an individual to make 
and remake his/her self-identity is mainly being mobilized by rapid social 
changes (e.g., Beck 1992, Hake 1998).  But social changes brought about by 
modernity could also be seen as an ideological agenda, that is, capitalism—one 
of the great driving forces in the expansion of modernity. The late modernist 
view of an institutional reflexivity of modernity leads to the understanding 
that modern people must continually make and remake their self-identity in 
order to update themselves in the rapid changing late modern environment. 
However, it could be argued that what underlies this idea might be the 
demands of the capitalism, which desperately require more flexible human 
labour power. This situation will expect individuals to shape and reshape 
themselves continuously throughout their lives in order to meet the endless 
need for flexible positions and high production. To do this is also to stimulate a 
consuming appetite for a diversity of ‘identities’ for the benefit of the free 
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market. In this understanding, we can see the assumption that a late modernist 
view of reflexivity of the self, or the power to motivate people to learn to 
reshape themselves continually, is actually based on the agenda of 
commodification and consumerism. Learning to make and remake one’s 
identity in order to adapt oneself to the rapidly changing social settings which 
seems to be everyone’s project of self-actualisation is in fact a duty for 
something unseen. Such lifelong learning is a ‘knowledge economy’ and a 
‘learning economy’, notions which have been criticized by many (e.g., 
Edwards 1997; Field 2000; Biesta 2006a, 2006b).  
 
Secondly, one consequence of reflexivity of the self in a late modernist view 
has been criticized for leading to radical ‘individualism’. Giddens has been 
attacked by many on his magnification of personal power in the making and 
remaking self-identity. He seems to assume that every modern individual has 
to and is able to make and remake different new self-identities just to adapt to 
changing nature of the late modern social settings and empower themselves 
for self-actualisation. But if self is understood as a reflexive project in such a 
normative way, then it seems that it is every individual’s responsibility to make 
and remake his/her self-identity.  If one fails to do so or does not do so 
sufficiently, it is again the individual himself/herself that should take the 
responsibility. Any individual him/herself has to learn to make choices in 
order to shape and reshape his/ her self-identity, taking all the responsibility 
to learn to have a certain kind of right identity because it is the result of 
his/her own choice.  This has to be achieved without finding any public place 
to resolve personal agony caused by the endless choices he/she has to make in 
order to keep pace with ‘modernity’. As Bauman says, this only leads to 
privatized human agony (see Bauman 2000). It is here we can see how 
Bauman’s argument differs from Giddens’s theory. Lifelong learning under 
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this radicalized ‘individualism’ is a kind of agony resulting from endless 
choices that any individual has to make him/herself and endless uncertainties 
and problems that an individual has to suffer privately.  
 
Given that Bauman mentions the importance of citizenship as a tool to bridge 
the gap between individual de jure and individual de facto,  learning about 
citizenship and democracy should be  included in lifelong learning for the 
common interest of the members of the ‘good society’ and ‘just society’. As he 
writes,  
 
‘The individual de jure cannot turn into the individual de facto 
without first becoming the citizen. There are no autonomous 
individuals without an autonomous society, and the autonomy of 
society requires deliberate and perpetually deliberated 
self-constitution, something that may be only a shared 
accomplishment of its members’ (Bauman 2000, p.40). 
  
This is why there is an urgent call for ‘democratic learning’, which has been 
raised to counter ‘individualistic learning’ in recent years (see e.g. Bauman 
2000, 2005; Biesta 2006a).  
 
Likewise, from Bauman’s argument about identity, one can exactly find the 
fundamental necessity of lifelong learning. He suggests that one needs to see 
him/herself as a smart missile, in order to adapt to the liquid settings where 
everything is uncertain, and targets continuously change. Thus the only thing 
one can do is to learn continually throughout one’s life. As he writes, 
 
 ‘More to the point, in the liquid modern setting education and 
learning, to be of any use, must be continuous and indeed life-long. 
No other kind of education and/or learning is conceivable; 
“formation” of selves or personalities is unthinkable in any other 
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fashion but that of an on-going and perpetually unfinished 
re-formation’ (Bauman 2005, p.19).  
 
2.10. Reflections on the notion of reflexivity in relation to identity 
It could be argued that these criticisms levelled at Giddens’s notion of 
reflexivity do not mean the notion ‘reflexivity’ has no worth at all in relation to 
lifelong learning. Instead, I think this notion is closely bound up with learning 
in relation to personal identity. First, learning about personal identity is not 
only learning about self-assertion and being an individual de facto with the 
support of collectivism and democracy. It could be argued that learning about 
personal identity is also learning about self-understanding and personal 
development with the help of self-examination and self-interpretation. It is 
also about learning concerning how an individual as a unique being lives with 
what and who are others in the intersubjective world. All these dimensions are 
related to learning about the human being him/herself, which largely relies on 
one’s reflexivity. Therefore, in my view, learning and lifelong learning that is 
relevant to personal identity cannot be sufficient without the aid of the notion 
of reflexivity.  
 
The second reason that the notion of ‘reflexivity’ is important is that, from my 
observations, I believe this notion is closely related to the narrative of one’s 
identity. While both Giddens and Bauman agree that identity today is not 
something that is ‘given’, but becomes a ‘project’ that has to be fulfilled by a 
person her/himself, they hold different views on narratives of identity. 
Giddens maintains that an identity can still be made and remade 
self-reflexively through the construction of individual’s personal life story. 
This at least suggests that person’s identity can be seen through his or her 
coherent narratives of their life-story. However, Bauman holds that identity 
has become ‘an unfulfilled project’, since any modern person lives in a state of 
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endless becoming—a selfhood which is never finished.  Under these 
conditions, modern persons find it hard to clarify coherent life narratives and 
coherent narratives of personal identity. Moreover, such non-coherent 
narratives produce confusion. Bauman’s view agrees with Sennett’s argument: 
‘what is missing between the polar opposites of drifting experience and static 
assertion is a narrative which could organize his conduct’ (Sennett 1998, p.30), 
since  ‘the experience of disjointed time threatening the ability of people to 
form their characters into sustained narratives’ (ibid., p.31).  
 
The absence of such narrative causes anxieties about the future. According to 
Sennett, ‘Narratives are more than simple chronicles of events; they give shape 
to the formal movement of time, suggesting reasons why things happen, 
showing their consequences’ (ibid., p.30). In this sense, any life narrative is not 
only related to an individual’s past, it is also concerned with people’s thoughts 
on the future. As, Sennett points out, ‘the dilemma of how to organize a life 
narrative is partly clarified by probing how, in today’s capitalism, people cope 
with the future’ (Sennett 1998, p.177). These observations make me think if 
narrative is considered to be a life story one tells about him/herself, and this 
story is an articulation of one’s personal identity, we cannot ignore the notion 
of ‘reflexivity’ since one’s life story is fundamentally constructed through the 
act of reflexivity.  
 
The critical question is how we should understand the notion of ‘reflexivity’. 
As I have shown above, Giddens’s notion of ‘reflexivity’ in relation to identity 
is problematic in that he based this notion on the assumption of radical 
individualism.  This puts the implication for learning in relation to identity in 
a difficult position. Next, I wish to explore different theories of identity, not 
only for the aims I presented in Chapter 1, but also for seeking alternative 
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views on reflexivity in relation to identity and the role of learning inherent in 
those views. I also hope to conduct a further investigation into the question 
about the role that narrative plays in understanding identity. 
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Chapter 3  Paul Ricoeur’s view on personal identity and narrative identity 
 
To say self is not to say I. The I is posited—or is deposed. The self is 
implied reflexively in operations, the analysis of which precedes the 
return towards this self. Upon this dialectic of analysis and reflection 
is grafted that of idem and ipse. Finally, the dialectic of the same and 
the other crowns the first two dialectics.  
(Ricoeur 1992, p.18) 
 
…personal identity can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of 
human existence. 
(Ricoeur 1992, p.114) 
 
Subjects recognize themselves in the stories they tell about themselves. 
(Ricoeur 1988, p.247) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Personal identity as ‘narrative identity’ has been studied by many theorists 
(e.g., Arendt 1958, MacIntyre 1981, Taylor 1989, Ricoeur 1984,1988,1991, 1992). 
In this chapter I will focus on a discussion of French philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur’s theory of identity and his theory of narrative identity. Here, I 
endeavour to find out the roles of learning in his theories and, in particular, pay 
some attention to aspects of lifelong learning in my discussion of those roles. 
The main reason of focusing on Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity is that he 
deals with paradoxes of personal identity by putting a considerable emphasis 
on temporal factors and on the notion of personal identity. He reveals the 
complex dialectics between sameness, selfhood and others on temporal 
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dimension, from which the concept of personal identity can be better 
articulated and theorized. Stressing the temporal dimension of personal 
identity in the dialects between sameness and selfhood makes Ricoeur develop 
his theory of narrative identity.  This theory permits the possibility for 
allowing human beings to come to terms with the temporality of their 
existence throughout their lives, from which the ‘lifelong’ dimension of the 
meaning of life can be examined. The significance of the notion of narrative 
identity not only lies in its structural function as a mediator in the dialectic 
relationship between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood at 
conceptual level. It also lies in one’s self-understanding of one’s life as human 
experience.  This is because one’s recognition of his/her personal identity 
through narrative of one’s life can be regarded as one’s understanding of the 
meaning of his/her life and of being a certain kind of person through one’s 
interpretation of his/her life story. This is an approach that is rooted in 
hermeneutic philosophy. All these aspects of Ricoeur’s theory of personal 
identity are therefore of great value in the exploration of the role of learning 
and aspects of lifelong learning in relation to one’s personal identity.  
 
This chapter will start from a general discussion of a conceptual paradox of 
personal identity and how Ricoeur responds to the issue. Then this chapter 
will be developed by following three modes of dialectics contained in 
Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity. Firstly, I will clarify and interpret in 
detail Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity by focusing on the difference 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity and the dialectics between them. Then, 
I will move to a section that focuses on his theory of narrative identity.  Here I 
will distinguish between the notion of ‘narrative identity’ at a conceptual level 
and ‘narrative identity’ in a practical category. The notion of narrative identity 
at conceptual level suggested by Ricoeur is required in order to resolve the 
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paradox of personal identity through narrative’s function as a mediator 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity. The notion of narrative identity in a 
practical category is one’s personal identity identified through one’s 
self-interpretation of one’s life story. Secondly, I will demonstrate another 
dialectic relationship that exists between selfhood and others. Thirdly, I will 
reveal the dialectic between sameness and others, a dialectic which spans the 
first two. Finally, I will present my thoughts on the role of learning and aspects 
of lifelong learning implicated in different modes of reflexivity that have 
emerged from the three kinds of dialectics present in Ricoeur’s theories of 
personal identity. 
 
3.2 Paradoxes of personal identity 
The British philosopher John Locke first revealed the aporetic character of the 
question of identity. In the chapter titled ‘Identity and Diversity’ in his work 
An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2d ed., 1694), Locke introduces a 
concept of identity. After having said that identity results from a comparison, 
Locke introduces the singular idea of the identity of a thing with itself (identity 
as ‘sameness with itself’): ‘When therefore we demand whether anything be 
the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a 
place, which it was certain at that instant, was the same with itself’ (Locke 1964 
[1694], p.207 cited in Ricoeur 1992, p.125). But when Locke reaches the notion 
of personal identity, which he does not confuse with the identity of man, he 
assigns ‘sameness with itself’ alleged by his general definition of identity to 
instantaneous reflection. For Locke, reflection can be extended from the instant 
to the duration (of time) which means the retrospective expansion of reflection 
as far as it can extend in the past can be seen as one’s memory. So, Locke 
contends that personal identity depends on consciousness, not on substance. 
Because of the transformation of reflection into memory as the same continued 
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consciousness, this ‘sameness with itself’ in a person can thus be said to extend 
in time. Locke then contends that personal identity is the ‘sameness with itself’ 
of a person in terms of one’s same extended reflection as the same memory.  
 
Locke then invented a criterion of identity, i.e. mental identity vs. corporeal 
identity, from which discussions about the paradoxes within various criteria of 
identity appeared from that time on.  For instance, Locke offers the example 
of a prince whose memory is transplanted into the body of a cobbler. The 
question he raises is: Does the latter become the prince whom he remembers 
having been, or does he remain the cobbler whom other people continue to 
observe? Locke, consistent with his general definition, decides in favour of the 
first solution, that is, memory decides who a person is. Thus the era called 
‘puzzling cases’ unforeseeably began. Locke’s successors who are more sensitive 
to the differences between these two criteria of identity even hold that the 
issue is not merely paradoxical but also undecidable. Their debates created by 
the hypothesis of transplanting one and the same soul/brain into another body 
began to appear more undetermined rather than simply paradoxical. The 
modern philosopher Derek Parfit even concludes from the indecidability of the 
puzzling cases (his version of a puzzling case was teletransporting a person’s 
brain to his replica in another planet) that the question posed about paradox of 
the criteria for personal identity was itself empty (see Parfit 1986 cited in 
Ricoeur 1992, p.35).  
 
David Hume, another British philosopher, posits identity as sameness in a 
more direct way in his work A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, part 4, section 
6 (1739),  ‘We have a distinct idea of an object that remains invariable and 
uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time; and this idea we call that 
of identity or sameness’ (Hume 2000 [1739], p.165). But when he moves from 
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things and animate beings to self, he concludes that personal identity is an 
illusion. As an empiricist, he based every real idea on a corresponding 
impression. Thus he argued, ‘For my part, when I enter most intimately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any thing but 
the perception’ (ibid. emph. in original). Hume suggested that each of us is 
‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed 
each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement’ (ibid.).  So, for Hume, the idea of personal identity as sameness of 
consciousness of the self is an illusion. It is no surprise that Hume reached 
such a conclusion since his assumption of the definition of personal identity is 
confined to identity as sameness, and was unable to realize that personal 
identity could also be seen as identity as selfhood. 
 
Faced with this age-old problem of personal identity, Ricoeur suggests that it is 
exactly because of the lack of a guidance in terms of distinguishing two models 
of idenitity, i.e. idem-identity (identity as sameness) and ipse-identity (identity as 
selfhood) that the concept of personal identity become such a difficult and 
paradoxical problem as mentioned above. In response to this problem he 
asserts that if the concept of personal identity limits itself to the world of 
sameness, one will find nothing in one’s self.  For Ricoeur, modern theorists’ 
attempts to distinguish between two criteria of identity are problematic.  This 
is because for them, it seems that memory is totally separated from body, as 
though the expression of memory were not itself a bodily phenomenon. Even 
though some theorists realize that a distinction exists between idem and ipse, 
they neglect to take account of the fact that there is a dialectic relationship 
between them. As the critique Ricoeur offers to Parfit’s analysis says,  
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‘…these analyses are situated on a plane where identity can signify 
only sameness, to the express exclusion of any distinction between 
sameness and selfhood, and hence of any dialectic – narrative or 
other – between sameness and selfhood (Ricoeur 1992, p.130).  
 
He further points out that Parfit’s conclusions could only be valid if one holds 
that identity merely means sameness. Rather than following Parfit’s conclusion 
that the question posed was itself empty, Ricoeur claims that unanswerable 
paradoxes may still be there in need of an answer. He further claims, ‘This 
dilemma disappears if we substitute for identity understood in the sense of 
being the same (idem), identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-same 
[soi-même]’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.246).  
 
In the following sections, I will clarify in detail how Ricoeur responds to the 
paradoxes of the personal identity by presenting his theory of personal 
identity and his theory of narrative identity as a solution to the problem. 
 
3.3 Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity   
Ricoeur argues that what is at stake in the very problem of identity when 
applied to a person is the confrontation between two major uses of the concept 
of identity: idem-identity and ipse-identity. On one side, personal identity is 
identity as sameness (Latin idem, German Gleichheit, French memete).  On the 
other, personal identity is identity as selfhood (Latin ipse, German Selbstheit, 
French ipseite). It is essential to distinguish between these two modes of 
identity. Ricoeur stresses, ‘selfhood, I have repeatedly affirmed, is not 
sameness’ (ibid., p.116). Identity as sameness can be obviously perceived in the 
sense of physical identity of a person, e.g. sameness of physical appearance 
and body, under the criteria of permanence in time (see, Ricoeur 1992, p.116). 
However, Ricoeur argues that identity as sameness can also be found in the 
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field of selfhood expressed as character by following the same principle of 
permanence in time. Further, identity as selfhood is also a mode of being 
through permanence in time expressed as self-constancy. What Ricoeur reveals 
here is actually his response to the paradoxes of personal identity by linking 
the temporality of body and the temporality of self of the person. He argues 
that the difference between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood ‘is 
raised to the level of problem only after the temporal implications have 
themselves moved to the forefront’ (see ibid., p.116).  
 
It is worth noting two difficulties here. The first difficulty is how exactly to 
distinguish between idem-identity and ipse-identity. This difficulty is related to 
a question of how to justify the status of idem-identity that is found in the field 
of selfhood, i.e. is it something one possess like sameness of physical identity, 
for instance, appearance, organs or whole body? The second difficulty is how 
idem-identity is related to ipse-identity in the field of selfhood in terms of 
permanence in time if idem-identity can also be found in the selfhood. Both 
difficulties touch on the paradoxes of personal identity. For Ricoeur, 
concerning personal identity in selfhood, there exist not only differences 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity, but also a relationship between the 
two, that is, the dialectic of sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse). 
 
3.3.1 The differences between idem-identity and ipse-identity 
In Ricoeur’s analysis, permanence in time is posited as the highest principle for 
any criteria relating to personal identity, which opposes the principle that is 
changing and variable. Permanence in time presents itself in two different 
modes in identity as sameness and identity as selfhood, respectively. 
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Idem-identity is identity as sameness. This notion is not difficult to understand 
in terms of permanence in time. Ricoeur thinks permanence in time holds the 
dominant place in sameness. In sameness, the first component we find is 
numerical identity. It denotes oneness, ‘one and the same’: the contrary is 
plurality (i.e. not one but two or several). Here, Ricoeur equates numerical 
identity with the notion of identification: ‘understood in the sense of the 
re-identification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same 
thing twice, n times’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.116). One thus can understand numerical 
identity as sameness that is permanent in time. The second component of identity 
is qualitative identity, which denotes extreme resemblance, e.g., x and y are 
interchangeable with no noticeable difference. This component corresponds 
with the operation of substitution without semantic loss. These two 
components of identity are irreducible to one another. However, one of the 
weaknesses of criterion of sameness, according to Ricoeur, is that ‘time is 
implied in the series of occurrences of the same thing that the re-identification 
of the same can provoke hesitation, doubt, or contestation’ (ibid., p.116). So, 
because a great distance in time exists between any series of occurrences this 
situation can cause uncertainties in terms of sameness.  Therefore one needs 
to seek another criterion, which is the third component of a notion of identity 
as sameness. This component is uninterrupted continuity ‘between the first and 
the last stage in the development of what we consider to be the same 
individual’ (ibid., p.117). Riceour explains the function of this criterion as 
following, ‘This criterion is predominant whenever growth or aging operate as 
factors of dissemblance and, by implication, of numerical diversity’ (ibid.). 
This is particularly the case when idem-identity refers to material or physical 
identity, e.g. one adult might look different compared with the his/her portrait 
in the picture taken during his/her childhood. Hence, Ricoeur considers that 
the threat to the identity as sameness cannot be totally dissipated if one does 
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not posit a principle of permanence in time at the base of similitude and of the 
uninterrupted continuity.    
 
So, conceptually, the sameness of a person can be identified according to the 
principles of numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity and 
permanence in time, which defines sameness. Obviously, permanence in time is 
not difficult to understand with respect to the identity as sameness 
(idem-identity) of a person in terms of material or we might say, the physical 
things, for example, sameness of a person in terms of one’s appearances or 
body over time. In this sense, idem-identity can be seen as something ‘given’, a 
‘thing’ one possesses. Here, sameness as a ‘thing’ changes or does not change 
on its own without the interference of the action initiated by the self. But in 
Ricoeur’s view, the notion of idem-identity can also be seen in the field of 
selfhood, an immaterial field, which is presented as sameness of the self. 
Consequently, is idem-identity in an immaterial sense or more precisely, in 
selfhood, still the same ‘thing’ on its own? Before answering this question, we 
need first to see how idem-identity can be seen in the field of selfhood. 
 
Ipse-identity is identity as selfhood, individuality or distinctiveness. Following 
this definition, it would be difficult to understand the claim that sameness can 
be found in selfhood.   Ricoeur’s in-depth analysis suggests it is exactly the 
temporality of the self that turns ipse-identity into a difficult problem. As he 
claims, ‘it is with the question of permanence in time that the confrontation 
between two versions of identity becomes a genuine problem for the first time’ 
(Ricoeur 1992, p.116).  In other words, it is exactly in the field of selfhood that 
permanence in time turns out to be a difficult question and presents itself as 
two different forms of permanence in time.  
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Ricoeur suggests that although idem and ipse are different, they intersect in the 
temporal dimension, that is, in permanence in time, in the field of the selfhood. 
He argues that personal identity in the field of selfhood should be seen as two 
different modes of identity underpinned by two different modes of 
permanence in time. One mode of identity is the identity of character in the 
selfhood backed by permanence in time in the sense of idem, which is the 
identification of the sameness of a self over time. In this mode of permanence in 
time, ipse is overlapped by and accords with idem. So, it is exactly in the 
identity of character that we find sameness, idem-identity. The other mode of 
identity is the identity as self-constancy backed by permanence in time in the 
sense of ipse, which is a kind of self-maintenance that one exerts over oneself 
over time. So, we may say that the latter mode of permanence in time can be 
read as permanence through time. Ricoeur suggests that it is exactly when the 
two modes of identity are examined according to the principle of permanence 
in time that we can find, on the one hand, permanence in time of the self as 
character expresses the mutual overlapping between idem and ipse. On the 
other hand, we can find the differences between perseverance of character and 
the constancy of the self in promising displays the fundamental differences 
between the identity of idem and the identity of ipse in the self (see ibid., p.118). 
But the immediate question is what exactly the fundamental difference is 
between the perseverance of character and the self-constancy in promise? To 
give a satisfactory answer to this question we need have a deep analysis of 
Ricoeur’s notion of the self in the sense of idem and in the sense of ipse.  
 
In clarifying his conception of self, Ricoeur distances himself from both the 
Cartesian conception of cogito and anti-Cartesian conception of cogito. He 
argues that in the Descartian conception of cogito, the ego, the ‘I’, is posited, 
independent of its body and body’s spatiotemporal setting, that is, 
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independent of otherness. In the radical anti-Cartesian conception the cogito is 
shattered and fragmented. Ricoeur writes,  
 
‘To say self is not to say I. The I is posited—or is deposed. The self is 
implied reflexively in operations, the analysis of which precedes the 
return towards this self. Upon this dialectic of analysis and 
reflection is grafted that of idem and ipse. Finally, the dialectic of the 
same and the other crowns the first two dialectics’ (Ricoeur 1992, 
p.18, emph. in original).  
 
This suggests, for Ricoeur, the self is essentially embodied. It is a matter in the 
dialectic of idem (the ‘thing’) and ipse (the being). On the one hand, self is both 
made possible and constituted by its material and cultural situation. But, on 
the other hand, self is in principle always capable of initiative, of inaugurating 
something new to change itself.  This quotation also suggests that the other 
than self is constitutive of the self.  
  
If we follow Ricoeur’s suggestion by adding two Latin words idem (meaning 
‘same’) and ipse (meaning ‘selfhood’) as qualifiers to the term ‘self’, two new 
terms of ‘self’ are coined: idem-self and ipse-self. Literally, idem-self refers to 
sameness of the self, i.e. one and the same self; ipse-self refers to selfhood of the self, 
e.g. ‘I myself’, ‘he himself’ or ‘she herself’. Ipse-self so conveys the sense of a 
self’s mineness in each case, like individuality, particularity, uniqueness or 
distinctiveness initiated by this very self.  Ipse-self therefore can be put into a 
certain category under the notion of ‘subjectivity’, or might amount to the 
literal meaning of the term ‘each-his-owness’, as suggested by Spiegelberg in 
his interpretation of Heidegger’s term ‘Jemeinigkeit’ (Spiegelberg 1984, p.386). 
While idem-self expresses the identical, similar or stable dimensions of the self, 
ipse-self implies the dimensions of acting, initiating and changing of the self 
that this self exerts reflexively. 
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For Ricoeur, the differences between idem-self and ipse-self, not only lie in 
grammatical, epistemological and logical dimensions, but also, more 
fundamentally, in ontological dimension.  Ricoeur stresses that idem-self and 
ipse-self fundamentally belong to two different modes of beings in terms of the 
ontology of the self. For Ricoeur, idem-self, i.e. sameness of the self, belongs to 
the categories of relation, i.e. substance as the first category of relation in 
Kantian sense. As Kant writes in Critique of Pure Reason, ‘All appearances 
contain the permanent [das Beharrliche] (substance) as the object itself, and the 
transitory as its mere determination’ (A182, p.212 cited in Ricoeur 1992, 
p.118n).  Thus idem-self is classified by Ricoeur as a mode of being as entities. 
In this sense, the being of idem-self can be identified or re-identified at different 
occurrences over time based on the substantiality of a substance or things, both 
given and manipulable.  Ricoeur therefore claims that idem-self as a being can 
be related to what Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit, a German term which is 
translated as being-present-at-hand. Wikipedia’s explanation of the term can 
help us understand it easily: ‘in seeing an entity as present-at-hand, the 
beholder is concerned only with the bare facts of a thing or a concept, as they 
are present and in order to theorize about it’ (see Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heideggerian_terminology).       
 
By contrast, the being of ipse-self in Ricoeur’s view can be seen as one of 
existentials, which belongs to what Heidegger calls the mode of being of 
Dasein.  According to Rioeur, Heidegger characterizes Dasein by ‘the capacity 
to question itself as to its own way of being and thus to relate itself to being 
qua being’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.191). What distinguishes Dasein from other entities 
is that ‘that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports 
itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility’ (Heidegger 1962, p.67). Ipse- 
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self as a mode of being of Dasein, therefore has the capacity to question itself. It 
can initiate new actions toward the existing self. Thus, Ricoeur concludes that 
‘the ontological status of selfhood is therefore solidly based on the distinction 
between two modes of being, Dasein and Vorhandenheit’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.309). 
 
Given the ontological differences between idem-self and ipse-self, personal 
identity in selfhood can be put under two irreducible headings: idem-identity 
of selfhood and ipse-identity of the self, and therefore have two different 
ontological bases. Since ipse-self is a mode of being of Dasein, more precisely, 
Dasein as Care as I will show later, the ontological status of ipse-identity can be 
seen as the being as Care intent on maintaining one’s existence expressed in 
one’s consistent responsibility to others. As Heidegger writes,  
 
‘Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that 
is present-at-hand or Real. Its “subsistence” [Bestand] is not based on 
the substantiality of a substance but on the “Self-subsistence” 
[Selbst-Ständigkeit] of the existing Self, whose Being has been 
conceived as care’ (Heidegger 1962, p.351).  
 
Ricoeur explicitly agrees with Heidegger on this point. As he writes, ‘In this 
regard, Heidegger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from 
self-subsistence’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.123). So, it can be seen that permanence in time 
in pure ipse-identity as self-constancy is different from that in character. The act 
of keeping one’s words given to others, for Ricoeur, ‘appear to stand as a 
challenge to time, a denial of change even if my desire were to change, even if I 
were to change my opinion or my inclination, ‘I will hold firm’ (ibid., p.124). 
This mode of permanence in time in ipse-identity therefore implies an act 
initiated by a person as a Being of self-constancy, in respect of maintaining 
self-esteem and holding a responsibility to others. 
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The ontological status of idem-identity needs further analysis. This analysis 
touches on the first difficulty I mentioned at the beginning of this section. With 
respect to idem-identity in the sense of physical identity, it implies a form of 
permanence in time that is reducible to the determination of a substratum. 
Substratum here can be understood as the substance in which qualities inhere, 
e.g., invariable structure or organization of a tool.  Permanence in time in this 
sense is the schema in the relational sense which Kant assigns to the category 
of substance (see ibid., p.117-118). With respect to idem-identity in the field of 
the self, one gives self an ascription of the character defined by lasting dispositions 
which include permanence in time as a result of the self’s sedimentation of its 
action and internalisation of otherness. But this form of permanence in time or, 
character, can still be reducible to the determination of a substratum.  This is 
because substratum here can still be understood as the invariable qualities of a 
substance, that is, an immaterial ‘thing’ itself. In this sense, character, like 
physical identity, can still be classified into the category of substance. In 
conclusion, idem-identity in the field of selfhood can be seen as character. It is 
still a ‘thing’ at ontological level. But it is the ‘thing’ belonging to the being of 
Dasein. As Ricoeur puts it,  
 
‘Character is truly the “what” of the “who”’ and ‘it is a question of 
the overlapping of the “who” by” the “what,” which slips from the 
question “Who am I” back to the question “What am I?” (Ricoeur 
1992, p.122).  
 
Character in this sense is not only a ‘thing’ given, but also a ‘thing’ that can be 
manipulated. 
 
However, in Ricoeur’s view, idem-identity of the body and idem-identity in the 
field of the selfhood are not separated, but are engaged with each other. To 
Ricoeur, self is embodied. It is body’s belonging to someone that enables one to 
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designate himself or herself as the one whose body this is. The body as my own 
constitutes one of the components of minenesss, the ipse of my self. Also, as I 
have discussed earlier in this section, Ricoeur considers the self is embodied at 
least because it is a self’s body that makes this very self possible.  In addition, 
the body is a mediator between the self and the spatial world it exists in. As 
Ricoeur argues, ‘…in virtue of the mediating function of the body as one’s own 
in the structure of being in the world, the feature of selfhood belonging to 
corporeality is extended to that of the world as it is inhabited corporeally’ (ibid., 
p.150). 
 
What we can see from the analysis of the difference between idem-identity and 
ipse-identity is that the notion of personal identity should not only be seen in 
terms of identity as sameness and identity as selfhood, but also be understood 
as two different beings, both as ‘substances’, the ‘thing’ and as a mode of being 
of Dasein. 
  
3.3.2 The dialectic of idem-identity and ipse-identity 
According to Ricoeur, when taking into account the notion of character, 
personal identity in the field of selfhood is constituted by a tie between 
idem-identity and ipse-identity. This touches the second difficulty I mentioned 
at the beginning of this section, that is, how idem-identity and ipse-identity are 
related to each other in the field of selfhood. Ricoeur assigns the notions of 
character and keeping one’s word to the two poles of two forms of permanence in 
time as two modes of identity in the field of selfhood respectively. The 
complexity between two modes of identity in terms of permanence in time 
shows a dialectic relationship. The following diagram presents not only the 
constitution of the concept of personal identity, but also the dialectic 
dimensions between the constituents of this concept. 
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Character can be seen as ‘self-sameness’ in the field of selfhood. It is ‘the set of 
distinctive marks which permit the re-identification of human individual as 
being the same’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.119). From this definition, one can perceive 
both the notion of sameness and the notion of selfhood as distinctiveness. In 
Ricoeur’s words, character, ‘is the self under the appearances of sameness’ 
(ibid., p.128). It ‘designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is 
recognized’ (ibid.,p.121, emph. added). He further proposes that there are two 
forms of lasting dispositions. The first form is habit, which gives the history, 
the temporality, to character. Habit is something both being formed and 
already acquired. Ricoeur maintains that subjectivity of the self ‘is neither an 
incoherent series of events nor an immutable substantiality, impervious to 
evolution’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.32).  Rather, subjectivity of the self has a 
dimension of evolution in the interaction between sedimentation and innovation. 
Innovation is initiated by the ipseity of the self, the selfhood. Ricoeur writes, 
‘…identity in the sense of ipse implies no assertion concerning some 
unchangeable core of the personality’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.2). Rather, ipse has the 
potential to give the existing self its unique unilateral ability to initiate new 
action to itself for certain new possibilities. In the meanwhile, Ricoeur analyses 
that sedimentation offers selfhood a sort of history, a kind of permanence in 
time. Here, this mode of permanence in time in selfhood presents itself as an 
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overlap resulting from a process that innovation is covered by sedimentation, 
i.e. ‘distinctive signs’ (ipse-identity) is overlapped by sameness of the self 
(idem-identity in the self) over time (ibid., p.121). So, character can be seen as a 
history in which sedimentation tends to cover over innovation that preceded it. 
Therefore, the interaction between sedimentation and innovation entails a 
process of overlapping of ipse by idem. However, this overlapping does not 
remove the differences existing between ipse and idem. As Ricoeur writes, ‘my 
character is me, myself, ipse; but this ipse announces itself as idem’ (ibid.).  
 
The second form of lasting disposition is the set of acquired identifications by 
which the other enters into the composition of the self-sameness. Ricoeur 
maintains, ‘the identity of a person or a community is made up of these 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the 
person or the community recognizes itself’ (ibid. emph. in original). Thus, 
Ricoeur holds, ‘Recognizing oneself in contributes to recognizing oneself by’ 
(ibid. emph. in original). This kind of identification is the process of assuming 
otherness as one’s own by identifying with certain values ‘which makes us 
place a “cause” above our own survival’ (ibid.). Here ipse and idem accord with 
one another. For Ricoeur, the acquisition of the acquired identification is in fact 
a process of internalization of something outside (e.g. values, culture or norms) 
into something inside the self. Internalization thus has an aspect of 
sedimentation, which implies a mode of permanence in time as well. Acquired 
identifications therefore are the result of self’s internalisation of moral and 
cultural norms over time, in which an element of faithfulness or love to oneself 
as a certain moral/cultural being is contained. This faithfulness ‘turns the 
character towards fidelity, hence toward maintaining the self ‘(ibid. emph. 
added). Hence, acquired identifications are largely about one’s moral identity. 
In Ricoeur’s words, ‘preferences, evaluations, and estimations are stabilized in 
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such a way that the person is recognized in these dispositions, which may be 
called evaluative’ (ibid., p.122). 
 
Another model of permanence in time in selfhood is self-constancy.  Ricoeur 
writes, 
 
‘The perseverance of character is one thing, the perseverance of 
faithfulness to a word that has been given is something else again. 
The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship 
is quite another’ (ibid. p.123).  
 
What Ricoeur tries to stress here is the notion of self-constancy in an ethical 
dimension. Self-constancy presents itself as ‘keeping one’s word in faithfulness 
to the word that has been given’ (ibid.). He writes, ‘I see in this keeping the 
emblematic figure of an identity which is the polar opposite of that depicted 
by the emblematic figure of character’ (ibid.). ‘Keeping one’s words’ reveals 
itself as a challenge to time, a denial of change, i.e. no matter what happens to 
me, ‘I will hold firm’ even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination. 
Underlying this act is responsibility and care of others through permanence in 
time. Such responsibility could be derived from the ‘obligation to safeguard 
the institution of language and to respond to the trust that the other places in 
my faithfulness’ (ibid., p.124).  But as I will clarify in section 7, self-constancy 
is not merely about the ethical dimension, it is also about the maintenance of 
oneself underpinned by the care of oneself. In this mode of permanence in time, 
ipse-identity has no aid or support of the sameness (idem). Rather, 
self-constancy has something to do with pure ipse-identity, something 
metaphysical which cannot be ‘inscribed’ as ‘things’, but supported by certain 
ontological justification of Being as care to itself and ethical justification with 
respect to others.  
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Thus appears the dialectic relation between idem-identity and ipse-identity. On 
the one hand, in the identity of character, ipse-identity is overlapped by 
idem-identity; on the other hand, ipse-identity as self-constancy is pure 
ipse-identity without the aid of idem-identity. Also, for Ricoeur, between the 
sameness of character and self-constancy in promising, or in temporal terms, 
between these two models of permanence in time, there opens an interval of 
sense to be filled in. He writes,  
 
‘It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation is to 
be sought. Now it is this “milieu” that, in my opinion, the notion of 
narrative identity comes to occupy’ (ibid., p.124).  
 
According to Ricoeur, the notion of narrative identity can be used as mediator 
between the perseverance of character (sameness) and the constancy of the self 
in promising (self-constancy).  Consequently, he envisages the function of 
narrative identity exists between two limits:  
 
‘Having thus situated it in this interval, we will not be surprised to 
see narrative identity oscillate between two limits: at lower limit, 
where permanence in time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; 
and an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity 
without the aid and support of the idem’ (ibid.). 
 
But what is exactly narrative identity? How can it be mediated between identity 
as sameness and identity as selfhood? These are questions that the following 
sections will discuss. 
 
3.4 Narrative identity as a solution to the paradoxes of personal identity    
The term ‘narrative identity’ should be distinguished between narrative 
identity at a conceptual level and narrative identity as a practical category. In 
this section, I will focus on the former and the latter will be discussed in 
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section 3.5.. It is exactly narrative identity at a conceptual level that Ricoeur 
uses to resolve the paradoxes of personal identity. In order to investigate how 
the notion of narrative identity as a concept mediates between identity as 
sameness and identity as selfhood, there is firstly a need to interpret his theory 
of narrative since narrative identity is a corollary of the contribution of 
narrative theory to the notion of personal identity. 
 
3.4.1 Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
Ricoeur’s theory of narrative is a result of his study of the relation between 
time and narrative. He proposes to use narrative to respond the aporia of the 
experience of time, i.e., between phenomenological time and cosmological time.  
However, there is an impasse where both mutually occlude each other to the 
very extent that they imply each other. After conducting a complicated 
structural analysis of narrative by linking narrative to the concept of time, he 
concludes that there is a dialectic relation between time and narrative: ‘time 
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal experience’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.3). 
 
Ricoeur develops his narrative theory of Threefold Mimesis. This is based on 
Augustine’s theory of the Threefold Presents, a theory of time, and Aristotle’s 
theories of plot in Poetics. Mimesis is a key concept in Aristotle’s Poetics. For 
Ricoeur, one major use of this concept is to mean ‘imitation or representation 
of action’ (ibid., p.33). According to Aristotle, ‘the imitation of action is the 
Plot’ (cited in Ricoeur 1984, p.34). So, Mimesis is closely connected with the 
concept of plot, or Muthos, namely, ‘the organization of the events’ (ibid.). I 
will briefly introduce Threefold Mimesis as following while stressing its 
relation to temporality. 
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Mimesis 1 
According to Ricoeur, Mimesis 1  is the pre-understanding of the world of 
action, which is also termed as ‘prefiguration’. If it is true that the plot is an 
imitation of action, the capacity for identifying action by means of its structural 
features (i.e., the conceptual network of the semantics of action expressed in 
the ability to raise questions of who, how, why, with whom, against whom in 
respect of any action) is required. Next, if imitating is elaborating an 
articulated significance of some action, an aptitude for identifying symbols of 
action (i.e. ability to understand symbolic meaning in certain cultures, e.g., 
values and norms) is required. Here, symbols, or in Ricoeur’s words, ‘symbolic 
mediation’, is a ‘meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it by 
other actors in the social interplay’ (ibid., p.57). Finally, Mimesis 1 concerns a 
temporal element in that it recognizes in action temporal structures that call for 
narration. By linking with Augustine’s notion of time, i.e. the Threefold Present, 
Ricoeur argues, ‘What counts here is the way in which everyday praxis orders 
the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present 
in terms of one another. For it is this practical articulation that constitutes the 
most elementary inductor of narrative’ (ibid., p.60).  
 
Mimesis 2 
Mimesis 2 is where configuration operates between what proceeds Mimesis 2 and 
what follows it. This mimesis has a mediating function between living and 
understanding, which derives from the dynamic character of the configuring 
operation. So, the term emplotment is preferred here, rather than the term plot. 
Mimesis 2 of narrative mediates in different ways towards the construction of 
the narrative necessity that connects different elements into a conceptual unity. 
In other words, the narrative necessity is emerged from the process that the 
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structure of one thing after another turns towards the conceptual relation of 
one thing because of another.   
 
There are at least three mediating functions of emplotment. Firstly, 
emplotment mediates between the individual events or multiple incidents that 
are discordant with each other and one story taken as a whole and complete 
which is in concordance. Through this mediation, an event is not just a singular 
occurrence; rather, any configurational act gets its meaning from its 
contribution to the development of the plot. A story is not just a listing of 
events in serial order; the events are organized into an intelligible whole story. 
This configuring act is thus a kind of concordance, the principle of order that 
presides over what Aristotle calls ‘the arrangement of facts’. In short, 
emplotment draws a configuration out of a simple succession of neutral and 
separate events (see Ricoeur1984, p.65). 
 
Secondly, emplotment brings together such factors as heterogeneous as 
intentions, causes, goals, means, interaction, circumstances, contingencies, 
accidents, encounters and unexpected results into a synthetic story. 
Emplotment tries to reach a heterogeneous synthesis and a ‘concordant 
discordance’ or ‘discordant concordance’ (see Ricoeur 1984, p.65-66; 1991, p.21; 
1992, p.141). 
 
Thirdly, emplotment mediates between cosmic time and phenomenological 
time. Emplotment not only reflects the Augustinian paradox of the time theory, 
i.e., Threefold Presents as concordant discordance, but also resolves it in a poetic 
mode. Emplotment reflects the paradox inasmuch as the operation of 
emplotment combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, one 
of which is chronological and the other not. The chronological dimension of 
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time constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative, which is made up of 
separate events. The second dimension of time is concerned with the 
configurational dimension of narrative where the plot composes events into a 
whole story. To use Ricoeur’s words,     
‘this configurational act consists of “grasping together” the detailed 
actions or what I have called the story’s incidents. It draws from this 
manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole’ (Ricoeur 1984, 
p.66).  
The act of emplotment thus extracts a configuration from a succession of 
events and reveals a certain ‘followability’ of a story, i.e., the story’s capacity to 
be followed. To understand the story is to understand how and why successive 
episodes lead to a conclusion, an ‘end point’ which might not be foreseeable, 
but must be ‘acceptable’, being congruent with the episodes brought together 
by the story. Thus, such a configurational arrangement transforms the 
succession of events into one meaningful whole, which is similar to the act of 
assembling the events together and which makes the story followable. The 
whole plot can be translated into one ‘thought’, ‘point’ or ‘theme’, which is not 
atemporal. Rather, the time of the theme is the ‘narrative time’ that mediates 
between the episodic aspect and its configurational aspect. Thus the fact that 
the story can be followed transforms the temporal paradox of distention and 
intention into ‘a living dialectic’ (ibid., p.67). On the one hand, the episodic 
dimension of the narrative draws narrative time from the direction of the 
linear representation of time; on the other hand, the configurational dimension 
of narrative reveals temporal features in a way that is opposite to those of the 
episodic dimension.  
 
Mimesis 3 
Mimesis 3 is the act of ‘refiguring’ following Mimesis 2.  In his work Tragedy, 
Aristotle says that poetry ‘teaches’ the universal, that tragedy ‘in representing 
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pity and fear…effects the purgation of these emotions’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.70), 
and that people can get pleasure from tragedy. Consequently Ricoeur thinks 
Aristotle signifies that it is in the hearer or the reader that the traversal of 
mimesis reaches its fulfilment. Based on this, Ricoeur develops his thinking on 
Mimesis 3 which ‘marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world 
of the hearer or reader’ (ibid., p.71).  According to Ricoeur, Mimesis 3 is an 
intersection of the world configured by plots and the world wherein real action 
occurs and unfolds its specific temporality.  Ricoeur writes, ‘The act of 
reading is thus the operator that joins mimesis 3 to mimesis 2. It is the final 
indicator of the refiguring of the world of action under the sign of the plot’ 
(ibid., p.77). However the act of reading not only entails the entry of any work 
into the field of communication, but also means the entry into the field of 
reference. By ‘reference’, Ricoeur means that  
 
‘what a reader receives is not just the sense of the work, but, 
through its sense, its reference, that is, the experience it brings to 
language and, in the last analysis, the world and the temporality it 
unfolds in the face of this experience’(ibid., p.79).  
 
Hence, reference can be seen as a type of ‘application’ of the world of text to 
the living world. Yet, with respect to narrative’s referential intention and its 
truth claim, the problem of reference seems to be more complicated. The most 
intractable problem proceeds from the imbalance between the two referential 
modes of narrative, i.e., historical narrative and fictional narrative, the two large 
classes of narrative discourse. It is generally considered that only history can 
claim a reference inscribed in empirical reality, inasmuch as historical 
intentionality aims at events and facts that have actually occurred. It is also 
widely acknowledged that literature will never equal to history in terms of any 
‘realistic’ claim, given that fictional narrative is mainly the product of 
imagination. However, Ricoeur argues, through historical traces, the historical 
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reference is partly borrowed from the metaphorical reference common to every 
poetic work, inasmuch as the past can only be reconstructed by the 
imagination. Conversely, fictional narrative borrows a part of its referential 
dynamics from historical reference through historical traces. Therefore, 
Ricoeur claims, ‘it is this reciprocal borrowing that authorizes my posing the 
problem of the interweaving reference between history and narrative fiction’ 
(ibid., p.82). It is exactly through the temporality of human action that the 
reference from historical traces and the metaphorical reference interweave. 
Thus, time is refigured by history and fiction through this interweaving of 
their referential mode.  For Ricoeur, this is human time. 
 
From the Threefold Mimesis, there emerges a ‘spiral circle’ or ‘healthy circle’, 
that is, in a mimetic relation of narrative to action: prefiguring is configured 
into refiguring, and refiguring leads back to prefiguring by way configuration. 
The first mimetic relation refers to, at the individual level, the semantics of 
desire which only includes ‘those prenarrative features attached to the demand 
constitutive of human desire’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.248).  Meanwhile the third 
mimetic relation is ‘defined by the narrative identity of an individual or a 
people, stemming from the endless rectification of a previous narrative by a 
subsequent one, and from the chain of refigurations that results from this’ 
(ibid.). This is exactly the process of identifying an individual or a community 
itself through the act of reading. The circularity of every analysis of narrative is 
dynamic and does not cease interpreting in terms of each other the temporal 
form inherent in experience and the narrative structure. As Ricoeur concludes, 
‘Thus the hermeneutic circle of narrative and time never stops being reborn 
from the circle that the stages of mimesis form’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.76). 
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3.4.2 Why does the concept of personal identity need to be connected with 
narrative theory? 
Why does the concept of personal identity need to be connected with narrative 
theory? Firstly, in Ricoeur’s mind, this question has something to do with the 
temporal dimension of identity. This feature can be seen in Ricoeur’s notion of 
‘subjectivity’ and his theory of personal identity as character. According to 
Ricoeur, ‘subjectivity is neither an incoherent series of events nor an 
immutable substantiality, impervious to evolution’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.32).  
Rather subjectivity has a dimension of evolution/history gained though the 
interplay of sedimentation and innovation instructed by social interaction and 
culture.  He argues that a study of the constitution of the self and human 
action needs to take into account the fact that ‘the person of whom we are 
speaking and the agent on whom the action depends have a history, are their 
own history’, and ‘…the changes that affect a subject capable of designating 
itself in signifying the world’ also need to put into consideration (see Ricoeur 
1992, p.113). Assuming that narrative has the function of portraying temporal 
features of human experience, Ricoeur concludes, ‘This is precisely the sort of 
identity which narrative composition alone can create through its dynamism’ 
(Ricoeur 1991, p.32).  
 
Furthermore, narrative not only can create/construct personal identity, but also 
redeploys it. As Ricoeur’s argument shows, the dialectic of innovation and 
sedimentation, underlying the acquisition of habit, and the equally rich 
dialectic of otherness and internalization, underlying the notion of acquired 
identifications, are there to remind us that personal identity as character has a 
history which it has contracted. Ricoeur connects this temporal aspect of 
character to the character in narratives and stories: ‘it is then comprehensible 
that the stable pole of character can contain a narrative dimension, as we see in 
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the use of the term “character” identifying it with the protagonist in a story” 
(Ricoeur1992, p.122). Ricoeur thus concludes, ‘What sedimentation has 
contracted, narration can redeploy’ (ibid.). 
 
Secondly, identity of character in the narrative category entails an internal 
dialectic that can be inscribed in the dialectic of idem-identity and ipse-identity. 
Ricoeur argues that it is exactly the internal dialectical feature of the concept of 
character as narrative identity that resolves the problematic nature of personal 
identity.  This is because narrative identity can act as a mediator in the 
dialectic of identity as sameness (idem-identity) and identity as selfhood 
(ipse-identity). Ricoeur thinks that the tradition in both Locke and Hume’s 
notion of personal identity are problematic in that they only treat personal 
identity as sameness of the person, i.e. one and the same ‘substance’ about a 
person as an entity over time and in different places. They did not realize that 
personal identity also includes the mode of ipse-identity, and that its 
relationship with idem-identity is a dialectic relationship at temporal 
dimension. On the one hand, both overlap each other and present the 
overlapping as last dispositions, i.e. character; on the other hand, ipse-identity 
departs idem-identity and expressed itself as self-constancy over time.  As I 
have shown earlier in this chapter, Ricoeur stresses it is important not only to 
distinguish between personal identity as idem-identity and as ipse-identity, but 
also to make sense of the dialectic relationship between the two.  Rather than 
taking the stance of either identity as sameness or identity as selfhood, Ricoeur 
responds to the problematic nature of identity by engaging with the space 
between the two poles of personal identity. He contends that identity should 
be understood as sense of oneself as ‘self-same’ and that this understanding must 
take the place of ‘the identity understood in the sense of being the same’ (see 
Ricoeur 1988, p.246). For Ricoeur, it is exactly in the sphere of temporality that 
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the mediator like concept of narrative identity is to be sought to oscillate 
between the pole of character, where idem overlaps ipse, and the pole of pure 
ipse-identity in selfhood. 
 
To sum up, one goal that Ricoeur tries to achieve through arguing thematically 
the relation between ipse- and idem-identity at temporal dimension is to 
respond to the dilemma of personal identity by using his framework of 
narrative theory.  Furthermore Ricoeur tries to show that it is within this 
framework that the dialectic of selfhood and sameness attains its fullest 
development. As Ricoeur maintains,  
 
‘Without the recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity 
would in fact be condemned to an antinomy with no solution. Either 
we must posit a subject identical with itself through the diversity of 
its different states, or, following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold 
that this identical subject is nothing more than a substantialist 
illusion, whose elimination merely brings to light a pure manifold of 
cognitions, emotions, and volitions’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.246).  
 
3.4.3 How is the identity of the character constructed in connection with 
narrative? 
But how is the identity of the character constructed in connection with 
narrative? How does narrative, the specific model of the interconnection of 
events, allows us to integrate with permanence in time what seems to be its 
contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, 
discontinuity, and instability? It is through Mimesis 2, i.e. ‘emplotment’, that 
the answers of these questions can be sought. 
 
As I have shown above, emplotment unifies elements that appear to be totally 
different. Emplotment is what makes a story intelligible. Emplotment, under 
the aegis of what Ricoeur calls narrative intelligence or narrative understanding 
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informed by culture, is the ability to take and tie discordant events and 
heterogeneous episodes of human action together into a coherent plot, 
permitting a concordant readability to our lives. The construction of plots is the 
place where events become episodes and episodes become the ordered 
contents of stories. The manifold of events are drawn into the unity of one 
temporal whole and Ricoeur applies the term ‘configuration’ to this art of 
composition, namely, emplotment, which mediates between concordance and 
discordance. He also defines the term ‘discordant concordance’ by using the 
notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous through plotting, which is 
characteristic of all narrative composition. As he writes, ‘…the narrative event 
is defined by its relation to the very operation of configuration; it participates 
in the unstable structure of discordant concordance characteristic of the plot 
itself’ (ibid., p.142).  
  
On the level of emplotment, identity can be described ‘in dynamic terms by the 
competition between a demand for concordance and the admission of 
discordances which, up to the close of the story, threaten this identity’ (Ricoeur 
1992, p.141). By ‘concordance’, Ricoeur means ‘the principle of order that 
presides over what Aristotle calls “the arrangement of facts” ’(ibid.). Ricoeur 
argues, ‘…by entering into the movement of a narrative which relates a 
character to a plot, the event loses its impersonal neutrality’ (Ricoeur 1992., 
p.142n, emph. added). By ‘discordances’, he means ‘the reversals of fortune that 
make the plot an ordered transformation from an initial situation to a terminal 
situation’ (ibid., p.141). Identity of character is thus entails an internal dialectic 
of concordance and discordance. 
 
Ricoeur then explains, ‘Understood in narrative terms, identity can be called, 
by linguistic convention, the identity of the character’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.141). 
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Character here refers to ‘the one who performs the action in the narrative’ 
(ibid., 143). He further points out, ‘Then category of character is therefore a 
narrative category as well, and its role in the narrative involves the same 
narrative understanding as the plot itself’ (ibid.). Although the narrative 
category of character should be distinguished from the concept of character as 
one mode of permanence in time of a person in the living world, they resemble 
each other in many ways as I have shown section 3.4.2. 
 
3.4.4 How does narrative identity mediate between idem-identity and 
ipse-identity? 
Ricoeur conceptualises the notion of narrative identity as following, ‘[T]he 
narrative constructs the identity of the character, which can be called his or her 
narrative identity’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.147-148). The key assumption where Ricoeur 
relates identity of character (narrative identity) to personal identity has 
something to do with the notion of narrative of life, the imitation of actions. As 
Ricoeur puts it, 
  
‘The question is then to determine what the narrative category of 
character contributes to the discussion of personal identity. The 
thesis supported here will be that the identity of the character is 
comprehensible through the transfer to the character of the 
operation of emplotment, first applied to the action recounted; 
characters, we will say, are themselves plots’ (ibid., p.143).  
 
From this argument, Ricoeur suggests that narrative identity (identity of the 
character) is subordinated to life story as narrative, life story as narrative is 
subordinated to action recounted in narrative, and narrative remains in a 
mimetic relation with action in reality (see ibid., p.157). As for the relation 
between the identity of character in the narrative category and the identity of 
the story itself, Ricoeur argues, ‘The narrative constructs the identity of the 
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character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of 
the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the 
character’ (ibid., p.147-148). In fact, Ricoeur has underscored the primacy of 
emplotment over character in his work Time and Narrative Volume 1 (Ricoeur 
1984, p.37) by referring to the theory of plot in Arisotole’s work Poetics. He 
seems to agree with Aristotle that character is subordinate to emplotment. This 
correlation is articulated by Ricoeur as following,  
 
‘It is indeed in the story recounted, with its qualities of unity, 
internal structure, and completeness which are conferred by 
emplotment, that the character preserves throughout the story an 
identity correlative to that of the story itself’ (Ricoeur 1992, p. 143). 
 
Ricoeur then argues, ‘The genuine nature of narrative identity discloses itself, 
in my opinion, only in the dialectic of selfhood and sameness’ (Ricoeur 1992, 
p.140). As I have shown above, there is a dialectic relation internal to the 
character as a narrative category, which is the result of the dialectic of 
concordance and discordance developed by the emplotment of action. 
 
‘…following the line of concordance, the character draws his or her 
singularity from the unity of a life considered as a temporal totality 
which is itself singular and distinguished from all others. Following 
the line of discordance, this temporal totality is threatened by the 
disruptive effect of the unforeseeable events that punctuate it (e.g. 
encounters, accidents, etc.)’ (ibid.,p.147).  
 
Given the concordant-discordant synthesis of the configuration of narrative, 
‘the contingency of the event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to 
speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identity of the character. 
Thus chance is transmuted into fate’ (ibid.). Identity of the character in a life 
story can only be understood in this internal dialectic.  
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When the character in a narrative is confronted with the search for permanence 
in time attached to the concept of personal identity, the internal dialectic of 
character needs to be inscribed in the interval between two poles of 
permanence in time, i.e., between identity as sameness and identity as 
self-constancy. It is here we can see that narrative identity of character is 
capable of mediating between these two poles of permanence in time. How? 
According to Ricoeur, narrative submits the identity of the character to what 
he calls imaginative variations.  These variations include, for example, the 
kinds of person one imagines oneself to be, the quality of life one imagines to 
pursue. ‘…narrative does not merely tolerate these variations, it engenders 
them, seeks them out’ (ibid.,p.148). In narrative, the space of variation open to 
the dialectic relation between sameness and selfhood is vast. At one end of this 
space, the character in the story has a definite character, a range of the lasting 
dispositions, which is identifiable and re-identifiable as the same.  At the 
other end, the character in the story ceases to have a definite character, 
exposing selfhood by taking away the aid of sameness or overwhelmingly 
imposing selfhood upon lasting dispositions. In the intermediary space of 
variations between these two modes of identity, where narrative operates, 
identification of the sameness decreases without disappearing entirely by 
varying the relation between two meanings of permanence in time through 
thought experiments reserved in narrative, e.g., literature, movies, life stories of 
others and so on. This process predominately occurs through reference to or 
being instructed by certain moral, cultural and ethical dimensions as well as 
social dimension of human world. 
 
3.5 Narrative identity as a structure of human experience   
As has been shown above, Ricoeur proposed that the notion of narrative 
identity mediates between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood. This 
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understanding of narrative identity is different from narrative identity as a 
structure of human experience emerging from the intertwining of historical 
narrative and fictional narrative, which mediates between ‘real’ life and 
narrative of life. In the sense of narrative identity as a structure of human 
experience, narrative can be considered as a condition of temporal existence of 
a human being.  This is a view that accords with Charles Taylor’s stress on 
the temporal nature of narrative, which I will discuss in detail in the next 
chapter. For Ricoeur, ‘[narrative] is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal experience’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.3). 
 
In his works on narrative, Ricoeur tries to articulate and develop the 
hermeneutic way of understanding human life and the self. As has been 
shown before, understanding human action through understanding mimesis is 
one major aim of Ricoeur’s work on narrative. For Ricoeur, narrative is not 
only mimetic of human action, but also reflects and transforms human life. The 
latter two functions of narrative particularly lie in Mimesis 3 through 
refiguration. We understand our lives, our actions, our selves and the world we 
live in, by interpreting them into narratives, so life understood as narrative 
constitutes self-understanding. Ricoeur has demonstrated this function of 
narrative in his work:  
 
‘to give expression to the complex historical present one must have 
a kind of discourse that can articulate both strings of actions and 
events and their human context. The kind of discourse to do this is 
narrative’ (see Ricoeur 1988, p.108-109, emph. added). 
 
3.5.1 Narrative identity as self-interpretation 
In fact, Ricoeur’s early discussion on the notion of narrative identity is different 
from that which I have presented so far. In the conclusion of the 3rd volume of 
his work Time and Narrative, Ricoeur argues that narrative identity could be 
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understood as a practical category. In that work, Ricoeur overcomes the 
dualism between historical narrative and fictional narrative by presenting a 
dialectic relation between the two. Historical narrative is considered to be 
about facts recorded and discovered by the historian.  Fictional narrative is 
regarded as something created through the imagination of a person. However, 
Ricoeur argues that both types of narrative in fact intertwine together. This is 
why and where ‘narrative identity’ is firstly introduced:  
 
‘The fragile offshoot issuing from the union of history and fiction is 
the assignment to an individual or a community of a specific 
identity that we can call their narrative identity’ (Ricoeur 1988, 
p.246). 
 
 For Ricoeur, narrative identity as a structure of human experience both at 
individual level and collective level would be a sought-after place of the 
interweaving between history and fiction. As he explained, 
 
‘Here “identity” is taken in the sense of a practical category. To state 
the identity of an individual or a community is to answer the 
questions, ‘Who did this?” “Who is the agent, the author?” We first 
answer this question by naming someone, that is, by designating 
them with a proper name. But what is the basis for the permanence 
of this proper name? What justifies our taking the subject of an 
action, so designated by his, her, or its proper name, as the same 
throughout a life that stretches from birth to death? The answer has 
to be narrative’ (ibid.). 
 
Ricoeur’s view of narrative identity echoes Hannah Arendt’s narrative theory 
that ‘to answer the question “who?” is to tell the story of life’. Ricoeur writes, 
‘The story told tells about the action of the “who.” And the identity of this 
“who” therefore itself must be a narrative identity’ (ibid.). This is because this 
‘action of “who” ’, throughout either personal life or community life, from birth 
to death, can only appear to us through a life story, i.e., the integration of 
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historical narrative and fictional narrative, where narrative identity lies.  
 
Ricoeur considers that both the individual and the community are constituted 
in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual 
history (see ibid., p.247). At a collective level, for example, Ricoeur argues, 
through the narrative of biblical Israel in The Bible, the stories taken to be a 
testimony about the founding events of its history; biblical Israel become the 
historical community that bears this name. At an individual level, a self 
understood as the who of a history (story), the one upon whom the story confers 
a sort of identity, is a self whose temporalisation shapes itself in accordance 
with a narrative model. To use Ricoeur’s own words, ‘Subjects recognize 
themselves in the stories they tell about themselves’ (ibid.). In Ricoeur’s view, 
narrative identity can be regarded as a kind of self-interpretation.As he argues, 
 
‘It therefore seems plausible to take the following chain of assertions 
as valid: self-understanding is an interpretation; interpretation of 
the self, in turn, finds in the narrative, among other signs and 
symbols, a privileged form of mediation; the latter borrow from 
history as well as from fiction, making a life story a fictional history 
or, if one prefers, a historical fiction, interweaving the 
historiographic style of biographies with the novelistic style of 
imaginary autobiographies’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.114n).  
 
3.5.2 From life to narrative identity 
A critical question that might be raised now is: how can we justify the linkage 
between one’s personal identity sensed in real life, the narrative and the 
narrative conception of identity? If we accept the narrative conception of 
identity, it should be realized that there is a crucial space or a passage between 
living and narrating, or between the action and the character. According to 
Ricoeur, it is exactly the dynamic Threefold Mimesis of narrative, i.e., 
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prefiguration, configuration and refiguration, that can nicely fit that space or 
passage. For Ricoeur, narrative mediates between the world of living and the 
world of self-understanding.   
 
In Ricoeur’s view, one’s identity cannot be simply given by one’s ego, which 
under these circumstances is likely to be reduced to a narcissistic, egoistic and 
stingy ego.  Instead, identity must be instructed by cultural symbols. ‘In place 
of an ego enamoured of itself arises a self instructed by cultural symbols, the 
first among which are the narratives handed down in our literary tradition’ 
(Ricoeur 1991, p.33). As he writes, 
 
‘…the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by 
the detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on 
the symbolic mediations which always already articulate action and 
among them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative mediation 
underlines this remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge—that it 
is self-interpretation’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.198) 
 
In this sense, our personal identity is not directly found by ourselves, but can 
be found fruitfully in our life by way of narrative, the recounted life. He 
further articulates this point as follows, 
 
‘Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the 
field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, 
by which we attempt to discover and not simply to impose from outside 
the narrative identity which constitutes us’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.32). 
 
3.6 Limitations of narrative identity 
However, narrative identity is not a seamless identity. It is necessary to reveal 
some limitations of narrative identity.  
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3.6.1 An instable and continually reconfigured identity 
There might be many narratives about someone’s life and therefore many 
possible versions of narrative identity. As Ricoeur writes, ‘narrative identity is 
not a stable and seamless identity. Just as it is possible to compose several plots 
on the subject of the same incidents (which, thus, should not really be called 
the same events), so it is always possible to weave different, even opposed, 
plots about our lives’ (Ricoeur 1988, p. 248). Because the dialectic of history 
and fiction, i.e. the criss-crossing processes of a fictionalization of history and a 
historization of fiction, and also because of refiguration of narrative, narrative 
identity continues to make and revise itself. In this sense, one problem of 
narrative identity is the question of stability in narrative identity.  
 
3.6.2 Exclusion of certain events 
Narrative identity tends to presents itself with the coherence, continuity and 
unity of a character through the configuration of heterogeneous events. But 
what justifies the selection of the certain events for intergration into a complete 
story seems to be merely the configuring principle, namely, making 
discordance concordant based on certain themes. In this sense, narrative 
identity is not a seamless account of life story. There is always the problem that 
some events, which hardly fit into the story as a whole, might be excluded and 
neglected. This problem makes getting a complete picture of an individual’s 
life impossible, thus narrative identity is still a limited presentation and 
understanding of an individual’s identity.    
 
3.6.3 Ethical limitation in narrative identity 
Narrative is not totally without any ethical dimension given the narrator is 
never an ethically neutral person. Although narrative identity implies ethical 
dimension, it does not exhaust the question of the self-constancy of a subject. 
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Villela-Petiti also interprets Ricoeur’s philosophy of selfhood by saying that 
selfhood (ipseity) cannot be reduced to a form of narrative identity because the 
influence of selfhood exceeds that of narrative identity. Narrative identity calls 
for an alternative approach, that is, an ethical approach, to analyse 
‘non-narrative components’ in the formation of identity of an acting subject. 
According to Ricoeur, the act of reading triggers an intersection between the 
world of narrative text and the world of the reader. Further, reading also 
includes a moment of impetus when reading becomes a provocation to be and 
to act differently. However, Ricoeur argues, 
 
‘this impetus is transformed into action only through an ethical 
decision whereby a person says: Here I stand! So narrative identity 
is not equivalent to true self-constancy except through this decisive 
moment, which makes ethical responsibility the highest factor in 
self-constancy’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.249).  
 
Narrative identity narrated by an author, an agent, and initiator of action more 
or less imposes on ‘the reader a vision of the world that is never ethically 
neutral, but that rather implicitly or explicitly induces a new evaluation of the 
world and of the reader as well’ (ibid.), for example, different lifestyles one 
would want to adopt and the kind of person one wants to be through one’s 
imagination. So, reading narrative identity places the reader, now an agent, an 
initiator of action into the ethical field, i.e., readers will face choices from 
amongst the multiple proposals relevant to ethical justice brought forth by 
reading.  Thus, Ricoeur claims, ‘It is at this point that the notion of narrative 
identity encounters its limit and has to link up with the non-narrative 
components in the formation of an acting subject’ (ibid.).  Ricoeur seems to 
suggest that these ‘non-narrative components’ must be seen and discussed 
through ethical approach in terms of the formation of an acting subject. In this 
sense, any narrative identity without exhausting its ethical dimension (implied 
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in self-constancy) will be problematic in having a coherent narrative identity 
under the call of a ‘good life’. In this sense, narrative identity that lacks any 
deep analysis of the dimension of ‘others’ might be at risk of leading to an 
identity of radical individualism, either in the form of an egotistical self or the 
form of narcissistic egotism. 
 
3.7 Ipse-identity in the dialectic of oneself and others 
In this section, I will conduct an in depth analysis on the ipse-identity on the 
ethical plane, since narrative cannot exhaust the identity as self-constancy. 
Ricoeur proposes that the connection between self and being of Dasein occurs in 
Heidegger’s work Being and Time ‘through mediation of the notion of care 
(Sorge)’ (ibid. p.309). But what is care in Heidegger’s mind? Heidegger writes, 
‘Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself 
or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in…. All these ways of 
Being-in have concern as their kind of Being’ (Heidegger 1962, p.56). Ricoeur 
interprets this idea as following, ‘The being of the self presupposes the totality 
of a world that is the horizon of its thinking, acting, feeling—in short, of its 
care’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.310). Thus, the connection between Dasein as care and 
selfhood can be seen. As interpreted by Ricoeur, this link ‘runs from the 
assertion of Dasein’s character of being in each case mine (§§5, 9), passing 
through the existential question “who” of Dasein (§25), then by equating the 
being of Dasein with care (§41), finally leading to the connection between care 
and selfhood (§64)’ (Ricoeur 1992. p.309-310). In this sense, certain parts of 
selfhood can be identified according to the self as Being as care.  
 
But what kind of care is it? It seems to me that Heidegger’s notion of 
‘self-subsistence’ is not based on ‘care of others’. In order to differentiate the 
responsibility to others in the notion of self-constancy in Ricoeur’s mind and 
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the notion of care in Heideggerian sense in the following discussion, I want to 
clarify here the exact meaning of care borrowed and interpreted by Ricoeur 
from Heidegger. It must be noted that Heidegger’s notion of care is primarily 
about self-care. As he claimed on several occasions in Being and Time, ‘Dasein 
exists for the sake of a potentiality-for-Being itself’ (Heidegger 1962, p.416). 
Kemp in his paper (1995) finds the message of care of oneself exactly from 
Heidegger’s analysis of Being-towards-death, which is not only anticipation of 
itself but ‘anticipation of potentiality-for-Being’. This anticipation ‘turns out to 
be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost 
potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, the possibility of proper existence1’ (ibid., 
p. 307 cited in and revised by Kemp 1995). Ricoeur himself also admits that the 
notion of care in a broad sense in Heidegger’s mind is not care of others. He 
writes, ‘Now care cannot be captured by any psychologising or sociologizing 
interpretation, nor in general by an immediate phenomenology, as would be 
the case for the subordinate notions of Besorgen (concern with things) and 
Fürsorge (solicitude or concern with people) (Ricoeur 1992, p.310). So, I 
conclude that the notion of care appropriated by Ricoeur from Heidegger 
should be understood as care of oneself.  Ipse-identity in this sense, can be seen 
as a being that Dasein exerts the constancy, maintenance, subsistence as a kind of 
self-esteem over oneself, which is underpinned by Dasein as being as care of 
oneself.  Such ipse-identity might change frequently without ethic justice since 
the self is often instructed by one’s own narrative imagination and a multiple 
of possibilities in life to become ‘someone’ or to act differently. Such 
ipse-identity might be at risk of leading to radical individual subject. Thus 
ethical issues might emerge if we do not look more closely at this mode of 
ipse-identity on an ethical plane. 
                                                 
1 The English translation has been revised by Kemp (1995) in his paper.   
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This is where Ricoeur suggests that others should come in, as can be seen in his 
discussion of the ipse-identity as self-constancy. So, does not this understanding 
of identity suggest a kind of care of others?  The question that emerges is how 
can we understand Ricoeur’s seemingly contradictory view of the ipse-identity 
as being.  The answer, in fact, to this question is that there is a dialectic of the 
selfhood and others. 
 
Ricoeur contends that a person finds its own constitution and identity in 
selfhood and the self’s question of ‘who’ finds its answer in the sense of being 
both agent and patient, in both his/her doings and undergoings, in his/her 
actions and sufferings over lifetime (see Ricoeur 1991, p.191). This suggests 
that Ricoeur’s notion of ipse-identity is primarily based on and linked with the 
identity of the self as agent, the initiator of action, and patient, the passive 
receiver of action. As agent, ipse-self initiates actions towards itself instructed 
by this self as being of care of oneself. Hence, ipse-identity can be recognized 
by oneself and others by ascribing actions to an agent. As patient, the 
ipse-identity can be identified by oneself or others through imputations of 
actions to a patient. The latter view justifies Ricoeur’s emphasis on ipse-identity 
as self-constancy that expresses a responsibility to others. As can be seen in the 
example that Ricoeur has given, one’s act of ‘keeping one’s words one has 
given to others’ is a kind of self-constancy that has its ethical implication in 
responsibility to others. This kind of self-constancy is largely stemmed from 
others’ imputation to the self as patient. As Ricoeur writes, 
 
‘Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my 
actions before another. The term ‘responsibility’ unites both 
meanings: “counting on” and “being accountable for.” It unites 
them, adding to them the idea of a response to the question “Where 
are you?” asked by another who needs me. This response is the 
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following: “Here I am!” a response that is a statement of 
self-constancy’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.165). 
 
In this sense, Ricoeur adds a sense of ethical dimension to self-constancy, 
which emerges from one’s care of others. As Ricoeur writes, ‘self-constancy is 
for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can 
count on that person’ (ibid.).  
 
The ethical dimension of self-constancy and the ethical justification of the 
promise, as Ricoeur writes, could be derived from the ‘obligation to safeguard 
the institution of language and to respond to the trust that the other places in 
my faithfulness [in the promise]’ (ibid., p.124). This ‘obligation’, in my deep 
analysis, is beyond the field of morality. Obviously, ‘obligation’ here contains a 
sense of responsibility to others acquired from or imposed by the external 
world in certain moral cultures, which implies a moral dimension. In deep 
analysis, this obligation could originate from the care of others as feelings of 
internal sympathy towards others (e.g., others’ sufferings) that emerge from 
intersubjective relations, which is in fact an ethical dimension2. That is to say, on 
the one hand, being a person as the result of self’s internalisation of certain 
cultural norms means that one should keep faith to some shared norms or 
moral rules as a moral being in his/her world. In the third volume of his work 
Time and Narrative, Ricoeur has asserted that ‘…self-constancy refers to a self 
instructed by the works of a culture that it has applied to itself’ (Ricoeur 1988, 
                                                 
2 In fact, Ricouer particularly distinguishes the notion of ethics and morality in his 
work. He defines term ‘ethics’ for personal conduct as aim of an accomplished life and 
define the term ‘morality’ as the articulation of this aim in norms (Ricoeur 1992, p.170). 
He further defines ‘ethical intention’ as ‘aim at the “good life” with and for others, in 
just institutions’ (ibid., p.172). He also maintains that morality is subordinate to ethics, 
and both complementary to each other (see ibid., p.170-171). 
CHAPTER 3 
 144
p.247). On the other hand, as a person, a certain kind of feelings of sympathy 
could emerge from inside of the self in its mutual understanding of the 
conditions of others implied in the intersubjective relationship. For example, ‘I’ 
can feel how others will suffer if ‘I’ do not respond the trust that others place in 
my act of keeping my words given to them. In this sense of similitude between 
oneself and others, Ricoeur concludes, ‘the esteem of the others as a oneself and 
the esteem of oneself as an other’ become equivalent (see Ricoeur 1992, p.194), in 
the intersubjective relationship. Otherwise, the relationship will not be in 
balance and equity.  
 
Now, what we can see on the ethical plane is an ipse-identity as being one 
which oscillates in the dialectics of narrative identity and ethical identity, of 
care of oneself and care of others, or we can see an ipse-identity exists in the 
balanced care of both self and others (see Diagram 1.). On the one hand, the 
question of ‘Who am I?’ without the aid of sameness can be incorporated into 
the declaration ‘Here is where I stand!’  From being a person who is captured 
by narrative imagination or many possibilities to choose for himself or herself, 
appears an unstable identity that others can hardly count on. As Ricoeur 
analyses this mode of identity, ‘“Who am I, so inconstant, that notwithstanding 
you count on me?”’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.168).  On the other hand,  
 
‘there is no doubt that the “Here I am!” by which the person 
recognizes himself or herself as the subject or imputation marks a 
halt in the wandering that may well result from the self’s 
confrontation with a multitude of models for action and life, some of 
which go so far as paralyze the capacity for firm action’ (ibid., 
p.167). 
 
Here, others are always in one’s vision, and perhaps have primacy over oneself, 
when considering the question of ‘Who I am’. To quote Ricoeur,  
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‘Between the imagination that says, “I can try anything” and the 
voice that says “Everything is possible but not everything is 
beneficial (understanding here, to others and to yourself),” a muted 
discord is sounded. It is this discord that the act of promising 
transforms into fragile concordance: “I can try anything”, to be sure, 
but “Here is where I stand!”’(ibid., p.167-168). 
 
3.8 The overarching dialectic: between sameness and others 
From the interpretation and reconstruction of Ricoeur’s theory of personal 
identity I have given by now, we can perceive an overarching dialectic 
relationship, a dialectic of sameness (of a person) and others in which selfhood 
is mediated between both (see Diagram 1.). It is not difficult to see this dialectic 
spans the first two dialectics, that is, the dialectic of the sameness and selfhood 
and the dialectic of selfhood and others. Sameness and others are different. 
Ricoeur argues,  
 
‘As long as one remains within the circle of sameness-identity, the 
otherness of the other than self offers nothing original… “others” 
appears in the list of antonyms of “same” alongside “contrary,” 
“distinct,” “diverse,” and so on’ (ibid., p.3).  
 
The first dialectic, that is, the dialect between idem-identity and ipse-identity is 
complementary to the dialectic of sameness and others, because selfhood can act 
as a mediator between sameness and others. On the one hand, to maintain the 
sameness of oneself, one might not heed the call from others; on the other hand, 
for the purpose of care of others, one might change his/her sameness, for 
example, changing one’s habit, for the sake of others. One’s final decision on 
changing or not depends on the proportion of one’s preference for the care of 
oneself as sameness and one’s preference for care of others in this dialectic 
scale. 
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3.9 Conclusion: Reflexivity and the role of learning in Ricoeur’s theory of 
personal identity 
In this chapter, I have presented an interpretation and a reconstruction of 
Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity. What characterises his theory are three 
pairs of dialectic relationships implied in the notion of personal identity, i.e., 
the dialectics between sameness and selfhood, between selfhood and others 
and between sameness and others. It could be argued that what emerges from 
these dialectic dimensions of personal identity are three modes of reflexivity in 
which the roles of learning relevant to personal identity can be perceived and 
developed. 
 
First, as can be seen from above, Ricoeur suggests that two modes of 
permanence in time in selfhood are basically two different modes of personal 
identity.  These may be seen in terms of two different beings of the self 
expressed in their dialectic relationship, i.e. identity as character and identity 
as self-constancy. Idem-identity in the field of selfhood is identity as sameness 
of the self, under the category of the being as substance, as ‘something’. 
Ipse-identity is the identification of the permanence of self’s ipseity, that is, the 
identification of self’s selfhood as one of the existentials as care, which belong 
to the mode of being of Dasein (e.g. the continuity, maintenance or subsistence 
of the ipseity). Between idem-identity and ipse-identity, there exists a dialectic 
relationship. On the one hand, identity of character is where idem-identity and 
ipse-identity overlap and accord with each other.  On the other hand it is 
precisely in the act of keeping one’s promise that ipse-identity departs from 
idem-identity and stands alone opposite to identity as sameness. It is exactly in 
this dialectic relationship between sameness and selfhood that a kind 
reflexivity of the self stands out. On the one hand, one goes back into his/her 
memory to seek sameness with himself/herself to gain a sense of consistency 
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within oneself from the past to the present. On the other hand, based on one’s 
reading of the past and imagination of the future ‘to be someone’, he/she 
exerts action over himself or herself in order to change and to be different from 
the ‘old’ self. This mode of reflexivity is thus mediating between one’s memory 
and his/her imagination, between being the same and being different. Thanks 
to the notion of narrative identity, this mode of reflexivity can be conducted by 
way of narrative, since it is narrative identity with its corresponding internal 
dialectic that serves as mediator to oscillate between sameness and selfhood. 
 
Secondly, we can see in ipse-identity as self-constancy, there is no aid of 
sameness, and ipse stands ‘alone’ by itself.  This is not difficult to understand 
since, as I have shown, ipse is a mode of being of Dasein as care of oneself.  
However, under closer examination we can see that self-constancy does not 
stand ‘alone’,.  Self-constancy, it can be argued, can be constituted by ‘others’, 
since ‘obligation’ expressed in self-constancy involves both moral and ethical 
dimensions. Hence what appears here is another dialectic relationship, which 
exists between selfhood and others. On the one hand, the notion of 
self-constancy is where the ipse goes hand in hand with others. On the other 
hand, when ipse neglects others, it might present itself as a troubled being, 
understood in egotism, narcissism and/or radical individualism. Here we can 
see the second mode of reflexivity, which mediates between the dialectic of the 
selfhood and others. However, this reflexivity no longer functions on the 
narrative scale, but puts itself on an ethical plane overarching both moral 
responsibility and sympathy towards others. 
 
Finally, a third dialectic relationship can be perceived between sameness and 
others in which selfhood is mediated between both. For the sake of others, for 
the sake of ethical purposes, the sameness of oneself can be changed by the 
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action initiated by this very self, since this self involves others as an element 
which is constitutive of itself, since this self is a oneself as another. The 
reflexivity of the self is therefore also conducted in the dialectic relationship 
between sameness and others, which can be partly facilitated by investigating 
one’s narrative identity, since this third dialectic crowns the dialectic between 
sameness and selfhood. 
 
It is worth noting that the implications of the roles of learning concerning one’s 
identity are rich in reflexivity existed in these dialectical frameworks.  
Through one’s reflexive construction of one’s personal life in life 
stories/narrative, one can learn a great deal about his/her personal identity in 
the first dialectic. Here one can learn not only the stability and the continuity 
of his/her identity as sameness through reading one’s narrative identity.  One 
can also learn who one wants to be, by imagining becoming ‘someone’ he/she 
preferred to be, an ‘imagined character’ inferred from his/her life story. One’s 
interpretation of one’s narrative identity is also a learning process for gaining 
the meaning of his life, e.g., learning something good or bad, happy or sad, 
conveyed in the narrative’s plot instructed by certain cultural mores. The role 
of learning contained in the second mode of reflexivity lies in one’s response to 
others, which is a kind of learning about both responsibility towards and 
sympathy for others. In the third mode of reflexivity, one can see that 
sameness of a person can be partly changed into different identity for the sake 
of caring for others, which implies a kind of learning in an ethical category. 
However, learning concerning one’s identity in this sense is also in a tension 
between learning for the sameness and learning for the ethical dimension of 
personal identity.
CHAPTER 4 
 149
 
Chapter 4 Charles Taylor’s view on identity and narrative 
 
In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how 
we have become and of where we are going. 
(Charles Taylor 1989, p.47) 
 
My self-understanding necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates 
narrative. 
(Charles Taylor 1989, p.50)  
 
 
4. 1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I aim to investigate the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor’s 
theory of identity, particularly focusing on the question of the need of personal 
identity for us. I will start with a section that concerns itself with the issue of 
whether or not personal identity matters by reconstructing a discussion of the 
issue based on ideas of Parfit, Ricoeur and Taylor. Then I will focus on Taylor’s 
theory of identity by first clarifying his view of the self. This part is followed 
by a section on Taylor’s definition of identity. Then I will provide a systematic 
interpretation of Taylor’s views that identity is underpinned by what he calls 
‘strong evaluation’.  Next, I will discuss Taylor’s main thesis that identity is 
connected with ‘the good’. After that, an interpretation of the relationship 
between Taylor’s moral theory and his notion of ‘the good’ will be given. Then, 
I will discuss how Taylor’s notion of moral identity is related to narrative. I 
will conclude with a discussion about the roles of leaning in Taylor’s theory of 
identity. 
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4. 2 Does personal identity matter? 
Does personal identity matter? This issue has been argued about by some 
philosophers in the last two decades. In his work, Reasons and Persons, Derek 
Parfit argues that ‘personal identity is not what matters’ (Parfit 1986, p.255 
cited in Ricoeur 1992, p.130). As I have showed in the previous chapter, Parfit 
argues that ‘puzzling cases’ of personal identity cannot be decided and the 
question as such is therefore empty. Parfit then argues that personal identity is 
not what matters.  He bases this view on his understanding of personal 
identity as sameness.   Ricoeur presents the line of Parfit’s argument clearly: 
 
‘…if indecidability seems unacceptable to us, it is because it troubles 
us. This is clear in all the bizarre cases in which survival is at issue: 
What is going to happen to me? I ask. Now if we are troubled, it is 
because the judgment of identity seems important to us. If we give 
up this judgment of importance to us, we cease to be troubled. 
Presented with the options opened by the puzzling cases, we are 
ready to concede that we know all there is to know about the case in 
question and to stop the investigation there’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.136, 
emph. added). 
 
The idea that personal identity does not matter can also be identified in Parfit’s 
definition of personal identity. He asserts that ‘[a] person’s existence just 
consists in the existence of a brain and body, and occurrence of a series of 
interrelated physical and mental events’ (Parfit 1986 cited in Ricoeur 1992, p 
131). In relation to simple mental or psychological continuity, the person 
constitutes a ‘separate further fact’. This ‘separate further fact’ is in the sense 
that the person is distinct from his/her brain and his/her experiences. So, for 
Parfit, ‘personal identity consists in an additional fact in relation to physical 
and/or mental continuity’ (see ibid.). Ricoeur states that all these terms are 
described in an impersonal manner, rather than described in relation to mineness. 
Further, the impersonal feature of Parfit’s version of personal identity, is 
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derived from the causal link between certain events and facts at physical and 
mental levels. As Parfit himself writes, ‘identity over time just 
involves…psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with 
the right kind of cause’ (Parfit 1986, p.216 cited in Taylor 1989, p.50).  
 
Parfit approaches personal identity from a ‘reductionist thesis’ and a ‘Further 
Fact View’ (Parfit 1986, p.210 cited in Ricoeur 1992, p.131), that is, he sees 
personal identity as an impersonal, separate, further fact in relation to the 
series of mental and physical events in question. However, these views seem to 
simply assume personal identity as sameness vis-à-vis self-consciousness, and 
exclude the dimension of self-concern to personal identity, that is, our concern 
for ourselves, including our concerns for our life as a whole, our life mode and 
who we are in human context.  Given that personal identity is seen as ‘an 
additional fact’ in relation to causal connectedness and continuity of 
psychological/physical events and facts, and given that personal identity as a 
result of self-understanding and personal (re-)construction involving self-concern in 
relation to one’s life seems to be neglected, it is no surprise that Parfit agrees 
on the view that ‘a human life is not an a priori unity or that personal identity 
does not have to be defined in terms of whole life’ (see Taylor 1989, p. 49). 
Hence, it is no surprise that Parfit concludes that personal identity does not 
matter to us.  
 
Ricoeur does not agree with Parfit’s view. For Ricoeur, Parfit’s conclusion not 
only draws simply from a view of personal identity as sameness, but also is a 
result of his unawareness of selfhood as mineness ‘in each case’. As Ricoeur 
argues,  
 
‘how can we ask ourselves about what matters if we could not ask to 
whom the thing mattered or not? Does not the questioning about 
CHAPTER 4 
 152
what matters or not depend upon self-concern, which indeed seems 
to be constitutive of selfhood?’ (ibid., p.137).  
 
He further argues that ‘it is “our view” of life that is at issue’ (ibid., p.,138). 
Although Ricoeur does contend that personal identity matters, he does not 
provide us with a detailed and systematic argument on this issue. It is Charles 
Taylor who asks us why personal identity matters to us by establishing 
personal identity as self-consciousness and personal identity as self-concern.  
 
Taylor argues, ‘personal identity is the identity of the self, and the self is 
understood as an object to be known’ (Taylor 1989, p.49). But this object is 
unlike other objects. But Taylor argues, ‘For Locke it (i.e. self) has this 
peculiarity that it essentially appears to itself. Its being is inseparable from 
self-awareness. Personal identity is then a matter of self-consciousness… 
Self-perception is the crucial defining characteristic of the person for Locke’ 
(ibid.). Taylor argues that ‘all that remains of the insight that the self is 
crucially an object of significance to itself is this requirement of 
self-consciousness’ (ibid.). Taylor points out that Parfait’s argument on 
personal identity is basically his further work on John Locke’s work of 
personal identity and Parift draws on Locke’s understanding of the self as 
self-awareness (ibid.). The full focus on self-consciousness, more precisely on 
one’s consciousness of ‘sameness’ of ‘self as an object’, can partly explain why 
the terms described in Parfit’s notion of personal identity is impersonal, since 
the language used to describe ‘sameness’ can only be neutral by nature. 
 
Taylor thus does not agree to fully adopt Locke’s notion of the self. ‘[W]hat has 
been left out is precisely the mattering. The self is defined in neutral terms, 
outside of any essential [moral] framework of questions’ (ibid.). According to 
Taylor,  
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‘Locke recognizes that we are not indifferent to ourselves; but he has 
no inkling of the self as a being which essentially is constituted by a 
certain mode of self-concern – in contrast to the concern we cannot 
but have about the quality of our experiences as pleasurable or 
painful’ (ibid., emph.  added).  
 
Taylor thus concludes that modern understanding of personal identity has for 
a long time produced an ‘erroneous understanding of the self’ (see ibid). For 
Taylor, a human self exists in a space of moral issues. Personal identity does 
matter to us because it is closely connected with the self as self-concern. As 
Taylor writes,  
 
‘We talk about a human being as a “self”. The word is used in all 
sorts of ways…But there is a sense of the term where we speak of 
people as selves, meaning that they are beings of the requisite depth 
and complexity to have an identity… (or to be struggling to find one) 
(ibid., p.32, emph. added).  
 
This understanding of the self is different from self that is regarded as a 
neutral object in terms of self-consciousness. Rather, Taylor’s understanding of 
the self is the self in the sense of self-concern in relation to moral questions. 
Personal identity matters exactly because the term self has a sense of the 
self-concern about its being in the world. However, as I will show Taylor’s 
self-concern is not an egotistic self-concern, but is fundamentally the 
self-concern constitutive of otherness and moralities.  
 
In order to have a better understanding of Taylor’s view of personal identity 
and why it matters to us, we need first of all understand his view of the self, 
since, to him, the latter is closely related to the former. 
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4. 3 Taylor’s view on the self  
4. 3.1 Self in ‘moral space’ 
Taylor’s approach to the ‘self’ features the relation of the ‘self’ to ‘the good’. In 
his words, self exists in ‘moral space’. His conception of the self is 
conspicuously stressed on the ‘value’ or ‘moral’. He criticizes that the self in 
the language of mainstream social sciences is ‘value-free’, which is mainly 
about the general fact on human care for the ‘ego’ and ‘self-image’.  He does 
not think that those aspects of self are essential to human personhood. Instead, 
he proposes the personal identity matters because it has something to do with 
a ‘human agency’ in his view.  He writes,  
 
‘the notion of self which connects it to our need for identity is meant 
to pick out this crucial feature of human agency, that we cannot do 
without some orientation to the good, that we each essentially are 
(i.e. define ourselves at least inter alia by) where we stand on this’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.33). 
 
Taylor further claims, ‘[W]e are selves only in that certain issues matter for us’ 
(ibid., p.34). This dimension of the self suggests a certain mode of self-concern, 
a kind of caring about our ‘selves’ with respect to certain moral issues. Taylor 
develops his argument by using a spatial metaphor: the self exists in moral 
space (see ibid., p.28). This moral space is a space inhabited by questions 
concerning moral issues. Taylor’s view that self exists in ‘moral space’ has two 
senses. Firstly, he argues, 
 
‘To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in 
which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth 
doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and 
what is trivial and secondary’ (ibid.)  
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Those questions are about moral issues, e.g., what kind of life modes I would 
like to adopt, what kind of person I want to be, etc. As Taylor says, ‘What I am 
as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance 
for me’ (ibid., p.34). If things, which mainly refer to desires or purposes in 
Taylor’s mind, have no significance and meaning for me, I might just live a 
‘mere life’ or just a ‘biological’ life, or might suffer the meaninglessness of life. 
In Taylor’s words, such a personal condition is ‘disorientation’ vis-à-vis the 
good, which is quite similar to the pathological dislocation of the person in an 
identity crisis (see ibid., p.28; cf. p.31). In this sense, self is in fact orientated by 
certain ‘good’ in ‘moral space’. 
 
Secondly, Taylor claims, ‘…we are only selves insofar as we move in a certain 
space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good’ (ibid. p.34, 
emph. added). That is to say, in this moral space, we can always be asked or 
ask ourselves, where we stand in relation to the good we strongly value within 
‘moral space’. Those questions are concerned with our direction, i.e. moving 
near or far, towards or away vis-à-vis the good we strongly value. In this 
second sense, self moves in a ‘space of questions’ or in ‘moral space’ in relation 
to the good.  
 
For Taylor, such a ‘moral’ self involves strong evaluations, a key notion in 
Taylor’s moral theory, which I will discuss in section 4. 5. of this chapter. That 
is, if ‘I’ have no strong evaluations to the different things in relation to 
different goods or within a certain good, ‘I’ might be at a loss to say what is 
worth mattering, and thus cannot judge what is important for ‘me’ and what is 
not.     
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4.3.2 Self in the web of interlocution 
Another crucial feature of self in Taylor’s mind is that ‘one is a self only among 
other selves’ (ibid., p.35). Taylor calls this as ‘self among interlocutors’ (ibid., 
p.29) or ‘dialogical’ self (see Taylor 1995b, p.230). He explains this feature of 
the self by examing the relationship between self and language. He writes, ‘to 
study person is to study beings who only exist in, or are partly constituted by, 
a certain language’ (Taylor 1989, p.34-35). ‘There is no way we could be 
inducted into personhood except by being initiated into language’ (ibid.,p.35). 
‘A language only exists and is maintained within a language community. And 
this indicates another crucial feature of a self. One is a self only among other 
selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround 
it’ (ibid.). So, for Taylor, a self exists within ‘webs of interlocution’ (see ibid., 
p.36). As he articulates,  
 
‘I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors who were 
essential to my achieving my self-definition, and in relation to 
certain interlocutors who are now critical to my continuing grasp of 
language of self-understanding, and both relation can overlap’ (ibid., 
p.36).  
 
Self-interpretation hence is acquired through others and requires language. As 
Taylor writes, ‘…things have significance for me, and the issue of my identity 
is worked out, only through a language of interpretation’ (ibid., p.34). 
 
Taylor further contends that the language used by an individual is not 
something invented by him/herself. An individual acquires language only in 
‘a language community’ (Taylor 1989, p.35) and through interaction with 
others who matter to us—what Mead called ‘significant others’ (see Taylor 
1995b, p.230). Also, according to Taylor, interlocutors are not necessarily 
face-to-face partners with an individual, they could be absent, or understood 
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as imaginary persons. This indirect way of relating oneself to ‘significant 
others’ is what Taylor calls a ‘transcendental condition’ (Taylor 1989, p. 38). In 
this sense, interlocutors might be absent; they can be the dead, or have not yet 
been born. For example, our conversation with our parents continues within 
ourselves as long as we live; reading a philosopher, a novelist and poet can 
also be seen as a dialogue with others.  
 
It seems to Taylor that ‘moral space’ and ‘web of interlocution’ overlap. He 
holds that a fundamental moral orientation is essential to being a human 
interlocutor, one who is capable of answering for oneself the question of ‘who’ 
in the web of interlocution (see ibid. p.29). As he writes, ‘…a person without a 
framework altogether would be outside our space of interlocution; he 
wouldn’t have a stand in the space where the rest of us are’ (ibid., p.31). He 
writes, ‘Normally, however, one dimension would not be exclusive of the 
other’ (ibid., p.36). In this sense, a ‘self’ exists in both domains at once. 
 
4.3.3 Self is partly constituted by its self-interpretation   
For Taylor, self is not like an ‘object’ in the usually understood sense in the 
mainstream social sciences (e.g. psychology and sociology). Self for Taylor is 
not ‘neutral’ and there is always a certain element of ‘self-concern’. As he 
writes, 
 
‘we are not selves in the way that we are organisms, or we don’t 
have selves in the way we have hearts and livers. We are living 
beings with these organs quite independently of our 
self-understandings or -interpretations, or the meanings things have 
for us’ (Taylor 1989, p. 34).  
 
In his early writing, Taylor claims that some of the human emotions involve 
import-ascription which is subject-referring, and those subject-referring 
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feelings are the basis of our understanding about what it is to be human (see 
Taylor 1985a). As he argues, 
 
‘… the human subject is such that the question arises inescapably, 
which kind of being he is going to realize. He is not just de facto a 
certain kind of being, with certain given desires, but it is somehow 
‘up to’ him what kind of being he is going to be’ (Taylor1976, 281). 
 
Therefore, Taylor claims that self is partly constituted by its self-interpretation 
(see Taylor 1985a, 1989, p.34). He claims,  
 
‘…our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive 
of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view 
on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which 
can be by-passed in our understanding of reality’ (1985a, p.47).  
 
Although how a person views or interprets him/herself is not all there is to 
know about him/her, self-interpretation is a vital component of an identity, 
one that cannot be neglected. In other words, in order to understand and 
explain ourselves and our identities, we must accommodate those 
self-interpretations. Taylor then concludes that ‘human beings are 
self-interpreting animals’ (1985a, p.45) and self is partly constituted by its 
self-interpretation. However, self-interpretation is not purely created by a 
subject.  I have shown above, self-interpretation requires language and the 
language is always a community language rather than a self-invented 
language. In this sense, self-interpretation is not forged in isolation, but 
achieved in relation with ‘others’ and a community.  
 
One important feature of Taylor’s notion of self-interpretation is that ‘our 
self-interpretations are partly constitutive of our experiences’ (1985a, p.37). 
Taylor claims that ‘our formulation about ourselves can alter what they are 
CHAPTER 4 
 159
about’ (1985a, p.101; cf. 35-8, 191; 1985b: 26-7). Changes in vocabularies of 
self-understanding of experiences, emotions and motivations, change the self 
that is thereby understood, and subsequently leads to changes in our 
experiences. As he writes, 
 
‘Our attempts to formulate what we hold important must, like 
descriptions, strive to be faithful to something. But what they strive 
to be faithful to is not an independent object…, but rather a largely 
inarticulate sense of what is of decisive importance. An articulation 
of this “object” tends to make it something different from what it 
was before” ’ (Taylor 1985a, p.38). 
 
Taylor coins the term ‘expressivism’ to mean that ‘the development of new 
modes of expression enables us to have new feeling, more powerful or more 
refined, and certainly more self-aware. In being able to express our feelings, 
we give them a reflective dimension which transforms them’ (1985a, p.233; cf. 
1995b, p.92, 97-98 quoted by Abbey 2000, p.61).  
 
Any change of expression about oneself has causal influences in two directions: 
‘it can sometimes allow us to alter experience by coming to fresh insight; but 
more fundamentally it circumscribes insight through the deeply embedded 
shape of experience for us’ (1985a, p.37). According to Taylor new 
self-interpretation as a result of expressivism is not arbitrary. Rather, it can be 
seen as a progressive articulation of narrative about the unfolding and 
improving of self-knowledge. Because, according to Taylor, in our articulation 
about ourselves, ‘there are more or less adequate, more or less truthful, more 
self-clairvoyant, or self-deluding interpretations’ (Taylor 1985, p.38), so the 
notion of ‘expressivism’ can be seen as an approach to have an ongoing, 
progressive and improved self-reflective understanding of one’s life.  
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Another feature of Taylor’s view of self-interpretation is that the self can only 
make best sense of him/herself through critical reflection. As he claims, 
 
‘What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs than 
those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of the 
errors we can detect make the best sense of our lives? “Making the 
best sense” here includes not only offering the best, most realistic 
orientation about the good but also allowing us best to understand 
and make sense of the actions and feelings of ourselves and others 
(Taylor 1989, p.57; cf.1995b, p.39). 
 
Our self-interpretation in this sense is always in quest for the best sense of our 
lives, and is open to revision based on critical reflection. 
 
4.4 Taylor’s definition of identity 
As I have shown above, there are mainly two features of self in Taylor’s self 
theory, i.e. the self in moral space and the self in the ‘web of interlocutions’. In 
the following section, I will show how Taylor’s definition of identity is related 
to his two views on the self. 
 
4.4.1 Identity as moral being 
Taylor defines his notion of identity in the sense of ‘finding one’s identity’ (see 
Taylor 1985, p.34; 1989, p.32). He clearly defines identity by linking it to the 
notion of moral framework, or ‘horizon’ provided by strong evaluations in moral 
space (see Taylor 1989).  It is not difficult to see that this approach to identity 
comes from his view of the self in the sense of ‘self in moral space’. For Taylor, 
the question of identity, i.e. ‘who am I?’, cannot be necessarily answered by 
name and genealogy. Rather, it can be expressed in a mode of self-concern in 
relation to certain moral issues. He writes,  
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‘What does answer this question for us is an understanding of what 
is of crucial importance to us. To know who I am is a species of 
knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments 
and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within 
which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or 
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In 
other words, it is the horizon ‘within which I am capable of taking a 
stand’ (Taylor 1989, p.27).  
 
According to Taylor, commitment here is moral and/or spiritual in meaning, 
e.g. being as a Catholic, or an anarchist; identification is defined by certain 
community mores in terms of nationality, tradition, culture, e.g., being a 
Chinese or an English man/woman. Identity as such is ‘the background 
against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense’ 
(Taylor 1995b, p.231). 
 
Thus, certain moral or spiritual commitments and certain national or 
traditional identifications are of great importance in the formation of the moral 
horizon or framework, and hence to the notion of identity. As he writes, 
 
‘…to be able to answer for oneself is to know where one stands, 
what one wants to answer. And that is why we naturally tend to 
talk of our fundamental orientation in terms of who we are. To lose 
this orientation, or not to have found it, is not know who one is. And 
this orientation, once attained, defines where you answer from, 
hence your identity’ (Taylor 1989, p.29). 
 
Taylor further claims, ‘…were they to lose this commitment or identification, 
they would be at sea, as it were; they wouldn’t know anymore, for an 
important range of questions, what the significance of things was for them’ 
(Taylor 1989. p.27). Without those commitments and identification, there might 
be no horizon/framework, and therefore, I will have no idea or lose any sense 
of where I stand. Taylor holds that it is a form of ‘disorientation’ (see ibid.) 
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which can be seen as a radical uncertainty about where I stand. Such a 
situation amounts to what we normally call an ‘identity crisis’ which is a term 
to express a state of not knowing ‘who I am’.  
 
4.4.2 ‘Others’ in moral identity 
However according to Taylor, identity is complex and many-tiered; identity 
defined by commitments and identification is just its historical facet. As has 
been shown, only within the horizon/framework partly provided by 
moral/spiritual commitments and certain national/traditional identifications, 
I can identify where I stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, 
admirable or of value and thus recognize an identity. In Taylor’s view, identity 
is not only about recognizing certain norms or something ‘given’ in the self 
through identification-with, it is also about the self-interpretation derived from 
dialogical dimension of the self, or intersubjective dimension of the self.  
 
As I have demonstrated above, Taylor asserts, ‘one is a self only among other 
selves’ and self exists within ‘webs of interlocution’. Consequently Taylor 
argues, ‘To be someone who qualifies as a potential object of this question (i.e. 
question of who) is to be such an interlocutor among others, someone with 
one’s own standpoint or one’s own role, who can speak for him/herself’ (ibid., 
29).  
 
‘My self-definition is understood as an answer to the question Who I 
am. And this question finds its original sense in the interchange of 
speakers. I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the 
family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and 
functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and also 
crucially in the space of moral and spiritual orientation within which 
my most important defining relations are lived out (ibid., p.35, emph. 
added). 
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What Taylor suggests here is that moral orientation not only comes from 
certain moral norms, but also results from our interaction with others, 
particularly, ‘significant others’ with whom we always have conversations in 
certain moral languages. Taylor argues, ‘If some of the things I value most are 
accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes part of 
my identity’ (Taylor 1995b, p.231). Thus, ‘My discovering my own identity 
doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through 
dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others’ (ibid.; cf. Taylor 1985a, 
p.209; 1989, p.36). This is what Taylor calls ‘inwardly generated identity’ 
through one’s relationship with others (see Taylor 1995b, p.231).  
 
The influence of ‘significant others’ on a person has a lifelong effect on his/her 
personal identity. To quote Taylor as following,  
 
‘We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in 
struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. 
Even after we outgrow some of these others – our parents, for 
instance – and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with 
them continues within us as long as we live’ (Taylor 1995b, p.230). 
 
From this argument, Taylor concludes that the influences of significant others 
continues over our lives even though they might be just internalized in our 
early years. Our identity is therefore continually shaped by our conversation 
with others. 
 
Taking the above into account, it is not difficult to see that Taylor’s full 
definition of someone’s identity thus usually involves not only one’s stand on 
moral and spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community 
and others.  This is because in most conditions, one’s ‘moral concerns’ in a 
community can only be interpreted in a language carried by ‘significant others’, 
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a community and certain norms.   
 
4.5 Taylor’s theory of ‘strong evaluation’ 
As I have already mentioned in section of 4.4.1, identity is defined by strong 
evaluations. But how should we understand the notion of strong evaluation? I 
will try to interpret this notion in the following section.  
 
In his essay ‘What is Human Agency?’ (1985[1977]), Taylor proposes an 
ontological thesis in which he tries to identify something essential to human 
agency, something without which an agent would not be recognizably human. 
He introduced the difference between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ evaluation and 
argues that human beings are ‘strong evaluators’. This is partly because the 
strong evaluator possesses a ‘self’ or a ‘human agent’ constitutive of strong 
evaluations that can assess quality of the life one lives or wants to live and 
kind of being one wants to be. Thus, for Taylor, the identification of the ‘self’, 
or our identity is defined by certain fundamental evaluations that are 
inseparable from ourselves as human agents as strong evaluators. Taylor 
therefore maintains that identity partly consists of strong evaluations, or of 
‘moral concerns’, or we may say, of certain ‘orientation’ to one’s strongly 
valued ‘good’ that discussed in his later work Sources of the Self (1989). 
 
4.5.1 What is strong evaluation? 
In his essay ‘What is human agency?’, the notion of ‘strong evaluation’ is put 
forward by Taylor as a result of his exploration of what is it ‘that we attribute 
to ourselves as human agents which we would not attribute to animals’ 
(Taylor 1985a, p.15). This notion is developed from Harry Frankfurt’s thesis on 
the distinction between first- and second-order desires. First-order desires are 
desires that human beings share with other animals; the second-order desires 
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are the powers or attitudes to evaluate our desires. Frankfurt thus claims that 
‘no animal other than man… appears to have the capacity for reflective 
self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires’ 
(Frankfurt 1971, p.7 cited in Taylor 1985, p.16). While Taylor agrees with 
Frankfurt, he conducts a further examination of the ‘capacity for reflective 
self-evaluation’ classified in a second-order desire by differentiating between 
‘weak evaluation’ and ‘strong evaluation’.  
 
‘Weak evaluation’ is concerned with ‘weighing two desired actions to 
determine the more convenient, or how to make different desires compatible  
(for instance, he might resolve to put off eating although he is hungry, because 
later he could both eat and swim), or determining how to get the most overall 
satisfaction (see Taylor 1985a, p.16). In weak evaluation, our evaluations are 
based on our contingent ‘feelings’ and caring about immediate outcomes. 
Taylor argues that a subject who only evaluates weakly is a simple weigher of 
alternatives. 
 
‘Strong evaluation’, first of all, however, is concerned with the quality of our 
motivations, or more precisely, the qualitative worth of different desires (ibid.). 
In strong evaluation, 
 
‘our desires are classified in such categories as higher or lower, 
virtuous or vicious, more or less fulfilling, more or less refined, 
profound or superficial, noble or base; where they are judged as 
belonging to different modes of life, fragmented or integrated, 
alienated or free, saintly, or merely human, courageous or 
pusillanimous and so on’(ibid.). 
 
Taylor writes in his later work, ‘A good test for whether an evaluation is 
“strong” in my sense is whether it can be the basis for attitudes of admiration 
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and contempt’ (Taylor 1989a, p.523). 
 
A subject who engages in strong evaluation is a strong evaluator. This is not to 
say that some people are strong evaluators, some are not. Rather, for Taylor, 
engaging in strong evaluation is a human universal. He writes, ‘I think this is 
something like a human universal, present in all but what we would clearly 
judge as very damaged human beings’ (Taylor 1994, p.249; cf. 1985a, p.16, 28, 
33). Arto Laitinen interprets this concept thus: ‘the crucial idea is that human 
relations to the world, to self and to others are value-laden, and thus 
intrinsically strongly evaluative (Laitinen 2003, p.19, 30). Arto further 
interprets,  
 
‘Engagement in strong evaluation is not merely one optional activity 
among others, not merely a matter of taking a break and stepping 
back and reflecting. It is rather a mode of understanding, which, to 
follow Heidegger, is an aspect of one’s being-in-the-world which is 
always already in operation, something one cannot really turn off’ 
(ibid., p.30). 
 
In Taylor’s moral theory, human moral intuition or moral reactions all involve 
strong evaluation. This is why Ruth Abbey (2000) interprets strong evaluation 
as a human’s intuitive judgement or response. In a word, Taylor claims that 
human beings are strong evaluators.  
 
4.5.2. ‘Depth’ of strong evaluation 
One important feature of strong evaluation is that it has ‘depth’ which weak 
evaluation lacks.  There are at least two different senses of ‘depths’ that the 
notion ‘strong evaluation’ contains. Firstly, the strong evaluator evaluates 
his/her alternatives by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and 
lower, noble and base, and so on through a language of evaluative distinction. 
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This is because a strong evaluator has ‘a vocabulary of worth’. As Taylor 
writes, 
  
‘Strong evaluation deploys a language of evaluative distinctions, in 
which different desires are described as noble or base, integrating or 
fragmenting, courageous or cowardly, clairvoyant or blind and so on’ 
(Taylor 1985a , p.19) 
 
The ‘language of evaluative distinction’ enables a strong evaluator to articulate 
his/her alternatives.  
 
‘The strong evaluator can articulate superiority just because he has a 
language of contrastive characterization. So within an experience of 
reflective choice between incommensurables, strong evaluation is a 
condition of articulacy, and to acquire a strongly evaluative language 
is to become (more) articulate about one’s preferences’ (1976a, p.288 
cited in Abbey 2000, p.20) 
 
Nicholas Smith further interprets this point thus: ‘the language of qualitative 
contrasts’ enables strong evaluator to ‘reach a more nuanced and refined 
understanding of the options available to him’ (Smith 2000, p.90). From this, 
one can realise that  ‘the language of evaluative distinction’ takes a key role in 
giving a ‘deep’ articulation about the strong evaluator’s preferences.  
 
Secondly, ‘depth’ contained in the notion of ‘strong evaluation’ concerns  ‘the 
quality of life’. Taylor writes,  
 
‘A strong evaluator, by which we mean a subject who strongly 
evaluates desires, goes deeper, because he characterizes his 
motivation at greater depth. To characterize one desire or inclination 
as worthier, or noble, or more integrated, etc. than others is to speak 
it in terms of the kind of quality of life which it expresses and 
sustains’ (Taylor 1985a, p.25).  
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In addition to this, Taylor suggests strong evaluation is related to the quality 
life and the kind of being, hence identity. He analyses how these notions are 
related one another: 
 
‘…strong evaluator reflection also examines the different possible 
modes of being of the agent. Motivation or desires do not only count 
in virtue of the attraction of the consummations but also in virtue of 
the kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly belong 
to’ (ibid.).  
 
Then Talyor concludes, ‘a reflection on the kind of beings we are takes us to 
the centre of our existence as agents. Strong evaluation is not just condition of 
articulacy about preferences, but also about the quality of life, the kind of 
being we are or want to be. It is in this sense deeper’ (ibid., p.26) 
 
4.5.3 The nature of strong evaluation 
What needs to be clarified first are Taylor’s uses of strong evaluation and 
strong evaluations. Taylor generally uses the uncountable form of the term to 
refer to the process of evaluation. There are different interpretations of this 
process. Some commentators think strong evaluation is a kind of reflection (e.g. 
Rosen 1991,Weinstock 1994, Anderson 1996, Flanagan 1996, Smith, 1996; 
Gutting 1999; Edgar 1995), some consider it to be a kind of deliberation (Smith 
2002), some regard it as a pre-understanding (Laitinen 2003), and some others 
treat it as an intuitive judgement or response (Abbey 2000, p.19). Some of these 
interpretations might have right aspects of their own. For example, one can 
find an interpretation of strong evaluation as reflection on one’s life. This is an 
interpretation that originated from Taylor’s discussion on the relationship 
between strong evaluation and self-responsibility in his essay ‘What is human 
Agency’. However, I am inclined to agree with Ruth Abbey’s (2000) 
interpretation of strong evaluation as an intuitive judgement and response, 
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because her interpretations are much closer to what Taylor mainly means, 
particular in his later works. This can evidently be seen in Taylor’s detailed 
discussion about the notion of moral intuition or response at the beginning of his 
book Sources of the Self (see Taylor 1989). In his later work Taylor further 
explains: 
‘I don’t consider it a condition of acting out of a strong evaluation 
that one has articulated and critically reflected on one’s 
framework…I mean simply that one is operating with a sense that 
some desires, goals, aspirations are qualitatively higher than others’ 
(Taylor 1994, p.249; cf. 1995b, p.140 cited in Abbey 2000, p.20). 
 
Abbey further interprets this meaning as following: 
 
‘The meaning of evaluation in this context is closer to an intuitive 
judgement or response than to the outcome of a reasoned, reflective 
process. As we shall see, Taylor does believe that the underpinnings 
of strong evaluation can be articulated to some extent, but this is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of strong evaluation. He 
contends that individuals always make these sorts of qualitative 
judgements even if they are unaware that they are doing so and 
even if they are oblivious to the bigger moral picture that forms the 
background to their distinctions of worth’ (Abbey 2000, p.19). 
 
In this sense, Taylor believes that strong evaluation is a condition of articulacy, 
not vice versa. Thus, Abbey concludes,  
 
‘Ultimately, Taylor’s position on strong evaluation is that while 
individuals can be conscious of the moral judgements that underpin 
their strong evaluations, they need not be. Strongly valued goods 
need not be explicit or articulated in order to exercise a powerful 
influence on a person’s actions and sense of morality and purpose. 
Nor do these judgements have to be part of the person’s awareness 
to be valuable in explaining moral life. Instead, strongly valued 
goods can exist as part of the tacit background of their 
understanding (ibid.)’ 
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I agree that strong evaluation as a process of intuitive judgement/response is 
closer to Taylor’s later thinking on the notion of strong evaluation and that we 
need not reflect on our strong evaluations in order to gain a better 
understanding of an individual’s moral life.  However, I would suggest that it 
is exactly such kind of reflection in relation to strong evaluation that should 
draw our attention. It is exactly in his early discussion on strong evaluation 
and re-evaluation as a mode of reflection that we can find the significant 
implications for roles of learning in terms of one’s identity.  As I will show, 
this process of reflection can be seen as a process of reflective learning 
concerning one’s life.   
 
The plural form of strong evaluation, i.e. strong evaluations could be 
understood as specific ‘qualitative distinctions’ regarding certain desires or the 
objects of desires.  However, Laitinen asserts that ‘strong evaluations’ are not 
literally second-order desires; rather, they are ‘evaluative beliefs’ or ‘strong 
convictions’ (Laitinen 2003, p.24-25, p. 30). I agree with Laitinen on this point 
because Taylor quite often describes strong evaluations as ‘judgements’, 
‘standards’, ‘ends’ or ‘goods’ that are ‘independent of’ our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices which are judged by those standards or judgements 
(see Taylor 1985b, 220; 1989a, p.4, p.20). As Laitinen writes, ‘More often, it 
seems, strong evaluations are used to refer to the resulting (or preceding) 
strong preferences or strong convictions, the stable conceptions of the good’ 
(Laitinen 2003, p.30). Laitinen explains that ‘strong evaluation’ can be seen as 
‘a matter of forming such evaluative beliefs’ (ibid., p.25). These ‘evaluative 
beliefs’ are: ‘…claims concerning evaluative aspects of the objects of evaluation 
(desires, actions, emotions, characters, ways of life, situations), and these 
claims may be mistaken, and liable to criticism’ (ibid.).  
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The criticisms levelled at the notion of strong evaluation might come from 
different moral assumptions/theories one holds. Taylor is critical of those 
moral theories that ignore ‘qualitative distinctions’. But what position does 
Taylor hold to affirm a ‘language of qualitative distinction’? According to 
Laitinen, in Taylor’s early articles, the process of strong evaluation can be 
interpreted in any subjectivist, communitarian and objectivist ways.  
However in his later works, Taylor’s interpretation of strong evaluation is 
explicitly directed towards a realist view. 
 
4.5.4 Strong evaluations and self 
Taylor maintains that the self is closely linked with strong evaluations. For 
Taylor, human beings are self-interpreting subjects (see 1985a, p.4) and ‘man is 
above all the language animal’ (ibid., p.216). Strong evaluation can be seen as a 
process of self-interpretation in the language of evaluative distinctions, which 
is in fact a kind of self-evaluation. This tight relationship between self and 
strong evaluations can be seen in the following quotation from Taylor, 
 
‘the human subject is such that the question arises inescapably, which 
kind of being he is going to realize. He is not just de facto a certain 
kind of being, with certain give desires, but it is somehow “up to” 
him what kind of being he is going to be’ (1976, p.281; see also 
‘Introduction’, Taylor 1985a/b) 
 
Here one can see that the close relationship between self and strong 
evaluations lies in self-interpretation and self-definition. Based on this link 
between self and strong evaluations, it is not difficult to understand why 
Taylor considers that the link between identity and strong evaluations is 
essentially tight. He considers that strong evaluations are constitutive of 
identity. As he writes, ‘Our identity is defined by our fundamental 
evaluations’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34). This characteristic is absent in weak 
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evaluations, a feature that also represents a key difference between strong and 
weak evaluations.  
 
4.5.5 Strong evaluations, agency and identity 
According to Taylor, the essential relationship between fundamental/basic 
strong evaluations and identity originates from the link between strong 
evaluations and agency. As has been shown above, in terms of the ‘depth’, 
‘strong evaluation is not just a condition of articulacy about preferences, but 
also about the quality of the kind of being we are or want to be’ (ibid., p.26).  
Taylor asserts, ‘…a reflection on the kind of beings we are takes us to the 
centre of our existence as agents’ (ibid.). An individual’s strong evaluations 
give judgement to the quality of the life he/she wants to live and kind of 
person he/she wants to be. 
 
Taylor defines his notion of identity in relation to strong evaluations as 
following, 
 
‘… the term where we talk about “finding one’s identity”, or going 
through an “identity crisis”. Now our identity is defined by our 
fundamental evaluations. The answer to the question “what is my 
identity?” cannot be given by any list of properties of other ranges 
about my physical description, provenance, background, capacities, 
and so on. All these can figure in my identity, but only as assumed in 
a certain way’ (ibid., p.34). 
 
If ‘my identity’, or ‘what I have become’, or ‘where I come from’ or in Taylor’s 
words, ‘my being of a certain lineage’ is of central importance to me, then this 
is my self-concern. If I see this identity as ‘conferring on me membership in a 
certain class of people whom I see as marked off by certain qualities which I 
value in myself as an agent and which come to me from this background, then 
it will be part of my identity’ (ibid.). Now, ‘my lineage’ as part of my identity 
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is bound up with certain qualities I value as an agent. It is here that one can 
perceive that identity is bound up with certain strong evaluations which are 
inseparable from certain modes of human agency. 
 
‘I identify myself by my strong evaluations, as someone who 
essentially has these convictions’, or else I see certain of my other 
properties as admitting of only one kind of strong evaluation by 
myself, because these properties so centrally touch what I am as an 
agent, that is as a strong evaluator, that I cannot really repudiate 
them in the full sense. For I would be thereby repudiating myself, 
inwardly riven, and hence incapable of fully authentic 
evaluation’(ibid.). 
 
Thus according to Taylor, our identity is defined by ‘certain evaluations which 
are inseparable from ourselves as agents’ (ibid.). In other words, essential 
strong evaluations are constitutive of identity, because they provide the 
indispensable horizon or framework within which we both recognize and 
self-define ourselves by our agency as strong evaluators. This mode of human 
agency largely amounts to human orientation to the good in the ‘moral space’ 
discussed in Taylor’s later work Sources of the Self (1989). To lose this horizon or 
framework, or not to have found it, is experiencing ‘disorientation’, or 
‘identity-crisis’ (see Taylor 1989, p.27).   
 
4.5.6 Strong evaluations, agent and person 
Taylor asserts that the link between strong evaluation and agency is a 
requirement to be a person. Taylor claims that the ‘horizons’ or ‘limits’ defined 
by certain strong evaluations are essentially important for human agency. As 
he writes, ‘…the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is 
constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be 
tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, 
undamaged human personhood’ (Taylor 1989, p.27). Without such evaluations, 
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according to Taylor, we will suffer a series of damages as a person. As he 
argues, 
 
‘…shorn of these we would lose the very possibility of being an 
agent who evaluates; that our existence as persons, and hence our 
ability to adhere as persons to certain evaluations, would be 
impossible outside the horizon of these essential evaluations, that we 
would break down as persons, be incapable of being person in the 
full sense’ (1985a., p.34-5). 
 
To put it in a nutshell, the existence of fundamental strong evaluations is 
constitutive of human agency in the sense that such agency makes being a 
human person possible. Identity is defined by fundamental strong evaluations 
in the sense that self-recognition and self-definition largely originate from 
strong evaluations which are inseparable from the self as an agent. 
 
4.5.7 Two modes of reflections  
What should be distinguished here are two different modes of ‘reflection’ in 
relation to strong evaluation. Firstly, strong evaluation as a framework in 
second-order desires always poses a self-evaluative judgement or response to 
certain desires or objects of desire, both consciously and unconsciously. In 
Taylor’s view, this evaluative process is human universal. Although an 
individual can be conscious of the moral judgements that underpin their 
strong evaluations, they need not be. One reason for this is that the moral 
ontology behind one’s views can remain largely implicit (Taylor 1989, p.9), or is 
not articulated. In this sense, this mode of reflection can be understood as 
either conscious or unconscious reflection. 
 
Secondly, a mode of conscious reflection might be identified in our deliberate 
articulation of our implicit strong evaluations. There are also two levels of 
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reflections in this mode of reflection. First, Taylor agrees with the Socratic 
belief in the value of examined life (Taylor 1989a, p.92), i.e., an unexamined life 
is not worth living. Taylor holds that a strong evaluator has the capacity of 
articulating the implicit strong evaluative background and  that this 
inclination is stronger in his early work (e.g. Taylor 1985a). He writes, ‘Our 
strong evaluations may be called contrast articulations…they are attempt to 
formulate what is initially inchoate, or confused, or badly formulated’ (Taylor 
1985a, p.25). He therefore claims, ‘To be a strong evaluator is thus to be 
capable of a reflection which is more articulate’ (ibid.). Thus according to 
Taylor, such a reflection is not a must for individuals, that is, they do not need 
to do such reflection. But Taylor believes that it will be good for individuals to 
do such reflection given his agreement on Socratic belief. Such reflection can be 
conducted within or among strong evaluative frameworks/backgrounds and it 
‘will draw people to particular moral outlook and that inspire them to act in 
accordance with it’ (Abbey 2000, p.41).  
 
Secondly perhaps more importantly in the modern sense, Taylor believes that 
an individual also has the capacity to re-evaluate his/her basic strong 
evaluations. In Taylor’s word, it is a ‘radical re-evaluation’ that will call the 
framework, which has already been formulated by individuals, into question 
(see Taylor 1985a, p.40-42). ‘Radical re-evaluation’, is, ‘the most basic terms, 
those in which other evaluations are carried on, are precisely what is in 
question’ (Taylor 1985a, p.40). As Taylor argues, 
 
‘This radical evaluation is a deep reflection, and a self-reflection in a 
special sense: it is a reflection about the self, its most fundamental 
issues and reflection which engages the self most wholly and deeply’ 
(ibid.,p.42).  
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What emerges from this refection will be a ‘self-resolution’ to the self in 
question, a new definition of fundamental (strong) evaluations that are 
essential to one’s identity. Radical re-evaluation, in my view, is similar to 
Taylor’s notion of ‘radical reflexivity’. As Abbey suggests, ‘This term refers to 
a focus on the self qua self, the turning of attention toward what sort of self it is 
that has experiences of knowing, feeling and so on’ (Abbey 2000, p.83). Taylor 
contrasts general reflexivity and radical reflexivity in the following way: 
 
‘If I attend to my wounded hand, or begin (belatedly) to think about 
the state of my soul instead of about worldly success, I am indeed 
concerned with myself, but not yet radically. I am not focusing on 
myself as the agent of experience and making this my object…Radical 
reflexivity brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is 
inseparable from one’s being the agent of experience’ (Taylor 1989a 
130-131 cited in Abbey 2000, p.84). 
 
4.6 Identity and the good 
4.6.1 How identity is linked with the good? 
Taylor maintains that identity cannot be separated from the good. The link 
between the notion of identity and the notion of the good can be brought to 
light as following. Taylor’s notion of ‘moral orientation’ to the good as a 
condition of moral identity can be understood as his notion of ‘strong 
evaluation’ in relation to moral identity. One seeks and finds frameworks in 
moral space. He argues, ‘To understand our predicament in terms of finding or 
losing orientation in moral space is to take the space which our frameworks 
seek to define as ontologically basic’ (Taylor 1989, p.29). He then expounds this 
point thus, ‘…we take as basic that the human agent exists in a space of questions. 
And these are the questions to which our framework-definitions are answers, 
providing the horizon within which we know where we stand, and what 
meanings things have for us’ (ibid.). These questions are moral questions in 
Taylor’s view, and are questions about ‘good’ and ‘worthiness’  which our 
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framework can offer us answers, enables us to hold a place in relation to other 
interlocutors and affords meanings to our lives. Hence, Taylor thinks that 
‘orientation to the good’ is one of the basic conditions of identity, or of one’s life 
making sense (see ibid., p.51). Following on from this we can see there is a 
necessary connection between an orientation towards the good and identity, 
and this connection is inescapable in Taylor’s view (see ibid., p.51-52).   
 
The ‘moral space in question’, Taylor argues, must be mapped by strong 
evaluations or qualitative distinctions (see ibid., p.29). The role of strong 
evaluation here, similar to orientation, is inescapable, because it is the condition 
needed in order for one to judge what is of worth or significance to him/her in 
this space. Taylor shows us the fundamental role of strong evaluation in 
guiding us in the moral space,  
 
‘…it only plays the role of orienting us, of providing the frame within 
which things have meaning for us, by virtue of the qualitative 
distinctions it incorporates…Our identity is what allows us to define 
what is important to us and what is not. It is what makes possible 
these discriminations, including those which turn on strong 
evaluations. It hence couldn’t be entirely without such evaluations. 
The notion of an identity defined by some mere de facto, not strongly 
valued preference is incoherent’ (Taylor 1989, p.30).   
 
This is why Taylor claims that ‘our identity is defined by our fundamental 
evaluations’ (Taylor 1985, p.34). Further, according to Taylor, certain 
fundamental/essential strong evaluations that define our identity provide the 
horizon, framework or standards for other or less fundamental strong 
evaluations one makes. 
 
A more basic question however is: where do strong evaluations come from? 
There must be an ontological background from which those strong evaluations 
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appear. I wish to explore this question in the following sections. To give a 
simple answer now, Taylor suggets, this background is something about 
constitutive good (see ibid., p.92) or more generally, strong values (see Smith 
2000). Constitutive good presents itself in ‘moral’ concern. So, if strong 
evaluations orientate us in moral space to move us towards the good we prefer, 
then, it is constitutive good that provides standards and motivations that form 
our fundamental strong evaluations. But what is ‘constitutive good’? How 
exactly should we understand Taylor’s notion of ‘good’? 
 
4.6.2 How should we understand the notion of the good?   
One might need to know that the notion of ‘the good’ in Taylor’s usage is in a 
broad sense. In my understanding, ‘good’ in Taylor’s language is not opposite 
to the meaning of the ‘bad’ or the ‘evil’ in its narrow sense. As one can see, at 
the very beginning of the Part I of Sources of the Self, Taylor points out that 
contemporary moral philosophy focuses on what is right and wrong, but gives 
no attention to a place for ‘a notion of the good as the object of our love or 
allegiance or, as Iris Murdoch portrayed it in her work, as the privileged focus 
of attention or will ’(Taylor 1989, p.3, emph. added). Thus, the notion of the 
good that Taylor hopes to explore in his work could be understood beyond a 
narrow moralistic sense. As Smith asserts, ‘[T]he link Taylor makes between 
identity and the good is premised on a non-moralistic, expansive 
understanding of the good’ (Smith 2002, p.95).  
 
In Taylor’s view, the good can be generally seen as ‘life good’, and ‘hypergood’ 
‘constitutive good’. I will discuss these terms separately as the following. 
(1) Life good 
To use Taylor’s own words, ‘good’ or sometimes what he calls ‘strong good’ 
means: 
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‘…whatever is picked out as incomparably higher in a qualitative 
distinction. It can be some action, or motive, or style of life, which is 
seen as qualitatively superior. “Good” is used here in a highly general 
sense, designating anything considered valuable, worthy, admirable, of 
whatever kind or category’ (Taylor 1989a, p.92, emph. added).  
 
The notion of the good may refer to a dimension of morality within the broad 
domain of Taylor’s moral theory which I will discuss thoroughly in section 4.7.. 
Taylor uses the term ‘moral concern’ to overarch the issues of what is right or 
wrong, better or worse, and higher or lower, through which he means to show 
that both ‘moral’ and ethical issues cannot be separated from what he calls 
‘strong evaluations’. Thus, it is not difficult to understand that the meaning of 
term ‘good’ is expanded and is used to refer to a central dimension of Taylor’s 
moral theory.  
 
Taylor uses the metaphorical term ‘moral space’ to accommodate the questions 
about the good. This link can be analysed through Taylor’s discussion about 
moral space and qualitative distinction. ‘Moral space’, Taylor writes, is ‘a space 
in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and 
what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and 
secondary’ (Taylor 1989, p.28). When probing deeper into the term ‘questions’, 
one may see that these are questions about qualitative distinctions. These are 
certain criteria or standards provided by certain ‘higher’ values, ideals, or 
more generally, goods. He gives these examples as follows, ‘One form of life 
may be seen as fuller, another way of feeling and acting as purer, a mode of 
feeling or living as deeper, a style of life as more admirable, a given demand as 
making as absolute claim against other merely relative ones, and so on’ (ibid., 
p.20). For Taylor, all these goods share a commonality expressed in the term 
‘incomparable’. He explains it further thus:  
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‘In each of these cases, the sense is that there are ends or goods which 
are worthy or desirable in a way that cannot be measured on the 
same scale as our ordinary ends, goods, desirabilia. They are not just 
more desirable, in the sense though to a great degree, than some of 
these ordinary goods are. Because of their special status they 
command our awe, respect or admiration’ (ibid., p.20).  
 
So, these ‘incomparable’ goods are themselves responses of our qualitative 
distinctions or strong evaluations. As Taylor puts it, 
 
‘…the fact that these ends or goods stand independent of our own 
desires, inclinations, or choices, that they represent standards by 
which these desires and choices are judged. These are obviously two 
linked facets of the same sense of higher worth. The goods which 
command our awe must also function in some sense as standards for 
us’ (ibid.). 
 
Taylor calls these types of goods as life goods (see ibid, p. 93), because these 
goods are about qualitative distinctions between actions, or feelings, or modes 
of life, which are facets or components of a good life. 
(2) Constitutive good 
But where do strong evaluations or qualitative distinctions that define ‘life 
goods’ come from? Smith contends that strong evaluations originate from 
certain standards or criteria provided by strong values. ‘Strong values are 
“goods” in the meaning that Aristotle gave to the term: ‘desirable things which 
are worthy of desire’ (see Smith 2002, p.91). In this sense, strong values are more 
fundamental than strong evaluations (see ibid.). But ‘strong value’ interpreted 
by Smith is tantamount to, in my understanding, what Taylor calls constitutive 
good.  According to Taylor, constitutive good is what constitutes or defines 
the good actions, feelings or motives in daily life. In addition,‘[t]he constitutive 
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good is a moral source…that is, it is a something the love of which empowers 
us to do and be good’ (Taylor 1989, p.93). Indeed, constitutive good provides 
the source of strong evaluations, or it is a ‘moral source’ of a self. Constitutive 
good might be, for example, the Idea of the Good in Plato’s moral theory, an 
understanding of God, or the image of the autonomous human agent and 
his/her ability to act out of respect for the moral law in Kantian ethics, etc.. 
 
(3) Hypergood 
In an age of pluralism, most Western modern persons are moved by many 
goods, that is, many values of worth, within or between multiple moral 
frameworks, but Taylor suggests that it is the most important one for ourselves 
that define our essential identity. For example, worship of God has an 
overriding importance among many modern goods for some people, or it 
might be value of social justice, or value of family life.  
 
‘Most of us not only live with many goods, but find that we have to 
rank them, and in some cases, this ranking makes one of them of 
supreme importance relative to the others (ibid., p.62).  
 
According to Taylor, there are higher-order and lower-order qualitative 
distinctions (ibid. p.63). Our higher-order qualitative distinctions help us 
discriminate among many goods, attribute differential worth or importance to 
them, or decide when and if to follow them. Our lower-order qualitative 
distinctions define the most important goods for us, or our strongly valued 
goods, which are ‘higher goods’ compared with other goods. As Taylor says, 
‘A higher-order qualitative distinction itself segments goods which themselves 
are defined by lower-order distinctions’ (ibid.). He further writes, ‘Let me call 
higher-order goods of this kind ‘hypergoods’, i.e., ‘goods which not only are 
incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from 
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which these must be weighed, judged, decided about’ (ibid.). Taylor even 
claims that the hypergood is the central feature of an individual’s identity. He 
writes,  
 
‘It is orientation to this which comes closest to defining my identity, 
and therefore my direction to this good is of unique importance to me. 
Whereas I naturally want to be well placed in relation to all and any 
of the goods I recognize and to be moving towards rather than away 
from them, my direction in relation to this good has a crucial 
importance’ (ibid.) 
 
In conclusion, the term ‘good’ according to Taylor is generally referred to as 
something that is qualitatively higher by which our daily desires and choices 
are judged and something that evoke our respect/love. The former is ‘life 
good’; the latter is ‘constitutive good’. Hypergoods are the higher goods after 
comparing and ranking many goods according to qualitative distinctions in 
one’s life. 
 
4.6.3 Three axes of ‘the good’ 
Taylor classifies three axes or dimensions of ‘the good’, the moral concerns or 
moral thinking that he supposes could be found in any form or another in all 
cultures (see ibid., p.16). They are: (1) our sense of respect for and obligations to 
others, i.e. the concern, love or respect for ‘other human beings’, which 
includes the rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities one should have in 
relation to other human beings; (2) our understandings of what makes a full life, 
which is about our understandings of what makes a full, worthwhile and 
meaningful life. This dimension seems to fit properly into a conception of the 
good; (3) notions concerned with dignity, including the sense of dignity, a 
feeling of self-worth (see ibid., p.15). For Taylor, ‘Frameworks provide the 
background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgements, intuitions, or 
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reactions in any of the three dimensions’ (ibid., p.26). He claims that it is the 
second dimension of the good that is in trouble in our age (see ibid., p.18). 
 
4.7 Taylor’s moral theory in relation to the notion of the good 
4.7.1 Taylor’s moral domain 
The moral domain that Taylor discusses is broader than the field that much 
contemporary moral philosophy focuses on. For Taylor, the latter is limited by 
focusing too much on the conceptions on right, duty and obligations in an 
individual’s relationship to others, and only debates questions about what is 
correct thing to do in such relationships. It gives no attention to what is good 
to be and rarely explores the nature of the good life. As he puts it, ‘…it has no 
conceptual place left for a notion of the good as the object of our love or 
allegiance or, as Iris Murdoch portrayed it in her work, as the privileged focus 
of attention or will ’(ibid., p.3).  
 
Taylor expands contemporary moral philosophy by incorporating the 
questions about what is good to be. By ‘enlarging our range of legitimate 
moral descriptions’ (ibid.). Taylor argues for ‘a gamut of views a bit broader 
than what is normally described as “moral”’ (ibid., p.4), that is, to bring out 
and examine ‘the richer background languages in which we set the basis and 
point of the moral obligations we acknowledge’ (ibid., p.3). Besides notions 
and reactions on issues of justice, respect for other people’s life, well-being and 
dignity, Taylor wants to explore further ‘our sense of what underlies our own 
dignity, or questions about what makes our lives meaningful or fulfilling’ 
(ibid., p.4).  
 
Abbey clarifies that some thinkers (e.g. Williams 1985, Foucault 1978-88, 1998) 
use the terms morality and ethics to refer respectively to the distinction between 
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what it is right to do and what it is good to be. They see morality as being 
about universalizable rules and codes of conduct that should govern 
other-regarding actions, while ethics is concerned with questions about the self, 
meaning and fulfilment in life (see Abbey 2000, p.11). Taylor’s distinction 
between what it is right to do and what it is good to be accords with Ricoeur’s 
treatment of these two notions as I mentioned in Chapter 3, but he does not 
adopt the term ‘distinction’ at all. Instead, he uses the term morality to 
encompass both meanings. What is the underlying reason for Taylor’s use of 
the term morality to cover the domain of ethics? Abbey suggests: ‘A major 
reason for using the term morality in this more comprehensive way is his 
belief that questions about right action and meaning or fulfilment in life both 
involve strong evaluation (Abbey 2000, p.11). One can perceive Taylor’s 
intention through his own words, 
 
‘What they have in common with moral issues, and what deserves 
the vague term ’spiritual’, is that they all involve what I have called 
elsewhere ‘strong evaluation’, that is, they involve discriminations of 
right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not 
rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather 
stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be 
judged’ ( Taylor 1989, p.4) 
 
Taylor also writes, ‘ “Morality”, of course, can be and often is defined purely in 
terms of respect for others. The category of the moral is thought to encompass 
just our obligations to other people. But if we adopt this definition then we 
have to allow that there are other questions beyond the moral which are of 
central concern to us, and which bring strong evaluation into play’ (ibid., p.14).  
Taylor believes, ‘respect for others’ and ‘our notions of a full life’ are ‘not two 
quite separate orders of ideas. There is a substantial overlap or, rather, a 
complex relation in which some of the same basic notions reappear in a new 
way’ (ibid., p.15). In this sense, Taylor uses the term ‘morality’ beyond the 
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scope of what is normally discussed in moral theory, which mainly deals with 
the notions of right, duty and obligation. Rather, he discusses the notion of ‘the 
good’, in its expansive meaning, i.e., respect for others, meaningful life and 
self-worth, in his ‘broader’ moral theory.  This is done on the grounds that he 
believes ‘moral issues’ are commonly related to the notion of ‘strong 
evaluation’ (premised on the notion of ‘the goods’ or ‘strong values’) which he 
considers essential to human agency. 
 
4.7.2 Moral ontology  
Taylor’s use of the word ‘moral’, is based on a broader and deeper 
understanding of the ‘moral intuitions’ of human beings. Firstly, these moral 
intuitions are different from other moral reactions as the consequence of 
upbringing and education. As he explains, ‘There seems to be a natural, inborn 
compunction to inflict death or injury on another, an inclination to come to the 
help of the injured or endangered’ (ibid., p.5). Secondly, Taylor thinks that 
these ‘instincts’ receive a variable cultural shape and this shape is inseparable 
from an account of what it is that commands our respect. He then thinks that 
‘the account seems to articulate intuition’ (ibid.). This analysis of moral 
intuition makes Taylor introduce his notion of moral ontology. As he 
expounds,  
 
‘Our moral reactions in this domain have two facets, as it were. On 
one side, they are almost like instincts, comparable to love of sweet 
things, or our aversion to nauseous substances, or our fear of falling; 
on the other, they seem to involve claims, implicit or explicit, about 
the nature and status of human beings. From this second side, a 
moral reaction is an assent to, an affirmation of, a given ontology of 
the human’ (ibid.) 
 
Thus, in Taylor’s view, the whole way in which we think, reason, argue, and 
question ourselves about morality supposes that our moral reactions are not 
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only ‘gut’ feelings but also implicit acknowledgements of claims concerning 
their objects. And Taylor stresses that it is exactly ‘the various ontological 
accounts’ that try to articulate these claims (ibid.,p.7). In this sense, according 
to Taylor, ‘a background picture’ or a ‘moral ontology’ not only lies behind our 
moral intuitions, but also enables us to articulate our moral intuitions. As he 
puts it, 
 
‘What is articulated here is the background we assume and draw on 
in any claim to rightness, part of which we are forced to spell out 
when we have to defend our responses as the right ones’ (ibid., p.9) 
 
Thus Taylor believes that the moral ontology behind any person’s views can 
remain largely implicit. One reason for this might be that ontological accounts 
‘are rather remote from our everyday descriptions by which we deal with 
people around us and ourselves’ (ibid., p.7). According to Taylor only some 
challenges or controversies between different moral ontological accounts 
might force one’s own account to the fore. Another reason that makes 
articulation of moral ontology difficult is related to modern pluralism. In 
Taylor’s words this is, ‘the tentative, searching, uncertain nature of many of 
our moral beliefs’ (ibid., p.10). For him, this is an essentially modern 
predicament. 
 
4.7.3 Articulation of moral frameworks 
Taylor maintains that many of the strongly held values, and even moral 
frameworks, by which people live often go unacknowledged and continue to 
be implicit, remaining in the background of their awareness. Only in times of 
controversy, conflict or crisis, is one forced to articulate the assumptions of 
his/moral values (see Taylor 1989, p.9). In accordance with Taylor’ views, 
without any articulation of moral ontology, we would lose contact with the 
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good (see ibid., p.97), though we do not have to do so. However, Taylor offers 
two justifications for us to make an articulation of the good.  
 
Firstly, Taylor believes articulation of implicit goods can be seen as a way of 
conducting an examination on one’s lives, which is a Socratic view (see Taylor 
1989, p.92). This reading of articulation can thus be seen as a mode 
self-reflection because this type of articulation deepens one’s understanding of 
moral values and moral responses by showing what underpins them, and thus 
acquire a deeper and broader self-knowledge (see Abbey 2000, p.41; Taylor 
1989, p.26, p.80, p.92). 
 
Secondly, Taylor stresses that articulation can make an individual make 
contact with constitutive goods and this empowers/enables him/her to live up 
to those goods. As Taylor writes, ‘articulation can bring us closer to the good 
as a moral source, can give it power’ (Taylor 1989a, p.92).  
 
‘Moral sources empower. To come closer to them, to have a clearer 
view of them, to come to grasp what they involve, is for those who 
recognize them to be moved to love or respect them, and through this 
love/respect to be better enabled to live up to them. And articulation 
can bring them closer’ (ibid., p.96).  
 
Also, Taylor argues, ‘A formulation has power when it brings the source close, 
when it makes it plain and evident, in all its inherent force, its capacity to 
inspire our love, respect, or allegiance. An effective articulation releases this 
force, and this is how words have power (ibid.). 
 
It is here we can see that narrative plays a key role in the articulation of the 
good.  Taylor believes we can be empowered ‘by articulating our feelings or 
our story so as to bring us in contact with a source we have been longing for. 
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This may come about through the recasting of our lives in a new narrative’ 
(ibid., p.97). Here one can see this is where narrative as a form of articulation 
comes in. Taylor points out that ‘One way in which people do this (narrative) 
is to relate their story to a greater pattern of history, as the realization of a 
good’ (ibid.). ‘It’s almost as these schematic historical narratives exercised a 
force of attraction of their own. The secret of their strength is their capacity to 
confer meaning and substance on people’s lives’ (ibid., emph. added). It thus 
follows that to learn to articulate the good can empower people to live up to 
that good, and narrative is a powerful form of articulation with which to do 
this.      
 
Taylor also points out that the people who articulate are not necessarily the 
actors themselves, they can also be others. He writes, ‘The agent himself or 
herself is not necessarily the best authority, at least not at the outset’ (ibid., p.9). 
But eventually, the agent may put others’ interpretations into his own, and 
then self-interpretation will be significant. As he writes, ‘things have 
significance for me, and the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a 
language of interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid articulation 
of these issues’ (ibid., p.34). In this sense, the role of learning concerning one’s 
identity not only lies in one’s own self-constructed interpretations, but also lies 
in others’ narratives and interpretations, though others’ interpretations are 
subject to one’s acceptance.  
 
4.7.4 A moral realism 
Taylor divides strong evaluations into ‘fundamental/essential’ evaluations 
(higher-order qualitative distinction) and ‘less basic ones’ (lower-order 
qualitative distinction). Essential evaluations ‘provide the horizon or 
foundation for the other evaluations one makes’ (See Taylor 1985a, p.39). 
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However, something ‘qualitatively higher’ concerning worth must be   
assumed as judgements for the operation of essential strong evaluations. It is 
here that Taylor links the notion of strong evaluations to his concept of the 
‘good’, the qualitative higher in terms of the judgement of worthiness. 
According to Taylor, such ‘good’ is strongly valued and is independent of an 
individual’s desires, inclinations and choices. As he says, 
 
‘I want to speak of strong evaluation when the goods putatively 
identified are not seen as constituted as good by the fact that we 
desire them, but rather are seen as normative for desire. That is, they 
are seen as goods which we ought to desire, even if we do not, goods 
such that we show ourselves up as inferior or bad by our not desiring 
them’ (1985b, p.120). 
 
However, how the ‘good’ comes into an individual’s mind is not further 
explained by Taylor. One can only perceive that such good is closely related to 
what Taylor mentions about ‘moral ontology’ which involves ‘ontological 
claims’, implicit or explicit, concerning objects (See Taylor 1989a, p.5). Hence, 
moral ‘ontological claims’ can be roughly seen as strongly valued ‘good’, or 
‘constitutive good’.  This is an idea that I have introduced earlier. Such ‘good’, 
therefore, like the second facet of ‘moral intuition’ discussed before, is formed 
unconsciously as a result of internalization, i.e. by receiving ‘variable shape in 
culture’ (ibid.) and acquired by the dialogical self in his/her conversation with 
significant others who have been the result of internalization of certain culture. 
In this sense, we can understand that this ‘moral ontology’ is realist in Taylor’s 
view. As he writes, 
 
‘…the fact that these ends or goods stand independent of our own 
desires, inclination, or choices, that they represent standards by 
which these desires and choices are judged’ (ibid., p.20). 
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Many critics criticise Taylor for his moral realism because it holds that moral 
values exist independently of human beings (e.g., MacIntyre 1996, p.523; 
Morgan 1994, p.52-3). Some commentators however, interpret that Taylor’s 
moral realism is based on his human ‘engaged’ view (e.g.,Abbey 2000, p.27; 
Laitinen 2003, p.12). These interpretations originated from Taylor’s 
phenomenological inclinations in his moral theory and philosophical 
anthropology. It has been argued that this inclination is particularly influenced 
by Merlearu-Ponty and Heidegger (See Smith 2004, Laitinen 2003).  The 
‘engaged view’, as Laitinen writes, is that ‘in living their lives, humans orient 
actively towards the world and participate in practices and engage in various 
meaningful activities, encountering demands and realizing values’ (Laitinen 
2003, p.12). Based on this premise, it is not difficult to understand what 
Taylor’s moral realism really means. As Taylor claims,  
 
‘We sense in the very experience of being moved by some higher 
good that we are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is 
valuable because of our reaction. We are moved by seeing its point as 
something infinitely valuable. We experience our love for it as a 
well-founded love’ (1989a, p.74; cf., p.341).  
 
Thus, Taylor’s moral realism could be seen from an ‘engaged’ or ‘embodied’ 
view, i.e. human’s experience of morality. It is then argued by Abbey (2002) 
that Taylor’s moral realism is not a ‘strong realism’ and she thus creates a new 
term for Taylor’s moral realism, that is, ‘falsifiable realism’ (see Abbey 2000, p. 
26-31). 
 
While these ‘engaged views’ may interpret the above mentioned claims as 
empirical ones, we can also read them as philosophical claims made by Taylor 
for his transcendental argument. All those claims about moral realism can be 
seen as the assumptions or conditions of the possibility of the claim that strong 
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evaluation is a human universal. We have to assume that those conditions are 
like that; otherwise, strong evaluation is not possible or doesn’t make sense. 
The notion of  ‘falsifiable realism’ collapses the distinction between empirical 
claims and philosophical claims, and therefore the interpretation in this line of 
thought might be incorrect.  
 
In short, Taylor’s notion of strong evaluation originated from ‘constitutive 
good’. The ‘good’ is not something coming from human’s desires, will or 
choices. Nor is it merely the fact that an individual operates according to their 
affirmation of their values. Rather, human beings experience the ‘goods’ that 
command their respect and admiration in a non-anthropocentric manner, as 
standards for other desires or choices.  
 
4.8 Identity and meaning of life 
4.8.1 The link between identity and meaning of life 
As I mentioned before, Taylor contends that the self exists in a space of 
questions concerning quality of life and kinds of being and thus his version of 
‘self’ is a mode of self-concern. I also suggested that the second dimension of 
the good is about understandings about what makes a full life. If this is so then 
it is not difficult for us to understand his argument that, 
 
‘The questions or concerns touch on the nature of the good that I 
orient myself by and on the way I am placed in relation to it. But then 
what counts as a unit will be defined by the scope of the concern, by 
just what is in question. And what is in question is, generally and 
characteristically, the shape of my life as a whole’ (Taylor 1989, p.50).  
 
My life as a whole is my concern and therefore how I conduct myself is a 
question for me because it gives the significance, worth or value to my 
personal identity as a moral being. As Taylor claims,  
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‘My point is that the goods which define our spiritual orientation are 
the ones by which we will measure the worth of our lives; the two 
issues are indissolubly linked because they relate to the same core, 
and that is why I want to speak of the second issue, about the worth, 
or weight, or substance of my life, as a question of how I am “placed’ 
or ‘situated’ in relation to the good, or whether I am in “contact” with 
it’ (ibid., p.42).  
 
Here Taylor is actually talking about two basic ranges of questions that arise 
when making sense of human lives. For the first range of questions, they ‘can 
arise of the “worthwhileness” or “meaningfulness” of one’s life, of whether it 
is (or has been) rich and substantial, or empty and trivial’ (ibid., p.43). These 
are questions about orientation. As he argues, ‘[N]ot being able to function 
without orientation in the space of the ultimately important means not being 
able to stop caring where we sit in it’ (ibid., p.42). According to Taylor, 
questions about orientation cannot be separated from questions of direction. 
Linked by the first range of questions, another range of questions arises for us 
that are concerned with ‘whether our lives have unity, or whether one day is 
just following the next without purpose or sense, the past falling into a kind of 
nothingness which is not the prelude, or harbinger, or opening, or early stage 
of anything…’(ibid., p.43). These are questions about directions of lives.  
 
In terms of questions about directions of life, Taylor might be attacked for a 
moralistic view that he assumes that only some lives are worthwhile because 
these lives have direction and purpose. However, one can defend Taylor’s 
position by referring to his claim that strong evaluation is human universal. 
Strong evaluation is about quality of life and kinds of being, a sense of 
difference between mere life and ‘good’ life. Living without orientation (strong 
evaluation) is just ‘mere life’, which for Taylor would not be a ‘human 
universal’. Orientation towards strongly valued good is bound up with 
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‘direction vis-à-vis that good’, i.e. how to be in contact with that good. Thus, 
Taylor’s notion of ‘direction of life’ is not a biased ‘moralistic’ view; it is about 
‘one of the most basic aspirations of human beings’ (ibid, p.42) 
 
‘Direction of lives’, suggests Taylor, is about ‘our most fundamental 
motivation, or our basic allegiance, or the outer limits of relevant possibilities 
for us, and hence the direction our lives were moving in or could move in’ 
(ibid., p.46). Taylor contends that issues of human condition cannot be 
restricted to what we are, because we are also always changing and becoming. 
We experience our life course from infancy, childhood, and adolescence to 
adulthood when we become autonomous agents and have our own places 
relative to the good we value. Even if we hold that place, it is still challenged 
by new events of lives and is possibly revised through our increased 
experience and growing maturation. Taylor writes, ‘So the issue for us has to 
be not only where we are, but where we’re going’ (ibid., p.47). In this sense, 
Taylor states by establishing that there are not only ‘more or less 
questions’/‘relative questions’ which are about how near or far in relation to 
what we see as the good, but also ‘yes or no’/‘absolute’ questions which 
concerns the direction of our lives, i.e. moving towards or away from the good, 
or concerns the source of our motivations in regard to this good (see ibid, 
p.45-47). Taylor claims that ‘an absolute question always frames our relative 
ones’ (ibid., p.47). In other words, the answer of how far or near I am in 
relation to my valued good depends on the strength of the 
motivation/allegiance that moves me towards that good and/or how externally 
limited the relevant possibilities for me to move closer to that good are.  
 
To sum up, the questions about directions of lives defined by the questions 
about orientations to the valued good provide the guidelines and standards to 
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answer the questions about how I am in contact with that good, and ‘gives me 
a sense of wholeness, of fullness of being as a person or self, that nothing else 
can’ (ibid., p.63). 
 
4.8.2 Problematic modern identity 
Taylor claims that it is the struggle of a modern person in finding the meaning 
of his/her life that puts the problems of identity on our agenda. Given that one 
important area I am investigating in this thesis is about learning in relation to 
identity, I want to focus now on the second axis of the good, i.e., the pursuit of 
a unity, the meaning, and/or the worthiness of life, which is the central 
dimension that makes personal identity matter to us.  
 
In Taylor’s view, the frameworks that define our identity today in the West is 
problematic. ‘None forms the horizon of the whole society in the modern 
West’ (ibid., p.17).  He points out,  
 
‘What is common to them all is the sense that no framework is shared 
by everyone, can be taken for granted as the framework tout court, 
can sink to the phenomenological status of unquestioned fact. This 
basic understanding refracts differently in the stances people take’ 
(ibid.)  
 
Taylor argues, ‘Moderns therefore anxiously doubt whether life has meaning, 
or wonder what its meaning is’ (ibid., p.16). The meaning of life as a modern 
concern can be analysed in three ways. Firstly, living in an age of pluralism, a 
modern person might feel him/herself in conflict concerning his/her personal 
identity since that identity is influenced by many different moral goods that 
might be at odds or are incompatible with one another. Taylor’s notion of 
hpyergood, as I have discussed before, can be considered as an approach to deal 
with this predicament.  This is because hpyergood eases the tensions that occur 
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when finding the meaning of life in the age of pluralism, by ranking the order 
of many goods. As he writes, ‘For those with a strong commitment to such a 
good, what it means is that this above all others provides the landmarks for 
what they judge to be the direction of their lives’ (ibid., p.62). 
 
Secondly, Taylor thinks the lack of meaning in modern life ‘might happen 
through personal inadequacy, but failure might also come from there being no 
ultimately believable framework’ (ibid., p.17, emph. added). He writes, ‘[N]ot to 
have a framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless. The quest is 
thus always a quest for sense (ibid., p.18).  
 
The third reason that ‘meaning’ features in modern life is the awareness of the 
importance of ‘articulation’ in the quest for the sense or meaning of life. He 
writes, ‘[W]e find the sense of life through articulating it. And moderns have 
become acutely aware of how much sense being there for us depends on our 
own powers of expression’ (ibid.). In respect of a third reason, there are two 
senses of talking about ‘meaning’ for moderns. Modern persons try to attain 
the meaning of life in the first sense, and when they do it, they create meaning 
depending on their ability to articulate it. It thus can be argued that since 
narrative has reflexive and temporal features, the latter sense can be seen as a 
necessity of narrative in quest of significance/meaning of one’s life. In this 
sense, narrative plays an essential role in exploring the sense of one’s identity.  
 
4. 9 Why does moral identity need narrative? 
4.9.1 Self-interpretation requires language 
The assumption that Taylor has recourse to narrative to link with the identity 
problem comes from his philosophical anthropology. One of the reasons why 
he is thought of as a hermeneutical thinker is because he claims that human 
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beings are self-interpreting animals; our understandings of ourselves play a 
crucial, albeit not exhaustive, role in shaping who we are and what we do ( see 
Taylor 1985a, p.202; 1989, p.34). He claims that self is much more about a 
certain mode of self-concern, that is, a kind of ‘caring’ about one’s ‘self’.  In 
Taylor’s own words , ‘what I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by 
the way things have significance for me’ (Taylor 1989, p.34). Furthermore he 
asserts,  
 
‘…these things have significance for me, and the issue of my identity 
is worked out, only through a language of interpretation which I 
have come to accept as a valid articulation of these issues. To ask 
what a person is, in abstraction from his or her self-interpretation, is 
to ask a fundamentally misguided question, one to which there 
couldn’t in principle be an answer’ (ibid.) 
 
Taylor adds that his discussion of this point ‘owes a great deal to Heidegger 
and his thesis that understanding is the mode of being’ (ibid., p.524).  
 
Consequently, for Taylor, self is partly constituted by its self-interpretation. 
But self-interpretation requires language. ‘To study persons is to study beings 
who only exist in, or are partly constituted by, a certain language’ (ibid., p.35). 
Self-interpretation uses language of one’s culture and community. The 
language ‘I’ use in self-interpretation is not something of ‘my’ own creation, 
but it is ‘our language’, the language provided by a culture and a society. ‘A 
language only exists and is maintained within a language community’ (ibid., 
p.35).  
 
Thus, identity cannot be separable from the community one lives in and the 
language used in that community. As Taylor puts it, ‘the self-interpretations 
which define him [the individual] are drawn form the interchange which the 
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community carries on’ (Taylor1985a, p.8 cf. p.11, p.209; 1989, p.38). This 
suggests that self-interpretation, in one way, is a consequence of interaction 
between the self and the others in everyday life.  In another way 
self-interpretation is the construction between self and social lives, or between 
personal stories and the history/tradition which is carried on by a 
social/cultural community. Both dimensions intertwine. As Taylor points out, 
‘One way in which people do this (narrative) is to relate their story to a greater 
pattern of history, as the realization of a good’ (Taylor 1989a. p.97). ‘It’s almost 
as these schematic historical narratives exercised a force of attraction of their 
own. The secret of their strength is their capacity to confer meaning and 
substance on people’s lives’ (ibid.). Here, Taylor seems to suggest that 
narrative identity presents itself at both an interpersonal level and a 
moral/cultural /social level. It thus can be argued that narrative entails 
different dimensions and contains different layers of meanings to a person in 
terms of his/her identity. But narrative can be seen as a desirable form of 
self-interpretation in relation to the good at least because it contains the 
language of strong evaluation.  Narrative therefore takes a significant role in 
articulating one’s moral assumptions or frameworks and in empowering one to 
live up to one’s moral sources.  
 
4.9.2 Narrative is an inescapable temporal structure   
As has been showed above, according to Taylor, ‘orientation to the good’ is 
one of the basic conditions in terms of defining an identity and is an 
inescapable structural requirement of human agency (Taylor 1989, p.51). But 
this does not exhaust the conditions of the understanding of identity, of 
making sense of our lives. According to Taylor, there are two other necessary 
conditions. His claim is that the ‘direction of lives’ is ‘another inescapable 
feature of human life’ (ibid., p.47). He argues for this point as following, 
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‘Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, and since we 
cannot be indifferent to our place relative to this good, and since this 
place is something that must always change and become, the issue of 
the direction of our lives must arise for us’(ibid., emph. added). 
 
From the above, we can see in order to make sense of our identity in relation to 
the good, we must not only answer questions about orientation, but also 
questions about the direction of lives. However, the questions of direction of 
lives do not merely exist in the moral space, they also exist over human’s life 
time. In Taylor’s words, ‘Now we see that this sense of the good has to be 
woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story’ (ibid.). It is here 
we can see how Taylor inserts a necessary link between the notion of identity 
and narrative, thus claiming that narrative is ‘not an optional extra’ (ibid.).  
 
Some critics consider that Taylor’s argument supporting a link between 
identity and narrative is not convincing in respect of its being ‘inescapable’ 
(see Smith 2002, p.97-102) and I will discuss this objection in a later part of this 
section. One of my interpretations of this point is that it is exactly the 
inescapability of the ‘direction of lives’ in relation to the good and its temporal 
dimension in human life that Taylor introduces as what he calls, ‘another basic 
condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.47).     
  
Taylor stresses that narrative reflects the temporal dimension of human life. As 
Taylor writes, ‘In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a 
notion of how we have become, and of where we are going’ (ibid.). Here we 
can see that the ‘direction of lives’ has an inherent temporal dimension, that is, 
we cannot give meaning to our present place related to the valued good 
without locating it in the temporal context of our lives, from past experiences to 
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the present life and to the future projects. 
 
Here, Taylor appropriates Heidegger’s notion of ‘being-in-time’. He writes, 
 
‘Heidegger, in Being and Time, described the inescapable temporal 
structure of being in the world; that from a sense of what we have 
become, among a range of present possibilities, we project our future 
being… Form my sense of where I am relative to it, and among the 
different possibilities, I project the direction of my life in a relation to 
it. My life always has this degree of narrative understanding, that I 
understand my present action in all form of an ‘and then’: there was 
A (what I am), and then I do B (what I project to become)’(ibid.). 
 
In this line of argument, Taylor’s notion of ‘sense-making’ of who I am is 
concerned with both a life history and a life project that can only be seen 
through narrative. In one way, he writes, ‘To the extent that we move back, we 
determine what we are by what we have become, by the story of how we got 
there’ (ibid., p.48). In another way Taylor proposes that, ‘As I project my life 
forward and endorse the existing direction or give it a new one, I project a 
future story, not just a sate of momentary future but a bent for my whole life to 
come. This sense of my life as having a direction towards what I am not yet is 
what MacIntyre captures in his notion quoted above that life is seen as a 
“quest”’ (ibid. emph. added)  
 
Taylor further suggests that one’s life direction towards good does not simply 
lie on linear time, but in non-linear human time.  
 
‘We can see this in two dimensions, to past and future “ekstaseis” that 
Heidegger talks about. I don’t have a sense of where /what I am, as I 
argued above, without some understanding of how I have got there or 
become so. My sense of myself is of a being who is growing and 
becoming. In the very nature of things this cannot be instantaneous. It 
is not only that I need time and many incidents to sort out what is 
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relatively fixed and stable in my character, temperament and desires 
from what is variable and changing, though that is true. It is also that 
as a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the 
history of my maturation and regression, overcomings and defeats. My 
self-understanding necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates 
narrative’ (ibid., p.50) 
 
From this quotation, Taylor suggests that how a narrative construction of life is 
not necessarily in linear temporality, i.e. in the linear order from the past to the 
present to the future as a linear ‘growing’ or ‘becoming’. The moral meaning of 
life is drawn from a moral theme of one’s human life. Such a moral theme is to 
be gained only when it is based on the consistence, coherence or integrity of 
one’s experiences and actions. The coherence and integrity of one’s experiences 
and actions can only be gained through a narrative articulation of one’s 
implicit moral framework and narrative understanding of various events and 
occurrences in one’s life course, through arranging them in a unique yet 
unitary way for a thematic unity of one’s life. This is why Taylor believes that 
our lives exist in a ‘space of questions’ that ‘only a coherent narrative can 
answer’ (ibid., p.47). 
 
After considering these discussions, one can see that a synthesis of 
‘thrownness’ and ‘projection’ presents a ‘wholeness’ of one’s life: we can 
understand various life events by localising them in the wider context of our 
lives as larger temporal wholes. Thus the different moments of life in relation 
to an understanding who we are have a direction towards a moral good. 
Therefore any human’s self-understanding inescapably occurs in time and 
requires some syntheses of the past, the present and the future. Here, Taylor is 
evidently resonant with Paul Ricoeur’s notion of emplotment.  Taylor’s 
notion of narrative, to some extent, as Smith puts it, is ‘a vehicle of such 
synthesis’ (see Smith 2000, p.97). Such synthesis gives us a sense of ‘unity’ and 
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‘wholeness’ in our lives in the ‘space of questions’ about our ‘direction of lives’. 
Narrative thus can be seen as an inescapable temporal structure, incorporating 
both linear and nonlinear requirements, in making sense of our identity. 
 
Taylor finally claims that the notions of ‘orientation to the good’, the 
‘directions of our lives’, and narrative are thus essentially interconnected and 
they are basic conditions required for making sense of identity. He writes,  
 
‘My underlying thesis is that there is a close connection between the 
different conditions of identity, or of one’s life making sense, that I 
have been discussing. One could put it this way: because we cannot 
but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place 
relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we must 
inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a “quest”. But 
one could perhaps start from another point: because we have to 
determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we cannot be 
without an orientation to it, and hence must see our life in story’(ibid., 
p.51-52). 
4.9.3 Is narrative an inescapable structure? 
But is narrative, like orientation towards the good and direction of life, an 
inescapable condition of identity as Taylor claims? Smith holds that if having 
an orientation towards the valued good and a sense of direction in relation to 
that good in our lives are inescapable for us to make sense of ourselves, we 
need not accept Taylor’s thesis that narrative identity is also ‘inescapable’. He 
argues that in talking about narratives, Taylor stresses that   narratives’ 
strength lies in ‘their capacity to confer meaning and substance on people’s 
lives (see Taylor 1989, p.97). Smith then explains, ‘In Taylor’s view, the desire 
for such meaning is shared by all human beings. It is, in a phrase he sometimes 
invokes, an ‘anthropological constant’ (Smith 2002, p.100). Then, Smith 
contends, ‘…narrative self-understanding helps us lead more fully human lives, 
precisely by realizing the capacity we have for meaning and substance’ (Smith 
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2002, p.100). However he then argues that it is doubtful whether all the people 
have to realize this capacity in order to understand their lives and identity. 
Consequently, he concludes narrative identity may be only desirable, and thus 
we do not have to accept that narrative is ‘inescapable’ as Taylor maintains.  
  
I agree on Smith’s point and wish to add that Taylor seems to imply that 
narrative is the only tool with which to articulate the direction, i.e., oneself in 
relation to one’s strongly valued good and temporality inherent in this relation. 
However, it can be argued that, firstly, one does not have to articulate the 
relationship of oneself to the good when understanding identity. We may still 
have an implicit assumption of this relation without articulating it. To 
articulate this relation is only to make this relation more explicit and make our 
life more meaningful. Secondly, if we need to articulate this relation, we do not 
have to do it in the form of narrative. If, as Taylor suggests, language, for 
example, narrative, is just one form of articulation (ibid., p.91-92), and other 
forms of articulation can also be applied to this relation, for example, music, 
painting, play and so on, then it would be too generalized to claim that 
narrative is an inescapable condition for identity. Without narrative as a form 
of articulation or self-interpretation, self’s sense-making might be inadequate, 
but not as impossible as it would be without orientation towards the good. In 
this sense, Taylor exaggerates the role of narrative in terms of ‘inescapability’ 
in understanding identity. Rather than inescapable, I accept that narrative is 
suggestive in making sense of identity.  
 
Hence, in my view, narrative is just an important and desirable instrument in 
understanding identity, particular one dimension of identity, i.e. wholeness of 
one’s life. However, it should be stressed, in terms of ‘meaning of lives’ as 
wholeness or unitary lives over one’s lifetime, narrative structure takes a 
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central role.  This is because, only narrative, with its unique temporal feature 
as a special form of articulation, can help unfold an individual’s ‘maturation 
and regression’, ‘growth and becoming’ in articulating one’s direction in 
relation to the good for a meaningful life as a whole. It is also only narrative 
that makes a coherent connection between small events, occurrences and moral 
themes possible over a life time. 
 
Smith is also not convinced by the view that narrative here must be a 
‘quest-type story’, a story of self-discovery in relation to the good. I would 
consider that in order to understand Taylor’s notion of ‘narrative’, one needs 
to put it against the background of his moral theory. It can be argued that the 
form of narrative as quest needs to be understood in Taylor’s discussion about 
modern persons’ moral frameworks. What Taylor’s thinking about narrative 
features among different narrative theories is his linkage of narrative to the 
good, particularly, to the ‘meaning of lives’. ‘Quest’ for a meaning of lives 
must be understood by linking Taylor’s notion of moral framework and the 
way the modern person articulates it. Moral frameworks need to be in quest, 
particular for modern persons who find it difficult to find a satisfactorily 
acceptable moral framework in the age of pluralism (see, ibid., p.18-19). Taylor 
argues,  
 
‘…a framework is that in virtue of which we make sense of our lives 
spiritually. Not to have a framework is to fall into a life which is 
spiritually senseless. The quest is thus always a quest for sense (ibid., 
p.18).   
 
According to Taylor, ‘We find sense of life through articulating it’ (ibid.). 
Abbey interprets this well, ‘These stories might include the discovery of a new 
good, the recovery of an old one, the sudden or dawning realization of an 
ongoing one, the need to choose among goods or a period of bewilderment 
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and loss of orientation’ (Abbey 2000, p.38). Thus, narrative is in quest and is 
open to critical thinking, rather than in stability or certainty.  This is 
particularly so for modern persons who find it difficult to discover a 
satisfactorily believable moral framework in the age of pluralism.  
   
4.10 The roles of learning in Taylor’s theory of identity 
4.10.1 Articulation and learning 
 Taylor believes identity is defined by strong evaluations backed by implicit or 
explicit moral assumptions. He also contends that these implicit moral 
assumptions can be articulated. 
1. Taylor suggests that articulation of implicit moral frameworks can be seen as 
a way of conducting an examination on one’s lives, which is derived from the 
Socratic maxim: an unexamined life is not worth living. This reading of 
articulation thus can be seen as a mode of self-reflection since this kind of 
articulation clarifies and deepens understanding of moral values by showing 
what underpins them, thereby enabling the person to acquire a deeper 
self-knowledge (Abbey 2000, p.41; Taylor 1989a, p.26, p.80, p.92). In this sense, 
there is a learning process in articulating of one’s implicit moral background 
through self-interpretation and others’ interpretation. Such kind of learning is 
a mode of learning about self-knowledge. 
 
2. Taylor also contends that articulation of constitutive good as a moral source 
can move people towards the good and empower people to live up to that 
good. This at least suggests that articulating any moral assumption about that 
which one respects and loves is a mode of learning, since the effect of 
articulation can empower people to live up that good. Articulating constitutive 
good can also helps one trace back to find out how he/she acquired such good 
through his/her dialogue with significant others or social norms. This learning 
CHAPTER 4 
 205
process can be seen as the discovery of one’s moral sources, which move 
him/her towards a good life that he/she strongly values. 
 
3. If narrative as self-interpretation is a powerful tool for the articulation of 
one’s constitutive good as Taylor claims, then the roles of learning analysed 
above can be found in one’s narrative. Taylor points out that the people who 
articulate are not necessarily the actors themselves; they can also be others. In 
this sense, we can see that the role learning relevant to his/her identity can 
also be found in one’s working on the interpretation, narrative and stories 
given by others to him/her, not merely from his/her own self-constructed 
interpretation. 
 
4.10.2 Narrative and learning 
1. Narrative as temporal structure  
Another role of learning relevant to identity comes from Taylor’s thesis that 
identity is the result of becoming and growing. According to him, a unitary 
identity can be presented through an unfolding story about one’s direction 
towards one’s strongly valued good, from the past, the present towards the 
future. In one’s narrative construction of the relationship between oneself and 
the good, and through reflection on this life story, one can acquire a 
meaningful and unitary sense of his/her life, and his/her identity. This kind of 
learning can only be carried out through a process of narrating because 
narrative entails a temporal structure of human experience.  
 
2. Narrative as self-interpretation  
Narrative has the capacity of ‘confer meaning and substance to people’s lives’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.97). This narrative’s capacity is subject to our ability to narrate 
a story, our power to construct our story. As Taylor points out, ‘… moderns 
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have become acutely aware of how much sense being there for us depends on 
our own powers of expression. Discovering here depends on, is interwoven 
with, inventing. Finding a sense to life depends on framing meaningful 
expressions which are adequate’ (ibid., p.18). It is here that a certain mode of 
learning can be found for modern persons to develop their ability to construct 
narratives that are adequately meaningful. Increasing one’s power of expression, 
especially for many who have problems with the ‘meaning of lives’ in the 
modern age, can be seen as a central element for narrative in the quest for the 
meaning of one’s life.   
 
(1) Learning about evaluative language 
Given that implicit strong evaluations can be articulated through evaluative 
language, and given that ‘the language of evaluative distinction’ takes a key 
role in giving a ‘deep’ articulation about a strong evaluator’s preferences and 
identity, the role of concerning learning about ‘evaluative language’ is 
important. As Taylor writes, ‘If I never acquire any evaluative language to talk 
about something, I can hardly articulate about my alternatives’ (Taylor 1985a, 
p.25). Laitinen also suggests, ‘Mastering an evaluative language is to have a 
certain kind of repertoire of “inner life”, a certain kind of sensibility’ (Laitinen 
2003, p.33). If Taylor is right in virtue of these points, then acquiring such a 
‘language of evaluative distinction’ could be seen as a mode of learning. Any 
such kind of learning would make the implicit evaluative background of an 
individual’s moral life owns a more clearer and richer expression and hence 
deepen his/her understanding of his/her framework of those strong 
evaluations that define his/her identity. Such learning requires us to acquire a 
deep grasp of the language and meaning used in that moral framework. 
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(2) Learning as developing new modes of expression 
In Taylor’s theory on ‘Philosophy of Language’ (1985a), he coins a term 
‘Expressivism’. This view suggests that changes in the vocabularies of 
self-understanding change the self and identity that is thereby understood. 
What we can see here is that a new role of leaning can be found in ‘the 
development of new modes of expression’.   Reading a new novel, seeing a 
new film, experiencing a new event…all can develop new vocabularies of 
expression of myself, which might change my self-interpretation, and hence 
change myself, my future experiences and my identity.  
 
Here we can also see an aspect of lifelong learning in this role of learning. In 
understanding ‘myself’ over ‘my’ life-time, the use of vocabularies and 
expressions of self-interpretation may change over time due to ‘my’ learning 
from different experiences in ‘my’ life.  This kind of learning helps to 
‘develop new modes of expression’.  Thus some aspects of my self-identity 
may change over time as well. Such a mode of learning can only be carried out 
through the ongoing experiences in our life, in which we enrich our 
vocabularies about our self-knowledge and increase our capacities to invent 
more adequate, truthful, self-clairvoyant or even self-deluding expressions. 
Through such mode of learning, we identify and/or understood different or 
renewed aspects of ‘self’ and identity. 
 
4.10.3 Reflexivity and role of leaning 
If as Taylor says, identity is defined by essential strong evaluations, and if 
those strong evaluations can be seen as ‘objects’ of self-reflection, we can find 
some roles of learning concerning identity in this process of reflection. Two 
modes of reflection related to strong evaluations could be identified. First, 
reflecting on one’s underlying moral assumptions or the framework of one’s 
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identity is an attempt to articulate the implicit moral background through the 
language of evaluative distinctions. In this reflexive process, one can learn how 
one could respond according to one’s strong evaluation in the face of certain 
moral issues in daily life.  
 
The second mode of reflection about strong evaluation is radical re-evaluation 
or ‘radical reflexivity’. Radical re-evaluation has the potential to re-evaluate 
the existing moral framework underlying certain strong evaluations. Such 
radical reflexivity has the potential to quit an old evaluative framework, accept 
a new one or to combine several frameworks in a unique way. Thus, to 
re-evaluate one’s strong evaluation entails certain modes of reflexive learning.   
 
4.11 Conclusion 
Through this lengthy discussion of Taylor’s theory of identity, we can see 
identity does matter to ourselves.  This is only so if we see personal identity is 
not simply about self-consciousness, as Locke and Parfit considered, and if we 
see personal identity is also about self-concern. The relationship between 
identity and the good suggests that personal identity is in a large part a moral 
concept defined by moral frameworks. These moral frameworks are provided 
by strong evaluations, without which we will feel disoriented and meaningless 
in terms of modes of life and kinds of being in human world. The significance 
of life as a whole could be found in one’s relation to the good over lifetime. 
The evaluative or moral dimension of personal identity demonstrates the 
significance of a normative constitution of personal identity. Personal identity 
in this sense is ‘given’, rather than purely ‘created’ by oneself in an isolated 
way. Taylor’s theory also suggests that the ‘dialogical self’ takes an 
irreplaceable role in defining one’s personal identity concerning moral issues, 
in its dialogue with others, particularly with significant others. This implies 
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that the definition of personal identity cannot be formulated without ‘others’. 
 
Taylor also stresses the importance of the articulation of moral assumptions 
underlying personal identity since this mode of articulation makes our 
constitutive good, i.e., our moral sources, explicit to us and makes us love it 
and move towards it. Although it is arguable that narrative is an inescapable 
condition required to make sense of one’s identity in relation to ones’ strongly 
valued good, it is a desirable temporal structure that may be used to portray 
this relationship. Some important roles of learning in relation to one’s personal 
identity emerge in Taylor’s notions of articulation and narrative. We also 
found two modes of reflections about strong evaluation with rich implications 
for the roles of learning concerning personal identity. 
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Chapter 5   The role of narrative in understanding identity 
 
 …the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the 
detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on the 
symbolic mediations which always already articulate action and among 
them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative mediation underlines this 
remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge—that it is self-interpretation. 
(Ricoeur 1991, p.198) 
 
Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us as 
the field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative 
understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not simply to 
impose from outside the narrative identity which constitutes us. 
 (Ricoeur 1991, p.32) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I conducted a general investigation into Ricoeur 
and Taylor’s works respectively on the notion of identity, the notion of 
narrative and the relation between the two. I have also discovered some roles 
of learning in their theories. We have seen that one way to understand 
personal identity is through the notion of narrative identity. But the question of 
how exactly the notion of narrative can be linked to the notion of identity has 
not been answered clearly yet. To put it in another way, the central question 
that needs further discussion is: how should we understand the role(s) of 
narrative in understanding the notion of identity, or, what contributions can 
narrative make in understanding identity? I will conduct an analysis of this 
topic in this chapter. Firstly, based on Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s work, I will 
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clarify and define how I understand the notion of identity. I will define 
personal identity mainly from dimensions of a conceptual constitution of this 
notion and the person’s need for personal identity. Secondly, I will conduct a 
detailed analysis of the role of narrative in understanding identity in Ricoeur 
and Taylor’s theories. I will argue that what emerges from my analyses are 
two categories of roles of narrative in understanding identity, i.e. a category of 
structural roles and a category of interpretative roles. I will also argue that simply 
holding either structural analysis or interpretative analysis of narrative, rather 
than both, will be likely to cause issues in understanding narrative identity. 
Thirdly, I will discuss the problem of the ‘truthfulness’ of narrative identity in 
relation to ‘identity’ ‘as it is’ in reality, which is a central issue that might be 
raised in using the notion of narrative identity. Before doing this, I will discuss 
the relation between life as narrative and life ‘as it is’ in reality. I conclude that 
if personal identity is partly constituted by self-interpretation and such 
self-interpretation as narrative keeps developing and being reflected, it is hard 
to say there is something like ‘identity as it is’ in reality. Narrative identity as a 
concept provides us with a strong approach to understand ourselves. 
 
5.2 What is identity?  
5.2.1 How can identity be defined? 
The use of the term of ‘identity’ at a theoretical level tends to be difficult to 
define precisely and clearly. By identity, I mean identity of the person, or 
‘personal identity’. This term is studied in many fields of humanities and 
social sciences, such as psychology, sociology and philosophy and so on. So, it 
is even hard for an expert of a particular area to understand what the term 
‘identity’ exactly means beyond his/her particular area. Also, the term identity 
is quite often qualified by numerous prefixes and is widely used in a radically 
reified way today. In the field of education, for example, there are terms like 
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‘teacher identity’, ‘learner identity’ and ‘autistic identity’ and so on, where the 
concept of identity is merely equated with the term ‘identification’ attached to 
social roles or status. Thus, the concept of identity is almost equated with 
numerous specific ‘labels’ referring to appearance, features, types of body, 
fashion, professional title or personal information and facts used in certain 
organizations (e.g. bank, club or insurance company).   
 
While the difficulty with the term ‘identity’ might be caused by its 
multi-disciplinary nature and reified use in a radical way today, it can also be 
argued that the difficulty with this notion is also a result of misunderstanding 
of this notion at conceptual level and insufficient understanding of the person’s 
need for this concept. I wish to define personal identity in these two 
dimensions. 
 
At a conceptual level, there are some ambiguities in understanding the notion 
of ‘personal identity’. As I have shown in Chapter 1, the word ‘identity’ can be 
traced back to its origin in 16th century, meaning ‘the quality or condition of 
being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular 
qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness’ (OED 
online 2008). During the seventeenth century this term was applied to ‘person’ 
and John Locke defines personal identity as sameness with itself in terms of 
one’s same memory over time and in different places. But the question 
emanating from that time on is: is a  ‘person’ simply like a ‘thing’ to which 
the notion of sameness can be attached? To put it in other words, is ‘personal 
identity’ a thing as sameness, or is it a unique existence among others? This 
issue has puzzled many theorists in defining the term ‘personal identity’ from 
the age of John Locke until today. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
term ‘personal identity’ at a conceptual level to deal with this ambiguity, in 
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order to formulate a clearer definition of personal identity. I will define 
personal identity at a theoretical level based on my reading of Ricoeur’s work. 
 
It is also necessary to define the notion of personal identity in terms of its 
importance as a concept, or in terms of answering the question of why we need 
‘personal identity’ as a concept. This question cannot have an answer without 
clear understanding about the question concerning to whom personal identity 
is important. These questions can be investigated from two approaches of an 
understanding the notion of personal identity. Firstly, the study of personal 
identity has been generally focused on the ‘identifications’ and/or ‘labels’ of a 
person, for example, one’s self-consciousness, membership of an organization, 
social role, age, gender and class and so on. While these dimensions display 
some general facts about personal identity from the impersonal view 
presented by psychological and sociological perspectives, what is excluded is 
the interpretation of what a person himself/herself says about the importance 
of being himself/herself in his/her life. Questions about the importance of 
personal identity are difficult to answer if personal identity is simply defined 
in terms of impersonal facts and causal events. Secondly, these questions can 
be articulated if we define personal identity in terms of self-concern and care of 
others. In defining personal identity, I will focus on self-concern, since to say 
personal identity matters is basically to say personal identity matters to oneself. 
But this does not mean that there are no ‘others’ in personal identity. Rather, 
‘others’ are constitutive of one’s self-interpretation and self-constancy. I will 
define the dimension of importance of personal identity based on my reading 
of both Taylor and Ricoeur’s theories. Before formulating a definition of 
personal identity based on my understanding  of  Ricoeur’s  and  Taylor’s  
works, we  need  to  revisit these two philosophers’ theories of personal 
identity.  
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5.2.2 An examination of the concept of identity 
1. Idem-self and ipse-self 
Ricoeur contends that by adding two Latin words idem (meaning ‘same’) and 
ipse (meaning ‘oneself’) as qualifiers to the self, it is not difficult to see that 
idem-self is self-sameness, i.e. one and the same self; ipse-self refers to ‘I myself’, 
‘he himself’ or ‘she herself’ i.e., the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a self or 
the self-uniqueness. As Ricoeur argues,  
 
‘To say self is not to say myself. To be sure, mineness is implied in a 
certain manner in selfhood, but the passage from selfhood to 
mineness is marked by the clause “in each case” (in German, je) 
which Heidegger is careful to add to the positing of mineness. The 
self, he says, is in each case mine’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.180). 
 
As I have shown in chapter 3, Ricoeur stresses that the differences between 
idem and ipse of the self, not only lie in grammatical, epistemological and 
logical dimensions, but also, more fundamentally, in an ontological sense. The 
self’s sameness, idem, belongs to a mode of being of entities which Heidegger 
characterizes as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. Self’s sameness can be 
identified or re-identified when based on the substantiality of a substance, or 
things, both given and manipulable. Idem-identity is given, in the sense that 
one has certain natural properties that are same over time, e.g., sameness of 
body, gender, ancestral title and character and so on. It is manipulable in the 
sense that some sameness can be acquired, altered and reconstructed by one’s 
agency and the radical example could be artificial transformation of one’s 
body by using technology. But manipulation of idem-identity also occurs 
through social interaction and self’s internalization of otherness, e.g. changes of 
one’s character.  
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By contrast, selfhood, ipseity, in Ricoeur’s view can be seen as one of the 
existentials which belongs to the mode of being of Dasein. Heidegger 
characterizes Dasein by the capacity to question itself as to its own way of 
being and thus to relate itself to being qua being. What distinguishes Dasein 
from other entities is that in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. Ipseity 
of the self as a mode of being of Dasein, has the capacity to initiate changes to 
itself. I have also suggested in chapter 3 that ipseity or selfhood can be 
identified through Self’s Being as care of the existing Self. Personal identity in 
this sense is a question of self-concern.  
 
Thus Ricoeur suggests that idem and ipse are two different beings of the self on 
an ontological level, i.e., being as substance and being as Dasein. In addition to 
this, Ricoeur stresses that others are constitutive of onseself. It is in this sense 
that self has its ethical dimension, and hence self is the self as care of others, 
e.g., one needs to respond in the face of ‘others’.   
  
2. Ricoeur’s view on personal identity 
(1) What is idem-identity and what is ipse-identity? 
Personal identity is widely considered as ‘sameness’ and ‘continuity’ of the 
‘self’.  But given differences between idem-self and ipse-self, personal identity 
can be seen from different ontological bases and is therefore under two 
irreducible headings, that is, idem-identity (i.e., identity as sameness both in 
physical sense and in the field of selfhood) and ipse-identity (i.e., identity as 
selfhood, individuality, particularity, distinctiveness and uniqueness of the 
self). Ricoeur underlines the vital importance of distinguishing these two 
modes of personal identity. 
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Besides ontological differences, two modes of identity are also different in 
terms of one of the underpinnings of the notion identity: permanence in time. 
With respect to idem-identity, one gives a self an ascription of the character 
defined by certain permanence in time in terms of the lasting dispositions of a 
person. Concerning ipse-identity, Ricoeur writes, ‘…identity in the sense of ipse 
implies no assertion concerning some unchangeable core of the personality’ 
(Ricoeur 1992, p.2). Self’s ipse-identity gives self its unique ability to maintain 
itself and/or initiate something new to itself. Thus ipse-identity as 
self-constancy can be identified as a kind of being as care to that existing self 
which initiates that action, for example, this act of keeping one’s promise is a 
kind of fidelity to one’s self, a kind of self-subsistence, which is a kind of 
self-concern.  
 
But the action constantly given by the ipse-self is also ascribable and imputable to 
that very self as an agent in relation to others over time. For example, the act of 
keeping one’s promise to others includes both an ascription and an imputation 
emerging from that act. In one sense, this act initiated by a self is identified by 
others, hence this act is an ascription given by others to an agent. In another 
sense, such act is also an imputation given by others to this agent in the sense 
that this agent has a responsibility to others stemming from one’s relationship 
to others. That is, such act is based on a person’s assumption that others will 
count on that person because of his/her faithfulness of his/her words, and 
therefore this person is accountable for that act before another (see Ricoeur 1992, 
p.165). It is in the sense of imputation, that self-constancy expresses an ethical 
dimension. This ethical dimension of the self not only originates from moral 
responsibility, but also is deeply based on one’s feeling of sympathy to others 
in intersubjective relations (see ibid., p.192-194).  
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When analysing the issue of personal identity discussed above, Ricoeur argues 
that both Locke and Hume’s notion of personal identity are problematic in that 
they only see personal identity as sameness of the person, i.e., one and the 
same ‘substance’ of a person over time and in different places. They neglect to 
recognise that personal identity is also the identity as selfhood, i.e., the 
identification of self’s unique capacity as a being, which is applied to his/her 
existing self.  Rather than taking the stance of either identity as sameness or 
identity as selfhood, Ricoeur deals with the problematic of identity by 
engaging with the space between the two poles of personal identity. Thus, 
Ricoeur contends that identity should be understood as sense of oneself as 
‘self-same’ and this understanding must take the place of the identity 
understood in the sense of being the same (see Ricoeur 1988, p.246).     
 
(2) Between idem-identity and ipse-identity 
As have shown by Ricoeur, personal identity should be understood as two 
different modes of identity: idem-identity and ipse-identity. But Ricoeur further 
argues that there is a dialectical relationship between them in terms of 
permanence in time, where two modes of identity not only accord to each other 
but also stand apart to each other. The confrontation between idem-identity and 
ipse-identity becomes a genuine problem when the question of permanence in 
time appears in two different modes of identity.      
 
Ricoeur maintains that ‘subjectivity is neither an incoherent series of events 
nor immutable substantiality, impervious to evolution’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.32). 
For Ricoeur, subjectivity has a dimension of evolution which is a result of 
interplay between sedimentation and innovation. Sedimentation contains the 
elements of permanence in time. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, permanence in 
time in the self presents itself both as self-sameness (i.e. character) and 
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self-constancy (e.g. keeping one’s word given to others). Between idem-identity 
and ipse-identity, there is a dialectical relationship. Character as self-same 
‘designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized’ 
(Ricoeur 1992, p.121).  
 
Ricoeur holds that there are two forms of lasting dispositions. One form of 
lasting disposition is habit, a history of character in which sedimentation 
overlaps innovation which preceded it. Innovation is initiated by the ipse-self. 
Sedimentation is an overlapping process of ipse by idem and hence offers 
selfhood a type of permanence in time. However, this overlapping does not 
remove the differences separating ipse and idem: my character is me, myself, 
ipse; but this ipse announces itself as idem.  
 
The second form of last disposition is the set of acquired identifications by which 
the other enters into the composition of the self-same. Ricoeur maintains, 
 
‘the identity of a person or a community is made up of these 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in 
which the person or the community recognizes itself. This 
identification is the process of assuming otherness as one’s own by 
identifying with certain values ‘which makes us place a “cause” 
above our own survival’ (ibid., p.121). 
 
Here ipse and idem accord with one another in that both rely on each other. In 
Ricoeur’s view, the acquisition of the acquired identification is in fact a process 
of the self’s internalization of something outside of the self (e.g. culture or 
norms) into something inside of the self over a lifetime. Internalization thus 
has an aspect of sedimentation, which implies a mode of permanence in time 
as well.  
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However, there is another mode of permanence in time in selfhood according 
to Ricoeure.  This is self-constancy. He writes, ‘The perseverance of character is 
one thing, the perseverance of faithfulness to a word that has been given is 
something else again. The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of 
friendship is quite another’ (ibid. p.123). Ricoeur further maintains that 
self-constancy presents itself as ‘keeping one’s word in faithfulness to the 
word that has been given’ (ibid.). No matter what happens to me, ‘I will hold 
firm’. This is a claim that implies permanence in time supported by an ethical 
justification. Ipse-identity as a mode of permanence in time, i.e., self-constancy, 
has no aid or support of the sameness (the idem), but it is underpinned by 
self-concern (e.g. self-esteem), one’s responsibility and sympathy towards others. 
Self-constancy has something to do with pure ipse-identity, something 
metaphysical which cannot be ‘inscribed’ as ‘things’, but supported by certain 
ontological justification of Being as care to itself and ethical justification with 
respect to others.  
  
5.2.3 An understanding of the importance of personal identity  
To define personal identity in terms of its importance has something to do 
with two different understandings of personal identity at a conceptual level. 
That is, it concerns the importance of ‘what am I’ and importance of ‘who am I’. 
By ‘what am I?’, I mean both neutral facts, e.g. my name, physical features, 
social class, ethnicity, and beliefs, character, e.g. a Christian. By ‘who am I ’, I 
mean the nature and kinds of being as self-concern, i.e. a self as a being which 
can answer the question of ‘Where do I stand?’ ‘What is important to me? ’. In 
addition, ‘who am I’ also concerns one’s relation to others, i.e., self as being as 
care of others.  
 
It can be argued that dimensions of ‘what’ and ‘who’ am I overlap in the 
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constitution of personal identity. This is, because ‘what am I’ is partly defined 
or initiated by ‘who am I’ as a kind of being in the world, and ‘who am I’ is 
partly shaped into of ‘what am I’ over time as character. Both dimensions 
could be discovered in one’s self-interpretation. Further, the self-interpretation 
of personal identity is not constructed in isolation, but through one’s dialogue 
with norms and other subjectivities. Thus, it can be further argued that 
personal identity has a deeper dimension, concerning the mode and the nature 
of ‘being’ in the world and one’s relation to others. 
 
What I mean in terms of defining personal identity in respect of the 
importance of this concept is that one needs this notion to answer the question 
of ‘who am I’ in terms of my stance in relation to norms, morals and other 
persons in human world.  Without such terms of reference one will feel 
disoriented, and will not be identified and relied on by others. This way of 
defining personal identity is based on my reading of Taylor’s theory of moral 
identity and Ricoeur’s theory of ethical identity, which I have discussed in the 
proceeding chapters. But to clarify this definition, let us briefly revisit Taylor’s 
identity theory. 
 
1. Taylor’s view on the self and its relation to personal identity 
(1) Self in ‘space of question’ and identity 
To understand Taylor’s theory of identity, we need first to have a look at his 
approach to the self without comprehension of which we would not be able to 
understand his notion of identity.  For Taylor the self as a being exists in a 
space of self-concerns or ‘a space of questions’. As he writes, ‘We are selves only 
in that certain issues matter for us’ (Taylor 1989, p.33). ‘The space in questions’ 
is where the self as an agent or strong evaluator exists to decide questions 
related to self-concerns. ‘The space in questions’ is mapped by strong 
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evaluations or qualitative distinctions (see Taylor 1989, p.29). Strong evaluation is 
acquired by and through the interaction between the self and significant others 
and the self’s internalisation of the culture and norms. These ‘questions’ can be 
issues about the qualities of life one evaluates, the kinds of person one wants 
to be, etc. In this sense, the self as an agent is orientated under the guidance of 
strong evaluation in the ‘space of questions’ relating to the ‘self as identity’.  
This is because strong evaluations entail questioning what kind of being I want 
to be. Thus there is a linkage among the notions of the ‘self’, the ‘strong 
evaluations’ and the ‘identity’ in Taylor’s work. This linkage can be analysed 
as following: (1) My identity can be seen as a self-definition defined by the 
strong evaluations held by the ‘I’ as a strong evaluator who essentially has 
these convictions.  (2) My identity can be seen as a self-identification of my 
certain properties corresponding to certain strong evaluations that touches the 
‘I’ as a strong evaluator, the ‘I’ as an agent in terms of orientation to what kind 
of person I want to be. As Taylor writes, ‘To know who you are is to be 
oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or 
bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for 
you and what is trivial and secondary’ (Taylor 1989, p.28). Therefore, Taylor 
maintains that ‘[o]ur identity is defined by our fundamental (strong) 
evaluations’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34). Thus it could be argued that the heart of 
Taylor’s theory of identity is about what is important to a self as being and/or 
person. As he claims, ‘Our identity is what allows us to define what is 
important to us and what is not’ (Taylor 1989, p.30). Hence, the need of 
personal identity for a person in Taylor’s theory is not difficult to understand 
from here. 
 
The importance of Taylor’s notion of identity reveals that identity is tightly 
linked with his notion of human agent. Strong evaluation according to Taylor is 
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an essential condition of being a person, because shorn of it,  
 
‘we would lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates; 
that our existences as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as 
persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the 
horizon of these essential evaluations, that we would break down as 
persons, be incapable of being persons in the full sense’ (ibid., 
p.34-35).  
 
Hence it is not surprise why Taylor maintains that ‘our identity is 
therefore defined by certain evaluations which are inseparable from 
ourselves as agents’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34). 
 
(2) Self-concept and identity in human history 
The self in ‘the space of questions’ is, for Taylor has historical dimension and is 
a result of social interaction. The self has a historical dimension because 
self-understanding in different historical ages has different meanings. The idea 
that one has a self, that we can talk about selfhood as some phenomenon is, as 
Taylor proposes, a modern development. As he puts it, ‘…certain 
developments in our self-understanding are a precondition of putting the issue 
in terms of identity’ (Taylor 1989, p.28). This view also applies to the notion of 
identity. As he writes, ‘Talk about “identity” in the modern sense would have 
been incomprehensible to our forebears of a couple of centuries ago’ (ibid.). 
This at the very least suggests that we cannot see the concept of identity as a 
non-historical notion and should not resolve questions of moral 
identity/orientation in universal terms.  
 
(3) Self in the ‘web of interlocution’ and identity 
Another crucial feature of Taylor’s notion of the self is that ‘one is a self only 
among other selves’ (ibid., p.35). He maintains, ‘The genesis of the human 
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mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes 
on his or her own, but dialogical’ (Taylor 1995b, p.230). This position, as Taylor 
mentioned, accords with Mead’s suggestion of the notion of the self, which is 
originated from intersubjectivity. Mead suggests that the meaning of ‘reflective 
consciousness’, including ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘conscious reflection’ 
occasions in ‘social interaction’ and has an ‘intersubjective’ origin (see Biesta 
1998). Taylor therefore calls this notion of the self as a ‘dialogical self’, which 
exists in ‘the web of interlocution’. He further maintains that we define our 
identity through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression 
through exchanges with others. Language here is used in a broad sense, 
meaning not only words we speak, but also ‘language’ of art, of gesture, of age, 
of a community, of a tradition, of a culture and the like. These languages of 
expression are also the languages of strong evaluation which enable us become 
full human agents, understand ourselves, define and discover our identity. In 
this sense, Taylor’s conception of identity is partly based on Mead’s view that 
the meaning of symbols and actions, e.g., language and gestures, has its origin 
in certain intersubjective conditions and certain social situations. Thus Taylor 
holds that ‘…to be able to answer for oneself (the question of who he/she is) is 
to know where one stands, what one wants to answer’ (Taylor 1989, p.29, emph. 
added).  
 
2. Taylor’s view on identity and self-interpretation 
According to Taylor, the ‘identity’ identified through ‘others’ by oneself in 
social interactions does not mean this identification constitutes all dimensions 
of one’s identity. It can be argued that Taylor’s notion of identity does not 
merely follow a social or psychological view of the self, i.e. focus on 
self-consciousness and/or self-identification. Rather he goes beyond this 
tradition. For example, Taylor goes further than Erving Goffman, whose 
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notions of a person’s ‘social identity’ and ‘personal identity’ are fundamentally 
‘frameworks of identification’ in the ‘eyes’ of others, though Goffman suggests 
that individual can also gain a sense of ‘self-image’ through reflection based on 
the reactions of the others’ attitudes (see Goffman 1963). For Taylor, whether 
those personal/social features (i.e. features reflected back from others to ‘me’) 
will be part of my identity still depends on whether I accept these features as 
important qualities for me or not.  That is, my acceptance of those features as 
part of my identity depends on my self-concern in relation to those features. 
According to Taylor, this is where self-interpretation is required. In another 
word, identity is also about an ‘I’ who cares, asks questions and decides ‘the 
meaning’ that this identity has for ‘me’.  
 
Although Taylor’s notion of identity seems to be normative and ‘given’, i.e., 
coming from outside of the ‘self’, he emphasises that it is still ‘up to’ an 
individual to decide what kind of being he is going to be (see Taylor 1976, 
p.281). This suggests that one’s identity is inseparable from a ‘subjective’ eye 
that one uses to see and evaluate him/herself. Hence, Taylor’s notion of 
self-identity should not simply be understood in an interactive dimension in 
sociological tradition, but also needs to be understood further in a ‘subjective’ 
manner. In this sense, the nature of Taylor’s notion of identity is similar to 
psychologist Erikson’s notion of ‘ego identity’. According to Erikson the latter 
has a subjective sense as well as an observable quality of personal sameness and 
continuity, which is paired with some belief in the sameness and continuity of 
some shared world image (see Erikson 1970). However, Taylor’s notion of a 
‘subjective’ element in identity seems to have a wider socio-historical 
background and deeper cultural foundation than what Erikson means by a 
‘subjective’ element. Taylor argues against the position that the self as an 
‘object’ could be understood in neutral and objective sense, a position which is 
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taken for granted in mainstream psychological and sociological fields. Rather, 
Taylor holds that there is always a certain mode of Self-concern. ‘What I am as a 
self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for 
me (Taylor 1989, p.34). He further claims that the self is partly constituted by 
its self-interpretation (Taylor 1985a, 1989, p.34). ‘…our interpretation of 
ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are’ (ibid.,p.47). 
Because of certain modes of ‘self-concern’, self-interpretation is a vital 
component of an identity, one that cannot be neglected. In order to understand 
and explain ourselves and our identities, we must include those 
self-interpretations. Hence, Taylor claims, ‘To ask what a person is, in 
abstraction form his or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally 
misguided question, one to which there couldn’t in principle be an answer’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.34).  
 
In sum, personal identity is not ‘out there’ in reality, or simply in the ‘eyes’ of 
others, and simply discovered by oneself, nor is it a pure subjective sense of 
the self without the influences of social interaction. Rather personal identity is 
partly constituted by and through interplay between the self, norms and others, 
but it only makes sense to an individual through his/her self-interpretation of 
who he/she is. 
 
5.2.4 A synthetic understanding of the notion of personal identity 
I hope that the above discussion will help me clarify my synthetic 
understanding of term ‘identity’, or more precisely, ‘personal identity’. I 
would like to present and discuss six salient common features shared by 
Ricoeur and Taylor in their theories of identity. 
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(1) Personal identity cannot be seen as simply ‘things’ out there from which a 
person can be identified and re-identified.  Personal identity also concerns the 
identification of the Being as Care of oneself and others. According to Ricoeur, 
while idem-identity is about the sameness of substantiality of substance of a 
person, his notion ipse-identity is concerned with the identification of a kind of 
being of Dasein as self-concern and a kind of being as care of others.  Taylor 
suggests that we cannot simply read ‘personal identity’ as an ‘object’ of 
self-consciousness.  Rather, personal identity is also about self-concern 
constituted by self-interpretation along with strong evaluations that decide 
what kind of being one wants to be.    
(2) Personal identity cannot be understood without an understanding of 
agency. For Ricoeur, personal identity is based on self as an agent in terms of 
ascription of action to an agent (as author) and imputation of action to an 
agent (as patient). For Taylor, identity is closely linked with one’s agency 
because identity is partly constituted by strong evaluations, which are     
inseparable from human agents as strong evaluators.   
(3) The concept of identity is inseparable from the notion of time. Ricoeur 
maintains that permanence in time is a defining principle of personal identity.  
Both Ricoeur and Taylor assert that the sense or meaning of one’s identity is 
developed through life history, i.e., the meaning of one’s life and the 
wholeness of one’s life are partly made by linking one’s past, present and 
future of personal life into a thematic and temporal whole. 
(4) Personal identity is shaped by cultural and norms.  The heart of personal 
identity, the ‘self’, is multi-faceted. The self is not merely a psychological 
notion like something internal, i.e., ego. The self is socialized by others and 
internalises cultures and norms, by and through social interaction. For Ricoeur, 
the self of self-knowledge is instructed by culture. Taylor suggests our identity 
is defined by fundamental evaluation that is shaped by culture. The concept of 
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the self has a historical development evolved through human history, so does 
the concept of identity. 
(5) Personal identity cannot be constituted without others. As Ricoeur argues, 
ipse-identity as self-constancy expresses one’s responsibility to others. 
According to Taylor, ‘significant others’ take an essential role in one’s 
construction and definition of his/her personal identity. 
(6) Personal identity is not stable and without changes, instead, it is 
developing and changing. Ricoeur shows us that identity is not stagnant, but is 
dynamic and has many dialectical dimensions. Human subjectivity has a 
dimension of evolution in the interaction between sedimentation and 
innovation received from the self’s experiences in the world. According to 
Taylor, identity is ‘growing’, ‘becoming’ in relation to certain ‘good’ and is 
constructed in one’s quest for meaning in the age of pluralism.  
 
There are however, at least two major different but complementary points 
between Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s views about understanding identity. Firstly, 
Ricoeur focuses on the conceptual analysis of the notion of personal identity, 
but Taylor focused on ‘significance’ and ‘need’ for identity. Ricoeur 
distinguishes between idem-identity (sameness) and ipse-identity (identity as 
selfhood). Taylor’s notion of moral identity can be classified into what Ricoeur 
calls acquired identification as ‘character’. But rather than conducting a 
conceptual analysis of differences between ipse- and idem-identity, Taylor 
focuses on the clarification of the ipse dimension of character and sees it from 
its ‘meanings’, ‘features’ and their qualitative aspects. In Taylor’s view identity 
is concerned with the meanings and importance that things have for ourselves. 
Ricoeur, however, does not focus too much on this aspect. 
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Secondly, in Taylor’s notion of moral identity, ‘others’ mainly appear at an 
epistemological level, but do not appear at an ontological level. In other words, 
the dimension of being which is responsible for ‘others’, is not stressed as 
being a constitutive element in the constitution of personal identity in Taylor’s 
theory. But in Ricoeur’s theory, responsibility to ‘others’, is the central factor in 
the constitution of ipse-identity as self-constancy. While Ricoeur agrees with 
Taylor’s thesis in that ‘what is important to me’ as my identity is partly 
defined by my self-concern, he particularly stresses that personal identity as 
self-constancy implies a kind of self’s care of others. According to Ricoeur, 
personal identity at an ethical level is embodied as responsibility to others. 
 
5.2.5 Defining personal identity 
Based on my discussion above, I would like to define personal identity as 
following: 
(1) Personal identity is a theoretical construct that belongs to both the category 
of the ‘thing’ and the category of the ‘being’. In the sense of the ‘thing’, it can 
be seen as identity as sameness; in the sense of ‘being’, it can be understood as 
identity as selfhood.   
(2) Personal identity cannot be merely understood as impersonal descriptions 
of facts or events, nor can it be simply understood as self-consciousness. 
Personal identity must also be defined in terms of self-interpretation 
underpinned by care, both as self-concern and as care of others. This definition 
is central in answering the question of why we need the concept of personal 
identity. 
(3) Otherness, including moral norms and other persons, is constitutive of the 
notion of personal identity. 
(4) The articulation of personal identity needs to be linked with a temporal 
dimension. 
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(5) Personal identity is discovered and constructed by the self in its ongoing 
cyclical activity formed from both outside in and inside out of one’s ‘self'.  
 
5.3 Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor on the role of narrative in 
understanding identity 
The narrative conception of identity has become one of the central concerns 
about identity theories in the second half of the last century (e.g., Arendt 1958, 
MacIntyre 1985, Taylor 1988, 1989, Ricoeur 1984, 1988, 1992, Giddens 1991). 
The term narrative identity can be generally understood as identity constructed 
and presented in the form of a narrative, e.g. life story, biography or 
autobiography. What I will do next is conduct an analysis of the role of 
narrative in understanding identity. I will focus on the work of Paul Ricoeur 
and Charles Taylor. This is firstly because both philosophers gave insightful 
and systematic arguments about identity and narrative. Secondly, both 
philosophers appear to complement each other in terms of their theories as 
well as in their analytical approaches. Finally, recognition of the two 
philosophers’ differences in their theories might produce a further analysis of 
narrative.  
 
Such an analysis has the potential to make contributions in various ways. It 
can bring unknown elements of narrative into light in terms of understanding 
identity, so as to deepen and widen our understanding of the notion of 
identity. This analysis might even provide grounds for finding out educative 
elements in narrative. Methodologically, such analysis can be seen as an 
endeavour to bridge the gap between narrative in humanities and narrative in 
social science.   
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Through this analysis, I also hope to examine Ricoeur and Taylor’s differences 
for further discussion and critical thinking. I hope that this comparative 
analysis of the role of narrative in understanding identity might produce a 
complementary understanding of the role of narrative in making sense of 
identity.   
 
5.3.1 Paul Ricoeur’s view on the role of narrative in understanding identity   
Ricoeur’s theory of narrative is a result of his study of the relationship between 
time and narrative. He conducted a sophisticated structural analysis of 
narrative by linking narrative to the notion of time and puts forward the 
notion of Threefold Mimesis. Mimesis means the imitation or representation of 
action. Between three moments of mimesis, i.e. mimesis 1 (prefiguration), 
mimesis 2 (configuration) and mimesis 3 (refiguration), mimesis 2 is the pivot 
of the analysis, in which emplotment mediates between mimesis 1 and 
mimesis 2. Mimesis 1 is concerned with preunderstandings of ‘the world of 
action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal 
character’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.54). Mimesis 3 is about the act of reading as ‘the 
intersection of the world of the text and world of the hearer or reader’ (ibid., 
p71). While mimesis 1 is configured through mimesis 2 into mimesis 3, the 
reader’s response to the text (mimesis 3) is also configured through mimesis 2 
into mimesis 1 as the new part of preunderstanding in the lived world, and 
thus a hermeneutic circle is completed. In analysing the concept of personal 
identity, Ricoeur mainly uses mimesis 2 to deal with the problematic of 
identity.  His structural analysis of narrative confers strong 
mediating/ordering functions and temporal elements on narrative and the 
notion of narrative identity. The heart of Ricoeur’s argument is that narrative 
essentially performs a mediating role in many dialectical dimensions in 
understanding identity. The following are some salient dialectical dimensions 
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in understanding identity. In each dialectical pair, narrative takes a mediating 
role.  
 
1. Between idem-identity and ipse-identity (Ricoeur 1988, p.246; 1992, 
p.115-138) 
Ricoeur maintains that narrative is the mediating ‘factor’ between ipse identity 
and idem identity. As I have discussed in chapter 3, Ricoeur not only 
distinguishes between ipse- identity and idem-identity, but also articulates a 
dialectical relationship between the two in selfhood. Narrative for Ricoeur is 
exactly an ideal form of mediation in this dialectical relation in understanding 
the notion of personal identity. Firstly, in the stable pole where ipse-identity is 
overlapped by idem-identity, it is exactly narrative that deploys the character 
contracted by sedimentation. ‘What sedimentation has contracted narration 
can re-deploy’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.122). Secondly, more importantly, in Riceoure’s 
mind, it is in the dialectal relation between the pole of character and the pole of 
self-constancy that the intervention of narrative identity as a form of mediation 
is suggested (see ibid., p.123).  As has been shown in chapter 3, narrative 
identity takes the role of mediator between permanence in time in 
self-sameness and permanence in time in self-constancy. Narrative identity in 
this sense is a poetic response to the conceptual paradox of personal identity.   
 
2. Between history and fiction (Ricoeur 1988, p.246-248; 1992, p.114) 
Narrative helps us understand practical identity in answering the question like 
‘Who did this?’ ‘Who is the agent, the author?’ Here, Ricoeur agrees with 
Hannah Arendt that ‘to answer these questions of “who?” is not merely to give 
the name(s), it is also to tell the story of life’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.246).  Ricoeur 
writes, ‘The story told tells about the action of the “who.” And the identity of 
this “who” therefore itself must be a narrative identity’ (ibid.). This is because 
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this ‘action of “who” ’, throughout either in personal life or community life, 
can only appear to us through the presentation of a life history/story. Life 
story as narrative occupies the place in the dialectic   between historical 
narrative and fictional narrative. According to Ricoeur, there are two classes of 
narrative: history and fiction. For Ricoeur, between historical narrative and 
fiction narrative there is a dialectic relation. They are different in that it is 
generally considered that history tells facts, but fiction is widely considered as 
something imagined. However, Ricoeur holds that people and nations in 
historical writing behave as if they were characters in a fiction (which is 
quasi-fictive in his term), just as characters in fiction behave as if they were real 
people. The past of fiction is depicted as if it were the real past that history 
depicts (which is quasi-historical in his term). Narrative of personal identity 
and/or community identity is ‘borrowed’ from the ‘the criss-crossing 
processes of a fictionalization of history and a historization of fiction’ 
(Ricoeur1988, p. 246).  This is why Ricoeur calls narrative identity as a 
structure of human experience that exists somewhere between historical narrative 
and fictional narrative. As he writes, ‘The fragile offshoot issuing from the 
union of history and fiction is the assignment to an individual or a community 
of a specific identity that we can call their narrative identity’ (ibid.). 
 
3. Between time as passage and time as duration (Ricoeur 1984, p.66-67; 1988, 
p.244; 1991, p.20-33) 
The time in narrative is the ‘narrative time’ that mediates between episodic 
aspect of time and configuration aspect of time (Ricoeur 1984, p.67). Ricoeur 
argues that philosophers see the notion of time at least in two different 
perspectives: time as passage in reality or universe (or cosmological time), e.g., 
clock time, and time as what we experienced as the duration of the past, the 
present and the future by an individual mind or consciousness (or 
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phenomenological time). Ricoeur argues that the latter can never replace the 
former and that there is no pure phenomenological time. After arguing the 
theories of time proposed by Aristotle versus Augustine, by Husserl versus 
Kant and by Heidegger versus the ‘Ordinary’ concept of time, Ricoeur 
concludes that there is a mutual occlusion between these two perspectives of 
time. However, both notions of time also imply each other, thus he calls this 
predicament as an ‘aporia of time’ (see Ricoeur 1988). 
 
Ricoeur then argues that narrative can be a poetical response to this ‘aporia of 
time’. Narrated time is like a bridge set over the breach speculation constantly 
opens between two perspectives of time (Ricoeur 1988, p.244). There are two 
sorts of time in every story told which correspond to cosmological time and 
phenomenological time respectively. One is the time that passes and flows 
away in linear manner. The other is the time that endures and remains in 
human consciousness. The former sort of time is made up of discrete points in 
linear succession that is open and theoretically indefinite; the latter is 
characterized by integration, culmination and closure owing to which ‘the 
story receives a particular configuration’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.22). The former 
dimension of time constitutes the episodic dimensions of narrative that is made 
up of separate events. The latter dimension of time is concerned with the 
configurational dimensions of narrative (mimesis 2) in which a plot composes 
events into a story. In this dimension, an act of  what  Ricoeur calls ‘grasping 
together’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.66) draws ‘the unity of one temporal whole’ (ibid.) 
or ‘temporal totality’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.22) from a succession of time that entails 
separate events or episodes. Ricoeur also maintains that story has its 
‘followability’, i.e., the story’s capacity to be followed under the guidance of an 
expectation that finds its fulfilment in the ‘conclusion’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.66). 
Ricoeur then argues that the story’s followability transforms the paradox of 
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distension (time as passage) and intention (time as duration) into ‘a living 
dialectic’. On the one hand, the episodic dimension of narrative draws 
narrative time in the direction of the linear representation of time; on the other 
hand, the configurational dimension of narrative reveals temporal features in a 
way that is opposite to those of the episodic dimension. Ricoeur argues that in 
the configurational act the whole plot can be translated into one ‘thought’, 
‘point’ or ‘theme’ which is not atemporal. The time of the theme of the story is 
the ‘narrative time’ that ‘mediates between the episodic aspect and 
configuration aspect’. 
 
4. Between concordance and discordance 
(1) Between multiple events/incidents and unified/complete story (Ricoeur 
1984, p.66; 1991, p.20-33) 
Emplotment unifies multiple elements that appear to be different. Emplotment 
(mimesis 2) is what makes a story intelligible. Emplotment, under the aegis of 
what Ricoeur calls narrative intelligence or narrative understanding (Ricoeur1984, 
p.65), is the ability to grasp multiple events and different episodes which are 
discordant and tie them together into an intelligible and complete story, 
permitting a concordant readability (thought) to our lives. This is one 
dimension of what Ricoeur calls ‘discordant concordance’, which is mediated by 
configuration.   
 
(2) Between heterogeneous factors and a single story (Ricoeur 1984, p.66; 1991, 
p.20-33, 1992, p.141-142) 
By ‘concordance’, Ricoeur means ‘the principle of order that presides over what 
Aristotle calls “the arrangement of facts” ’(Ricoeur 1992, p.141). By referring to 
Aristotle’s theory in Poetics on Tragedy, Ricoeur shows that the plot comes first 
before the characters. The thought (dianoia), or the theme, which goes with the 
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plot, guided by followability, constitutes the ‘what’ imitated by the action. By 
‘discordances’, he means ‘the reversals of fortune that make the plot an ordered 
transformation from an initial situation to a terminal situation’ (ibid.), that is, 
heterogeneous components like agents, goals, means, interactions, unintended 
circumstances, discoveries, chances or planned encounters and unexpected 
results etc (see also Ricoeur 1984, p.65; 1991, p.20-33). In this sense, the 
gathering together of all these factors into a single story is both concordant and 
discordant at once. Again, Ricoeur applies the notion ‘configuration’ in 
narrative to emplotment (mimesis 2), which mediates between concordance and 
discordance, making a ‘synthesis of heterogeneous ‘elements (see Ricoeur 1992, 
p.141).   
 
5. Between lived and told  
(1) Emplotment (mimesis 2) in narrative mediates between the story that is told 
and the action (Ricoeur 1992, p.143). 
The identity of character in narrative is comprehensible only through the 
transfer of the operation of emplotment, which is firstly used to arrange the real 
action recounted, to the character. So, character is subordinated to the 
emplotment. In constructing the identity of the story told firstly, the narrative 
constructs the identity of the character, (or the narrative conception of the identity, 
or narrative identity). As Ricoeur writes, ‘It is indeed in the story recounted, 
with its qualities of unity, internal structure, and completeness which are 
conferred by emplotment, that the characters preserves throughout the story 
an identity correlative to that of the story itself’ (ibid. p. 143). 
 
(2) Refiguration (mimesis 3) of narrative mediates between the world of text 
and the world of reader (Ricoeur 1984, p.70-82; 1991, p.20-31; 1992, p.163). 
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Ricoeur maintains that it is the refiguration in the hearer or the reader that the 
narrative reaches its fulfilment. Refiguration is an intersection of the world 
configured by the plots and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds 
its specific temporality. Firstly, the act of reading does not only mean the entry 
of the work into the field of communication, but also at the same time, it means 
the entry into the field of reference (Ricoeur 1984, p.77). Reference is a type of 
‘application’ of the world of narrative text to reality. The recounted past is the 
interweaving of factual reference and imaginative reference, that is, it is a 
quasi-past, in which the narrated past involves a projection of the future (see 
Ricoeur 1992, p.163). Refiguaration helps us look at our future in reading our 
past. Secondly, in responding to the criticism from structuralist views that 
narrative has a closure, but life is not completed until death, Ricoeur argues 
that narrative is open-ended. He argues that the narrative of a life needs 
refiguration, that is, examined reading, in order for it to be understood.  In 
the same way, it is the scrutiny of the life that gives person’s life a closure, not 
death. If the closure of a life is not completed by examination, then narrative 
closure is not fulfilled by the act of reading, because it is possible that new 
reading may always confer new meanings on narrative. This suggests that 
despite the fact that Ricoeur mainly employs a structural analysis of narrative 
in studying the notion of identity, he does not underestimate the interpretative 
dimension of narrative. In fact, he uses the Hermeneutic tradition to clarify 
narrative identity. He asserts, ‘self-understanding is an interpretation; 
interpretation of the self, in turn, finds in the narrative, among others signs 
and symbols, a privileged form of mediation’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.114n). This 
suggests that the self of ‘self-knowledge’ in Ricoeur’s mind is a self which is 
instructed by cultural symbols. Narrative, either historical or fictional, is 
conveyed by culture (see also Ricoeur 1989, p.245).   
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5.3.2 Charles Taylor’s view on the role of narrative in understanding identity   
Like Ricoeur, Taylor believes that the question of identity is inseparable from 
self-interpretation. As he writes, ‘To ask what a person is, in abstraction from 
his or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally misguided question, one 
to which there couldn’t in principle be an answer’ (Taylor 1989, p.34). 
Self-interpretation requires language and language is gained through social 
interaction and internalization.  Taylor’s theory of narrative in relation to 
identity is also linked with his assumption that the institution of meaning in 
language and narrative is bound up with our being as ‘human’ in everyday life, 
our moral framework, or our background of strong evaluation. The moral 
language of strong evaluation is the result of interaction in daily life and 
internalization of culture and norms. So, narrative in this understanding is 
embedded in the certain cultural and historical assumptions and hence provides 
a background for self-interpretation. Furthermore, this understanding of 
narrative demonstrates a dialogical/argumentative dimension between oneself 
and others, between different self-interpretations, cultures, histories, values, 
etc.  
 
Taylor’s full definition of someone’s identity involves both a moral perspective 
and reference to a defining social community (Taylor 1989, p.36). He basically 
confers roles of articulating, unity-constructing, meaning-making and 
conflict-resolving on narrative in understanding identity. 
 
1. A form of articulation of implicit moral background of moral identity. 
(Taylor 1989, p.26, p.80, p.92; Abbey 2000, p.41) 
Based on his theory of ‘strong evaluation’, Taylor maintains that strong 
evaluations are constitutive of identity. As Taylor writes, ‘Our identity is 
defined by our fundamental evaluations’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34). Strong 
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evaluations are acquired through internalization and they provide individuals 
with an orientation towards their ‘strongly valued good’. In other words, 
Taylor’s notion of identity is tightly linked with the notion of human agency as 
such orientation. As he writes, strong evaluations are ‘certain evaluations 
which are inseparable from ourselves as agents’ (ibid.). 
 
According to Taylor, strong evaluations are implicit or explicit assumptions 
concerning our moral backgrounds. ‘Moral’ here is beyond the normal use in 
the sense of duty and obligation. In Taylor’s mind ‘moral’ concerns the broad 
view about ‘what makes life worth living’ which involves ‘strong evaluation’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.4). Making the implicit moral background of strong evaluations 
explicit through articulation, can be seen as examining one’s moral values by 
reflecting what underpins them. In this process, one can gain a deeper 
understanding of one’s of self-identification and self-definition. Also, 
articulation can bring us to the goods as moral sources and moral sources 
empower people to love and respect those goods. This respect and love can 
better enable people to live up to those goods. In this sense, narrative can 
empower people to confirm and love the convictions conveyed implicitly in 
their moral identity and live up to them. Narrative as a key form of articulation, 
Taylor asserts, acts as one of the conditions of moral identity (ibid., p.51-52). 
 
2. A structure to provide a ‘thematic unit’ of life and identity. (Taylor 1989, 
p.34, p.49-51, 528) 
Taylor’s notion of identity, which is largely defined by moral frameworks, 
corresponds to his notion of the self that exists in ‘moral space’. For Taylor, the 
identity of a self is not merely the sameness of human organism, identity of a 
self also has something to do with the ‘care’, the ‘self-concern’ of every human 
being her/himself. As Taylor argues, what is concerned, for ‘a self as being 
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who exists in the space of concerns’ (Taylor 1989, p.51), is basically the unity of 
my life, that is, the continuity between the past, the present, and the future in 
my life as a whole. ‘What is in question is, generally and characteristically, the 
shape of my life as a whole’ (ibid., p.50). My narrative with my language of 
strong evaluation has the capacity to portray my ‘concern’ about myself, or 
what matters to me, and make my life a meaningful whole, a thematic unity, 
hence a coherent personal identity in moral dimension. 
 
3. A tool to arrange multiple events and a plurality of goods over lifetime into 
a single life story. (Taylor 1989, 47-52) 
(1) Narrative is an unfolding story or a history of oneself’s contact with ‘strong 
valued good(s)’. In order to make sense of our identity in relation to such goods, 
we must not only answer questions about orientation, but also questions about 
the direction of our lives. However, the directions of lives, that is, the moving 
towards or away from the good/goals, is not only found in a moral space, but 
also presented over human lifetime. In other words, in my contact with the 
‘goods’, there is a history of failures and successes, ups and downs, moving 
away or toward the ‘goods’ or ‘worth’ of my life (Taylor 1989, p.47). Not only 
my history of how I have become as what I am, but also the future about what I 
am going to be, needs to be understood in an ‘unfolding story’ (see ibid.). As 
Taylor writes, ‘[I]n order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a 
notion of how we have become, and of where we are going’ (ibid.). Here we can 
see that the ‘direction of lives’ has inherently a temporal dimension.  That is, we 
cannot give meaning to our present place related to the valued good without 
locating it in the temporal context of our lives, both the past events and future 
projects. Thus, Taylor concludes, ‘My self-understanding necessarily has 
temporal depth and incorporates narrative’ (ibid., p.50). 
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(2) Narrative also brings plurality of goods, both in a diachronous 
heterogeneity and synchronous heterogeneity, into a single unity. As  
Laitinen explains, ‘Narrativity can bring concordance to both synchronous and 
diachronous discordances, through combining a plurality of goods within a 
single life and through reasoning in transitions’ (see  Laitinen 2002). 
Individuals not only balance different goods, but also hold new ones and 
discard old ones as well as avoid others. Diachronously, there might be a 
diversity of goods over one’s life time. Narrative can help him/her make sense 
of the transitions and even make radical changes in one’s moral outlook 
through their expression in practical reasoning. More importantly, being 
confronted with a plurality of goods at a certain time for an individual can be 
seen as a synchronous heterogeneity. According to Laitinen’s interpretation, 
‘one way of unifying different goods is to assign them different places and 
times in one’s life’ (ibid.). Thus, disparate goods can be combined into a unity. 
As Abbey proposes, narrative doesn’t have to be relentlessly linear; it can be a 
story about change, twists and turns both in diachronic and synchronic ways 
(see Abbey 2000). 
 
4. A ground for meaning making and re-making for the self-understanding of 
identity. (1985a, p.35-8, 191, 233; 1985b, p.26-27; 1989, p.17-18) 
Taylor believes that the meaning of lives is defined by moral frameworks, 
particularly in ancient time. However he claims that ‘frameworks today are 
problematic’ (Taylor 1989, p.17). Taylor argues that among modern people, 
some people might stick to a traditionally defined framework and reject other 
views. Others might hold pluralist views and loosely bind on these views. Still 
others are seekers in ‘quest’ of meaning due to their own awareness of 
uncertainties of modernity or personal inadequacies. For seekers, meaning of 
lives cannot simply be understood as the gamut of traditionally available 
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frameworks. For them, the meaning of lives is a complex issue. As he writes,  
 
‘Not only do they embrace these traditions tentatively, but they also 
often develop their own versions of them, or idiosyncratic 
combinations of or borrowings from or semi-inventions within them. 
And this provides the context within which the question of meaning 
has its place’ (Taylor 1989, p.17, emph. added).  
 
Taylor believes that the version of ‘seekers’ is dominant in our age (ibid., 
p.18-19). Meaning of lives nowadays therefore seems to be a product of 
interweaving between moral frameworks and personal capacities. The failure of 
having this product might result from ‘personal inadequacy’ or ‘come from 
there being no ultimately believable framework’ (ibid., p.17) and leads to ‘a life 
which is spiritually senseless’ (ibid., p.18), or suffers form a sense of 
meaningless, emptiness or homelessness. The seeking of meaning of lives 
equates with a quest for a sense of spiritual fullness and unity and/or moral 
significance. So, Tayor writes, ‘[W]e find the sense of life through articulating 
it’ (ibid.). But he adds, ‘…modern have become acutely aware of how much 
sense being there for us depends on our own powers of expression’ (ibid.).  
 
In this respect, Taylor claims that people can attain meaning of life (from 
existed frameworks) through articulation in the first sense, and when they do 
it, they create meaning depending on their ability to articulate it. In the first 
sense, narrative as a form of articulation is suggested. But it is in his thoughts 
about the latter sense of meaning-creating, that he stresses his theory of 
‘expressivism’ and this seems to be another key reason why narrative is 
significant in understanding identity. According to Taylor’s theory on 
linguistic articulation, ‘our formulation about ourselves can alter what they are 
about’ (see Taylor 1985a, p.101; cf.35-8, 191; 1985b, p.26-7). Changes in 
vocabularies of self-understanding of experiences, emotions and motivations, 
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change the self that is thereby understood. Taylor coins the term 
‘expressivism’ to propose that ‘the development of new modes of expression 
enables us to have new feeling, more powerful or more refined, and certainly 
more self-aware. In being able to express our feelings, we give them a 
reflective dimension which transforms them’ (1985a: 233; cf. 1995a, p.92, 97-98 
cited in Abbey 2000, p.61).  Here, what we can see is an important role that 
narrative plays in understanding identity. 
 
But why and in what way can self-interpretation be different? Taylor argues, 
what an individual articulates ‘is not an independent object with a fixed 
degree and manner of evidence’ (Taylor 1985a, p.38), rather it is implicit or 
inarticulate sense of what is decisive importance, i.e. implicit strong evaluation. 
A new articulation of this ‘object’ tends to make it something different from 
what it was before. This is because, in a new articulation, ‘there are more or 
less adequate, more or less truthful, more self-clairvoyant, or self-deluding 
interpretations’ (ibid.). This can answer the question of why narrative can be 
seen as a structure of meaning-making and remaking of personal identity. If 
one uses different or new modes of expression and vocabularies in narrative, 
then narrative as a linguistic form of articulation in the sense of ‘expressivism’ 
could be seen as an ongoing process of self-reflective making and re-making of 
the meaning of one’s life and one’s identity.  
 
5. A place of arguments to show ‘biographical transition’ 
According to Taylor, narrative has an argumentative dimension, particularly 
when displaying one’s ‘biographical transition’. Narrative shows, not merely 
tells (see Steele 2003, p.429; Taylor 1995a, p.221). Taylor stresses the 
biographical nature of practical reason as a transitional argument, which he calls 
‘biographical transition’ (Taylor 1995a, p.224). In Taylor’s view, narrative is not 
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merely about story ‘telling’, it is also about ‘showing’ the transition from one 
moral ‘position’ to another one. One is confident that position Y is superior to 
his/her former position X through making a comparison between both 
self-readings, because he/she knows that he/she passed from one to the other 
via an ‘error-reducing move’, for example, an identification of contradiction, a 
clarification of a confusion and a realization of a neglected belief which is 
significant to him/her. He/she accepted Y and it brings about the 
self-justifying transition (see ibid.). This ‘error-reducing move’ is an epistemic 
gain (see ibid., p.225).   
 
The argumentative dimension of narrative can also be seen as a comparison 
between one’s self-interpretation and other interlocutors’ interpretations. 
Because the narrator compares different interpretations (readings) about one’s 
life and oneself (both implicit and explicitly), narrative in this sense can be 
seen as a comparative argument. Narrative as an account of comparison 
between different self-interpretations (transitional argument) shows/makes 
sense of ‘biographical transition’, which is comes about through one’s practical 
reasoning. Narrative thus can be seen as a key form of transitional argument 
(esp. biographical transition) in the form of practical reasoning. 
 
5.4 The emergence of two categories of roles of narrative in understanding 
identity 
Over the landscape of narrative studies, it can be observed that there are at 
least two dominant analytical approaches to narrative. The first approach of 
analysis puts emphasis on the structural analysis of narrative (e.g. Kermode 
1966, Barthes 1966, Chatman 1978, Ricoeur 1984, 1985, 1988, Carr 1986, 1991). 
This approach focuses on narrative as a linguistic, temporal and experiential 
structure in relation to action of an individual. It examines how narrative as a 
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structure arranges, organizes and deploys different events, actions, 
occurrences and temporal elements into a coherent unity, e.g. a unity with a 
beginning-middle-end structure. The second approach to analysis stresses 
interpretative analysis of narrative (e.g. Taylor 1989; Ricoeur 1991, Bruner 
2004). This approach pays special attentions to narrative as a media or symbol 
that conveys or produces meaning. It examines how narrative can carry out and 
formulate self-interpretation and meaning embedded in culture, norms, 
morality, values, history and tradition of certain human contexts. However, 
these two approaches to narrative do not stand apart in total separation; they 
overlap in some aspects. This overlapping can be seen in either Ricoeur’s work 
or Taylor’s work. What emerges from preceding analyses is that these two 
approaches to narrative bring into formation two categories of roles of 
narrative in understanding identity: the category of structural roles and the 
category of interpretative roles. However, the two categories also overlap since 
structural analysis and interpretative analysis are interconnected in many 
aspects of narrative. 
  
Despite of the differences between these two philosophers’ theories, we can 
draw from them some essential roles of narrative in understanding identity 
which can be classified in these two categories. What I present below are just 
some salient roles that narrative takes in understanding identity. These roles 
either belong to a structural category or belong to an interpretative category, 
and some roles span both categories since the two categories overlap each 
other. This is not only because of Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s different focuses on 
the notion of personal identity, but also because they share certain common 
ground in their theories. 
 
5.4.1. Category of structural roles of narrative in understanding identity  
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1. Narrative as temporal structure  
Both Ricoeur and Taylor have shown the importance of the temporal nature of 
narrative in understanding identity. They maintain that narrative identity not 
only recounts an individual’s ‘past’, but also implies one’s ‘future’. Both agree 
that narrative recounts care of one’s life as a whole (Taylor 1989, p.38, 59, 238; 
Ricoeur 1992, p.136, 163). Based on his metaphor, Taylor maintains that any 
humans’ direction in relation to the goods in ‘moral space’ inherently involves 
a temporal dimension (Taylor 1989, p.50). Narrative as a life story is essential 
in the way that it gives the meaning of life as a whole, with an interweaving of 
the past, the present and the future over one’s lifetime.  Narrative according 
to Taylor is necessary in order to recount an individual’s contact with ‘strongly 
valued goods’. In a similar way, Ricoeur thinks that the past in narrative is 
only the quasi-past that includes projects, expectations and anticipations of the 
future (see Ricoeur 1992, p.163). He agrees with Taylor that narrative displays 
one’s care in terms of the unity of life (ibid.).   
 
Ricoeur’s structural analysis of narrative not only demonstrates the 
relationship between time and narrative, but also points out that narrative has 
the capacity to deal with time issues raised by the problematic of identity. 
Ricoeur proposes that ‘narrative time’, i.e., the temporal nature of narrative 
structure itself, shows a dialectical process of combining the ‘episodic aspect’ 
in the chronological dimension of narrative with the ‘configuration aspect’ in 
plotting a story. This analysis offers a solid ground to justify the temporal 
nature inherent in the structure of narrative as a linguistic mode. Here, 
narrative is important to identity in that it provides a temporal totality of one’s 
life by mediating between linear time and lived time. Bruner seems to agree 
with Ricoeur and writes, ‘[W]e seem to have not other way of describing 
“lived time” save in the form of a narrative’ (Bruner 2004, p.692). Also Ricoeur 
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demonstrates the significance of permanence in time in both identity as 
self-sameness and identity as self-constancy, and maintains that identity 
constructed by narrative acts as an ideal mediating role between two types of 
permanence in time. 
 
2. Narrative as a mediating structure 
Narrative’s mediating capacity provides a dynamic understanding of identity. 
As I have shown, in Ricoeur’ theory, the concept of personal identity contains 
many dialectical dimensions.  These include, for example, dimensions 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity, between sedimentation and 
innovation, between life history and personal imagination, between 
concordance and discordance and so on. All these dialectics can be mediated 
through a narrative structure in various ways. Similarly, according to Taylor, 
the articulation of one’s moral identity contains a dialectical dynamism 
between implicit and explicit dimensions. Narrative as a form of articulation 
mediates between implicit and explicit moral assumptions. Narrative 
articulates identity from an implicit level (as a result of internalization of 
culture) towards an explicit level so as to empower oneself to move towards 
strongly valued good. 
 
Bruner also perceives a similar capacity of narrative in his work Acts of 
Meaning (1990), through discussing what he calls ‘three domains’. The division 
between an inner world of experience and outer one that is autonomous of 
experiences ‘creates three domains, each of which requires a different form of 
interpretation’ (Bruner 1990, p.40). The first ‘is a domain under the control of 
our own intentional states: a domain where Self as agent operates with world 
knowledge and with desires that are expressed in a manner congruent with 
context and belief’ (ibid., pp.40-41). The ‘third class of events is produced 
“from outside” in a manner not under our own control. It is the domain of 
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“nature.” In the first domain we are in some manner “responsible” for the 
course of events; in the third not’ (ibid.). There is a second class of events that 
comprises ‘some indeterminate mix of the first and third, and it requires a 
more elaborate form of interpretation in order to allocate proper causal shares 
to individual agency and to ‘nature’ (ibid.). Bruner suggests that it is exactly 
narrative that mediates between the first domain and the third one. 
 
However, let me stress, it is Ricoeur who shows us a detailed and 
encompassing structural analysis of the mediating role of narrative. The 
emplotment of narrative structure mediates between discordance and 
concordance at various levels of reality of action.  This mediation makes a 
‘heterogeneous synthesis’ of a ‘life’ possible, and thus makes a life story 
readable and its conclusion acceptable. In this sense, if identity as life story is 
intelligible, meaningful and coherent, it is because narrative structure conveys 
a dynamic power of ‘grasping together’ through its mediating function. 
 
3. Narrative as structure of heterogeneous synthesis 
As I have shown in Ricoeur’s theory, narrative has capacity to arrange and 
organize various events, actions, occurrences guided by plot. Narrative can 
‘grasp’ all those discordant elements into a concordant unity. With this 
narrative unity, we can find a unique identity of a life story; hence, we can find 
an identity of character in that story. Taylor also suggests, faced with so many 
forms of ‘goods’, we can arrange them in narrative by allocating them in 
different periods of lifetime or rank them over one period of time. 
 
The following are some other examples of structural roles of narrative in 
understanding identity. However, these examples do not mean these theorists 
do not acknowledge narrative’s interpretative role. In the field of 
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psychoanalysis, David Polonoff argues that ‘[T]he object of a self-narrative was 
not its fit to some hidden “reality” but its achievement of “external and 
internal coherence, liveability, and adequacy” (see Polonoff 1987). Social 
psychologist Kenneth Gergen classified narrative form into a structure with 
three sub-forms in clarifying his notion of moral identity: stability narrative, 
progressive narrative and regressive narrative (see Gergen1998). The sociologist 
Giddens has considered that identity has turned from ‘given’ to ‘task’ (see 
Giddens 1990). Identity changes frequently due to external changes. Giddens 
then contends that a coherent identity can be acquired through keeping the 
narrative of one’s life going, because narrative has the capacity to construct 
various events and changes into a biography coherently and reasonably. 
 
5.4.2. Category of interpretative roles of narrative in understanding identity 
1. Narrative as a conveyor of meaning of culture, norms and history 
Narrative’s cultural nature presents a multi-dimensional aspect of identity. 
Ricoeur and Taylor maintain that narrative identity entails both individual 
identity and community identity. According to Ricoeur, both individual 
identity and community identity can be identified through narrative as the 
intertwining of historical narrative and fictional narrative. As Ricoeur writes, 
‘an examined life is, in a large part, one purged, one clarified by the cathartic 
effects of the narratives, be they historical or fictional, conveyed by our 
culture’ (Ricoeur 1988, p.247).  
 
Taylor believes that identity is ‘enframed in a social understanding of great 
temporal depth, in fact, in a “tradition”’ (Taylor 1989, p.39). This shows that 
Taylor locates personal narrative in the context of culture and history. He 
maintains that an articulator can find out the meaning of one’s life as a whole 
from narrative by locating personal narrative in a history or tradition as I 
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discussed before. As he writes, ‘One way in which people do this is to relate 
their story to a greater pattern of history, as the realization of a good’, because 
the secret of strength of historical narratives ‘is their capacity to confer 
meaning and substance on people’s lives’ (ibid., p.97). According to Taylor, 
personal identity cannot be separated from the community one lives in. As he 
puts it, ‘the self-interpretations which define him [an individual] are drawn 
form the interchange which the community carries on’ (Taylor 1985a, p.8 cf. 
p.11, p.209; 1989, p.38). 
 
Taylor’s notion of the role of narrative as a combination of personal and 
collective stories is endorsed by some other theorists. For example, Bruner has 
written in one of his papers that discuss the relationship between narrative 
and culture, ‘…the tool kit of any culture is replete not only with a stock of 
canonical life narratives (heros, Marthas, tricksters, etc.), but with combinable 
formal constituents from which its members can construct their own life 
narratives: canonical stances and circumstances, as it were’ (Bruner 2004, 
p.694). Also, Appiah argues for this point in terms of a multicultural context, 
 
‘…crossculturally it matters to people that their lives have a certain 
narrative unity; they want to be able to tell a story of their lives that 
makes sense. The story – my story – should cohere in the way 
appropriate by the standards made available in my culture to a 
person of my identity. In telling the story, how I fit into the wider 
story of various collectivities is, for most of us, important’ (Appiah 
1994, p.160 cited in Abbey 2000, p.216). 
 
Narrative thus has multi-levels of meanings. It is not only about something 
personal, it is at the same time about something cultural, historical and social. 
Narrative identity is therefore not only about a sense or identification of a self. 
Narrative identity is a ‘self’ as being understood narratively by and through 
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certain aspects of culture, history and social context. 
 
2. Narrative as a ground for self-interpretation 
Narrative’s meaning-making capacities present different paths from which to 
understand identity. Ricoeur and Taylor hold the Hermeneutic view that the 
central question of self-interpretation is closely linked with questions about 
one’s personal identity (Ricoeur 1992, p.114; Taylor 1976, p.281; see also 
‘introduction’ 1985 a/b; 1989, p.34). Ricoeur considers that narrative, as a form 
of self-interpretation, is a ‘privileged form of mediation’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.114)). 
Taylor holds that narrative is an ‘inescapable structure’ in meaning-making of 
one’s life and identity (Taylor 1989, p.52). 
 
The agreement between Ricoeur and Taylor on this point suggests that 
narrative does have something to do with the capacity for meaning-making 
and remaking. Narrative is a central form of articulation. In Ricoeur’s view, 
‘Narrative has its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and 
suffering in mimesis 3’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.70). The refiguration (mimesis 3) takes 
place between the world of text narrated and the world of readers, which is 
exactly the process of self–identification of any individual or community 
through the act of reading. It is through the act of reading that the refiguration 
of narrative is possible, and that making a narrative resignifies the world in its 
temporal dimension to the extent that narrating, telling, reciting is to remake 
action following personal experiences and imagination, and that the new 
meaning of the narrative can be added, shaped and created based on the 
original narrative. Ricoeur’s idea is based on the theory of reading from 
Wolfgang Iser (1978) and theory of reception from Robert Jauss (1982) who 
both agree that the text is a set of instructions that the individual reader or the 
reading public executes in a passive or a creative way (see Ricoeur 1984, p.77). 
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Reading one’s life story then acts as a role of self-interpreting mediated 
between one’s narrative identity and his/her life.  This is because the plot in a 
life story acquired from culture conveys the meaning of good or bad, sadness 
or happiness. The imagination to be someone conveyed in narrative is also 
largely borrowed from and adjusted by culture, norms and one’s past 
experiences.  This mode of self-interpretation is thus a kind of narrative 
understanding of oneself. 
 
Likewise, Taylor maintains that the meaning/sense of personal identity can be 
articulated through self-interpretation.  One’s place in ‘moral space’ vis-à-vis 
strongly valued good over time can only be understood as ‘an unfolding story’ 
(Taylor 1989, p.47). Narrative serves as the basis for self-interpretation, 
contains the language of ‘strong evaluations’ (which refers to the ‘worth’ of 
different desires, feelings, actions or modes of life).  Narrative hence serves as 
the articulation of self-concern underpinned by certain moral assumptions. As 
Taylor shows, narrative makes meaning for personal identity as a whole 
through articulating one’s implicit moral ontology, through comparing, 
arguing and evaluating different interpretations as ‘biographical transition’, 
through arranging pluralist views and through inventing something unique by 
using one’s ‘powers of expression’ (ibid., p.18). 
 
3. Narrative as a space for evaluative reflection   
Narrative’s reflexive nature provides an evaluative understanding of identity.  
Taylor shows that the ‘self’ cannot be understood or explored as a mere ‘object’ 
in impersonal terms dominated by mainstream social sciences, which are free 
from evaluative language. The self, as he repeats, is also a being in a ‘space of 
questions’ about the good. Personal identity according to Taylor is partly 
defined by strong evaluations. Narrative contains the language of strong 
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evaluation and is a key form of articulation of moral assumptions about one’s 
moral identity. This point has also been supported by Bruner, ‘To tell a story is 
inescapably to take a moral stance, even if it is a moral stance against moral 
stances’ (ibid., p.51). Ricoeur also suggests that narrative as refiguration is 
inseparable from ethical fields. ‘….narrativity is not denuded of every 
normative, evaluative, or prescriptive dimension’ (Ricoeur 1989, p.249).  
 
Nevertheless Taylor also argues that moral ontology is implicit and only in 
times of controversy, conflict or crisis, is one forced to articulate the 
assumptions of his/moral values (see Taylor 1989, p.9). This process has 
something to do with what Taylor calls ‘radical re-evaluation’ (see Taylor 1985, 
p.40). To put this in other words, it is a process of reflecting on our 
fundamental ‘strong evaluations’ or re-evaluating our moral frameworks. This 
view has also been discussed by Bruner. As he stresses, ‘The values underlying 
a way of life, as Charles Taylor points out, are only lightly open to “radical 
reflection” (Bruner 1990, p.29). Bruner even claims ‘that only when constituent 
beliefs in a folk psychology are violated that narratives are constructed’ (ibid., 
p.35). Hence, Bruner claims that ‘the function of story is to find an intentional 
state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a 
canonical cultural pattern’ (ibid., p. 50). In this sense, narrative as a key form of 
articulation of moral assumptions in respect of understanding identity entails 
such radical reflection. Such radical reflection might trigger what Taylor calls 
‘practical reasoning’, in which different interpretations in narrative can be 
articulated through comparative argument and finally leads to ‘biographical 
transition’, as I have discussed before.  
 
Seeing from above, we can say to give a narrative is to provide an opportunity 
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for people to reflect on what is morally essential to one’s identity and 
(re)evaluate their meanings to them.  
 
4. Narrative as a tool of expression 
Taylor maintains that the new meaning of life can be created through what he 
calls ‘expressivism’. He maintains, ‘[W]e find the sense of life through 
articulating it. And modern have become acutely aware of how much sense 
being there for us depends on our own powers of expression’ (Taylor 1989, p.18). 
According to Taylor, modern people try to attain the meaning of life by 
articulating it, and when they do so, they create meaning depending on their 
ability to articulate their lives. But Taylor suggests, ‘our formulation about 
ourselves can alter what they are about’ (Taylor 1985a, p.101; cf. 35-8, 191; 
1985b: 26-7). Narrative as a tool of expression, with its ongoing refiguration 
and temporal feature, therefore plays an important role in the formulation of a 
new meaning of one’s life, hence one’s identity. 
 
5.4.3 Narrative as a double role: both as structural role and interpretative 
role 
The two categories of role of narrative are not strictly separated. Rather, some 
roles of narrative in relation to identity have to be understood by integrating 
both categories. The following are two examples. 
1. Narrative as self-interpretation by way of narrative as structure 
Narrative as self-interpretation plays a central role in attaining the meaning of 
the wholeness of one’s life, hence the meaning of one’s personal identity.  
However, this meaning-making process largely relies on narrative as structure.  
 
Both Ricoeur and Taylor stress the necessity of unity of one’s life in 
understanding personal identity. What underpins this understanding is that 
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both philosophers acknowledge the fact that a subject always cares about and 
has concerns or worries about its ‘self’ as a whole over time (see Taylor 1989, 
p.38, 59, 238; Ricoeur 1992, p.136, 163). To put this in a nutshell, narrative 
recounts care or self-concern.  Ricoeur and Taylor regard narrative as a means 
of self-interpretation to offer concordance to discordance in one’s life.  Thus 
both thinkers agree that it is the use of narrative that makes it possible to gain 
a sense of life as a whole, since narrative can produce a thematic or narrative 
unity of life.  
 
However, this interpretative role of narrative intertwines with structural role 
of narrative. Ricoeur stresses that through the narrative structure of synthesis, 
narrative grasps the discordant events, actions, heterogeneous factors and 
discordant temporal elements into an intelligible narrative of one’s life. 
Through reading and reflection on this life story, one can gain the meaning of 
life as a whole, hence gain the importance of one’s personal identity.  
Through narrative’s temporal structure, Taylor argues for the meaning of life 
as a whole. Narrative has the capacity to link and reorganize the inescapable 
temporal structure of the past, the present and the future of human life. 
Meaning of life as a whole hence needs to be articulated through an unfolding 
story. Taylor also pays special attention to the importance of unifying 
discordant ‘goods’ and ‘values’, diachronically and synchronically into a 
harmonious whole over one’s life. As Taylor suggests, narrative has the 
capacity to unify the conflicting goods by assigning them different places and 
times over one’s life (see Abbey 2000;  Laitinen 2002).    
 
Similar example is MacIntyre’s notion of narrative in relation to personal 
identity. He also claims the need for integrity of selfhood and personal identity 
by way of a ‘narrative unity of human life’ (MacIntyre 1985, p.219). He argues 
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that we can do this if we think about our lives in terms of a unique story 
beginning with birth and ending with death. Since life can be gathered 
together as a whole in the form of a narrative, a subject of actions can give an 
ethical character to this life. He writes, ‘… personal identity is just that identity 
presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of a narrative 
requires. Without such unity there would not be subjects of whom stories 
could be told…’ (ibid., p.217).  Although MacIntyre mainly suggests using 
narrative structure in terms of narrative unity to clarify his notion of the self 
and identity, he also stresses the fact that narrative is inseparable from history, 
tradition and social community, which highlight the interpretative role of 
narrative.  
 
2. Narrative as self-understanding borrowed from narrative as structure of 
human experience gained through interweaving of history and fiction 
According to Ricoeur, narrative could be seen as a sought-after structure 
where both personal identity and community identity can be recognized and 
understood, which can be called narrative identity on both levels. This is 
because narrative can be seen as a structure of human experience as a result of the 
intertwining of personal life story and a community history. ‘Human time’ 
stands for the combination of the past in history and the imaginative variations 
of fiction (see Ricoeur 1984, p.82; 1988, p.192). So, in Ricoeur’s opinion, 
narrative borrows from history as well as fiction, in making narrative identity, 
that is, identity as a life story, or a fictional history (see Ricoeur 1992, p.114). 
Narrative therefore has both historical and fictional references (see Ricoeur 
1984, p.81-82). As Ricoeur writes,  
 
‘self-understanding is an interpretation; interpretation of the self, in 
turn, finds in the narrative, among other signs and symbols, a 
privileged form of mediation; the latter borrows from history as well 
CHAPTER 5 
 257
as from fiction, making a life story a fictional history, or, if one 
prefers, a historical fiction, interweaving the historiographic style of 
biographies with the novelistic style of imaginary autobiographies’ 
(Ricoeur 1992, p.114). 
 
In sum, the roles of narrative in understanding identity discussed above do not 
exhaust all the roles that narrative plays in understanding identity. They are 
just salient roles that narrative plays. They are mainly drawn from a 
complementary understanding of Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories on identity 
and narrative. But from the roles illustrated above, we can at least conclude 
that the role of narrative in understanding identity is complicated and 
multifunctional. Furthermore, these roles of narrative an be generally 
categorized into two types, i.e., structural category and interpretative category, 
though both categories overlap in terms of certain roles. 
 
5.5 Differences and issues between two theories 
I have analysed the salient roles that narrative plays in Ricoeur and Taylor’s 
theories of identity respectively and argued that those roles can be regarded as 
structural roles, or interpretative roles or both. We can see both theorists not 
only share some common grounds in their thoughts, but also complement each 
other. Now, I wish to conduct a critical analysis of noticeable differences 
between these two theories of narrative and narrative identity. The purpose of 
this analysis is to find out the strengths and weaknesses of these two theories 
in order to acquire a deeper and critical understanding of their thoughts. An 
analysis about their differences might also disclose some issues. 
 
5.5.1 What are the differences? 
1. Different assumptions of the analysis of narrative 
Ricoeur based his structural analysis of narrative largely on the notion of 
‘mimesis’. He regards mimesis 1 as his starting point from which to examine 
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the notion of narrative. Mimesis 1 is the preunderstandings of ‘the world of 
action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources and its temporal 
character’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.54). He also stresses that some competence is 
required to gain such preunderstaning. Mimesis 1  according to Ricoeur is not 
only such preunderstanding, but also the result of sedimentation of the 
innovation produced by mimesis 3, which is a consequence of circular 
processes as I have shown in chapter 3. Ricoeur seems in a large part to treat 
personal sedimentation as subject’s background to give a narrative identity. 
He writes, ‘What sedimentation has contracted, narration can redeploy’ (1992, 
p.122). One of the assumptions that Ricoeur deals with the notion of narrative 
in such kind of structural analysis is that he attempts to mediate Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, Kantian schematism and Structuralism in his analysis of 
narrative (see Steele 2003). There are at least two drawbacks of Ricoeur’s 
assumptions about his structural analysis of narrative in understanding 
identity. First, this approach seems to suggest that inchoate narrative from 
certain preunderstandings and sedimentation can be simply attained by 
certain competence, and can be well ready to interpret experiences. Such 
preunderstanding neglects the important role of social interaction in 
meaning-making in real life. Secondly, stressing the structural analysis of 
narrative might mean that less attention is paid to the historical, socio-cultural 
and evaluative dimensions embedded in the language of narrative as discourse. 
Both aspects discussed above, however, are what Taylor stressed.  
  
Taylor’s idea about the background of narrative is different form Ricoeur’s. In 
Taylor’s view, the notion of narrative emerges from one’s articulation of moral 
ontological assumptions or presupposition, implicit or explicit, which  results 
from internalization of norms, including social, historical and cultural 
dimensions of the human world. The articulation is made in dialogue with and 
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against other moral languages and narratives of the past and the present (see 
Steele 2003). In this sense, first, Taylor suggests that there is an interactive or 
intersubjective dimension in the notion of narrative itself. Second, narrative 
here is moral, historical and dialogical in any certain cultural context, because, 
the self, for Taylor exists in the ‘moral space’ and ‘web of interlocution’. The 
moral issue of our ‘being’ therefore is bound up with our moral language as 
narrative, which contains dialogues with others and history. According to 
Taylor, a human being is also a self-interpretive subject and narrative is a basic 
condition for making sense of identity. Finally, while Ricoeur focuses on the 
analysis of narrative identity in the world of text in relation to the ‘world of 
action’, Taylor stresses that narrative is a form of linguistic articulation in the 
form of moral language in spelling out the moral assumptions of personal 
identity.  
 
2. Different focuses on the notion of narrative identity 
Although Ricoeur maintains that narrative identity as the identity of a life 
story, a story about actions of the ‘who’, can be seen as a kind of 
self-understanding that has emerged from the story, he focuses on the 
structural analysis of narrative identity in trying to resolve the problematic 
notion of ‘personal identity’. That is, he mainly regards narrative as 
emplotment where its mediating role is to deal with the dialectical relation 
between idem-identity and ipse-identity. Taylor, however, sees narrative 
identity as an unfolding story of the ‘self’ vis-à-vis the ‘goods’ that define one’s 
moral identity. While Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity focuses on 
narrative’s mediating function in understanding the notion personal identity, 
Taylor’s notion of narrative identity stresses the normative dimension of 
identity by means of narrative.  
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3. Different approaches to fulfil the same roles of narrative in understanding 
identity 
The two philosophers suggest different approaches to fulfil the same roles of 
narrative in understanding identity.  
 
While Ricoeur tells us to seek meanings in understanding one’s identity 
through the reading of the narrative as ordering/arranging of various types of 
elements and actions, Taylor shows us to search for the meaning of identity 
through narrative by articulating the orientation and direction in ‘moral space’, 
which underpins the actions of an individual. While Ricoeur stresses 
narrative’s dynamic mediating role in multiple dialectical relations in the notion 
of personal identity, Taylor underscores narrative’s argumentative role for 
conflict-resolving and biographical transition in the face of a plurality of goods. 
As Steele analyses,  ‘Ricoeur wants to keep novelists out of the argument 
business, however, limiting them only to emplotment…This same formalism 
undermines Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity, since identity becomes the 
ordering of components and not an argument with other self-conceptions, 
which is how Taylor understands it’ (Steele 2003, p.429).  
 
In conclusion, on the one hand, we can see that Ricoeur’s notion of narrative 
identity is more analytical than the ‘thematic unity’ of narrative identity 
around the notion of ‘the good(s)’ proposed by Taylor. The heart of Ricoeur’s 
argument on narrative identity, while not neglecting the importance of culture 
and history, stresses the narrative structure, its dynamic functions and how 
they work together to help us perceive the nature and unity of personal 
identity. His notion of narrative identity shows us how narrative takes a 
mediating role between idem-identity and ipse-identity.  
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Taylor, however, demonstrates the significance of the narrative capacity to 
form the meaning of life as a whole; his discussion about how narrative 
operates and functions in doing this are not satisfactorily sufficient and clear.  
However, Taylor’s interpretative or normative analysis of narrative in the 
understanding of identity presents us with a rich meaning of personal identity 
by revealing cultural, social and historical meanings of identity inherent in 
narrative. Although Ricoeur does not neglect the fact that narrative is one form 
of cultural symbols, he does not clarify in depth how narrative’s cultural, 
social and historical nature can help to shape one’s personal identity.  Rather, 
he chiefly confines his discussion to how the effect that the plot receives from 
culture may work on one’s self-understanding.  
  
5.5.2 What are the issues? 
Although either of philosophers does not confine themselves just to one 
approach, the differences between Ricoeur’ theory and Taylor’s theory might 
reflect the gap between the structural analysis of narrative and interpretative 
analysis of narrative in understanding identity, where certain issues might rise. 
If we simply stick to just one approach of analysis, it is likely to be at risk of 
leading to an insufficient or a biased understanding of the narrative 
conception of identity. For example, David Carr, following the 
Phenomenological tradition, focuses on structural analysis of narrative in 
understanding history and real life. He claims that the beginning-middle-end 
structure of narrative can be seen as an extension of the basic structure of 
means-end action or human experience, i.e. anticipation/protention, attention and 
retention. Thus, Carr contends that ‘narration is not only a mode of discourse 
but more essentially a mode, perhaps the mode, of life’ (Carr 1991, p.173). It 
can be argued that this view reduces narrative to experience and reduces 
experiences to life. Experiences without self-interpretations and others’ 
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interpretations, cannot be equated with life, if life is not simply understood in a 
biological sense. Carr’s view thus might reduce the notion of narrative identity 
to the structural experience of a person in the reality since he neglects 
narrative’s interpretative role. Consequently, Carr’s view seems to me an 
inadequate view of narrative in relation to life and identity. This is particularly 
because narrative is also about interpretations and meaning, not simply a 
structure about a selection of events of reality following the sequences of 
consciousness of reality as a form of discourse.  
 
Also Louis Mink assumes that the beginnings-middle-end structure of 
narrative cannot be applied to life itself, because according to him ‘stories are 
not lived but told’ (Mink 1970, p.557-558 cited in Ricoeur 1990, p.159n). In 
Mink’s view, ‘life has no beginnings, middles and ends…Narrative qualities 
are transferred from art to life’ (Mink 1970, pp.557f. cited in Carr 1991, p.161). 
Mink also assumes narrative is just a form of artistic discourse. This raises the 
issue of ‘truthfulness’ of narrative identity, identity based on life story, because 
if life story is just told, not lived as ‘real’, how can we accept that ‘our narrative 
identity’ is ‘real’ or ‘true’ in relation to ‘our identity’? I will discuss this issue in 
detail in the next part of this chapter. These issues result from 
overemphasising the structural analysis of narrative, and focusing on 
structural role of narrative in understanding life and/or personal identity. 
What these views underestimated or excluded is the interpretative role of 
narrative in relation to life and personal identity. Thus, it can be argued that 
we can avoid those issues by combing structural analysis and interpretative 
analysis into a holistic approach to narrative. 
 
Drawing on what is discussed above, it becomes apparent that the analyses of 
narrative in understanding identity can be generally categorized into two 
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approaches towards analysis: one approach is the structural approach to 
narrative as a linguistic or experiential structure in relation to actions of the 
self; another approach is the interpretative approach to narrative as a conveyer 
and/or a creator of self-interpretation and meaning embedded in culture, 
history and tradition of certain social settings. Although both approaches seem 
not to be applied in a strictly separated way, different emphasis on either of 
approaches is perceivable in different theories. Simply holding one approach 
of analysis will be likely to cause an insufficient and/or biased understanding. 
Based on this general observation, I therefore suggest that in order to have a 
deeper and comprehensive understanding of the role of narrative that plays in 
understanding identity, it is essential to bear in mind the importance of both 
approaches of analyses to narrative. 
 
5.6 Between life as narrative and life ‘as it is’1 
Now, as we can see, the role of narrative is multifunctional in understanding 
identity. This leads us to a conclusion that narrative can be a very propitious 
mechanism to help us understand identity. Thus we should accept that 
narrative might be the most useful and desirable tool for use in understanding 
our lives and our identity. But some might challenge the ‘truthfulness’ of the 
                                                 
1 The discussion in this section is based on the following key literature: Carr, D., 
Taylor, C., and Ricoeur, P. (1991). Discussion: Ricoeur on narrative. In Wood, David 
(ed.). On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and interpretation. London: Routledge; Ricoeur, P. 
(1991). Life in quest of narrative. In D.Wood (ed.) On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
interpretation. London: Routledge; Ricoeur, P. (1991). Narrative identity. In D.Wood 
(ed.) On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and interpretation. London: Routledge; Ricoeur, Paul 
(1992 [1990]). Oneself as Another. Trans. By Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press; Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, 
MA & London: Harvard University Press; Bruner, J. (2004). Life as narrative. Social 
Research, 71(3), 691-710; Bruner, J. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. Critical 
Inquiry, 18(1), 1-21.  
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conception of narrative identity. In other words, the question that might be 
asked is whether we can equate narrative identity to the identity ‘as it is’ in 
reality. This question is reminiscent of another question, that is, how should 
we understand the relation between life as narrative and the life as it was/is? 
It has been widely maintained that narrative as life stories should not be 
equated with ‘real’ life.  For example, as I mentioned before, Louise Mink 
claims, ‘Stories are not lived but told’ (Mink 1970, p.557-558 cited in Ricoeur 
1990, p.159n). As David Carr comments, the theorists who hold this view claim 
that narrative distorts life either as ‘self-delusion’ or something ‘imposed from 
without by some authoritative narrative voice’ (see Carr 1991, p.162). Carr 
labels this view as a ‘standard view’, because it is broadly hailed as a truth by 
many structuralists and non-structuralists and Carr gives the examples by 
listing the following theorists: Frank Kermode (1966), Seymour Chatman 
(1978), Roland Barthes (1966), Louis Mink (1979), Hayden White (1981) (see 
ibid., p.160-161). In this section, while presenting an overview of the debates, I 
will put forward my position on this issue by holding a perspective of 
combination of Hermeneutics and Pragmatic Constructivism. I will clarify my 
stance that narrative imitates, reveals and transforms life and life imitates, 
reveals and transforms narrative. Finally, I will argue against the position that 
narrative identity is not ‘true’ or ‘real’ in relation to the identity ‘as it is’ in 
reality.  
 
5.6.1 Carr’s view on relation between life as narrative and reality 
David Carr is the one who opposes the ‘stand view’ as I mentioned above. He 
contends that narrative itself is a form or a (the) mode of real life. As he writes, 
‘…narration , far from being a distortion of , denial of or escape from ‘reality’, 
is in fact an extension and enrichment, a confirmation, not a falsification, of its 
primary features’(Carr 1991, p.162). By referring Husserl’s phenomenological 
CHAPTER 5 
 265
theory of time-consciousness, i.e., even the most passive experience involves 
tacit anticipation or protention as well as retention of the just past, Carr argues 
human reality is hardly a structureless sequence of isolated events. Besides 
passive experience, Carr argues that this is truer of our active lives. As he writes, 
‘…we quite explicitly consult past experience, envisage the future and view 
the present as a passage between the two’ (ibid., p.163).  
 
He then argues that there is a relationship between the structure of actions in 
our life and that of narrative. The means-end structure of action is related to 
the beginning-middle-end structure of narrative. Narrative selects relevant 
events that are necessary to ‘further the plot’. In this understanding, Carr 
argues, ‘…life differs from stories just because such a selection is not made; all 
the static is there’ (ibid., p.164). He further argues, ‘Life admits no selection 
process; everything is left in; and this is because there is no narrator in 
command, no narrative voice which does the selecting’ (ibid., p.165).  Thus, 
Carr contends, ‘Narratives do select; and life is what they select from’ (ibid.). 
He argues that selections actually happen in real life as well. ‘Our very 
capacity for attention, and for following through more or less long-term and 
complex endeavours, is our capacity for selection’ (ibid.) We do this selection 
because we hope to attain a coherence in our life based on those endeavours. 
The unselected events of life are just ‘pushed into the background, saved for 
later, ranked in importance’ (ibid.). When we explain our life to ourselves or 
others, selections-making in real life actually are emerged as acts of plotting of 
our life stories. Consequently, the art of narrative thus makes a mode of 
coherent life to us, and this narrative coherence is drawn from life, and does 
not impose itself upon an incoherent, merely sequential existence. In this sense, 
Carr concludes that ‘narration is not only a mode of discourse but more 
essentially a mode, perhaps the mode, of life’ (ibid., p.173). 
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Thus, Carr disagrees on the point that narrative is an artefact of literary 
and historical writing and that narrative structure does not track any 
structure that exists in world. As Carr claims, ‘narrative form is not a 
dress which covers something else but the structure inherent in human 
experience and action’ (1986, p.65). 
 
It can be argued, however, Carr’s view is not adequate, though it might 
be plausible. This is at least because he excludes narrative’s interpretive 
roles in understanding life. As Ricoeur holds, a hermeneutic circle of 
prefiguration, configuration and refiguration construct narrative.  
Narrative is also an interweaving of personal imagination and historical 
facts. All these features of narrative entail self-interpretation and 
interpretations of one’s life given by others. Also, as Taylor suggested, 
narrative contains self-interpretation and language of strong evaluation. 
Without any evaluative interpretations contained in narrative, one’s 
experience in reality is simply a series of actions with neutral means-end 
linkage as Carr suggests. Narrative simply based on experiences in 
Carr’s view, can hardly be equated with life which is filled with 
meanings, happiness and sufferings, good and bad. Further, Carr’s view 
is also insufficient because it is not just that narrative structure reflects a 
structure of human experiences in reality, it is also plausible that human 
experiences in reality are informed by the meanings conveyed in one’s 
or other’s narrative of life. As I have suggested, this inadequate 
understanding of narrative in relation to life results from Carr’s over- 
emphasis on structural analysis in narrative.   
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5.6.2 Ricoeur’s view on relation between life as narrative and reality 
In responding to Carr’s criticism, Ricoeur avoids simply understanding the 
relationship between narrative and life as an oversimplified and direct 
relationship, that is, narrative as distortion of life, or narrative as a/the mode 
of life. Ricoeur deals with this issue by not directly choosing either position. 
Rather, the relationship between narrative and life according to Ricoeur can be 
formulated as ‘a life in search of its own history’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.181). Ricoeur 
maintains that what he calls the circularity of the dynamics of triple mimesis 
addresses the difficulty found in the relationship between life and narrative. In 
Ricoeur’s view, narrative is not merely imitatings of actions in life, narrative 
also reveals and transforms life (ibid., p.180).  
 
At the beginning of his argument, Ricoeur offers a deep analysis of Aristotle’s 
notion of mimesis, i.e., the plot. He maintains that mimesis is not only imitation 
of actions, but also is the representation of action, which reflects as ‘revelatory’ 
and ‘transformative’ features in refiguration. Ricoeur suggests that, according 
to Aristotle’s Poetics, mimesis does not confine its function to the imitating of 
action, but it evokes ‘a dynamic operativity’ (ibid., p.180). Ricoeur then 
contends that mimesis also ‘designates a production’ (ibid., 181).  He is in 
agreement with Gerald Else who ‘proposes the term “imitatings” to designate 
the products of mimetic activity’ (ibid.). In this sense, plot is not a static 
structure, but an ‘integrating process’ of composition which gives a dynamic 
identity to the story that is recounted. The process of plotting is completed in 
the reader or the receiver of the narrated story. How does the ‘dynamic 
operativity’ of mimesis function? It functions through the circularity of triple 
mimesis. Ricoeur maintains that life itself is an inchoate narrative, an 
ill-wrought history eaten away by discordances. This is why Ricoeur says that 
life has a pre-narrative feature. In this ill-wrought history or pre-narrative, an 
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individual gropes about and seeks a meaning or understanding of his/her life. It 
is only through the configurational act that discordant history is transformed 
into a concordant narrative. It is through reading this narrative that 
refiguration reveals the meaning of my life to me and helps me further 
transform my comprehension of my life into a different/new understanding of 
this life, then this new understanding becomes a new part of prefiguration. 
This integrating process forms a hermeneutic circle. As Ricoeur argues, ‘This 
circle is not however a vicious circle, because there is nevertheless an extension 
of meaning, progressive meaning, from the inchoate to the fully determined’ 
(Ricoeur 1991, p.182). As he concludes, ‘one may say both that poiesis reveals 
structures which would have remained unrecognized without art, and that it 
transforms life, elevating it to another level’ (ibid.). 
 
However, Ricoeur admits that life is different from history due to the 
differences between a theory of action and a theory of history. ‘History tears 
itself away from life; it is constituted through the activity of comprehension 
which is also the activity of configuration’ (ibid., p.181). Nevertheless Ricoeur 
argues, ‘Action, according to Arendt, makes an appeal to history, because 
history discloses the who of the action’ (ibid, p.182.). Narrative, according to 
Ricoeur, is an ideal form to do such configuration of action.  
 
Also, in dealing with the relationship between life and narrative, Ricoeur 
responds to the stance that ‘stories are told and not lived’ (Mink 1970) and its 
counterpart: ‘life is lived and not told’ in another essay titled ‘Life in Quest of 
Narrative’ (1991). He argues first against the position that ‘stories are told, not 
lived’ from the side of ‘narrative’. Ricoeur maintains that the importance of 
narrative in relation to life lies in refiguration, which corresponds with his 
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belief of Socrates’ maxim that an unexamined life is not worth living. As he 
writes, 
 
‘My thesis is here that the process of composition, of configuration is 
not completed in the text but in the reader and, under this condition, 
makes possible the reconfiguration of life by narrative. I should say 
more precisely: the sense or the significance of a narrative stems from 
the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the 
reader…On it rests the narrative’s capacity to transfigure the 
experience of the reader’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.26).  
 
From a Hermeneutical point of view, i.e. the point of view of interpretation of 
literary experience, a literary text ‘is a mediation between man and the world, 
between man and man, between man and himself; the mediation between man 
and the world is what we call referentiality; the mediation between men, 
communicability; the mediation between man and himself, self-understanding. A 
literary work contains these three dimensions: referentiality, communicability 
and self-understanding’ (ibid.,p.27).  
 
The act of reading narrated life is a way of examining life and has the potential 
to give new meaning to life. Ricoeur writes, ‘…it is the act of reading which 
completes the work, transforming it into a guide for reading, with its zones of 
indeterminacy, its latent wealth of interpretation, its power of being 
reinterpreted in new ways in new historical contexts’ (ibid.). Ricoeur then 
concludes that narratives or stories are not only recounted, but also lived.  
This is because the act of reading is carried out in the interaction between the 
world of text and the world of reader. As Ricoeur writes, ‘…for reading is itself 
already a way of living in the fictive universe of the work; in this sense, we can 
already say that stories are recounted but they are also lived in the mode of the 
imaginary’ (ibid.).  
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Then Ricoeur argues against the counterpart of former stance, i.e., the stance 
that ‘life is lived, not told’ from the side of ‘life’. As has been mentioned above, 
what Ricoeur maintains is true about the relationship between life and 
narrative is ‘life in quest of its own narrative’. Ricoeur claimed that he applies 
Socrate’s maxim to the relationship between life and narrative. He agrees on 
what Socrates advocates that ‘an unexamined life is not worth living’ (cited in 
Ricoeur 1991, p.20). As he writes, ‘A life is no more than a biological 
phenomenon as long as it has not been interpreted’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.28). Then 
Ricoeur argues that life is a pre-narrative and ‘something like stories that have 
not yet been told’, and concludes that ‘narrative fiction, is an irreducible 
dimension of self-understanding’ (ibid., p.30).  
 
In clarifying the relation between life and life story, Ricoeur argues that an 
examined life is a life recounted (ibid., p.31). The nature of this relation is 
obviously based on his belief in Socrates’ maxim. Consequently, Ricoeur 
contends that we need to understand the relation between life and narrative in 
such a way that ‘fiction contributes to making life, in biological sense of the 
word, a human life’ (ibid., p.20). But what is recounted life? In recounted life, we 
can find not only all the basic structures of the narrative but also narrative’s 
dynamic play between concordance and discordance. Most particularly, 
narrative mediates between Augustine’s concordant discordance in time and 
Aristotle’s discordant concordance in plot. This is why Taylor maintains that 
‘time becomes human time to the extent that it organized after the manner of 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the 
features of temporal experience’ (Ricoeur 1984, p.3). Through the plot 
instructed by culture and the imaginative elements contained in narrative, we 
gain the meaning of our life and elicit an idea of who we want to be. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 271
From all this, we can see Ricoeur believes that the ‘life in quest of narrative’ is 
a narrative construction and narrative understanding of reality. Life as 
narrative is neither a mere sequence of events of human reality nor a pure 
distortion of reality. Life as narrative imitates, reveals and transforms the reality 
of human life. 
 
5.6.3. Taylor’s view on the relation between life as narrative and reality  
Like Ricoeur, Taylor maintains that narrative is an important form of reflection 
in quest of the meaning of one’s life based on his agreement on the  Socratic 
maxim about ‘examined life’. Taylor believes that we do not just lead a ‘mere 
life’; we are also moved by certain forms of ‘good life’. With respect to narrative 
in relation to life, Taylor is more specific in terms of the nature of narrative. 
That is, Taylor focuses on the evaluative nature of narrative in its articulating a 
good life. Narrative has the capacity to articulate a certain mode of ‘good life’, 
because narrative contains the moral language of strong evaluation. 
 
Taylor’s notion of narrative is the basis for ‘one’s understanding of one’s life as 
an unfolding story’ in relation to ‘strongly valued good(s)’, something about 
‘self-concern’. This link suggests that narrative contains moral language. The 
moral language of strong evaluation does not come from nowhere, but come 
from practices in life itself through the process of interaction and 
internalization. As Taylor writes,  
 
‘The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in 
the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, 
practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, 
but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p.36).  
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He also claims, ‘These must be the common property of the society…Hence 
they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individuals, but 
rather inter-subjective meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in 
which individuals find themselves and act’ (ibid. emph. added).  
 
These arguments suggest, firstly, that evaluative meaning in narrative comes 
from an inter-subjective situation. The meaning has its origin in intersubjective 
situations in fact has been suggested in Mead’s early writing on the concept of 
the self (see Biesta 1998). Secondly, Taylor’s argument also suggests that 
meaning in narrative has its social, cultural, normative, spiritual and 
traditional dimensions carried by social practices. Taylor believes that certain 
identity is ‘enframed in a social understanding of great temporal depth, in fact, 
in a ‘tradition’ (Taylor 1989, p.39). He argues that articulators can find that 
personal narrative often embeds or can be embedded in history or tradition, 
and this is a way to hold a meaning for one’s life as a whole. ‘One way in 
which people do this (narrative) is to relate their story to a greater pattern of 
history, as the realization of a good’ (ibid., p.97). He further explains, ‘It’s 
almost as these schematic historical narratives exercised a force of attraction of 
their own. The secret of their strength is their capacity to confer meaning and 
substance on people’s lives’ (ibid. emph.added). From all this, Taylor seems to 
suggest that narrative entails characteristics featured in a pragmatic 
constructivism in relation to reality, that is, 1. meaning in narrative is gained 
through inter-subjective situations in day-to-day realities; 2. meaning in 
narrative is also gained through one’s interplay with norms, traditions and 
history through social practices in reality.  
 
Furthermore because in Taylor’s view, the self as the being is a ‘being-in-time’ 
as Heidegger shows, so Taylor believes that ‘[My] self-understanding 
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necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narrative’ (ibid., p.50). This is 
because narrative as a temporal structure has the capacity to connect one’s past, 
present and future into a ‘thematic unity’.  
 
Seeing from above, given that both the meaning of good life and the inescapable 
temporal structure of life are embedded in narrative, narrative is constitutive of 
reality, and it also reflects and constructs reality.  
 
5.6.4 Bruner’s view on the relation between life as narrative and reality 
Jerome Bruner holds a social constructionist view and considers that narrative 
construction of reality is a cognitive achievement. He challenges the 
empiricists’ and rationalists’ perspectives on the achievement of the ‘true’ 
knowledge of the world that developed from the tradition of the 
Enlightenment. He maintains that narrative is a mode of thinking which is 
concrete and particular compared with thinking that is general, logic and 
abstract. Bruner tries to show in his remarkable paper Narrative Construction of 
Reality (1991) that there is an important form of (constructivist) thought in 
achieving the knowledge of the world apart from the traditions of rationalist 
and empiricist views. Some domains of knowledge cannot be attained in the 
same ways that other domains of knowledge can be attained. He asserts, 
‘…[M]any domains are not organized by logical principles or associative 
connections…’ (Bruner 1991, p. 4). He describes some specific domains of 
human knowledge and skills constitute (or are supported and organized by) 
something like a culture’s treasury of tool kits. Narrative has an available 
cultural tool kit and is one form to gain the knowledge of such domain. Bruner 
argues, ‘…we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings 
mainly in the form of narrative’ (ibid.).  
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Bruner’s central concern is ‘how [narrative] operates as an instrument of mind 
in the construction of reality’ (ibid., p.6). With respect to the relationship 
between narrative constructed reality and the reality ‘as it was/is’, Bruner 
maintains, “…Narrative constructions can only achieve “verisimilitude’” 
(ibid.,p.4, emph. added) and ‘narrative “truth” is judged by its verisimilitude 
rather than its verifibility’ (ibid.,p.17). 
 
According to Bruner, “Narrative imitates life, life imitates narrative’ (Bruner 
2004, p.692). He claims, ‘ “Life” in this sense is the same kind of construction of 
the human imagination as “a narrative” is’ (ibid.). Bruner believes that the 
whole act of ‘telling stories’ is a cognitive achievement, but it is finally ‘a 
narrative achievement’. He even argues,  
 
‘There is no such thing psychologically as “life itself”. At very least, it 
is a selective achievement of memory recall; beyond that, recounting 
one’s life is an interpretative feat. Philosophically speaking, it is hard 
to imagine being a naïve realist about ‘life itself”’ (ibid., p.693).    
 
He concludes that ‘…a life as led is inseparable form a life as told—or more 
bluntly, a life is not “how it was” but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, 
told and retold: Freud’ psychic reality’ (ibid., p.708).  
 
In his book Act of Meaning (1990), Bruner argues, from a cultural psychology 
point of view, how narrative, more precisely autobiography, should be 
understood in terms of its ‘trueness’. He believes that autobiography can be 
understood as ‘an account of what one thinks one did in what settings in what 
ways for what felt reasons’ (Bruner 1990, p.119). Bruner adds that this will 
‘inevitably be narrative’ and ‘its form will be as revealing as its substance’ 
(ibid.). He further argues, 
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‘It does not matter whether the account conforms to what others 
might say who were witnesses, nor are we in pursuit of such 
ontologically obscure issues as whether the account is 
“self-deceptive” or “true”. Our interest … is only in what the person 
thought he did, what he thought he was doing it for, what kinds of 
plights he thought he was in, and so on’ (ibid., pp.119-120).  
 
Bruner obviously links his argument to his notion of ‘subjuncitivizing 
transformations’ which are “lexical and grammatical usages that highlights 
subjective states, attenuating circumstances, alternative possibilities” (ibid., p. 
53).    
 
Bruner’s view accords with Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic understanding of narrative. 
He believes that narrative of reality is a cognitive constructive achievement 
realised by means of cultural tool kits. He also believes narrative not only 
imitates life, but also interprets life. His idea that life ‘as it was/is’ is nothing 
but the construction of human imagination as a ‘narrative’ suggests that we 
lead our lives partly based on the interpretation of our own story and the 
stories we are told. In this sense, it is not difficult to understand why Bruner 
uses the term ‘verisimilitude’ to describe the relation between life as narrative 
and reality. 
 
5.6.5 A discussion of my view 
Drawing on what I have discussed above, I have come to a view that 
encompasses elements of both Hermeneutic interpretativism and social/ 
Pragmatic constructivism in understanding the relation between life as 
narrative and life as reality.  
 
What Carr and Mink exclude is the fact that narrative is also about 
interpretation and re-interpretation as a Hermeneutic understanding. 
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Narrative is not simply a form of the selection and order of ‘human events’, 
because any narrative has been already based on certain interpretations or 
meanings in certain cultural and social contexts, if that narrative, to use 
Ricoeur’s term, is to be ‘intelligible’. Thus, narrative should not be merely 
understood as a structure of the configuration of one’s consciousness or simply 
a form of art. The meanings of action embodied in narrative are largely from 
one’s self-interpretation constructed by and through one’s interaction with 
others within certain social, moral and historical, human contexts. As Goodson 
stresses, ‘The life story script, far from being autonymous, is highly dependent 
on wider social scripts… The life story therefore has to be culturally located as 
we pursue our understandings’ (Goodson 2006, p.15). These ideas are invisible 
in Carr’s and Mink’s view.  
 
Given narrative structure’s constructive activities, mediating functions and 
Hermeneutic nature, I would follow Ricoeur and take a hermeneutic stance 
that narrative imitates, reveals and transforms life. This has been seen through 
Ricoeur and Bruner’s argument for the implications of imaginative elements in 
a narrative construction of reality, which is relevant to what Ricoeur calls 
narrative understanding as a corollary of emplotment and thought experiments 
that might change the landscape of one’s life.  But I would like to add that life 
to some extent also imitates, reveals and transforms our life stories. Life events 
and facts, that have happened or that will happen, are largely organized and 
visible in a narrative form. So, changes in life’s trajectory change one’s life 
story as well. For example, big contingent occurrences in one’s life might affect 
one’s life plan that is based on one’s ‘care’ of one’s life as a whole project 
constructed in his/her narrative of life. 
 
This mutual relationship between life as narrative and reality can be supported 
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by the adoption of a Pragmatic Constructivist perspective by examining the 
relationship between meaning conveyed in narrative language and the 
meaning inherent in human reality. On the one hand, narrative, as a conveyor 
of the language or meaning of self-interpretation, culture, norms and social 
settings, is the result of social interaction in daily life. On the other hand, 
narrative itself is also a key means by which social interaction can be 
conducted and carried on. The meaning of life is gained by articulation of 
one’s moral assumptions about that life, which are shaped through social 
interaction both in inter-subjective situations and in an individual’s 
internalization of reality, e.g., culture and the norms of the community, which 
are themselves conveyed in narrative. Narrative in this sense is constitutive of 
reality and tradition; something which has been shown by Taylor to us. In this 
sense, it could be argued that there is a dynamic interactive relationship 
between life as narrative and life as reality. 
  
5.7 Between narrative identity and identity ‘as it is’ 
Now regarding the issue of ‘truthfulness’ of narrative identity in relation to 
identity ‘as it is’ in reality, I wish to construct an argument based on the 
background of Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s discussions about the relationship 
between life as narrative and life in reality.  
 
5.7.1 Narrative identity is subordinated to reality 
Firstly, the key assumption that Ricoeur relates narrative identity to personal 
identity has something to do with the notion of narrative of life, i.e., in its 
original meaning, the imitation of actions in reality. So, between identity ‘as it 
is’ and narrative identity, there seems to be a passage. Ricoeur argues that it is 
exactly the dynamic of emplotment that occupies that passage.  
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Identity ‘as it is’ in reality, according to Ricoeur can be seen as identity of 
character discovered in the story constructed by plot/emplotment which is first 
applied to the action in reality that is recounted in narrative. This view is 
based on Ricoeur’s understanding of Aristotle’s Poetics that the character is 
subordinated to the emplotment. As Riceour writes,  
 
‘The thesis supported here will be that the identity of the character is 
comprehensible through the transfer to the character of the operation 
of emplotment, first applied to the action recounted’ (Ricoeur 1992, 
p.143).  
 
This suggests that it is first of all in the plot we look for the mediation between 
permanence and change before it can be conferred to the character. The 
advantage of using emplotment here is that this constructive act provides a 
model of discordant concordance on which it is possible to construct the 
narrative identity of the character. 
 
Ricoeur therefore argues, ‘It is indeed in the story recounted, with its qualities 
of unity, internal structure, and completeness which are conferred by 
emplotment, that the character preserves throughout the story an identity 
correlative to that of the story itself’ (ibid. p. 143).  Therefore, it is the identity 
of the story that makes the identity of the character (narrative identity). In 
other words, it is the identity of ‘life as story/narrative’ that makes one’s 
narrative identity. 
 
Form this line of argument, Ricoeur suggests that narrative identity (identity 
of the character) is subordinated to life story as narrative, and life story as 
narrative is subordinated to action recounted in narrative, and narrative, in a 
large part, is still the imitation of actions in reality (see ibid., p.157).  
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5.7.2 Narrative identity reflects the nature of the identity of the subjectivity 
Narrative identity reflects the very nature of identity of the subjectivity. To 
articulate the nature of the identity in a practical field, Ricoeur clarifies his 
notion of subjectivity. As I discussed in the first section, Ricoeur maintains that 
subjectivity is ‘neither incoherent series of events nor immutable 
substantiality’ (Ricoeur 1991, p.32), but has a dimension of evolution gained 
through the interaction between sedimentation and innovation. Identity of 
such a subjectivity is therefore neither simply changing nor merely stable, but 
a kind of in-between. As he writes, ‘This is precisely the sort of identity which 
narrative composition alone can create through its dynamism’ (ibid.).  
Examining his definition of ‘subjectivity’, we can see that Ricoeur suggests that 
self-interpretation develops and changes under the interplay between 
sedimentation and innovation. Firstly, as Ricoeur argues, this means that we 
never cease to reinterpret our narrative identity according to the narratives 
proposed to us by our culture. Secondly, self-understanding understood as 
interaction between sedimentation and innovation also shows the difference 
between a narrator of life and an author of a fiction. ‘It is in this way (of 
understanding) that we learn to become the narrator and the hero of our own 
story, without actually becoming the author of our own life’ (ibid. emph. in 
original).  
 
5.7.3 Narrative identity is a corollary of our self-interpretation of our lives  
Narrative identity is the result of our self-interpretation of our lives. As I 
demonstrated in the last paragraph, Ricoeur argues that there is a certain 
difference between the narrator of life and the author of a story. This is because 
there is a kind of interplay between sedimentation and innovation in 
self-interpretation of the narrator as actor, but there is no such interplay in a 
fiction entirely manipulated by an author. But Ricoeur suggests, for actors, this 
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difference is or can be partly removed by certain kind of self-preference or 
personal imagination of the subjects borrowed from their understandings of the 
narratives they have read. In Ricoeur’s words, the difference between the actor 
and the author is or can be ‘partially abolished by our power of applying to 
ourselves the plots that we have received from our culture and of trying on the 
different roles assumed by the favourite characters of the stories most dear to 
us’ (ibid., p.33).  
 
The use of this kind of ‘self-preference’ comes from what Ricoeur calls narrative 
understanding. As I have discussed above, it is through recognizing the identity 
of ‘life story’ that makes narrative identity recognized. During this process of 
recognizing, a narrative understanding of ourselves is gained through the 
narrative understanding of our life. ‘Narrative understanding of our life’ should 
be ascribed to structural features and dynamic configuring acts of narrative as 
well as thematic implication gained from a sequence of events and conducts 
constructed by plots that are received from culture. Following this definition, 
firstly, ‘narrative understanding of ourselves’ is gained through the discordant 
concordance of plots we received from our culture by which we learn how 
reversals of fortune result from this or that conduct, what is good and what is 
bad to us and their linkages with happiness and unhappiness. Secondly, 
‘narrative understanding of ourselves’ is obtained by means of the imaginative 
variations of our own ego, which direct us to be our favourite figure or to 
imitate the role we want to be. As Ricoeur writes,  
 
‘What narrative interpretation brings in its own right is precisely the 
figural nature of the character by which the self, narratively 
interpreted, turns out to be a figured self—which imagines itself (se 
figure) in this or that way (ibid. p.198-199).  
 
In this way, ‘narrative understanding of ourselves’ comes to have a ‘narrative 
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unity’ or ‘thematic unity’, which is acquired exactly from ‘narrative 
understanding of our life’. Finally we recognize our character, the narrative 
identity, from this ‘narrative unity’ of our life story. However, this unity is not 
‘substantial’, but is ‘narrative’ according to Ricoeur. That is to say, narrative 
identity is found from a structural unity of a story that is instructed by the 
narrative understanding of one’s life. Therefore, with the help of a narrative 
understanding of our life, we gain a narrative understanding of ourselves from 
which we identify our narrative identity. So, we can say that narrative identity 
is constructed with the help of a narrative understanding of our life. 
 
But how should we understand the term narrative understanding? I wish to 
clarify that narrative understanding is a kind of self-interpretation. Personal 
identity is a self-understanding or a mode of self-interpretation. Such 
self-interpretation is not purely initiated by the self as ego, but it is also the 
self-understanding of the self instructed by culture/norms. Among cultural 
symbols, the self finds narrative as a privileged one. Hence, self-interpretation 
gained from narrative is in a cyclical process of formation that is operated from 
the outside (others, culture, norms and tradition) of the self to the inside of the 
self, and from the inside of the self to the outside of the self.  
 
By the same token, one’s personal identity is constitutive of self-understanding 
of the self which is in its ongoing cyclical activity that is operated from the 
outside of the self to the inside of the self and vice versa. As Ricoeur maintains, 
narrative of personal identity or/and community identity is ‘borrowed’ from 
the ‘the criss-crossing processes of a fictionalization of history and a 
historization of fiction’ (Ricoeur1988, p. 246). Narrative understanding is hence 
gained through the effects of narrative’s plots instructed by culture and norms. 
In this sense, narrative understanding is partly imposed from the outside of 
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the self (e.g, culture). However, it is still up to the subject’s ‘self-preference’ or 
‘self-concern’ to determine, from the inside of the self, what facts and events to 
select, what plots to adopt and what character he/she wishes to try to imitate 
through imaginative variations. Therefore, narrative understanding is also 
constructed from the inside of the self. Narrative understanding in this double 
sense amounts to self-interpretation that is both instructed by culture and 
constructed by the self as agent. 
 
Following these discussions, what Ricoeur shows us is actually how ‘life’, a 
‘life as narrative’ and  ‘narrative identity’ are related to one another with the 
help of narrative understanding as self-interpretation. As he writes,  
 
‘Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the 
field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, 
by which we attempt to discover and not simply to impose from 
outside the narrative identity which constitutes us’ (Ricoeur 1991, 
p.32, emph. added).  
 
Likewise, in Taylor’s view, self-interpretation is constitutive of personal 
identity. Narrative as a form of articulation and a temporal structure play the 
key roles in one’s self-interpretation of oneself and of one’s life. As I have 
discussed in the first section, although Taylor’s notion of moral framework 
which is used to define one’s identity, seems to be imposed from outside, it is 
still up to an individual’s subjectivity to internalize, accept, evaluate and 
interpret. Taylor clearly stresses that personal identity is inseparable from 
self-interpretation. ‘…our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is 
constitutive of what we are’ (ibid., p.47). Personal identity is not out there in 
reality; rather it is acquired by and through social interaction between the self 
(including the self as a mode of self-concern) and social reality. However, ‘my’ 
personal identity makes sense to ‘me’ only through ‘my’ self-evaluation. Thus, 
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personal identity, particular moral identity, in a large part, is a self-constructed 
interpretation, which includes self-evaluation, supported by meaning gained 
through social interaction and self’s internalization of the culture over one’s 
lifespan. Stressing the social and historical levels of life story, Goodson clarifies, 
‘[life] story… provides a starting point for developing further understandings 
of the social construction of subjectivity; if the stories stay at the level of the 
personal and practical, we forego that opportunity (Goodson 2006, p.15). 
Narrative identity in this sense is attained through self-interpretation 
developed from something outside of the self to the inside of the self and vice 
versa over time. 
 
In conclusion, narrative identity is subordinated to the identity of the life story 
that imitates, reflects and transform real life.  Narrative identity reflects the 
very nature of the identity of the subjectivity. Finally, narrative identity 
accords with our view of personal identity as self-interpretation formed both 
from the outside of the self to the inside of the self and from the inside of the 
self to the outside of the self. Can we still say narrative identity is not ‘true’ or 
‘real’ in relation to personal identity ‘as it is’ in real life? What is at stake here 
is that personal identity is not simply a thing that is there for identification, it 
is also a being as both care of oneself and care of others which are inseparable 
from self-interpretations. If personal identity is in a large part constituted by 
self-interpretations and such self-interpretations as narrative keep developing 
in the interplay between sedimentation and innovation, between external 
shape and internal imagination, it is hard to say there is something like 
‘identity as it is’ in reality. Rather, narrative identity as a concept with its 
structural and interpretative strengths provides us with an ideal approach to 
understanding ourselves. 
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Chapter 6 Lifelong learning, identity and narrative 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I wish to take a critical look at some theories of learning that is 
relevant to personal identity, particularly the aspect of lifelong learning 
derived from Giddens’s analysis of identity and modernity. I will reveal 
conceptual and moral/ethical issues in the field of lifelong learning in 
understanding Giddens’s analysis as a normative condition. I then will present 
different views as alternatives to those views that are drawn from the 
normative reading of Giddens’s depiction of identity in a post-traditional age.  
 
I will start with a discussion of the emergence of the notion of lifelong learning. 
Then I will link the notion of personal identity with lifelong learning. After 
that I will revisit Giddens’s theory on self-identity and present my critical 
analyses of his view by examining three assumptions of his idea of ‘reflexivity’ 
inherent in his notion of identity. This analysis leads me to the conclusion that 
lifelong learning implied in Giddens’s theory of identity is problematic in that 
it is a mode of learning merely for the sake of adaptation to external changes, 
and contains certain conceptual, moral/ethical issues. Next, I will move to the 
alternative views of identity by employing Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor’s 
theories of identity and draw out some new understandings about the role of 
learning indicated in their theories. I will then argue for a critical synthesis of 
four different views of reflexive learning that is relevant to personal identity 
and connect them to different theories of lifelong learning. Finally, I will take a 
critical look at the necessity of narrative in relation to lifelong learning and 
identity in Giddens’s theory and present different views derived from Ricoeur 
and Taylor’s theories on the issues. 
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6.2 The emergence of lifelong learning: from education to learning to 
lifelong learning1 
6.2.1 From the discourse of education to the discourse of learning 
It has been argued by some theorists that the discourse of education has been 
largely displaced by the discourse of learning in the last few decades (e.g. Field 
2000, Jarvis et al. 2003, Biesta 2006, Martin 2003, 2006). Gert Biesta has argued 
that a ‘new language of learning’ has dominated theories, practices and 
policies of education in what he calls ‘the age of learning’ (Biesta 2006b). He 
asserts that this shift is not a consequence of a single agenda or caused by a 
single reason, but is a result of various changes in the field of education. As he 
argues, ‘…the new language of learning is more an effect of a range of events 
than the intended outcome of a particular program or agenda’ (ibid., p.17). 
Biesta further argues that there are four main noticeable trends that contribute 
to the move from the language of education to the language of learning. Firstly, 
there has been the emergence of new theories of learning that focuses on 
                                                 
1 The discussion in this section is based on the following key literature: Biesta, G.J.J. 
(2006b). Beyond learning: democratic education for a human future. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers; Biesta. G. J.J. (2006a). What’s the point of lifelong learning if lifelong 
learning has no point? On the democratic deficit of policies for lifelong learning. 
European Educational Research Journal, 5(3-4), 169-180; Jarvis, P., Holdford, J. & Griffin, 
C. (2003). The theory and practice of learning. 2nd edition. London: Kogan Page Limited; 
Field, J. (2000). Lifelong learning and the new educational order. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham; 
Edwards, R. (1997). Changing places: flexibility, lifelong learning, and learning society. 
London: Kogan Page; Martin, I. (2003). Adult education, lifelong learning and 
citizenship: some ifs and buts. International Journal of Lifelong Education. 22 (6), 566-579; 
Martin, I. (2006). Where have all the flowers gone? Adults Learning, 18 (2), 15-18; Hake, 
B. (1998). Lifelong learning and European Union: A critique from ‘risk society’ 
perspective. In J. Holford, P. Jarvis  & C. Griffin (eds.) (1998). International perspectives 
on lifelong learning. London: Routledge; Hake, B. (1999). Lifelong learning in Late 
Modernity: The challenges to society, organizations, and individuals. Adult Education 
Quarterly, 49 (2), 79-90; Selections of white papers of CEC (1993,1995,1997,1998) and 
OECD (1996,1997). 
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learners rather than teachers. Traditionally, behaviourist and cognitivist 
theories of learning stress the role of the teacher in terms of controlling the 
process of the learning of children and young persons.  However, with the 
emergence of social-cultural theories of learning in school education (e.g. 
Vygotsky 1978; Fosnot 1996; Lave and Wenger 1991) and with the influence of 
student-centred approaches to the education of adults (e.g. Lindeman 1926; 
Knowles 1980), learner-centred education has been widely recognized and is 
often taken for granted in school and adult education. Secondly, the 
educational curriculum was based on disciplines that were based on rational 
and universalistic truth. Now these ‘truths’ are changeable, relativistic and 
fragmentary in the post/late modern settings and have to be approached by 
reflexive, pragmatic and experiential ways.  Thus, the teachers or experts are 
no longer absolute authorities on curriculum, knowledge or the source of 
‘truth’ and learners are put at the heart of learning process. Thirdly, the trend 
of nonformal learning activities in adult learning are increasingly popular, e.g. 
fitness centres, sports clubs, self-help manuals, self-therapeutic books, CDs and 
DVDs on cooking, gardening and regimen. John Field characterised this mode 
of learning as individualistic learning given its individualized nature (Field 
2000). Fourthly, education as welfare provision for citizens has declined with 
the erosion of the welfare state. Consequently, learners increasingly become 
the ‘consumers’ of educational provision. Curriculum in this logic has become 
a commodity and in educational practice it increasingly is the learner as 
consumer that has say on the purpose, the contents, the style and the 
significance of what is learned. This is because the teacher’s role in this sense 
seems to be regarded as service-provider rather than his/her original role as 
professional expert. Although what Biesta illustrates cannot exhaust all 
reasons for this shift, there is no doubt that the series of events that have 
happened in recent years contribute towards the trend that the discourse of 
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learning increasingly dominates the current theories and practices of 
education. 
 
The transition from the discourse of education to the discourse of leaning is 
not limited to the school education for children and young persons. The 
discourse of learning also pervades the field of ‘lifelong education’.  This fact 
has been demonstrated in the high frequency of the use of the term ‘lifelong 
learning’ in policies and practices in the field of lifelong education in recent 
years, both nationally and internationally. In the UK, lifelong education is a 
term considered relevant to the terms ‘adult education’, ‘recurrent education’ 
and ‘continuing education’, which have different emphases and meanings in 
the history of education. The notion of ‘lifelong education’ began to be widely 
accepted from late 1960s and early 1970s because it suggests a more 
encompassing notion of education and acknowledges that education is a 
lifelong process for a person that can occur both inside and outside formal 
educational institutions. The term ‘lifelong learning’ can be seen as a notion 
that became separated from the notion of ‘lifelong education’ during the 
middle 1970s and the early 1980s. Originally, the assumptions that learning 
has a lifelong process are inherent in the notion of ‘lifelong education’, which 
is an ‘organising principle’ for all education advocated by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in a report titled 
Learning to be: The world of education today and tomorrow written by Edgar Faure 
et al. in 1972. This report claims that to educate a kind of ‘complete man and 
woman’, both for social purpose and for personal development and fulfilment, 
an ‘over-all’ and ‘lifelong’ education is necessary and hence an individual 
needs to ‘learn to be’ over his/her lifetime. The aspect of ‘lifelong learning’ 
implied in this report therefore can be understood as a human process where 
individuals conduct their learning under the aegis of lifelong education by 
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developing a sense of socio-political solidarity, beliefs in democracy and the 
body of knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and emotions for social and 
personal development and fulfilment over a lifetime. One assumption of such 
a notion of learning is that all the aspects listed above cannot be learned once 
and for all during a fixed age range through a fixed period within traditional 
educational institutions. Although, lifelong ‘learning’ here is spurred on by the 
notion of ‘personal fulfilment’, which suggests a sense of ‘self-actualization’ 
and ‘self-realization’, it is still guided by the social, personal and political 
language of lifelong education. Lifelong learning under the aegis of lifelong 
education is framed in three such dimensions as social, personal and economic 
traditions (see e.g., Aspin & Chapman 2001, Edwards et al. 2002, Biesta 2006a).  
 
Over the last decade, the shift form lifelong education to lifelong learning is 
increasingly noticeable and dramatic. As Cropley concluded, changes in 
education have a direct effect on lifelong learning practices (see Cropley 1980, 
p.3). The new concept of ‘lifelong learning’ has been formally defined by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 
with an emphasis on learning ‘from cradle to grave’ rather than education. For 
instance, OECD (1996) made the requirement that  ‘learning to learn’ should 
be ‘an essential foundation for learning that continues throughout life’. Exactly 
in the same manner, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 
puts the learners at the centre of lifelong education, and explicitly downgrades 
the importance of the role of teaching, 
 
‘Placing learners and learning at the centre of education and training 
methods and processes is by no means a new idea, but in practice, 
the established framing of pedagogic practices in most formal 
contexts has privileged teaching rather than learning.… In a 
high-technology knowledge society, this kind of teaching-learning 
relation loses efficacy: learners must become proactive and more 
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autonomous, prepared to renew their knowledge continuously and 
to respond constructively to changing constellations of problems 
and contexts. The teacher’s role becomes one of accompaniment, 
facilitation, mentoring, support and guidance in the service of 
learners’ own efforts to access, use and ultimately create knowledge’ 
(CEC 1998, p.9). 
 
Thus, it can be argued that these ideas not only devalue the importance of 
education as a relational concept, but also suggest that an individual should 
take responsibility for his/her own learning.  
 
Lifelong learning has also become the mantra of government policy since 1990s, 
with dominant focus on economic dimension (see e.g. Delors at CEC 1994, 1996; 
OECD 1997; Van des Pas at EU 2001) but with less emphasis on the personal 
and socio-political dimensions (see Biesta 2006a). Increasingly, ‘lifelong 
learning’ has become the centrality of policy, including educational policy for 
lifelong learning, which is dominated by the discourse for economic growth 
and language of employability. The notion of ‘lifelong learning’ seems to 
oscillate between ‘learning as a process’ and ‘learning as an institutional 
phenomenon’. As Jarvis et al. write, ‘…learning has acquired a social 
institutional meaning in terms such as the learning society, the learning 
organization and even lifelong learning itself’ (Jarvis et al. 2003, p.4). 
 
6.2.2 Changes and lifelong learning 
Although there might be different reasons to explain the shift in discourse 
from education to learning, one common view is that the pervasiveness of a 
language of learning is an outcome of rapid changes of modern society in the 
second half of last century. For instance, rapid social changes have put one 
fundamental function of education as ‘socialization’ in a difficult position. The 
notion of modern education as socializing individuals into modern society is 
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frequently challenged since the actual nature of modern society is difficult to 
grasp. The structure of modern society, which was originally characterized as 
stability, rationality, objectivity, universality, emancipation and linear progress, 
is undergoing rapid changes. The shift from a language of lifelong education to 
the language of lifelong learning particularly reflects the effects of social 
changes.  
 
During the second half of the 20th Century, it has been widely argued that we 
are in a new emerging society which has been given different labels, such as 
‘post-modern society’ (Lyotard 1979), ‘late modern society’ (Giddens 1990), 
‘risk society’’ (Beck 1992), ‘liquid modern society’ (Bauman 2000), ‘information 
society (Castells 1989), and ‘knowledge (-based) society’ (Bindé 2005).  Such 
labels are characterized as rapid changes and uncertainties in knowledge, 
technology, economy, culture, and even the person’s sense of the self. Rapid 
and radical changes in these areas directly influence traditional institutions 
and individual life. Thus the cries for corresponding changes at global, 
national and individual levels for adaptation to those changes are increasing.  
 
The changes and responses at different levels to rapid social changes probably 
can explain the dominance of a language of lifelong learning in the current age. 
Firstly, the economic changes seem to be so dramatic that rapid capitalization 
extends into the domain of knowledge as a result of the competition of 
knowledge economy in the global market. This extension requires ‘learning’ to 
be a force to produce added value. This change puts learning at the central 
place in economic competition in local and global milieus. Secondly, changes 
in knowledge, technology and skills are so rapid that learning concerning 
different areas of knowledge and technology will never be done once and for 
all (e.g. knowledge about information technology and biotechnology). This 
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situation justifies the idea that learning in different areas of knowledge and 
technology has to be renewed continually and rapidly, hence lifelong learning 
becomes a significant idea. Thirdly, in order to be able to survive in the sense 
of insecurity caused by the threat of social exclusion (e.g. to keep being 
employed), mere reliance on initial education is far from the sufficient, lifelong 
learning is thus a necessary means to increase human capital for survival. 
Finally, the impacts of external changes and the decline of stable structures 
make an individual feel uncertain and disoriented in terms of having external 
referential points for the self in its construction of personal identity. To find or 
have a sense of self, or in the modern sense, ‘to be someone’, more than ever, 
seems to need ongoing quest and learning, over one’s whole lifespan.  
 
Under these changing conditions, unsurprisingly, the new language of lifelong 
learning replaces the old language of lifelong education. It is in this social 
background that the concept of lifelong learning takes on a new and central 
role in current educational policies, theories and practices. This can explain 
why there is the so-called rise of the ‘learning paradigm’ (Martin 2006) and ‘the 
new language of learning’ (Biesta 2006b). This probably can also explain why 
the centrality of policy goals today is variously interpreted as to create a 
“learning society” (CEC 1996; NCIHE 1997) or ‘lifetime learning’ (DfEE 1996). 
 
6.2.3 Flexibility, reflexivity and lifelong learning  
It has been widely discussed that the dominant discourse of lifelong leaning 
policy is economy and employment-orientated. According to Richard Edwards, 
this trend is driven by economic competition caused by globalization and 
personal insecurity threatened by social exclusion, i.e. differentiation between 
employed workers and unemployed workers (see Edwards 1997, p.29ff). 
Edwards suggests that in responses to economic competition and individual 
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insecurity, the need for flexibility in capital markets, in production techniques, 
in business organizations and among the labour forces seems to be 
increasingly emerged. Such flexibility implies adaptation to changes both at 
institutional and individual levels, which implicitly demand ‘reflexivity’ at 
both levels. As Edwards comments,  
 
‘Changes and adaptation to change have become watchwords of 
policy, including educational policy. Many such characterizations 
incorporate a view that contemporary change processes require 
greater reflexivity by individuals, organizations and societies and that 
this is achieved through learning’ (Edwards et al 2002, emph. added).  
 
This understanding is particularly noticeable in the late modernist view. For 
example, an organization/workplace in a late modern context is reflexively 
organized and reorganized with its capacity to reflect on and learn from its 
practices in order to change, be adaptable, flexible, competitive, efficient 
and/or profitable and/or effective. This view seems to be advocated by many 
new organisational and management theories. However, only when staff 
members within organizations change, can an organization change. 
Accordingly, staff members as learners have to flexibly renew themselves in 
order to help the organisation to achieve its goals. Such a mode of 
self-transformation is a constant process given the constant changes and 
competition in capital market. Seeing from this point of view, individual 
identity as ‘a reflexive project’ seems to become the rationale for managing 
organization and managing workers, hence a governing principle of 
work-based learning. 
 
The need for flexibility and reflexivity at institutional and individual level can 
explain why one of the notable things in today’s theories and policies about 
lifelong learning is the rising interest in references to notions of ‘flexibility’ and 
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‘reflexivity’. For example, Barry Hake summarized four words of European 
Union’s lifelong learning policy and two of them are ‘flexibility’ and 
‘individual responsibility’ (Hake 1998, p.34). Many academic contributions to 
the field of lifelong learning have argued that ‘reflexivity’ implied in policy 
and practice of lifelong learning is linked with or drawn from the notion of 
‘reflexivity’ in the late modernist view of some influential sociologists like 
Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Their notions of ‘reflexivity’ are quite 
similar and seem to be considered in a normative manner as theoretical 
sources for the theory, policy and practice of lifelong learning today. For 
example, Hake argues, ‘Giddens’ discussion of the structural necessity of 
reflexivity provides one way of understanding why learning is a permanent 
feature of social life in late modern societies’ (Hake 1998, p.33). By referring to 
Beck’s notion of ‘individual reflexive modernization’ (1986), Hake argues, ‘A 
corollary of organizational reflexivity is intentional learning as a vehicle for 
“individual reflexive modernization”’ and ‘late modern societies are typified 
by learning challenges and necessity of lifelong learning as a structural 
characteristic’ (Hake 1998, p.39). He even claims that ‘learning can be 
understood as an active acquisition and application of knowledge and skills in 
all forms of social interaction. From this perspective, lifelong learning is 
constructed by learners themselves in the very process of institutional, 
organizational and individual reflexivity’ (Hake 1999, p.88). Likewise, Field 
argues, ‘they (Giddens and Beck) certainly contribute something to our 
understanding of the scope of lifelong learning, as well as of its ultimate 
significance’ (Field 2000, p.61) and ‘their work seems to me central in grasping 
the underlying function and place of lifelong learning in contemporary 
societies’ (ibid., p.62). 
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The social-economic institutional meaning added to the concept of lifelong 
learning as a human process causes a great deal of confusions and problems in 
understanding this notion itself, because this makes it difficult to distinguish 
clearly between lifelong learning as a human process of learning throughout 
one’s life and lifelong learning as government strategy. Lifelong learning as 
‘learning to be’ has seemed to shift towards lifelong learning as ‘learning to be 
flexible’, ‘learning to adapt’ and ‘learning to survive’ in the face of rapid 
changes in our societies. The questions that have emerged are: is learning, 
particularly lifelong learning, simply underpinned by changes? Should learning 
that is relevant to one’s identity simply be a kind of reflexive learning that will 
enable the individual to be ‘flexible’? 
 
6.3 Personal identity and lifelong learning 
6.3.1 Personal identity as a ‘thing’ and as a ‘being’ 
In this chapter, I want to frame the notion of personal identity in two ways and 
to discuss them in terms of their importance to a person him/herself and in 
relation to others. My two approaches to the notion of personal identity are 
identity as a ‘thing’ and identity as a ‘being’. Firstly, as a ‘thing’, personal 
identity is not, at least not merely ‘made’ or ‘created’ at one’s will. The view 
that identity is created has been very popular and taken for granted by many 
as a norm, which is largely based on the modern idea of ‘self-actualization’ and 
‘self-realization’. However, it can be argued that personal identity primarily 
needs to be explored, found, understood and interpreted at least because what 
is inherent in the concept of personal identity is the notion of temporality. That 
is to say, this is not only because personal identity is a ‘thing’ that an 
individual has and is formed through sedimentation and internalization over 
time, which needs to be examined through its history. This is also because 
personal identity as a concept is inseparable from the notion of permanence in 
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time, a notion that is in tension with the notion of change. This is not to say that 
personal identity as a ‘thing’ is simply given; it is also a product constructed by 
the self. However both senses are conditional upon permanence in time. 
Personal identity is the certain trait (or a set of traits) that one has and which 
can be identified and re-identified as the same person by both oneself and 
others.  
 
Secondly, personal identity is significant for a person in that it is about the self 
as a ‘being’, and the nature and kind of such a being in a world, or about 
questions related to being a unique ‘person’ in a human world. Personal 
identity as a being can further be understood in two senses. First, the being, or 
existence of a ‘person’ fundamentally concerns the ‘meaning’ or ‘worth’ of 
one’s life, if the notion of ‘a person’ is not confined to biological sense. Such 
meaning is acquired through and shaped by society, culture and moral views 
that one experiences with others. Second, personal identity as being is found, 
by himself/herself and/or others, in the way that he or she responds to others 
in an intersubjective world. This implies that personal identity contains an 
ethical dimension. It is an identification of a unique subjectivity as 
self-constancy that expresses one’s responsibility to others and that others can 
count on.  
 
The multi-dimensions of the notion of personal identity, however, cause plenty 
of misunderstandings and confusions related to the problematic of this notion 
ever since the age of Locke and Hume. Nowadays, a much more modern 
notion called self-identity has been pervasively used by psychologists, 
socio-psychologists and sociologists to roughly mean personality, singularity 
and individuality of a person, and even some philosophers (e.g. Charles Taylor) 
also use this term. One reason for the popular use of the term self-identity 
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might be because it can particularly refer to the self that is identified or made 
by a person himself/herself, rather than by others. But self-identity is not simply 
an identity of the ‘self’ understood in this narrow way, because it at least also 
implies something to do with the sense and the meaning of ‘being a person’ in 
certain social, cultural and historical contexts. Even Antony Giddens 
acknowledges that the concept of self-identity ‘includes the cognitive 
component of personhood’ (Giddens 1991, p.53). The notion of self-identity 
hence should be discussed under the umbrella of the notion of personal 
identity. In the following argument, I will use the term personal identity or 
identity to embrace the concept of self-identity, identity as sameness, identity 
as selfhood and to denote a term that can be used to encompass personal 
identity recognized both by oneself and by others.  
 
6.3.2 ‘Learning’ and ‘lifelong learning’ that is relevant to personal identity    
From my framing of the notion of personal identity, I would say ‘personal 
identity as being’ is fundamentally significant for being a person in the human 
world. This is not only because it confers meaning to the life of oneself, but also 
because personal identity as responsibility to others in intersubjective world 
provides a stable referent for oneself and for others in respect of how one can 
live harmoniously with what and who is other and different. In this sense, 
one’s learning that is relevant to personal identity concerns a question of 
whether one can acquire certain meaning for one’s life and a question of 
whether one can nourish a harmonious relationship with others in one’s life. 
Learning that is relevant to personal identity is therefore not only about 
learning as developing self-understanding, but also about learning as responding 
to others (see Biesta 2006b).  
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At least two other features of learning that is relevant to identity can be 
recognized. Firstly, learning that is relevant to identity is a mode of learning 
that may happen everywhere, from school, workplace to home, and any time, 
from pre-school to post retirement. This is because consciousness of or 
reflection on the identity of oneself can be triggered by any events at any time 
in the interaction between oneself and the world one experiences. This feature 
also implies that one’s learning connected with personal identity could be a 
lifelong process. Secondly, learning that is relevant to personal identity not 
only leads to development of personal understanding, but also leads to 
personal changes. One cannot understand oneself once and for all, because 
one’s self-understanding is developing with one’s increasing experiencing of 
the world. We experience the world from birth to death, in different historical 
times, social contexts, cultures, and in interaction with others. Our 
understanding about ourselves develops in our lives and spans over our 
lifetime. Again, from this feature, learning concerning personal identity is a 
process of lifelong learning.   
 
6.3.3 Normative reading of Giddens’s analysis and reflexive learning that is 
relevant to identity 
Giddens has argued in a brief article on lifelong learning in terms of changing 
something about oneself in the context of social transitions. He writes, 
‘Although training in specific skills may be necessary for many job transitions, 
more important is the development of cognitive and emotional competence’ 
(Giddens 1998, p.125 cited in Field 2000, p.138). Edwards et al. confirm that in 
the theories of Giddens (1991) and Lash & Urry (1994), there seems to be a 
certain kind of reflexive learning which is relevant to development of one’s self. 
As Edwards et al. suggest,  
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‘For us, in adopting a learning approach to life, one is able 
reflexively to negotiate a trajectory through the insecurity and risks 
associated with change processes. Implicit here is a view that the 
reflexivity associated with contemporary change processes entails 
forms of learning that develop a capacity for questioning one’s self 
and the historical and social circumstances from which action to 
accomplish change may envisioned and resourced’ (Edwards et al. 
2002, p.531).  
 
However, Giddens’s analysis and description has been pervasively hailed as a 
normative understanding of the nature of an individual concerning work, 
personal life and identity in modern Western societies. Particularly, his 
analysis or similar views have been adopted as a norm, a central agenda or the 
basis for theoretical assumptions in the field of lifelong learning, especially in 
work-related learning in relation to one’s identity questions, in the last two 
decades. This normative understanding can evidently be found in the policies 
of lifelong learning. For example, Albert Tuijnman suggests that current 
lifelong learning policies and practices are assigned their meaning in a 
situation characterized by uncertainty, change and anticipated further 
structural adjustment (see Tuijnman 2003). He asserts that according to The 
Commission of the European Union (CEC 1997), lifelong learning ‘is being 
considered a means for raising the skills of workers: making already 
well-trained people even more flexible and productive, while upgrading the 
skills of the poorly trained who otherwise would probably face unstable jobs, 
low wages or unemployment’ (Tuijnman 2003, p.8). In fact, CEC (1998) even 
claims that ‘learners must become proactive and more autonomous, prepared 
to renew their knowledge continuously and to respond constructively to 
changing constellations of problems and contexts (CEC 1998, p.9). A similar 
normative view can also be seen in a claim made by the Information Society 
Forum:  
 
CHAPTER 6 
 299
‘The pace of change is becoming so fast that people can only adapt if 
the Information Society becomes the “Lifelong Learning Society”. In 
order to build and maintain competitive economic advantages, skills 
and talents must be constantly reshaped to meet the changing needs 
of the work place, wherever that is’ (Information Society Forum 1996, 
p.2 cited in Field 2000, p.18).  
 
The notion of changes seems to become a justification for the ‘universal’ need 
for reflexive learning concerning personal identity vis-à-vis one’s life. This view 
seems to be read as a ‘norm’ and has extended into the field of lifelong 
learning. John Field has argued that there is a ‘silent explosion’ of non-formal 
forms of learning nowadays which are characterized as ‘individualistic’ 
learning, e.g. fitness centres, sport clubs, self-help therapy manuals, internet 
learning, self-instructional video’s, DVD’s and CD’s, and so on (Field 2000, 
p.35 ff.). The content and purpose of adult learning, Field argues, have shifted 
from collective-directed to self-directed, i.e. a learning towards dealing with a 
learner himself or herself, e.g. with one’s body, one’s identity, and one’s 
relationship to others – a phenomenon which Field considers has something to 
do with individual ‘reflexive modernization’ (ibid., p.58). Field has claimed 
that ‘our informal learning now tries to deal, however unsatisfactorily, with 
fundamental questions about our individual identity and intimate relations’ 
and ‘more over, these have now become defining characteristics of our way of 
life’ (ibid., p.67). He believes that the ‘silent explosion in informal and 
self-directed learning’ concerning the transformations in individuals’ identities 
has something to do with the economic, social and cultural changes (ibid.,ix). 
Field seems to assume such a relation is an expression of ‘reflexivity’ in late 
modernist views. As he writes, ‘Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, have made 
what they call “reflexivity” a central part of their thinking: for both, late 
modernity is characterised by the requirement placed upon individuals and 
institutions to reflect upon what they know in order to make their choices 
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about who they are and how they behave’ (ibid., p.x). Focusing on 
‘individuals’, Hake claims, ‘Individuals increasingly have to assume personal 
responsibility for formulating their identities and life courses’ (Hake 1999, 
p.85). This view is evidently based on Giddens’ notion that ‘self-identity has 
become a reflexive achievement’ (Giddens 1991, p.215). Likewise, Alheit (1995) 
links his notion of ‘biographical learning’ to the transitions characteristic of late 
modern society. He defines ‘biographical competency’ as ‘the ability to attach 
modern stocks of knowledge to biographical sources of meaning and, with this 
knowledge, to associate oneself afresh’ (Alheit 1992 cited in Hake 1999, p.86). 
This agrees with Giddens’ view on the importance of some input of modern 
knowledge and information in forging one’s self-identity. The key idea in these 
views seems to advocate a mode of learning towards a ‘flexible’ identity. These 
views of learning concerning self or personal identity are closely related to 
Giddens’s analysis of identity and reflexivity and seem to read his analysis as a 
normative phenomenon in our age.  
 
While it is perhaps practical and necessary for an individual to be flexible in 
terms of learning new knowledge and skills in order to keep himself or herself 
surviving in competitive and changing working circumstances, I doubt the 
view of the need for learning towards a ‘flexible’ personal identity through 
one’s continuous ‘reflexivity’, since the holders of this view simply read 
Giddens’s analysis as a normative phenomenon. We should realize that the 
view of reflexive learning implied in Giddens’s ‘late modernist’ analysis of 
‘reflexivity’ is just one view of reflexive learning. Hence, we should be careful 
not to read Giddens’s analysis as a normative condition for lifelong learning 
that is relevant to identity, considering the limitation of his approach to 
identity and inadequacy of empirical evidence, let alone the moral/ethical 
issues inherent in his analysis, which I will reveal soon.  
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In the following sections, I wish to take a critical look at the need for learning 
to have a flexible identity through ‘reflexivity’ drawn from the late modernist 
view. I will do this by revisiting Giddens’ work: Modernity and self-identity, but 
rather than giving a general analysis as I did in Chapter 2, I will endeavour to 
scrutinise this work critically in order to examine the need for a person to 
develop a ‘flexible’ identity. 
 
6.4 Giddens’s view on modernity, self-identity and reflexivity 
In his work Modernity and Self-identity (1991), Giddens claims, ‘Modernity must 
be understood on an institutional level’ (ibid., p.1). He further writes, ‘In this 
book I use the term “modernity” in a very general sense, to refer to the 
institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal 
Europe, but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become 
world-historical in their impact’ (ibid., p.15). For Giddens, ‘high (late) 
modernity’ refers to ‘the current phase of development of modern institutions, 
marked by the radicalising and globalising of basic traits of modernity’ 
(ibid.,p.243). He claims that in late modern settings, ‘new mechanisms of 
self-identity’ are ‘shaped by – yet also shape – the institutions of modernity’ 
(ibid., p.2).  
 
In what way do institutions of modernity and self-identity shape each other in 
late modern settings? According to Giddens, one way they shape each other is 
through the interplay of institutional reflexivity of modernity and reflexive 
monitoring of action of the agent. Why in Giddens’s view is it claimed that 
identity in the current age has become a problem? His answer is that the 
problem is caused by the negative impact of the modernity on the self. High 
modernity is characterised as ‘uncertainty’. But ‘it is not just that more or less 
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continuous and profound processes of change occur; rather, change does not 
consistently conform either to human expectation or to human control’ (ibid., 
p.28). This view is bound up with the dynamic of institutional reflexivity of 
modernity, that is, ‘[t]he chronic entry of knowledge into the circumstances of 
action it analyses or describes creates a set of uncertainties to add to the circular 
and fallible character of post-traditional claims to knowledge’ (ibid.). Giddens 
then claims that ‘“[f]utures” are organised reflexively in the present in terms of 
the chronic flow of knowledge into the environments about which such 
knowledge was developed – the very same process that, in an apparently 
paradoxical way, frequently confounds the expectations which that knowledge 
informs (ibid., p.29). The ‘uncertainties’ resulting from the reflexivity of 
institutions of modernity cause the self new anxieties, dangers and 
opportunities (see ibid., p.13), since there seems to be no more fixed reference 
points to a person for the construction of the self. New anxieties and risks2 in 
terms of the existential questions about an inidividual’s being in the world are 
created and have emerged from both his/her trust to the disembedding 
mechanism3 and uncertainties inherent in that mechanism. These anxieties and 
risks threaten one’s ontological security purchased by modernity (see ibid., 
p.19-20), though securities (certainties) and new possibilities are also created as 
a consequence of modernity. Media (e.g. newspaper, TV etc.) as a product of 
modernity are both expressions and instruments of the disembedding 
mechanism and globalising tendencies of modernity, from which no one can 
escape. Thus, Giddens concludes that ‘[t]he reflexivity of modernity extends 
                                                 
2 Risk here can be understood as a consequence of a mode calculable thinking among 
a variety of possibilities in terms of colonization of the future. 
3 Disembedding mechanism is a character of the dynamism of modernity which 
separates interaction from the particularities of locales and which includes symbolic 
tokens and expert systems reorganized and reconstituted by institutional reflexivity. 
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into the core of the self’ (ibid., 32).  
 
However, Giddens also stresses that the self is not a passive entity. As he 
explains, ‘[t]he social conventions produced and reproduced in our day-to-day 
activities are reflexively monitored by the agent as part of “going on” in the 
variegated settings of our lives’ (ibid., p.35). This reflexive monitoring of action is 
‘characteristic of all human action, and is the specific condition of that 
massively developed institutional reflexivity’ (ibid.). Consequently, Giddens 
suggests that institutional reflexivity mobilises reflexivity of the self as agent, 
and at the same time that reflexivity of the agent makes institutional reflexivity 
possible; what exists between two kinds of ‘reflexivity’ is an area of interplay. 
As he claims, ‘[t]he self is not a passive entity, determined by external 
influences; in forging their self-identities, no matter how local their specific 
contexts of action, individuals contribute to and directly promote social 
influences that are global in their consequences and implications’ (ibid., p.2). 
 
The position Giddens holds regarding the relationship between modernity and 
the self pave the way for the heart of his theory about the self: ‘in the context of 
a post-traditional order, the self becomes a reflexive project’ (ibid., 32, emph. in 
original), and ‘in the settings of what I call ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernity – our 
present-day world – the self, like the broader institutional contexts in which it 
exists, has to be reflexively made’ (ibid., p.3 emph. added.). Self-identity, in 
late modern settings, ‘is not something that is just given, as a result of 
continuities of the individual’s action-system but something that has to be 
routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual’ 
(ibid., p.52, emph. added). As Giddens analysed, faced with a variety of 
possibilities in social life, both negative and positive, created by interaction 
between late modernity and the self, self becomes a reflexive project based on 
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the notion of self-actualisation and self-realization, and every individual seems to 
have no choice but to make lifestyle-choices by using personal resources for 
his/her life (see ibid., p.214-215).   
 
Furthermore, according to Giddens, a diversity of information and knowledge 
of abstract systems4 can reach an individual through modern media, so, an 
individual ‘must’ integrate them through negotiation, by calculable thinking, 
with the involvement of the self in such a way as to connect future projects 
with past experiences. Self-identity nowadays, according to Giddens, seems 
only to be the self as reflexively understood in terms of one’s (aubo)biography 
through narrative, because narrative has the capacity to (re)organize in a 
reasonably coherent manner an individual’s ‘uncertain’ life which is in the 
dialectic relationship between the self and modernity in the rapidly changing 
social milieu. As Giddens claims, 
 
‘…self-identity today is a reflexive achievement. The narrative of 
self-identity has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in 
relation to rapidly changing circumstances of social life, on a local 
and global scale. The individual must integrate information deriving 
from a diversity of mediated experiences with local involvements in 
such a way as to connect future projects with past experiences in a 
reasonably coherent fashion’ (ibid., p.215). 
 
Through so-called lifestyles-choice made by an individual, a process of 
weighing up of positive and negative possibilities, self-identity then can be 
constructed and reconstructed by an individual based on his/her self-reflexivity. 
Life-planning for the future, presumably informed by modern science and 
technology, is hence a central feature in the structuring of self-identity. 
                                                 
4 Abstract systems: symbolic tokens and expert systems taken generically. 
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‘Lifestyle choice’ for Giddens concerns what he calls ‘life politics’, which has 
emerged from the centrality of the reflexive project of the self, or 
self-actualisation and from where processes of self-realisation influence global 
strategies (see ibid., p.214, emph. added). Life politics is therefore the politics 
in terms of decision and debate of ‘lifestyle’ which then affects self-identity 
(see ibid., p.215). In a word, Giddens suggests that in our age, lifestyle-choice is 
the central issue that influences the very core of an individual’s self-identity 
(see ibid., p.5).  
 
6.5 What kind of reflexivity? What kind of identity?   
As I have discussed in chapter 2, Giddens’s late modernist notion of 
‘reflexivity’ of the self has been criticized for its empirical inadequacy, hidden 
agenda and individualistic consequences. Lifelong learning as implied in this 
view therefore has been criticized for its ideological purpose and 
individualistic nature, and this is why a mode of ‘democratic learning’ and 
‘learning democracy’ is urgently called for5. However, I would further argue 
that the notion of ‘reflexivity’ of the self in Giddens’s view is fundamentally 
based on three problematic assumptions with respect to its relations to human 
agency, modernity and its referential criteria. What kind of ‘reflexivity’ is it that 
an individual relies on to continually make his/her self-identity? Why does an 
                                                 
5 See for example, Bauman, Z, (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press; 
Bauman, Z. (2005). Learning to Walk in Quicksands. In A. Bron, E. Kurantowicz, H. S. 
Olesen & L. West (2005). ‘Old' and 'new' worlds of adult learning. Wroclaw: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe DSWE TWP; Martin, I (2003). Adult education, lifelong 
learning and citizenship: some ifs and buts. International Journal of Lifelong Education. 
22 (6), 566-579; Biesta. G. J.J.( 2005). The learning democracy? Adult learning and the 
condition of democratic citizenship. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 26 (5), 
687-703; Biesta. G. J.J. (2006a). What’s the point of lifelong learning if lifelong learning 
has no point? On the democratic deficit of policies for lifelong learning. European 
Educational Research Journal, 5(3-4), 169-180. 
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individual have to make and remake his/her self-identity through this type of 
reflexivity? Is such kind of reflexivity blind or is it guided by some criteria, and 
if so what kind of criteria? Furthermore, what will a kind of self-identity made 
thus be like? All these questions are important if, as I have argued in chapter 2, 
reflexivity is directly related to the roles of learning and lifelong learning that 
are relevant to identity. In the following section, I wish to show that: (1) such a 
view of reflexivity is derived from an active human agency seeking change for 
the sake of change; (2) this type of reflexivity is radically driven by ‘anxieties’ 
brought by the interplay between a self as reflexive project and an amplified 
modernity requiring individual’s adaptation and flexibility to it; (3) this type of 
reflexivity is guided by the criteria merely within the internal referential 
system without referring to external criteria. Self-identity made in such a 
manner is not only unbalanced and narrowly formed in respect of the 
constitution of identity, but also at the risk of being demoralized and likely to 
neglect the ethical relationships with others. 
 
6.5.1 An active human agency? 
Giddens’s late modernist analysis of reflexivity is largely derived from an 
active human agency that intends to make changes for the sake of changes. The 
purpose of reflexivity of the self in this view is much more about construction 
and innovation of one’s self-identity, and far less about the identification, 
understanding and maintenance of it. The issue here is: are we what we make of 
ourselves or are we what we are? No doubt, we would have an encompassing 
meaning of identity if we put both into consideration. However, in Giddens’s 
analysis of reflexivity of the self, what one can see is simply a kind of 
reflexivity ‘mobilized’ by an active agency: a kind of reflexivity for the sake of 
‘creating’ and ‘revision’. Furthermore, such an act of reflexivity for self-identity 
constructing and reconstructing is even supposed to be conducted in a 
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continual and routine manner! 
 
The view of ‘active agency’ is a view assumed by Giddens. This fact can be 
seen as follows. Firstly, Giddens seems to agree that the self as ‘a reflexive 
project’ is a pervasive phenomenon in modern time, since individuals have 
been emancipated from the control of pre-modern shackles. This view assumes 
that every individual faces the openness of modernity and enjoys a vast 
freedom of choice, even including choosing who we want to be as a way of 
self-actualisation and self-realization.  
 
Secondly, Giddens’s assumed idea of ‘active human agency’ has perhaps also 
originated from his notion of reflexive monitoring of action which is 
‘characteristic of all human action’ (see ibid., p.20, 35). In late modern settings, 
‘the reflexivity of the modernity extends into the core of the self’ (ibid., p.32). 
Giddens assumes that each individual is able to reflexively monitor 
conventions produced and reproduced in our day-to-day activities as part of 
keeping himself/herself ‘going on’ in the changing world (see ibid., p.35).  
Hence, such kind of an ‘active agency’ appears to focus on being sensitive to 
external changes for the sake of adaptation (to changes) that needs to be given 
to the self in the changing world. An individual who owns such ‘active agency’ 
is not only able to, but also has to continually make and remake its self-identity 
reflexively, given the ongoing changes in modern institutions. Hence, 
Giddens’s idea of ‘active human agency’ seems to contribute to his view that 
‘self becomes a reflexive project’ nowadays. 
 
Following the view of ‘reflexive project of the self’ that is based on this ‘active 
human agency’, it appears that one’s self-identity will never be found stable 
and constant and is impossible to be ‘maintained’ in our age; rather it simply 
CHAPTER 6 
 308
needs changing continually. It also appears that self-identity understood in 
terms of ‘self-actualisation’ and ‘self-realization’ should be seen as not only a 
‘norm’, but also a ‘priority’, in our understanding of ourselves in our time. 
Self-identity with respect to self-understanding, self-identification and 
self-maintenance appears to be less important, and perhaps should just be 
subordinated to the continual and routine self-making.  
 
However, it could be argued that these assumptions about active agency are 
problematic. Firstly, personal identity is not merely ‘made’ and ‘revised’ 
reflexively and continually. Before ‘reconstructing’ certain aspects of 
self-identity, one must acknowledge that he/she has already been ‘somebody’ 
whose self-identity is either explicit or implicit to himself/herself. The 
fundamental importance of the self-identity that one has already possessed, 
that has been/needs to be identified and that should be understood as well as 
maintained through reflexivity is largely de-emphasized in Giddens’ view. 
Secondly, it has not been made clear yet that the self as a reflexive project has 
become a universal phenomenon for all individuals. I do believe that there is 
considerable number of people who adopt such a view in their lives, since this 
view expresses a kind of popular individualism that exists in Western societies 
today. Nevertheless, it is hard to find sufficient evidences to show that all or 
most individuals of Western societies in different age group today see their 
lives and identity purely as a project or task to fulfil, let alone the individuals 
in non-Western societies which are becoming modernized rapidly by the trend 
of globalization. Thirdly, on a moral/ethical dimension, I do not think that the 
view of ‘self as reflexive project’ based on self-actualisation is the best and only 
view one should hold nowadays, even though Giddens seems to take a neutral 
attitude towards this view. There are at least two problems inherent in this 
view. Firstly, the mere rationale of such a view of the self is the idea of 
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‘rationality’, implying the autonomous control of time or colonization of the 
future and keeping life-planning manageable and reasonable. This is a stance 
that does not tolerate contingencies in life. This view does not realize that 
contingencies like accidents and/or encounters are also a constitutive part of 
human life and beyond the control of life planning. Instead, this view tries to 
express the control and mastery of a perfect future or 
self-actualisation/realization, simply through rational autonomous and 
calculable thinking and life-planning. Any reversal in human fortune might 
easily have disastrous effects on such a kind of self. The second problem of a 
‘reflexive project of the self’ is that the individual himself/herself has to be 
responsible for the ‘project’. This view might lead to radical individualism and 
turn the ‘project of the self’ into an agonizing burden for the individual 
him/herself over their lifespan.   
  
6.5.2 Radical dynamics of modernity? 
The ‘reflexivity’ in Giddens’ view seems to be radically driven by the 
‘anxieties’ brought about by the interplay of a reflexive project of the self and 
the exaggerated dynamics of the institutions of late modernity. As has been 
shown by Giddens, in late modern settings, self-identity, 
 
‘is not something that is just given, as a result of continuities of the 
individual’s action-system but something that has to be routinely 
created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual’ 
(ibid., p.52).  
 
However, the first question that might be posed is why, in late modern settings, 
self-identity becomes ‘something’ that one has to work and rework on? To put 
it more precisely, if we accept that self-identity is not something just given, 
and if we also accept that the notion of ‘identity’ of the self presumes ‘reflexive 
awareness’, then, why does self-identity become ‘something’ that one can have 
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but only through the act of creating and sustaining in short term, and only in a 
routine and continual manner? The second question that follows is how 
‘reflexivity’ is related to this narrowly defined way of coping with one’s 
self-identity?  
 
Giddens’s answer to the first question seems to be that pervasive uncertainties 
and changes resulting from the institutional reflexivity of late modernity bring 
anxieties, risks and dangers to the individuals’ existence in their living world. 
These uncertainties and changes engender individuals’ concerns about 
keeping those risks and dangers at bay, and keeping themselves ‘going on’ in a 
world filled with changes. Thus individuals are forced reflexively and 
routinely to create and change themselves, and hence make and remake their 
self-identities. As Giddens writes, ‘[t]ransitions in individual’s lives have 
always demanded psychic reorganisation’ (ibid., p.32-33), and ‘…the altered self 
has to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting 
personal and social change’ (ibid., p.33). The active agency that underpins the 
‘reflexive project of the self’ seems to precipitate and exacerbate the ‘anxieties’ 
that emerge from risks and dangers caused by external changes, since the life 
plans perfectly made by such an active agency for a controlled future are 
continually disturbed and intruded by the external unexpected changes. In 
short, for Giddens, individuals live in a state of uncertainty nowadays. All 
these interpretations seem to stress a necessity that an individual has to make 
and remake routinely on his/her self-identity. 
 
However, it could be argued that these assumptions about the interplay 
between self-identity and modernity nowadays are not sufficiently true. This is 
firstly because these assumptions not only seem to exaggerate the impact of 
the dynamism of modernity on the self, but also seem to underestimate the 
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existence of moral and cultural influences on personal identity. Secondly, these 
assumptions also seem to advocate the values of ‘adaptation’ and ‘flexibility’ 
of being a person, which are in conflict with the notion of permanence in time 
attached to the notion of personal identity. Identity made thus can be seen as 
an adaptive and flexible identity. I will show just how ‘radical’ this modernity 
is in relation to shaping personal identity in the following critical analyses. 
 
(1) Giddens seems to suggest that the social changes of modernity have 
already become the most powerful and pervasive external force in shaping one’s 
self-identity, which gives himself the justification to claim that an individual 
has to keep making his/her self-identity adaptable to social changes. But 
Giddens’s claim that ‘the reflexivity of modernity extends into the core of the 
self’ (ibid., 30) has not been proven to be a general truth yet both in terms of 
depth that this type of reflexive modernity reaches to the self and in terms of 
the scope it covers over population. In terms of the depth that the reflexive 
modernity reaches to the self, Giddens offers some examples: the 
paediatrician’s knowledge that is applied to the socialization of children, the 
rise of therapeutic industries and the popular publishing materials on personal 
life guide. These examples are regarded by Giddens not only as the means 
whereby individuals cope with novel anxieties, but also are the expression of 
‘reflexivity of the self’ (see ibid., p.33-p.34). However, it could be argued that it 
is hard to perceive whether these examples are signs of the ‘pathology of the 
self’ or of what is the so-called ‘reflexivity of the self’.  
 
With regards to the wide scope the impacts of reflexivity of modernity have on 
the self, it is still hard to hold it to be true either. For example, it is not 
everyone calls for the help of therapists and expert knowledge in dealing with 
problems relating to the self and personal life. Hence, it is hard to accept as a 
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general truth the view that ‘[t]he intrusion of abstract systems into day-to-day 
life, coupled with the dynamic nature of knowledge, means that awareness of 
risk seeps into the actions of almost everyone’ (ibid., p.112), and thus ‘everyone is 
in some sense aware of the reflexive constitution of modern social activity and 
the implications it has for her or his life’ (ibid., p.14). To some extent, such 
over-generalization neglects the other dimensions of personal identity, i.e., the 
roles of morality and traditional culture play in the construction of the one’s 
sense of the self. It could be argued that even some ‘risks’ are inescapable for 
certain sectors of the population, those ‘risks’ might not be risks at all for some 
people through the lens of the moral/cultural frameworks they hold. For 
example, if one holds the belief that contingencies are natural part of human 
life, he/she might not feel frightened when facing the negative impacts or 
possibilities caused by certain modern changes in his/her life. Therefore, 
although modernity might be radicalised and gobalized in the world today, it 
is problematic to assume that the dynamism of modernity has become such a 
powerful and pervasive force in shaping everyone’s personal identity that 
everyone has no choice but to change him/herself reflexively according to the 
changes posed by that force.  
The view of exaggerated modernity can be further clearly seen in Giddens’s 
discussion about his notions of lifestyle and life-planning in relation to 
self-identity. According to Giddens, lifestyle is an example of reflexivity, which 
has resulted from modernity (see ibid, p.81n). Giddens considers in late 
modern settings, choosing among ‘lifestyles’ has become a ‘must’ for 
individuals. As he writes, ‘…in conditions of high modernity, we all not only 
follow lifestyles, but in an important sense are forced to do so—we have no 
choice but to choose’ (ibid, p.81,emph. added).  This claim clearly indicates 
that such ‘reflexivity’ is heavily impinged by modernity and therefore seems to 
be compulsory by nature given the rapid changes of modern settings. 
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Nevertheless, this claim is doubtful to me in that ‘we all’ have ‘problems’ 
about lifestyles. More importantly, the question emerged from this claim is 
why we are ‘forced to’ do so. To this question, Giddens’s answer seems to be 
that, in our age, on the one hand, with the decline of traditional framework(s), 
one has no fixed ‘reference points’ for one’s self-construction and the way of 
living in the world; on the other hand, modernity provides many possibilities, 
including a diversity of lifestyles. Hence, lifestyle choice as a process of 
reflexivity of the self among multiple choices and possibilities of one’s life, 
concerns the making and remaking of one’s self-identity. As he writes,  
‘In modern social life, the notion of lifestyle takes on a particular 
significance. The more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life 
is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and 
the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle 
choices among a diversity of options. …because of the “openness” of 
social life today, the pluralisation of contexts of action and the 
diversity of “authorities”, lifestyle choice is increasingly important in 
constitution of self-identity and daily activity’ (ibid., p.5).   
This analysis seems to suggest that lifestyle choice as a kind of reflexivity, 
which is ‘urged’ on by modernity, increasingly determines the core of one’s 
self-identity. However I doubt the pervasiveness of Giddens’s view that 
self-identity becomes conditional upon life style choice. In the meanwhile, I 
believe this relationship could also be the other way around. That is, it is our 
self-identity that largely facilitates our lifestyle choice. Charles Taylor has 
argued that our self-identity is defined by strong evaluation that allows us to 
decide what is important and what is not to a person in terms of quality of life 
and the kind of being we wish to be (see Taylor 1989). The lifestyle that a 
person decides to adopt could be seen as, among others, what is important to 
that person. Hence, lifestyle choice is largely informed of by his/her strong 
evaluation that frames one’s identity.  
Even if we follow the idea that lifestyle choice is a key factor needed for any 
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individual to have a self-identity, I doubt that self-identity made thus has 
something to do with the real ‘core’ of one’s self, because people might just 
superficially imitate or follow certain typical or ‘popular’ or ‘new’ lifestyles, 
adopted by others in living world, or advocated by experts/businessmen in 
person or through the media. One might just continually shift from one 
lifestyle to another since he/she might simply motivated by the endless desire 
for adopting countless lifestyles. Thus, it is debatable that our self-identity is 
conditional upon lifestyles choices, even in the setting of late modern settings.  
Another key dimension of Giddens’ view of reflexivity of the self, is his stress 
on life-planning. According to Giddens, life-planning is significant in 
structuring one’s self-identity. However, life-planning is frequently in contact 
with expert knowledge in radical modernity: 
 
‘Reflexively organised life-planning, which normally presumes 
consideration of risks as filtered through contact with expert 
knowledge, becomes a central feature of the structuring of 
self-identity’ (ibid., p.5). 
 
Seeing from here, expert knowledge and technology in late modern settings 
takes an assumed central role in life-planning in terms of controlling one’s 
future and who one wants to be by putting risks into consideration. This is 
because ‘reflexivity of the self’ in Giddens’ view has the same assumption of 
the ‘institutional reflexivity of modernity’, which basically concerns about the 
new knowledge, new information and reasoning required for control and 
mastery of the future. But is this possible? And is this pervasive?  
 
It could be argued, however, that Giddens’s idea of life-planning is greatly 
focused on the involvement of expert knowledge and information. The concept 
of self-identity seems to have to be informed and supported by modern 
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information, knowledge and technology concerning one’s life. Hence, this 
view is not only biased but also considerably narrow. Paul Ricoeur has shown 
us how the notion of life-planning can be understood differently. He argues 
that life plans constitute ‘the intermediary zone of exchange between the 
undetermined character of guiding ideals and the determinate nature of 
practices’ (Ricoeur 1990, p.158, emph. added).  The norms, ideals, values and 
the role of others that shape one’s identity and that are conveyed in one’s 
life-planning seem to be excluded or forgotten by Giddens. 
 
(2) Stressing radical modernity seems to suggest that modern person’s identity 
can no longer be discovered as sameness and maintained as constancy, but can 
only be created and re-created for the sake of changes. It is still hard to believe 
that any individual’s response, although based on reflexivity, to the ‘anxieties’ 
caused by modernity could only be the act of ‘changing’ and/or ‘revising’ in 
relation to his/her identity. This is at least because an individual might just 
maintain and/or reinforce his/her original identity that he/she had, which are 
underpinned by certain moral commitments and/or ethical concerns. In this 
respect, I do not think the ‘reflexive project of the self’ is a promising view for a 
‘stable’ sense of personal identity.  
 
Although as Giddens contends, an individual’s reflexivity can ‘contribute to 
and promote social influences’ (Giddens 1991, p.2), it is hard to say such kind 
of influences that an individual has upon the powerful modern social 
dynamism would be able to change any part of modern institutions. This is 
one reason why there is a need for individuals to participate in 
collective/democratic effort for social change. Without collective effort, 
individuals seem to have no choice but to change themselves for adapting to 
modernity, i.e., change oneself for the sake of change as continual adaptation to 
CHAPTER 6 
 316
changing world. Thus, the central implication of Giddens’ view of reflexivity of 
the self seems to be adaptation and flexibility. As Giddens writes, anxiety ‘is 
caused by disturbing circumstances, or their threat, but also helps mobilise 
adaptive responses and novel initiatives’ (ibid., p.13).  Côté and Levine 
comment that in late modernist view, ‘self-identity is … a product of 
meaning-making as a mode of adaptation to the vicissitudes of late modern 
society’ (Côté & Levine 2002, p.44). However, if the reflexivity of the 
modernity moves towards demoralized directions at the end of the day, 
should an individual also change his/her identity for the sake of the 
adaptation to that immoral modernity?  
 
It could be argued that to have a stable sense of identity is in a large part to 
have a sense of sameness and self-constancy of ourselves over time. This stable 
sense is not only a source of self-esteem, but also what others can count on in 
us. Richard Sennett writes that character concerns the personal traits that we 
value in our ‘selves’ and for which we seek to be valued by others (see Sennett 
1998). Thus, maintaining a stable personal identity or character, no matter 
what external changes impinge on us, is significantly essential to a person. 
Adaptation and flexibility of the person in a flexible society, as Sennett 
complains, leads to ‘corrosion of character’ (ibid.). 
  
(3) Finally, in Giddens’s understanding, social systems, including the 
institutions of modernity, in their shaping of day-to-day practice, are even 
incompatible with other external forces like moralities and traditions. As he 
writes, ‘[C]rucial to these processes is the evaporation of morality, particularly 
in so far as moral outlooks are integrated in a secure way with day-to-day 
practice. For moral principles run counter to the concept of risk and to the 
mobilising of dynamics of control’ (ibid., p.145). He also claims that 
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‘[t]raditions of behaviour have their own moral endowment, which specifically 
resists the technical power to introduce something new’ (ibid.). I do not believe 
modernity is incompatible with morality and tradition in their shaping of 
human lives and personal identity, which evidently can be seen from Eastern 
countries where moral and culture distinctiveness is not removed by 
modernization and modernity through globalization. In fact, these countries 
are trying to reserve their moral and cultural uniqueness that appears to be 
under ‘threat’ in modernization and globalization. For example, Japan, South 
Korea and Singapore are at the similar level of late modernity as Western 
countries, but these societies nicely combine their Eastern traditions and 
cultural characteristics with Western modernity in their unique forms. Also, 
China, after experiencing The Cultural Revolution from 1960s to 1970s, is now 
in the process of radical modernization nowadays. However, this country is 
also experiencing a renaissance of Confucian tradition as a cultural identity for 
Chinese people. Even in Western countries, religions and cultural values never 
‘evaporate’ along with the advancement of modernity. 
 
6.5.3 Internal criteria? 
Giddens’s view of the role of reflexivity in making and re-making self-identity 
is guided by an internally referential system of the self without referrance to 
external criteria. The internally referential system of the self is a system within 
which the self uses the internal criteria for its development based on an 
individual’s life project and life-planning. In this view, an individual only uses 
something ‘true’ to himself/herself to control and master his/her 
self-development. Giddens writes, ‘The key reference points are set “from the 
inside”, in terms of how the individual constructs/reconstructs his life history’ 
(ibid., p.80) and ‘His first loyalty is to himself’ (ibid.). In this view, an 
individual’s lifespan ‘becomes freed from externalities associated with 
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pre-established ties to other individuals and groups’ (ibid., p.147). Others only 
figure in one’s life in his/her reflexive ordering of his/her personal life- 
planning. The only morality that guides this reflexivity is a morality of 
‘authenticity’, i.e., being true to be oneself. As Giddens analyses, ‘Authenticity 
substitutes for dignity: what makes an action good is that it is authentic to the 
individual’s desires, and can be displayed to others as such’ (ibid., p.170, emph. 
added). Thus, authenticity seems to take an important role in self-actualisation.  
 
In Giddens’s analysis, mastery and control of a ‘true’ self for oneself becomes a 
necessary condition of authenticity. Mastery and control of one’s life, including 
one’s self-identity, seems to replace one’s reliance on external 
morality/tradition, by an individual’s living within the parameters of 
internally referential systems of the self and of modern social life. Giddens’s 
analysis of this internal referential system even leads himself to the conclusion 
that underlying the processes of life-planning, the mastery and control of the 
self of an individual, is the looming threat of personal meaninglessness (see ibid., 
p.201, emph added).  
 
It could be argued that the reflexivity that only exists in an internal referential 
system might not only raise moral issues, but also lead to ethical problems.  
This is because reflexivity within internal referential systems seems not to refer 
to responsibility towards ‘others’ in its self-identity making. What Giddens 
calls a ‘pure relationship’ in modern settings is ‘not anchored in external 
conditions of social or economic life – it is, as it were, free floating’ (ibid., 
p.89-90). Such a mode of relationship ‘is sought only for what the relationship 
can bring to the partners involved’ (ibid., p.90). External conditions of 
reflexivity, such as a moral life and a person as a cultural being, seem to be 
excluded in Giddens’s analysis.  
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To sum up, firstly, Giddens’s notion of ‘reflexivity’ of the self is derived from 
an active human agency with mere purpose of making and changing.  
Secondly, he amplifies the effects of the dynamics of modernity on the self and 
overemphasizes the intrusion of social changes into the self and suggests that 
these are predominant factors in the constitution of the identity. More 
specifically, he overestimates the prevalence of the changing nature of social 
life, modern expert knowledge and technology and their contact with the 
self-identity. This only leads to the creation of an identity for the sake of 
adaptation and flexibility as demanded by capitalist societies. Thirdly, the 
notion of ‘internally referential systems’ within which the self performs its 
‘reflexivity’ prevents Giddens from including external criteria, such as 
normative, moral and cultural dimensions of the constitution of self-identity, 
into his analysis. This leads him to conclude that underlying the reflexive 
project of the self ‘personal meaninglessness’ is a looming threat. Although 
Giddens’s analysis of the emergence of ‘life politics’ can be seen as an attempt 
to re-moralize the individual life, this notion has been criticized. It has been 
crticized for its apolitical nature in that its underpinning notions of 
‘self-actualisation’ and ‘self-realization’ seem to advocate hyper-individualism 
which in fact is a burden for individuals and which excludes 
collective/democratic endeavour to solve individual’s private problems. 
 
6.6 Issues of personal identity and learning implied in Giddens’ analysis   
Drawing on what I have analysed, it appears that three issues about personal 
identity have emerged. They are: 1. Are we what we make of ourselves or are 
we what we are? 2. Is personal identity merely and predominantly shaped by 
the social impact of modernity? 3. Is the ‘internal referential system’ the only 
criterion that an individual’s reflexivity refers to in coping with questions 
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about identity? If Giddens’s analyses of self-identity and modernity face these 
issues, the learning derived from his view of ‘reflexivity’ as a mode of reflexive 
learning which is relevant to making and remaking self-identity in late modern 
settings needs rethinking. For example, is the ‘reflexivity’ derived from an 
active human agency the only justifiable source of learning that is relevant to 
identity? Should the reflexivity driven by the ‘anxieties’ resulting from the 
interplay between self-actualisation and the overstated dynamics of modernity, 
be the major assumption about learning concerning identity? Can reflexivity 
guided by internal criteria provide one with a mode of learning towards a 
good and harmonious life in an age of pluralism? What I can see is that this 
mode of reflexive learning that is relevant to identity is largely limited not only 
because it is highly individualistic and burdensome to the individual, but also 
because it concerns conceptual and moral issues in term of learning to be 
flexible, as I have shown previously. 
 
The moral/ethical issues relating to this mode of reflexive learning are related 
to aspects of lifelong learning since Giddens’s analysis plays an influential role 
in current thinking about lifelong learning in relation to personal identity as I 
have shown in section 6.3.2. It will be hard to realize the importance of these 
issues without further examining the real nature of ‘lifelong’ learning drawn 
from Giddens’s analysis. The first reason that reflexive learning implied in 
Giddens’s view concerning identity is a ‘lifelong’ process seems to be that the 
external changes are so fast that one has to ‘continuously’ catch up with the 
run-away world. In order to survive in this rapid changing world, one has to 
learn to change oneself quickly for the sake of adaptation to external change. 
Thus, one aim of such lifelong learning is adaptation or flexibility. Hence, it is 
not difficult to understand why reflexive learning about being flexible is a 
‘lifelong’ process. But the issue is: can we have a ‘flexible’ identity? Can we 
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rely on a person who has a ‘flexible’ identity, e.g., can we have a ‘flexible’ 
friend? The more critical question is: for whom do we really need to be 
flexible?  
 
The second reason that the reflexive learning that is relevant to identity drawn 
from Giddens’s analysis contains ‘lifelong’ component seems to be that 
external changes are endless, thus an individual appears to be forced to learn to 
change him/herself ‘routinely’. However, since such reflexive learning that is 
relevant to identity is driven by self-actualisation, learners have to be 
responsible for the consequences of their learning. Consequently, such mode of 
lifelong learning could be seen as an endless burden to an individual over 
his/her lifetime. Some theorists have made critiques on this issue, as I have 
shown in chapter 2.   
 
The third reason that reflexive learning for renewing one’s identity implied in 
Giddens’s analysis can be seen as a mode of ‘lifelong’ learning seems to relate 
to an assumption that the only response of an individual to external changes 
which are uncertain to one’s future should be mastering and controlling. What 
we need to realize here is that human ambition based on rationality that is 
used to control the natural and social environment seems to apply more 
radically to the human being him/herself, and now to the field of lifelong 
learning that is relevant to personal identity. The central aim of such reflexive 
learning appears to try to keep one’s future under control and/or maintain 
mastery of personal life over one’s lifespan. Hence, one key idea underpinning 
such lifelong learning seems to be an autonomous rationality for 
self-actualisation. Such mode of lifelong learning seeks to control and manage 
one’s life based on a calculable life-planning. However, this mode of lifelong 
learning seems to neglect the existence the un-calculable aspects of life and 
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forget the fact that contingency is also constitutive of human life. The more 
essential issue here perhaps is: do we only live our lives according to the 
dominant discourse of rationality, one of the cornerstones of modernity? The 
answer is obviously no, since a large number of counter-examples can 
immediately be given. The dominant language of rationality and modernity 
has excluded other moral languages that shape our identity.  
 
From all these, we can see that what has emerged from Giddens’s analysis is a 
learning for the sake of external social change, which is problematic in many 
ways. This understanding of the learning and its implications for lifelong 
learning concerning identity are inadequate and in moral/ethical deficit if we 
simply associate learning concerning identity with Giddens’ sociological 
analysis on modernity and self. 
 
6.7 Towards different views of learning in relation to personal identity 
The immediate task I will perform is to present my views about the three 
issues relating to identity I mentioned above. More precisely, I will argue for 
how the notion of personal identity and roles of learning that are relevant to 
identity can be understood differently. I will do this by following Ricoeur and 
Taylor’s theories about identity. This is because what is significantly 
insufficient in Giddens’ view has been found to be copious in those two 
theories. I found that both Ricoeur and Taylor not only provide us with 
different views of personal identity, but also different views of reflexivity 
through which a larger space for the roles of learning can be analysed. These 
views of reflexivity are different from Giddens’s view in that these views cover 
such dimensions as conceptual constitution of personal identity, the influence 
of moral framework(s) and the inter-subjective relationship in the human 
world. What is significant in Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories is that they also 
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offer us a treasure trove of narrative theories and analysis of the relation of 
narrative to personal identity. It is again, in stark comparison with Giddens’s 
analysis, in this dimension, I found how we could see the necessity of narrative 
in relation to personal identity, learning and lifelong learning. 
 
6.7.1 Are we what we make of ourselves or are we what we are? 
To deal with this issue of personal identity, there is a need to re-examine the 
constitution of the concept of personal identity. I would argue that personal 
identity is not merely made, it is also partly ‘given’, and thus is identified, 
found, understood and maintained by a person himself/herself and by others. 
I follow Ricoeur and believe that ontologically, personal identity can be 
distinguished between identity as an entity, a thing, and identity as a mode of 
being of Dasein. This implies that personal identity as a ‘thing’ has its evolution 
– it ‘becomes’ and ‘develops’ on its own over time and some traits are permanent 
in time. It is in this respect, we can say one’s personal identity is ‘discovered’, 
‘recognized’, ‘identified’ and ‘understood’ by oneself through reflexivity and 
by other persons through social interaction. Charles Taylor even defines his 
use of the term ‘identity’ in virtue of ‘finding one’s identity’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34, 
emph. added). Therefore, ‘what we are’ is inherently constitutive of personal 
identity. 
  
Ricoeur’s conceptual analysis of personal identity through distinguishing two 
kinds of permanence in time reaches the conclusion that the conceptual 
constitution of personal identity should be understood both as identity as 
sameness (idem-identity), the thing, and identity as selfhood (ipse-identity), the 
being as Dasein. In the field of selfhood, there exists a dialectic relationship 
between the idem-identity and ipse-identity. On one pole of the dialectic 
relationship, ipse-identity is overlapped by idem-identity, which is expressed as 
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character; on the other pole of the dialectic relationship, ipse-identity departs 
from idem-identity and stands alone being identified as self-constancy. 
Character, which can be seen as ‘lasting dispositions’, is made up of both habit, 
which is a result of an evolutional interaction between sedimentation and 
innovation, and an acquired identification. The latter is a result of internalisation 
through the self’s interaction with otherness, including significant others, norms, 
morals, values, ideals, cultures, models and heroes and so forth. In this sense, 
the notion of ‘character’ entails the criss-cross of permanence in time in 
sameness and permanence in time through self-constancy. Within this dialectic 
framework, we can see personal identity in selfhood is not merely made. 
Firstly, this is because habit is not merely a result of innovation by the self. It is 
the result of overlapping of sedimentation and innovation. What implies here 
is that innovation is partly based on the self’s identification of itself and 
self-understanding of its sedimentation. Secondly, character as an acquired 
identification amounts to a certain existing framework of pure 
‘identification-with’. Ricoeur argues, ‘Recognizing oneself in (e.g., certain 
moral frameworks) contributes recognizing oneself by (both oneself and 
others)’ (see Ricoeur 1992, p.121). Thirdly, personal identity as self-constancy 
amounts to the self’s maintenance of itself as a being in permanence in time in 
intersubjective relationship, which expresses both care of oneself (Dasein) and 
care of others.  In all these senses, we are not merely what we make of 
ourselves, we are ‘what’ and ‘who’ we are at the same time.  
 
However, in Giddens’ approach to self-identity, we can only see an amplified 
ipse-identity, corrosive idem-identity, and little self-constancy underpinned by 
imputations from others. It seems to be difficult to find two modes of 
permanence in time attached to the conception of personal identity in Giddens’s 
analysis. What I want to suggest is that the person who has a ‘flexible identity’ 
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is hard to identify and/or re-identify as a same person and a constant being 
both by him/herself and by others. In the dialectic between sameness and 
selfhood, the subject might suffer from the problem that ‘I’ am ‘nothing’, if, as 
Ricoeur writes, ‘[a] self [is] deprived of the help of sameness’ (Ricoeur 1992, 
p.166). Here, Ricoeur provides a view to explain the ‘meaninglessness of 
personal identity’ at a conceptual level by showing the importance of identity 
as sameness. 
 
What does Ricoeur’s conceptual analysis of personal identity suggest about the 
role of learning here? Firstly, Ricoeur’s analysis of the concept of personal 
identity provides a reflexive understanding of personal identity through the 
dialectic framework of constitution of personal identity. Such framework is a 
scale for ‘measuring’ by sense the ‘proportions’ of different constitutive part of 
personal identity. Given that there is a dialectic relationship between 
idem-identity (sameness) and ipse-identity (mineness, individuality) which can 
be mediated by narrative identity within selfhood, one can learn the degree of 
the stability of one’s personal identity by ‘sensing’ the proportion of the 
sameness of the self. One can also learn the degree of individuality of one’s 
personal identity by ‘sensing’ the proportion of their ipse-identity within the 
dialectic framework. Finally, one can learn to what extent one’s personal 
identity is imputed by others by ‘sensing’ the proportion of self-constancy.  
 
Secondly, Ricoeur maintains that habit is the result of the interaction between 
sedimentation and innovation over time, where ipse is overlapped by idem; 
acquired identification is the process of internalisation of otherness over time, 
where ipse and idem accord with each other. All these analyses suggest that 
reinforcing, developing and innovating one’s character as part of ‘learning’ 
that is relevant to personal identity could be based on one’s reflection on the 
CHAPTER 6 
 326
parts of ‘sedimentation’ and ‘internalisation’ inherent in one’s personal 
identity. In other words, learning concerning one’s personal identity could be 
based on one’s identification and understanding of existing habit and acquired 
identification, in order to gain the senses of continuity, integrity and stability 
in personal identity. Following this, one’s learning to identify and understand 
one’s existing character can help an individual move in one’s lifetime 
coherently from ‘how I have become’ to ‘who I am now’ to ‘where I am going’. 
This is different from making personal identity simply for the sake of 
adaptation to ongoing changing society, which is likely to lead to fragmented 
and shifting personal identity.  
 
As I will show, these two kinds of learning can only be facilitated by narrative. 
They can be seen as a kind of reflexive learning drawn from the dialectic of 
sameness and selfhood within the conceptual framework of personal identity. 
This mode of reflexive learning reinforces the stable constituents of identity by 
identifying the ‘sameness’ and ‘constancy’ of oneself, which is in contrast with 
‘learning to be flexible’ or ‘learning as adapting’ which is implied in the idea of 
identity in ongoing need for renewal. 
 
6.7.2 Is personal identity merely shaped by social impacts of the dynamics of 
modernity? 
My view about this issue is that personal identity is not merely or primarily 
shaped by the dynamics of the institution of modernity. In the constitution of 
personal identity, external factors that impact on the self of a person cannot be 
restricted to the scope of social forces of modernity. This criticism might be 
unfair to Giddens, since his argument is primarily based on a sociological 
perspective. But my point is that, even from a sociological perspective, 
Giddens’s analyses still overestimates the impact of the institution of 
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modernity on the self and gives little space to the impact of other external 
factors. Giddens’ view of self-identity seems to be merely based on a self that is 
being radically shaped by social structure. Following this idea, the self is 
further assumed as a reflexive project of the self that is flexible for self-innovation 
and adaptation to social changes. What is significantly lacking in his view of 
reflexivity is morality and values. Although the link of the psychological 
dimension with modernity has been examined deeply in Giddens’s analysis, 
his discussion of moral and cultural influences on personal identity in the 
context of modernity is remarkably absent.  
 
As can be seen from Ricoeur’s notion of acquired identifications, personal 
identity as character is partly gained through the self’s internalisation of the 
norms, ideals, values and cultures, rather than merely modern institutions. 
This approach to personal identity has been stressed in Charles Taylor’s theory 
of identity as I have discussed in chapter 4. Taylor sometimes uses the term 
‘self-identity’ in his theory, but his notion of it can be largely equated with that 
of acquired identifications in Ricoeur’s theory of personal identity.  
 
According to Taylor, the self exists in a ‘moral space’, and self-identity has (a) 
‘moral assumption(s)’. The moral assumptions, implicit or explicit, are 
constituted by what he calls strong evaluations or qualitative distinctions. Strong 
evaluation is an evaluation of our desires in virtue of quality of life and the 
kind of being we wish to become (see 1985a, p.25). As Taylor writes, ‘To know 
who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise 
about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has 
meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary’ (Taylor 
1989, p.28). The heart of Taylor’s theory of identity is that ‘[o]ur identity is 
defined by our fundamental [strong] evaluations’ (Taylor 1985a, p.34). He 
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argues that, fundamentally, strong evaluation ‘plays the role of orienting us, of 
providing the frame within which things have meaning for us, by virtue of the 
qualitative distinctions it incorporates (Taylor 1989, p.30). In this sense, our 
identity can be seen as certain ‘moral framework(s)’, or the horizon ‘within 
which we know where we stand, and what meanings things have for us’ (ibid., 
p.29). Without or losing the moral framework, we will suffer what he calls 
disorientation or identity crisis. As he says, ‘[t]he condition of there being such a 
thing as an identity crisis is precisely that our identities define the space of 
qualitative distinctions within which we live and choose’ (ibid., p.30). Thus, 
Taylor claims, ‘Our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us 
and what is not. It is what makes possible these discriminations, including 
those which turn on strong evaluations’ (ibid.). This is why I think Giddens’s 
view that the making and remaking self-identity is conditional on lifestyle 
choices is problematic. This is because at the very least Taylor shows that the 
issue can be seen differently, i.e., it is largely our personal identity that helps 
us make choices about lifestyle. 
 
As discussed above, identity as acquired identifications is fundamentally 
underpinned and shaped by morals and cultures, though modern institutions 
also shape our identity. But Taylor further argues that if one wants to live up 
to his strongly valued good, one can articulate his/her moral assumptions, i.e., 
the implicit or explicit moral space of questions – questions about self-concern 
as a mode of being in the world, through self-interpretation by using one’s 
language of his/her strong evaluation. This is because such articulations not 
only help an individual examine his/her life by following Socrates’ maxim, i.e., 
an unexamined life is not worth living, but also, more importantly in Taylor’s 
view, help one empower oneself to live up to one’s strongly valued good. As 
Taylor writes, 
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‘A formulation has power when it brings the source close, when it 
makes it plain and evident, in all its inherent force, its capacity to 
inspire our love, respect, or allegiance. An effective articulation 
releases this force, and this is how words have power (ibid., p.96). 
 
Therefore, this articulation not only is an evaluative examination of the 
meaning of one’s moral /cultural identity, but also can be seen as a kind of 
empowerment. It is from here, narrative as a form of self-interpretation can be 
seen as a strong tool of articulation.  
 
What can we see about the role of learning in Taylor’s theory (and partly in 
Ricoeur’s theory) here? It is not difficult to see that the role of learning lies in 
his notion of articulation about moral assumptions for a better understanding 
of one’s personal identity. ‘To give a certain articulation is to shape our sense 
of what we desire or what we hold important in a certain way’ (Taylor 1985a, 
p.36). By trying to articulate a certain moral framework, one is learning in the 
sense that one is reflecting, evaluating, shaping and interpreting oneself and one’s 
life by and within certain moral framework(s). In Taylor’s view, our articulation 
of its object (i.e., what we hold important), shapes this object, making it 
accessible and/or inaccessible in new ways (see ibid., p.38).  
 
If we see ‘articulation’ as a learning process, then at the end of this process, we 
can say we have learned something. This is because, firstly, implicit 
assumptions can be turned into explicit ones; secondly, past life is examined 
and a new and deeper understanding of the meaning of life and of personal 
identity can possibly emerge; and thirdly, the learned/identified moral 
assumptions become a source of power enabling one to live up to his/her 
strongly valued good/moral sources. Such a mode of learning is not ‘driven’ 
by anxieties, but is moved by their valued ‘goods’. Thus, this learning is not the 
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learning as an adaptation in response to external power imposed on a person; 
rather, it is a mode of autonomous learning for the ‘good’ one strongly aspires 
to contact with. Again, such a mode of learning emerges from a different view 
of ‘reflexivity’ of a person compared with ‘reflexivity’ in Giddens’s view. It is a 
kind of ‘reflexivity’ that is conducted by and within certain moral framework(s) 
inherent in certain cultures, norms and values.  
 
6.7.3 Is the ‘internal criteria’ the only criteria a person uses to guide the 
reflexivity in coping with his/her identity?  
The reflexivity merely guided by ‘internal criteria’ in terms of one’s life and 
personal identity in Giddens’s analysis is morally limited and ethically 
deficient. As can be seen from Taylor’s theory, personal identity has its moral 
assumptions or frameworks. These moral frameworks are exactly the criteria an 
individual uses to define his/her identity. In Giddens’s analysis, the only 
moral framework underpinning one’s self-identity is ‘authenticity’ which is a 
main criterion within an individual’s internal referential system. Charles 
Taylor has shown that ‘authenticity’ is just one moral framework among a 
diversity of moral assumptions in the Western World over the past few 
centuries. Holding merely ‘authenticity’ as moral framework to cope with 
one’s identity, as Giddens himself has realized, involves being at risk of 
suffering ‘personal meaninglessness’ since ‘authenticity’ as internal criterion 
largely excludes ‘otherness’. But Taylor’s and Ricoeur’s theories provide us 
with different views about the referential system in understanding the notion 
of identity. According to Taylor, in the modern age of Western societies, 
identity might base itself on a diversity of moral and cultural frameworks as 
the result of pluralism (see Taylor 1989). This is because in our modern age 
there exist different moral frameworks, e.g., utilitarianism, altruism, hedonism, 
freedom, universal justice, rational agency, Christianity and so on. Therefore 
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each individual’s reflexivity that is relevant to one’s identity might refer to a 
diversity of framework(s), rather than simply one framework like 
‘authenticity’.  
 
What needs to be clarified is that the reflexivity of the self which is guided by 
internal criteria for mastery and control of the future life, without referring to 
external criteria, is not the only reason that modern individual suffers so-called 
‘personal meaninglessness’. If the sense of meaninglessness of the personal 
identity does exist, it can also be seen from a different view. This 
‘meaninglessness’ might also come from the conflicts of multiple moral and 
cultural assumptions on which personal identity has already been based in the 
age of pluralism. Taylor argues that the meaningfulness in personal identity 
becomes an issue only when one’s moral assumptions and other different 
moral assumptions are in controversy or in conflict. Following this view, in 
Western societies today, communication between different moral and cultural 
groups or individuals, resulting from international migrations and travelling 
has vastly increased both in scale and frequency, when compared with a more 
traditional age. This phenomenon, together with the collapse of the 
authoritative traditional moral frameworks has produced controversies and 
issues about moral assumptions at ethnic, cultural, moral and religious levels 
in many communities more frequently than ever. Hence, this can be seen as a 
different reason why identity becomes a problem today.  
 
I have shown, Taylor asserts that one way to have or find one’s meaning of life 
and identity is to articulate one’s moral assumption. Now we can see this can 
be done not only in one moral assumption, but many. In the face of a plurality 
of moral assumptions, Taylor firstly suggests that one way to deal with the 
issue is to develop the capacity to invent the meaning for one’s identity by 
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combining different meanings of moral goods in a unique manner. Secondly, 
being open to plural and incompatible moral frameworks is another possible 
response to this issue. According to Taylor, taking a stance of openness in the 
face of rival or different moral frameworks/self-interpretations suggests 
re-evaluating our most fundamental formulations and what they were meant 
to articulate. This is to conduct what Taylor calls ‘radical re-evaluation’, that is, 
‘the most basic terms, those in which other evaluations are carried on, are 
precisely what is in question’ (Taylor 1985a, p.40).  ‘…it is a reflection about 
the self, its most fundamental issues and reflection which engages the self most 
wholly and deeply’ (ibid.,p.42). What emerges from this reflection will be a 
‘self-resolution’ for the self in question, a new definition of fundamental 
(strong) evaluations that are essential to one’s identity. Thirdly, arguing 
among different moral and cultural frameworks through practical reasoning can 
be considered as a way to resolve the issue of the moral plurality in Taylor’s 
mind. One can do this by arranging different goods and by ranking a plurality 
of goods in one’s life/life story through comparison so as to select a ‘superior’ 
one as one’s ‘hypergood’. 
 
According to Ricoeur, as I demonstrated in chapter 3, there exists the dialectic 
tension between oneself and others, in addition to the dialectic between idem 
and ipse. On the one hand, self is a being as self-concern; on the other hand, self 
is a being as care of others. From an ethical stance, Ricoeur argues that 
personal identity as self-constancy expresses a responsibility to others, e.g., 
keeping one’s own word given to others. This type of the personal identity is 
recognized in the way one responds to others. Self-constancy is underpinned 
by the imputations from others. In this sense others is constitutive of personal 
identity. Here, the criterion that the self reflexively refers to is the relationship 
between oneself and others. This criterion is more ethical than moral. Why? 
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Ricoeur has distinguished between the notion of ethics and morality. He 
defines term ‘ethics’ for personal conduct as an ‘aim of an accomplished life’ 
and defines the term ‘morality’ as ‘the articulation of this aim in norms’ (see 
Ricoeur 1992, p.170). He further defines ‘ethical intention’ as ‘aim at the “good 
life” with and for others, in just institutions’ (ibid., p.172, emph. added). 
Furthermore, Ricoeur argues that when weighing these two notions, morality 
is subordinate to ethics. Thus, the understanding of the identity of a person 
who wishes to achieve ‘an accomplished life’ or ‘good life’ with and for others 
is more ethical than moral.  
 
In addition to these two dialectic relations in the notion of personal identity, 
there is the third dialectic relationship in Ricoeur’s notion of persona identity 
as I discussed in chapter 3, that is, the dialectic between sameness of the self and 
others. The first dialectic, i.e., the dialect between idem-identity and ipse-identity, 
is complementary to the dialectic of sameness of the self and others, because it is 
selfhood (ipse) that acts as a mediator between the sameness and others. On the 
one hand, to maintain one’s sameness, one might not change him/herself in 
order to meet the need of others or respond to the call from others; on the other 
hand, for the purpose of care of others, one might change his/her sameness, 
e.g., one’s certain habits might change for the sake of others. One’s final 
decision on this issue depends on the proportion of one’s preference for the 
selfhood and one’s preference for others in this dialectic scale. 
 
Then, what can we see about the role of learning in these two theories here? 
From Taylor’s theories, one can see a different view of personal identity in the 
settings of modern age, that is, there might be various moral assumptions 
underpinning one’s personal identity. Firstly, this suggests that the act of 
‘reflexivity’ about personal identity might be guided by and within many 
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external, moral criteria. Through one’s ‘reflexivity’ in relation to different 
moral frameworks, the meaning of one’s life and of one’s self-identity can be 
learned from his/her articulation of his/her multiple moral assumptions. 
Secondly, as Taylor suggests, leaning also lies in developing a capacity to 
invent the meaning of life or of personal identity by combining a multiple of 
moral assumptions in a unique way. Such an inventing capacity, however, is 
based on one’s ‘reflexivity’ between various moral assumptions. It is here that 
narrative takes an important role in learning about this capacity since narrative 
can offer unfolding stories with which to arrange and organize different goods 
over time in one’s life. Thirdly, a deep transformation in strong evaluation can 
be gained through a learning processes implied in radical re-evaluation. 
Through this learning process, new moral framework(s) that define personal 
identity can possibly emerge. Fourthly, the process of justifying certain moral 
frameworks for oneself among many moral and cultural interpretations 
suggests a kind of learning process. In this learning process, one can gain a 
different moral assumption through comparative argument by using practical 
reasoning. 
 
From Ricoeur’s theory on identity as self-constancy, e.g. keeping one’s promise 
to others, one can see what Biesta calls ‘learning as responding’ (see Biesta 
2006). What emerges form this mode of learning connected to identity is a 
reliable identity supported by one’s responsibility to others. Such mode of 
learning is conducted exactly through a mode of reflexivity in a person, a 
‘reflexivity’ that is enframed in the dialectic between oneself and others. 
Finally, from the third dialectic in Ricoeur’s identity theory, i.e. the dialectic 
between sameness and others where self oscillates between the two, one can 
also identify a mode of reflexive learning. Such mode of learning mediates 
between maintaining sameness of the self and care of others. 
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6.8 Leaning that is relevant to identity as lifelong learning: a critical 
synthesis of different views 
6.8.1 A definition of learning 
Learning is normally understood as acquisition, e.g., acquiring skills and 
knowledge, with respect to personal identity.  Following what I have argued, 
however, I would like to define learning as a kind of reflexive learning in two 
dimensions, i.e., learning as developing one’s understanding of oneself and learning 
as reflecting on one’s responding to others and others’ responding. By ‘developing 
one’s understanding of oneself’, I do not mean making sense of oneself by 
isolating oneself from the external world.  Rather one’s understanding of 
oneself is achieved by one’s linking oneself to the moral and cultural sources 
that have shaped one’s self implicitly and explicitly. An in-depth examination 
reveals that moral and cultural shape largely relies on one’s interaction with 
others, particularly significant others.  
 
By ‘reflecting on one’s responding to others and others’ responding’, I mean 
one can learn to identify oneself through one’s reflection on both the way one 
responds to others and the way others respond to him/her. This is a mode of 
reflexive learning concerning one’s identity that emerges from intersubjective 
learning. I develop this definition by following Ricoeur’s notion of 
‘imputation’ (Ricoeur 1992) and Biesta’s notion of ‘learning as responding’ 
(Biesta 2006). Biesta understands personal identity as a unique ‘being’ that is 
preconditioned by others: ‘what makes us into a unique, singular being – me, 
and not you – is precisely to be found in the way in which we respond to the 
others, to the question of the other, to the other as question’ (ibid., p.28). 
‘Learning as responding’ is therefore the learning about how one responds to 
‘what and who is other and different’ as a unique being ‘coming into world’ 
(see ibid.). Whereas I believe this idea is true, in my understanding, only when 
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we reflect on our implicit or explicit assumptions about/our understanding of 
our act of responding to others and reflect on ‘responses’ or ‘imputations’ given 
by others to our very act of responding, can we say we identify a unique being 
as ourselves. Without such reflections on the responses both given by 
ourselves and imputed from others, both our responding and others’ 
responses might simply be regarded as intuitive behaviours. 
 
As can be seen, both dimensions of my definition of learning are based on an 
intersubjective relationship and are subject to such relationship. This is different 
from reflexive learning as individualistic learning aimed at transforming oneself 
continually in order to be adaptable and flexible to the external changes, which 
puts the individual at risk of becoming demoralised. This situation comes 
about because such individualistic learning seems not to involve ‘others’ and 
external moral criteria that are in operation, but is only mobilized by ‘changes’.  
 
As I will show in the following sections, what emerges from my analysis of 
Ricoeur and Taylor’s theory of identity are two types of frameworks within 
which four modes of reflexive learning can be conducted. The first type of 
framework is the conceptual framework of three dialectical relationships, i.e. 
between sameness and selfhood, between selfhood and otherness, between 
sameness and others. The second type of framework is a (range of) moral 
framework(s). Three modes of reflexive learning are inherent in the first type 
of framework, and one mode of reflexive learning in the second type of 
framework.  
 
If we further link these modes of reflexive learning with the notion of lifelong 
learning, what emerges from Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories of identity are new 
views about reflexive learning as lifelong learning that is relevant to personal 
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identity. These new views of reflexive learning as lifelong learning are 
different from reflexive learning for ‘adaptation’ and/or ‘ flexibility’ as lifelong 
learning implied in Giddens’s theory.    
 
6.8.2 Reflexive learning in the dialectic between sameness and selfhood  
The first mode of reflexive learning is a mode of learning through reflexivity 
which is not only concerned about bringing changes to personal identity, but 
also about maintaining and reinforcing the understanding of personal identity 
that has been found. This idea is based on the assumption that personal 
identity is still in a considerable part what we are or something ‘given’, as can 
be seen from Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s theory. This is so not only in a practical 
sense, e.g., our body, but also at a conceptual level, i.e., the notion of character. 
This mode of reflexive learning is important in that it suggests that an 
individual does not merely learn for ‘adaptation’, ‘transformation’ and 
‘self-actualisation’ in respect of his or her personal identity. An individual also 
learns to discover and understand who he/she has been and is, and how 
he/she has become who he/she is in order to connect his/her ‘being’ in the 
future as a whole. Such a mode of reflexive learning, as I have suggested, is 
conducted within the dialectic framework between idem-identity and 
ipse-identity in Ricoeur’s conceptual framework of identity. 
 
This mode of reflexive learning fits nicely into two categories of learning 
summarized in the work of Jarvis et al (2003, p.72): learning that reinforces the 
status quo (e.g. ‘maintenance learning’ in Botkin et al [1979]) and learning that 
allows for change (e.g. ‘innovative learning’ in Botkin et al [1979]). 
Interestingly, Jarvis’ notion of ‘reflective learning’ is included in both groups, 
because for Jarvis, ‘reflective learning does not automatically result in change’ 
(ibid., p.73). According to Jarvis, reflective learning is ‘the process of being 
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critical. This can mean thinking about the situation (and/or what is presented) 
and then deciding to accept or seek to change the situation. It can also involve 
accepting or seeking to change the information which has been presented’ (ibid., 
p.68, emph. added). Following this definition, our new mode of reflexive 
learning that is relevant to identity echoes Jarvis’ theory of reflective learning, 
because our first mode of reflexive learning can be seen as a process of 
thinking about and reflection on what is and has been presented about our 
personal identity, and then deciding to accept, maintain or seek to change our 
identity.   
 
Jarvis’ notion of reflective learning can be seen further as a type of ‘experiential 
learning in everyday life’, and this confers a lifelong element to this first kind of 
reflexive learning. 
  
‘Everyday life takes place in, and relates to, people’s social contexts. 
In the process of experiencing in all its modes, people learn – 
sometimes deliberately but often incidentally. Experiential learning 
in everyday life is synonymous with conscious living when we treat 
experience as a lifelong phenomenon’ (ibid., p.66).  
 
Experiential learning may be further supported by the following argument: 
‘…while many capabilities are developed in the crucible of experience, it is 
only with the ability to express understanding that we can call something 
learning’ (Polanyi 1967 quoted by Edwards et al. 2002, p.532, emph. added). 
This suggests the development of understanding plays a fundamental role in 
experiential learning as lifelong learning. 
  
6.8.3 Reflexive learning in the dialectic between oneself and others 
The second mode of reflexive learning that is relevant to personal identity 
entails ‘learning as responding’ emerging from intersubjective relationship in 
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the human world (Biesta 2006b, p.27). If personal identity is the ‘being’ as 
‘presence’ of self-constancy as Ricoeur shows, then the notion of personal 
identity inherently entails the imputations from others, or we may say the self is 
also constituted by other than self. The self in this sense can be understood as 
oneself as another. Focusing on an individual’s presence as ‘uniqueness’, and 
‘singularity’, Biesta takes a parallel view of personal identity as ‘being’ about a 
‘self’ that is preconditioned by others. As he writes, 
 
‘what makes us into a unique, singular being – me, and not you – is 
precisely to be found in the way in which we respond to the others, 
to the question of the other, to the other as question’ (Biesta 
2006b.,p.28).  
 
‘Personal identity’ in this sense is not identity as a ‘thing’, but as a ‘being’ 
existing in an intersubjective world. Biesta writes, ‘Coming into the world is 
not something that individuals can do on their own. This is first of all for the 
obvious reason that in order to come into the world one needs a world, and 
this world is a world inhabited by others who are not like us’ (ibid., p.27). This 
‘world’ can only be a social and intersubjective world. This is not least because 
the language and symbols used by individuals to have meanings are not 
his/her own possessions, but are shared by a language community (see Mead 
1934; Taylor1989, 1995b; Derrida 1998). Thus, personal identity as being, either 
as ‘being as self-constancy’, or as being ‘coming into world’, is ‘about 
responding to and therefore also being responsible for what and who is other’ 
(Biesta 2006, p. 28).  
 
‘Learning as responding’ in the face of ‘what and who is other and different’ in 
a large part is a kind of reflexive learning conducted in Ricoeur’s dialectic 
framework between oneself and otherness. When we stop to think and reflect 
on how to respond to others and the differences, ‘learning as responding’ 
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occurs. This comes about, because, as I have suggested in chapter 3, our 
responses to others contain both our ‘responsibility’ to others that they impute 
on us and our ‘sympathy’ derived from ‘oneself as another’, i.e., our evoked 
feeling that others need our responding without which they might suffer. It is 
in this double sense that learning as responding is a mode of reflexive learning.  
 
Learning that is relevant to identity as responding to what and who is other and 
different is to learn how to come into the world as a unique being with 
constancy that others can count on. This kind of learning is fundamentally 
learning concerning ‘responsibility’ and ‘sympathy’ towards others. Such a 
mode of reflexive learning requires constancy and permanence in time, and hence 
is a kind of lifelong learning. From here, we can see self-constancy is not 
supported by the sameness, but by the responsibility and sympathy as a unique 
‘being’ initiated by a ‘self’ through its self-persistence over time. This is in 
sharp contrast with the idea of identity as being ‘flexible’, which does not 
recognise the importance of self-constancy in terms of responsibility to others 
and the needs of others.  
 
6.8.4 Reflexive learning in the dialectic between sameness and others  
The third mode of reflexive leaning is a mode of learning that has emerged 
from the reflexivity in the dialectic of the sameness (of a person) and others. It 
is the ipse that mediates in this dialectic relationship. On the one hand, one 
may just maintain one’s character without caring too much of others, e.g., out 
of respect for one’s belief, one may not change their character underpinned by 
this belief in one’s response to the needs from others. On the other hand, one 
may learn to change one’s character for the sake of others, e.g., in the light of 
certain responsibilities to and sympathy with others, one learns to change 
one’s belief or give up his/her own habits. The third mode of learning can be 
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seen as a reflexive process of the self that mediates between the sameness of 
oneself and the care about others, so it is a mode of reflexive learning. The 
tension between the sameness of (a person) and others exists throughout one’s 
life; hence this reflexive learning that emerges from this dialectic relationship is 
a kind of lifelong learning. 
 
6.8.5 Reflexive learning in moral frameworks 
The fourth mode of reflexive learning is a mode of learning through reflexivity 
as a kind of self-evaluation. Following Taylor’s identity theory, a new mode of 
reflexive learning as articulation about one’s personal identity can be 
conducted within one moral framework or between different moral 
frameworks. I suggest this mode of learning should be called frameworks-aided 
evaluative learning. This kind of reflexive learning evokes certain analytical and 
critical capacities with which to engage with conflicts and changes between the 
self and the external world, rather than simply to revise oneself flexibly in 
order to adapt to the ongoing changing conditions of late modern settings. 
This reflexive learning aims to ‘move’ an individual towards the goods, rather 
than to be ‘driven’ by anxiety caused by the impact of social changes. This 
understanding of reflexive learning is or might be increasingly needed with 
the rise of conflicts between the self and society caused by changes and 
controversies brought by pluralism.  This is because such reflexive learning 
can make an individual take a critical look at new problems as they emerge in 
his/her lives so that he/she can decide either to maintain their original 
position or seek to change.  
 
A key part of this mode of reflexive learning is underpinned by Taylor’s notion 
of radical re-evaluation as I discussed in Section 6.7.3. This accords with what 
Edwards et al. argue in a paper on developing a theory of lifelong learning 
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based on the notion of reflexivity as ‘metacognitive analysis and change of 
schema’ (Edwards et al. 2002, p.533). As they write,  
 
‘Here consciousness transforms action because it produces reflective 
analysis of interpretative and evaluative schema routinely embodied 
in practice (Taylor 1989). This is the transformation of ‘habitus’, the 
re-formation of inherited schemata or structure of feeling, thought 
and belief through reflexivity that we view as crucial to a theory of 
lifelong learning’ (ibid., p.532).  
 
Recognizing both ‘learning as the transformation of understanding, identity 
and agency’ and ‘learning as involving a developing awareness, which results 
in a growing understanding of customary practice, leading to reflexive social 
and self-questioning and the transformation of “habitus”’, they argue, ‘It is the 
development of reflexivity, the capacity to develop critical awareness of the 
assumptions that underlie practices, especially the meta-cognitive, 
interpretative schemata that constitute worlds, which we see as central to an 
adequate theory of lifelong learning’ (ibid., p.532-533).  
 
As can be seen, these four modes of reflexive learning can be further classified 
into two dimensions of learning that is relevant to identity as I have just 
demonstrated. The first and fourth modes of reflexive learning can be 
classified into a dimension of learning as developing one’s understanding of 
oneself. The second mode of reflexive learning can be classified into the 
dimension of learning as reflecting on one’s responding to others and others’ 
responding. The third mode of reflexive learning can be seen as the learning 
spanning both dimensions of learning. 
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6.9 The need of narrative in lifelong learning in relation to personal identity   
6.9.1 The role of narrative and lifelong learning in Giddens’s analysis of 
identity 
Giddens claims that ‘[t]he reflexive project of the self, which consists in the 
sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes 
place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems’ 
(Giddens 1991, p.5). Therefore, although Giddens contends that self-identity 
has become ‘the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or 
his biography’ (ibid., p.53), he seems to emphasize that the need for narrative 
is simply because the changes of the self caused by modern institutional 
changes need to be coherently constructed with the external rapid changes in 
social circumstances. The reason to use narrative is that it has the capacity to 
construct a reasonably coherent life story against the vicissitudes of late 
modernity (see ibid., p.215). As Giddens writes, ‘[a] reflexively ordered 
narrative of self-identity provides the means of giving coherence to the finite 
lifespan, given changing external circumstances’ (ibid. emph. added). Thus, 
Giddens’s assumption of resorting to narrative in response to the problem of 
self-identity is limitedly confined to the impact of radical social/external 
changes on the self. For Giddens, the changes in the self resulted from changes 
externally imposed on the self need to be connected into a coherent life story by 
means of narrative construction.  
 
This view of Giddens can be further seen from his analysis of the two main 
characteristics of a person who loses a stable sense of self-identity. Firstly, 
Giddens suggests that a person who loses a stable sense of self-identity may 
‘lack a consistent feeling of biographical continuity’ (ibid., p.53), instead, 
‘discontinuity in temporal experience is a basic feature of such sentiment’ 
(ibid.). In this feeling, temporal experiences become discrete moments that are 
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disconnected or unrelated in such a way that ‘no continuous “narrative” can 
be sustained’ (ibid.). Giddens then claims that ‘Anxiety about obliteration, of 
being engulfed, crushed or overwhelmed by externally impinging events, is 
frequently the correlate of such feelings’ (ibid.). Secondly, Giddens writes, ‘in 
an external environment full of changes, the person is obsessively preoccupied 
with apprehension of possible risks to his or her existence, and paralysed in 
terms of practical action’ (ibid.). Anxieties can be caused by an inability to 
block off the impinging dangers. These dangers can threaten an individual’s 
sense of integrity of the self or what Giddens calls the protective cocoon of the 
self (see ibid.). In short, Giddens analyses that because modern social changes 
make such a negative impact on the self, there is a serious lack of biographical 
continuity and integrity of the self. Hence a coherent narrative constructed by 
the individual him/herself is needed in order to have a stable and integrated 
sense of self-identity.  
 
Although narrative is needed for the purpose of having a stable and coherent 
sense of self-identity in the changing circumstances, it could be argued that the 
role of narrative in Giddens’ view is too limited in virtue of narrative’s 
relationship to personal identity. This is firstly because the role of narrative in 
relation to shelf-identity in his view seems to predominately focus on 
narrative’s structural role. This is a role as constructing and reconstructing one’s 
biography/autobiography for a reasonable coherence of self-identity through 
which an individual can get a feeling that he/she is able to adapt him/herself 
flexibly to the rapid social changes. Over-stressing narrative’s structural role as 
constructing and revising self-identity might lead to a misunderstanding that 
identity is predominantly ‘constructed’ and ‘revised’. This view does not 
realize that narrative’s central role in relation to identity might largely lie in 
narrative’s interpretative role as ‘reflecting’, ‘discovering’ and ‘understanding’ 
CHAPTER 6 
 345
the meaning of one’s identity through one’s (auto)biography. Secondly, why 
should the coherence of a narrative simply be focused on being ‘reasonable’? Are 
our life stories simply constructed in virtue of reason? This view largely 
downgrades and perhaps misplaces the role of narrative in relation to human 
lives and personal identity, because the organizing principle of narrative here 
seems centrally based on rationality. My third criticism is about how one’s 
wish for having a stable sense of self-identity can be sufficiently possible, if one 
continually and routinely makes changes through narrative construction to 
his/her (auto)biography simply for the sake of social changes. The moral, 
ethical and cultural dimensions of personal identity, which can be regarded as 
sources for finding a stable sense/meaning of identity are remarkably absent 
in Giddens’s analysis of narrative. 
 
Following Giddens’s analysis, learning that is relevant to identity as (narrative) 
biography seems to be learning to develop a capacity to construct coherence and 
integrity of the self in the context of ongoing change, by means of narrative. 
Lifelong learning that is relevant to personal identity in relation to narrative 
seems to emerge from Giddens’s idea about ‘the capacity to keep a particular 
narrative going’ (ibid., p.54, emph. added). Following this understanding, 
learning to ‘keep a particular narrative going’ is learning to keep renewing 
oneself in order to adapt oneself to the rapidly changing world and ‘ward off’ 
the possible risks and this learning can only be realized by keeping revising 
one’s (narrative) biography. Therefore such learning needs to be conducted in 
continuous and lifelong ‘reflexivity’ for adaptation. It is in this sense that such 
learning is a ‘lifelong’ learning. But what kind of the lifelong learning is it? A 
lifelong learning that simply subjects one’s biography to the external changes? 
A lifelong leaning that keeps one revising one’s biography according to those 
external changes? As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, it is in fact a kind 
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of lifelong learning for the sake of adaptation to changes, which has been 
shown to be problematic in many ways. 
 
6.9.2 Alternative views of narrative in relation to identity and lifelong 
learning 
Drawing on Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories of identity, as presented in my 
previous discussion, we discover that reflexive learning as lifelong learning is 
closely linked with narrative at many levels. This is because in their theories, 
the role of narrative is multifunctional in understanding the notion of identity, 
as I have demonstrated in chapter 5. Narrative cannot be simply regarded as a 
structural role in constructing a coherent self-identity in terms of adaptation to 
social changes. Rather, taking both structural and interpretative roles, 
narrative has the capacity to facilitate different types of learning in relation to 
personal identity. I will connect different functions of narrative to those types 
of learning. I will do this by referring to the roles of learning drawn from 
Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories of identity that I have previously discussed.   
 
(1) The need of narrative in lifelong learning concerning personal 
identity at the conceptual level 
First of all, Ricoeur’s conceptual analytic framework is a scale of measuring the 
‘proportions’ of different modes of personal identity in selfhood, as I have 
demonstrated before. Because there is a dialectic relationship between idem- 
and ipse-identity within selfhood, one can measure by one’s own sense the 
proportion of the sameness of the self, the proportion of the singularity and the 
proportion of self-constancy of the personal identity. Thus, one can learn the 
degree of the stability of one’s personal identity by sensing the proportion of 
the sameness of the self, learn the degree of individuality of one’s identity by 
sensing the proportion of their ipse-identity and learn to what extent one’s 
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identity is imputed by others by sensing the proportion of self-constancy. 
 
The learning concerning the proportion of constitutions of identity can only be 
carried out through narrative, because narrative with its mediating function 
offers a good response to the problematic of personal identity at a conceptual 
level.  
 
In Ricoeur’s theory, narrative identity at a conceptual level, takes the role of the 
mediator between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood. Firstly, 
narrative as emplotment constitutes the specific model of the interconnection of 
events and this allows us to integrate the diversity, variability, discontinuity 
and instability with permanence in time. This art of composition is the 
configuration between discordance and concordance and can be termed as 
discordant concordance defined by the notion of synthesis of heterogeneous. This 
art is characteristic of all narrative composition. The dialectic between 
discordance and concordance includes the following pairs: between the 
manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story; between the disparate 
components of the action and the sequence of the story; and between pure 
succession of linear time and the unity of the temporal form. The correlation 
between narrative and identity of character for Ricoeur is that ‘characters… are 
themselves plots’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.143). Thus, through the identity of a unique 
story or a unique narrative, one can see the identity of the character, which is 
his/her narrative identity. Secondly, emplotment produces the internal dialectic 
of the character as a narrative category, which is clearly the dialectic of 
sameness and selfhood. There is a mode of dialectic internal to the character as 
a narrative category, which is the result of the dialectic of concordance and 
discordance developed by the emplotment of action. As Ricoeur writes, 
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‘…following the line of concordance, the character draws his or her 
singularity from the unity of a life considered as a temporal totality 
which is itself singular and distinguished from all others. Following 
the line of discordance, this temporal totality is threatened by the 
disruptive effect of the unforeseeable events that punctuate it (e.g. 
encounters, accidents, etc.)’ (ibid., p.147).  
 
Given the concordant-discordant synthesis of the configuration of narrative, 
‘the contingency of the event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to 
speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identity of the character. 
Thus contingency is transmuted into fate’ (ibid., p.147). Identity of the 
character in a life story can only be understood in this internal dialectic.  
 
When character as narrative identity is confronted with the search for 
permanence in time attached to the concept of personal identity, the internal 
dialectic of character (as a narrative category) needs to be inscribed in the 
interval between two poles of permanence in time i.e. between identity as 
sameness and identity as self-constancy. It is here we can see how character as 
narrative identity can mediate between these two poles of permanence in time. 
How? According to Ricoeur, narrative submits the identity of the character to 
what he calls imaginative variations. ‘…narrative does not merely tolerate these 
variations, it engenders them, seeks them out’ (ibid.,p.148). In narrative, the 
space of variation open to the dialectic relation between sameness and 
selfhood is vast. At one end, the character in the story has a definite character 
(i.e., lasting dispositions) which is identifiable and re-identifiable as the same; 
at the other end, the character in the story ceases to have a definite character, 
exposing selfhood by taking away the aid of sameness or overwhelmingly 
imposing selfhood upon lasting dispositions. In the intermediary space of 
variations where narrative occupies, the identification of the same decreases 
without disappearing entirely by varying the relation between two meanings of 
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permanence in time through thought experiments reserved in narrative, e.g., 
literature, movies and life stories of others, etc., by referring to certain moral, 
cultural and ethical dimensions as well as the social dimension. 
 
Thus, we can see how our learning that is relevant to personal identity is 
closely bound up with narrative. Firstly, through the internal dialectic of the 
identity of the character in narrative, one can learn to understand how the 
contingencies, e.g. accidents, chances and encounters, affect a personal life 
history that can be regarded both as the unity and the singularity of his/her 
personal identity. Secondly, learning about the constitution of one’s personal 
identity can be conducted through one’s imaginative variations to which the 
narrative submits the identity of the character, because imaginative variations 
can be inscribed within the dialectic of identity as sameness and of identity as 
selfhood. One can even further learn to balance the proportion of two modes of 
identity by adjusting the imaginative variations offered by narrative. 
 
Secondly, as I analysed before, Ricoeur’s theory of character suggests that 
developing and innovating one’s character could be based on one’s work on 
sedimentation and internalisation, that is, based on one’s identification and 
understanding of existing habits and acquired identification for a sense of 
integrity of personal identity. As Ricoeur explains, ‘…character has a history 
which it has contracted’ (Ricoeur 1992., p.122). Similarly, Taylor contends that 
‘In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we 
have become and of where we are going’ (Taylor 1989, p.47). From this, 
learning to identify and understand the character that one has already 
possessed is significant not least because it makes it possible to construct one’s 
personal identity coherently. Such kind of learning can be facilitated by 
narrative, because the temporality inherent in personal identity can only be 
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presented through an unfolding story. As Ricoeur claims, ‘What sedimentation 
has contracted, narration can redeploy’ (Ricoeur 1992, p.122).  
 
(2) The need of narrative in lifelong learning concerning personal 
identity on practical level 
In relation to personal identity on a practical level, narrative takes a 
multifunctional role. As I have shown in my previous chapters, in Ricoeur’ s 
theory, narrative takes on such roles as ‘imitation’, ‘reflection’ ‘interpretation’, 
‘revelation’ and ‘transformation’ of life and personal identity. In Taylor’s 
theory, narrative takes on roles as ‘articulation’, ‘examination’ ‘interpretation’, 
‘meaning making’ and ‘argumentation’ of /for life and identity. But to focus 
on the relation between learning and identity, I will examine the functions of 
narrative within the role of learning derived from Ricoeur and Taylor’s 
identity theories. Narrative plays essential roles in the following dimensions of 
learning in respect of personal identity. 
 
(1) The role of learning lies in Taylor’s notion of articulation about moral 
assumptions upon which one’s personal identity as a moral identity is based. 
The role of such leaning can be facilitated by narrative. By trying to articulate 
certain moral framework(s), one is learning in the sense that one is reflecting, 
evaluating and interpreting oneself by and within certain moral framework(s). 
Learning as articulating according to Taylor relies on narrative. This is because, 
first of all, what is articulated is one’s moral space, and one’s place in ‘moral 
space’ vis-à-vis strongly valued good over time can only be understood 
through ‘an unfolding story’ (Taylor 1989, p.47). Therefore, narrative acts as a 
necessary condition for a better understanding of one’s moral identity. Second, 
articulating moral assumptions about personal identity is a kind of 
self-interpretation. Self-interpretation requires language; the language used in 
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narrative contains the language of ‘strong evaluations’ that are shaped by 
certain culture and norms. Thus, narrative is a strong tool for articulation of 
moral identity. Third, language empowers individuals to move towards 
strongly valued good. As Taylor says, ‘[w]ords may have power because they 
tap a source hitherto unknown or unfelt…or they may restore the power of an 
older source that we have lost contact with…Or they may have power in 
another way, by articulating our feelings or our story so as to bring us in 
contact with a source we have been longing for’ (ibid., p.97). Narrative as 
articulation in this sense empowers people to have a better understanding of 
themselves. Hence, learning as articulation needs narrative. 
  
(2) Learning as developing of our self-understanding and meaning of our life can be 
facilitated by narrative’s capacity for meaning making. In Taylor’s view, in the 
age of pluralism, a modern person may not only discover the moral frameworks 
about his/her personal identity, but also invent a unique combination of 
different frameworks through narrative. However, not all modern persons can 
discover, identify and recognize a believable framework. Taylor suggests, ‘This 
might happen through personal inadequacy, but failure might also come from 
there being no ultimately believable framework’ (ibid., p.17). Thus, some 
modern people might be engaged in a quest for sense. Taylor asserts, ‘[w]e 
find the sense of life through articulating it. And moderns have become 
acutely aware of how much sense being there for us depends on our own 
powers of expression. Discovering here depends on, is interwoven with, 
inventing’ (ibid., p18, emph. added). He then concludes, ‘[M]ore and more, we 
moderns attain meaning in the first sense, when we do, though creating it in 
the second sense’ (ibid.) Thus, the meaning of one’s life and of one’s personal 
identity in the age of pluralism can be learned by developing a capacity to invent 
the meaning of life and construct personal identity by combining the plural moral 
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assumptions in a unique way, by using the power of expression.  
 
If we see this act of combing as a capacity to produce learning in respect of the 
meaning of personal identity, then narrative takes a pivotal role in this 
capacity. This is because narrative as an unfolding life story is a privileged 
form of self-interpretations with which to arrange and organize different 
goods over one’s lifetime. If we accept Taylor’s claim that ‘[o]ur formulation 
about ourselves can alter what they are about’ (Taylor 1985a, p.101;1985b, 
p.26-7) and consider that a ‘power of expression’ should be developed in order 
to acquire a better or different sense of our identity, it is again only through the 
process of formulating a new narrative about ourselves that we can learn to 
improve our power of expression. Through the reconfiguration of narrative by 
using new and adequate expressions of feelings through refined 
languages/vocabularies of strong evaluations, we can then gain a new 
self-understanding of ourselves. 
 
(3) Learning about the meaning of one’s identity through conducting 
arguments between different moral and cultural assumptions could also be 
seen as a learning process that is relevant to personal identity in our age. For 
Taylor, narrative is not merely about story ‘telling’, it is also about ‘showing’ 
the transition from one moral ‘position’ to another one through argument. He 
suggests this mode of argument is a process of practical reasoning (see Taylor 
1995a). One is confident that position Y is superior to his/her former position 
X by comparing both self-interpretations, because he/she knows that he/she 
passed from one to the other via an ‘error-reducing move’. This ‘move’ can be 
gained through, for example, identification of contradiction, clarification of a 
confusion and realizing a neglected belief which is significant to him/her. Once 
position Y is accepted, it brings about a self-justifying transition. For Taylor, 
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this ‘error-reducing move’ is an epistemic gain (Taylor 1995a, p.225), a 
biographical transition. The argumentative dimension of narrative can also be 
seen as comparison between one’s self-interpretation and other interlocutors’ 
interpretations. This kind of learning, which is accomplished by way of 
argument and comparison through narrative, can be categorized into what I 
call ‘framework-aided evaluative learning’. 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this final chapter, I have given a brief exploration of the 
emergence of lifelong learning with a particular focus on how it is related to 
questions about personal identity. Against this background, I wish to draw on 
what I have discussed in earlier sections of this work, to present six concluding 
remarks: 
 
1. I have shown that implications for lifelong learning, drawn from a 
normative reading of Giddens’s sociological analyses of modernity and 
identity, display a certain degree of conceptual limitation and represent a 
moral and ethical deficit. I have also conducted a deep analysis of Giddens’s 
view of self-identity. His approach to identity is predominantly based on the 
interplay between the self with an active agency and the society, for adaptation 
to external social changes and for attaining the goal of self-actualisation. 
Although we do identify a personal singularity resulting from the achievement 
of the self as a reflexive project, we can hardly find two modes of permanence 
in time attached to the concept of identity, i.e. the identity as sameness and 
identity as self-constancy. Rather, we only see an identity of a self with an active 
agency that continually works and reworks on itself. Giddens also exaggerates 
the impact of the institutions of modernity on the self-identity, but he 
underestimates the importance of moral, cultural and ethical factors in the 
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constitution of personal identity.  
 
2. The key implication for learning from Giddens’s analysis of self-identity is 
that learning to be an adaptable and flexible person through reflexivity in the 
social context of radical change is a necessity. This mode of reflexive learning is 
therefore learning as adapting and innovating. While such a mode of reflexive 
leaning might be necessary for personal survival and security in a changing 
environment, it is a mode of highly individualistic learning for the purpose of 
self-actualisation. Self-actualisation, which is guided only by a morality of 
‘authenticity’ or ‘true desire’ to oneself, seems to ignore external criteria for the 
construction of the self. This individualistic learning might bring an endless 
burden and fatigue to the individual over lifetime, because ‘self-actualisation’ 
seems to require the individual him/herself to take full responsibility for such 
learning. Hence such learning has forgotten to resort to democratic effort to 
resolve privatised social problems. More importantly, such a mode of reflexive 
learning corrodes some good characters formed over long-term and stable 
norms. It undermines the identity as sameness for identification and 
re-identification by oneself and others, and ruins the identity as self-constancy 
in terms of responsibility and sympathy to others over time. So, besides 
democratic deficit, there is a remarkable moral/ethic deficit in this kind of 
reflexive learning. Finally, such a kind of reflexive learning is predominantly 
based on a modern discourse of autonomous rationality that directs 
individuals towards the mere purpose of mastery and control of one’s future 
with almost no tolerance towards contingencies that naturally impact on 
human life.  
 
What emerges from earlier discussions is that such a mode of reflexive 
learning can be seen as a kind of ‘lifelong’ learning simply because it is a 
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learning for the sake of continual and routine adaptation to endless, rapid and 
uncertain social changes. Lifelong learning that is relevant to identity seems to 
become learning to be a flexible person in order to respond to those changes. 
This, as I have argued, might bring above-mentioned moral/ethical issues. The 
issues of lifelong learning that can be inferred from normative reading of 
Giddens’s analysis suggests that there is a need to develop different views of 
lifelong learning which is relevant to identity, particularly on moral, ethical 
and cultural levels, since all these aspects form a significant part of learning 
about one’s life and identity.  
 
3. Although a normative reading of Giddens’s analysis of the notion of 
reflexivity in relation to identity in the field of lifelong learning is problematic, 
my view does not represent an absolute denial of the ‘worth’ of reflexivity. 
Rather, I think that learning which is relevant to ‘who we are’ inescapably 
relies on the notion of reflexivity first and foremost because the object of that 
learning is ‘oneself’, a person himself or herself. The fact that reflexivity is 
essential to such kind of learning is particularly the case when we try to learn 
about the meaning of our lives, about the continuity and constancy of the 
nature and kind of our existence in our world, and about our responsibility to 
others. All these are aspects of the learning that are relevant to personal 
identity. Nevertheless, I have particularly become aware that certain types of 
reflexivity bring about certain types of lifelong learning. In other words, 
reflexive learning needs to be conducted within proper frameworks if we hope 
to draw out proper views of lifelong learning. It is therefore important to find a 
different understanding of the notion of personal identity with different views 
of reflexivity, and investigate different roles of learning in those views, with 
particular attention to aspects of lifelong learning. 
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4. I have shown how personal identity and reflexivity can be understood 
differently. I have based these views on Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s theories of 
identity that I reconstructed in chapter 3 and chapter 4. I approached the 
notion of personal identity through an analysis of the nature of the concept of 
personal identity and by arguing for the need of personal identity for the 
person. I defined the notion of personal identity on a conceptual level by 
following Ricoeur’s conceptual analysis of personal identity. His analysis 
distinguishes between idem-identity and ipse-identity in his response to the 
paradoxes of the concept of personal identity in the history of Western 
philosophy. This analysis suggests that personal identity can be seen both as 
an ‘entity’, a ‘thing’, and as a ‘being’, the ‘existence of a person in the world’, a 
mode of being of Dasein.  
 
Firstly, personal identity belongs to the category of a ‘thing’ in the sense that it 
denotes sameness of the person, which can be identified and re-identified by 
oneself and others.  
 
Secondly, personal identity belongs to the category of ‘being’ because it is 
about the presence of our unique being over time at moral and ethical levels in 
the human world. In a moral sense, one is concerned with and needs to find 
and/or discover the ‘meaning’ of life in a ‘moral space’. Having and 
maintaining such a meaning allows us to define in our life what is important 
and what is not. Thus, this meaning of life decides the mode of life we want to 
live and kind of person we want to be in a human world, hence our identity. 
Without such meaning, we would feel disoriented in our life. By articulating 
such meaning, we could be empowered to live up to the goods we strongly 
value. Personal identity thus is a mode of ‘moral being’ that we concern 
ourselves with, which exists in the ‘moral space’ of the human world. 
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Identification and understanding of such a ‘moral being’ as same character of a 
person can be better gained through a history of a self that moves vis-à-vis 
one’s strongly valued good in the ‘moral space’.  
 
In an ethical sense, personal identity is also about a mode of ‘ethical being’, 
because such a kind of being presents itself in the way he/she responds to 
others, and finds in the way others respond to him/her in the intersubjective 
world. For example, in the act of keeping one’s word to others, one can find a 
self that is accountable for this act to others and others can recognize an 
individual identity that they can count on. Identity as ‘being’ on an ethical 
level could be expressed in ‘self-constancy’, a persistence that the self exerts 
over itself through time. Self-constancy is important in terms of the need for 
personal identity, because it is concerned with the notion of ‘personhood’ in 
intersubjective relationship, that is, the quality or condition of being a person 
in relation to others on a metaphysical level, not simply the concept of a person 
without the elements of ‘others’ and/or a ‘person’ in a purely biological sense. 
I have come to regard all these understandings about the notion of personal 
identity as the theoretical rationale of this thesis. 
 
5. What Ricoeur and Taylor’s theories imply are four modes of reflexive 
learning as lifelong learning. I conclude that firstly, lifelong learning 
concerning identity is not merely for self-actualisation, but it also reinforces 
understanding about ourselves and maintaining who we are. Secondly, there is 
also a mode of learning as responding, aiming at living in harmony with what 
and who is other and different. Thirdly, in the dialectic of sameness and others, 
lifelong learning that is relevant to identity is both about developing one’s 
self-understanding and about learning to respond to others. Fourthly, there is 
also a mode of lifelong learning aiming to articulate and evaluate oneself 
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within and between certain moral and cultural frameworks that encapsulate 
the meaning of life, in order to direct oneself towards one’s strongly valued 
good, hence towards a clear and/or new sense of oneself.  
 
6. The role of narrative in understanding the notion of identity is multiple and 
complex, but can be generally classified into a category of structural roles and 
a category of interpretative roles, which I have discussed in chapter 5. 
However, simply focusing on either a structural analysis or an interpretative 
analysis of narrative in understanding identity might lead to an insufficient 
understanding of identity. In Giddens’s analyses, social changes cause the 
changes in the self. Hence, in order to understand one’s self-identity, one 
needs to resort to narrative in order to organize the ‘vicissitudes’ between the 
self and social changes into a coherent unity.  For Giddens, this is because 
narrative has the capacity to construct all these changes reasonably and 
coherently together. Lifelong learning implied in ‘keeping a particular 
narrative going’ is to serve the purpose of continually making oneself adaptable 
and flexible in a constantly and radically changing world. However, the role of 
narrative here is mainly confined to structural category in that Giddens’s 
analysis focuses on narrative’s capacity for constructing and reconstructing a 
life story by incorporating uncertainties of personal lives into a reasonably 
coherent unity. This largely excludes the interpretative roles of narrative in 
understanding identity. The language of modernity significantly marginalizes 
the moral, ethical, spiritual, cultural and historical languages and meanings 
inherent in narrative. This further restricts the roles of learning that is relevant 
to identity by way of narrative.  
 
However, according to what I have argued for the views of identity and the 
roles of narrative in understanding identity based on Ricoeur’s and Taylor’s 
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work, the scope of learning concerning identity is vast and such kinds of 
learning can be largely facilitated by narrative. Clearly, the first mode of 
reflexive learning that mediated between idem-identity and ipse-identity can be 
carried out through one’s reflection on one’s narrative of one’s life. Although, 
the second mode of reflexive learning implied in the dialectic between oneself 
and others might be beyond the domain of narrative and might enter into the 
domain of ethics, the third mode of reflexive learning, i.e. learning that 
emerges from the dialectic between sameness and others, can be partly 
conducted through one’s narrative of his/her life. The fourth mode of reflexive 
learning emerging from articulation of one’s moral assumptions/frameworks 
by the language of strong evaluations largely relies on one’s narrative of one’s 
life in relation to one’s strongly valued good(s). 
 
6. 11 Final reflections 
Finally, I wish to make some reflections on my reconstruction of the notion of 
personal identity and the roles of learning I uncovered in this thesis. Firstly, 
the notion of identity is a complex concept that can be examined through so 
many different approaches. As a concept, its constitution contains different 
dialectic relations and needs to be approached and understood on different 
conceptual dimensions.  
 
Secondly, one’s reflexivity in relation to one’s identity conducted within 
certain frameworks can facilitate learning concerning questions about ‘what and 
who am I?’. Without being conscious of certain frameworks, it is hard to say 
that any ‘reflexive learning’ which is relevant to identity really occurs. It is 
exactly through the conceptual framework of personal identity developed from 
Ricoeur’s theory that the reflexivity in different dialectical dimensions of the 
concept of identity is conducted. In the same way, moral/ethical 
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understanding of identity is guided by one’s reflexivity in and within certain 
moral /ethical framework(s) of identity.  
 
Thirdly, it should be noticed that the reflexivity that emerges from the two 
types of frameworks I argued for is not based on radical individualism driven 
by self-actualisation/self-realization or guided by internal criteria, e.g. 
authenticity. Rather the new mode of reflexivity is based on an intersubjective 
understanding of oneself. This mode of reflexivity is not only conducted in our 
dialogues with (significant) others from whom we internalise our moral 
sources, but also conducted in conversations with others who need us. 
Consequently, the new views of reflexive learning as lifelong learning suggests 
that learning that is relevant to personal identity is not merely a kind of 
learning for oneself as ‘individualistic’ learning, but more importantly, it is also 
a kind of learning concerning morality and ethics in relation to ‘others’, which 
is a mode of learning with and for others, conducted within intersubjective 
relations in human world. 
 
Fourthly, in my view, investigating different views about reflexive learning 
that is relevant to personal identity as lifelong learning can be seen as an 
attempt to give a broader meaning to the notion of personal development in the 
field of lifelong learning which is dominated by the language of economic 
competition and individual employability that is underpinned by the current 
ideological agenda. I have shown that the approach to the notion of identity at 
least should not be dominated by sociological analysis, since the need and 
significance of personal identity is largely based on a person’s moral and 
ethical assumptions, and therefore must also be approached through a moral 
and/or ethical analysis. The theories and practices of lifelong learning relevant 
to personal identity as personal development therefore must not neglect the 
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truth that a living ‘person’ over their lifespan is not only a social being, but also 
a political, cultural, moral, spiritual and ethical being in the human world. 
 
I should state that there might be some limitations and weakness in this 
research. To clarify any possible weaknesses is of great importance to further 
research in this area. Firstly, although one of my research aims is to clarify the 
complexity of the notion of identity, my approach to this notion is mainly 
philosophical. This approach is particularly based on certain Hermeneutic 
approaches to the notion of identity implied in two philosophers’ theories.  
This research is just one endeavour to show how identity can be understood 
differently through certain conceptual and moral/ethical perspectives. 
 
Secondly, because my approach to identity is defined in terms of its conceptual 
nature and significance to the person on a conceptual level, the definition of 
identity in this thesis mainly displays conceptual constitutions and 
moral/ethical dimensions of identity. Consequently, some other equally 
important dimensions of identity are not given sufficient discussions. For 
example, I did not discuss the specific categories of identity, e.g., gender 
identity, social identity, national identity, community identity, etcetera. In 
terms of the significance of identity, I did not give an adequate discussion 
about the dimension of body as the symbol of one’s personal identity. Hence 
researches in other areas would be differently nuanced and emphasize 
different aspects of identity and raise different questions and problems. 
 
Thirdly, because the theoretical rationale of my definition of identity is 
necessarily limited, the role of learning drawn from this theoretical 
understanding of identity is therefore a mode of learning that is applicable 
mainly to conceptual, moral and ethical domains of person identity. Learning 
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in terms of acquiring specific skills, information and knowledge in relation to 
one’s identity and how these modes of learning have impact on one’s identity 
are not discussed in this thesis. Given that learning as an acquisition of 
different domains of skills and knowledge might affect one’s sense of self, the 
relation between such modes of learning and identity could be an avenue of 
further research. 
  
Despite of these limitations, the different understandings about identity that I 
argued for in this thesis could present a case for demonstrating the 
complexities of the notion of identity and how vast in scope learning 
connected with personal identity is. I hope the different views of reflexive 
learning that I drew from my argument will not only open some new 
discussions among those researching lifelong learning, but also provide some 
insights for policy makers in shaping new thinking about personal 
development for individual members of current societies. I also hope that this 
study is not only of help to lifelong learners in their reflections about their 
identities, but also helpful for lifelong educators who wish to guide learners to 
explore the question of ‘who am I’ for various reasons.  
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